Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics)
Target Company: Netflix, Inc.
Date: 2026-05-01
No public evidence identified.
Netflix, Inc. is a subscription-based streaming media and content production company. Its core commercial activity — streaming platform access, original content licensing, and consumer entertainment software infrastructure — has no documented nexus to Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) contracting, IDF procurement, Israel Prison Service agreements, or Israel Border Police framework contracts.1
A review of Netflix SEC filings (Form 10-K, FY2023 and FY2024)1 contains no disclosure of any defence sector revenue, government defence contracts, or formal relationships with Israeli security bodies. Netflix’s ESG disclosures2 equally contain no reference to defence contracting activity of any kind.
Netflix does not appear in publicly accessible SIBAT (Israel Defence Export & Defence Cooperation Directorate) directories14, international defence exhibition catalogues cross-referenced against Jane’s Defence Weekly and Defence News publicly accessible coverage, or Israeli defence procurement registries. No corporate press releases from Netflix4, no Israeli government announcements, and no trade press reports document any defence cooperation, joint venture, or formal partnership agreement between Netflix and any Israeli defence entity.
Evidence gaps noted:
– The publicly accessible portion of SIBAT’s export directory does not enumerate all registered entities; restricted or classified portions could not be reviewed. No indication exists that Netflix appears in the restricted portion, but this cannot be positively confirmed.14
– Israel’s full defence tender database (Rachash) is not comprehensively accessible in English-language public records. The accessible portion contains no Netflix entries, but complete coverage cannot be guaranteed.
No public evidence identified.
Netflix produces no hardware and manufactures no physical products. Its commercial offerings are limited to: a consumer streaming platform, proprietary content delivery network software (Open Connect), and licensed original and third-party content. None of these product lines have documented ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants. Netflix’s Supplier Code of Conduct3 and 10-K filings1 contain no reference to military-specification product development.
As Netflix manufactures no physical goods, the civilian-to-military product distinction framework does not apply in any operational sense. Netflix’s Open Connect appliance programme provides CDN hardware to internet service providers for commercial network efficiency purposes; no evidence exists of military procurement of this infrastructure. The BIS export enforcement actions database12 and DDTC debarment and compliance records13 contain no entries referencing Netflix in connection with dual-use product sales to Israeli military or security end-users. European Commission dual-use export control public registers similarly contain no Netflix entries.20
Evidence gap noted: Whether any Israeli defence-affiliated ISP or network operator has received Open Connect appliances, or whether any secondary market transfer of such appliances has occurred, could not be confirmed or excluded from publicly available records alone. No evidence of such a transfer was identified.
No public evidence identified.
Netflix does not manufacture, sell, lease, or finance heavy machinery, construction equipment, vehicles, or earthmoving plant. No NGO investigation — including Who Profits5, Corporate Occupation, or the Don’t Buy Into Occupation coalition’s 2023 financiers of settlements report9 — places Netflix-branded or Netflix-supplied equipment in Israeli settlements, along the separation barrier, at military installations, or elsewhere in occupied territories. UN OCHA OPT reports18 and the UN Human Rights Council database of enterprises with activities in occupied territories (A/HRC/43/71)8 contain no entries referencing Netflix in connection with construction, infrastructure, or equipment supply.
Netflix holds no documented contracts for the construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure in any publicly accessible procurement or corporate disclosure record.12 No indirect or subcontracted equipment supply relationship involving Netflix and Israeli settlement or military construction has been identified in any civil society, UN, or investigative source consulted.
No public evidence identified.
Netflix is not a manufacturer of components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services. Its supply chain consists primarily of cloud computing services (Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure), consumer electronics manufacturers within the Netflix app ecosystem, content production vendors, and telecommunications partners. No verified supply relationship exists between Netflix and Elbit Systems15, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries in any publicly accessible corporate filing, trade press record, or NGO investigation.1
Elbit Systems annual reports15, IAI public supplier disclosures, and Rafael public disclosures contain no reference to Netflix as a supplier, sub-contractor, component vendor, or technology partner. Profundo corporate supply chain research and the Who Profits database5 similarly contain no entries linking Netflix to Israeli defence prime contractors.
No joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between Netflix and any Israeli defence firm appear in any publicly accessible record reviewed for this audit.1415
No public evidence identified.
Netflix provides no catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, or physical logistics services of any kind. Its service offering is limited to digital content streaming delivered over commercial internet infrastructure. No contract between Netflix and any IDF base, military training facility, detention centre, or security installation appears in any publicly accessible procurement record, corporate filing, or investigative report.125
Netflix is not a shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling operator. Its content delivery infrastructure operates entirely via digital networks. No verified shipping or freight contract servicing Israeli defence logistics or military cargo is documented in the SIPRI arms transfers database11 or Reuters corporate archive. Geographic specificity analysis is not applicable, as no logistical service contracts to military installations have been identified.
No public evidence identified.
Netflix is not a defence prime contractor and has no documented role as a manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or any other lethal platform. The SIPRI arms transfers database11, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Defence News, and Elbit/IAI/Rafael public disclosures15 contain no entries associating Netflix with lethal systems manufacturing or sales.
Netflix has no documented role in the supply of ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to any end-user, including Israeli defence bodies.121311 Netflix has equally no documented role in the manufacture, integration, maintenance, or component supply for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence systems, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems. Rafael public disclosures, IAI annual reporting15, SIPRI databases11, and Forensic Architecture published investigations16 contain no entries referencing Netflix in connection with strategic platforms or their sub-systems.
Netflix supplies no guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, or warhead casings to any documented party.
No public evidence identified.
No government in any jurisdiction has been documented as granting, denying, suspending, or revoking an export licence for Netflix products to Israeli military or security end-users. The U.S. BIS enforcement actions database12 and DDTC debarment and compliance records13 contain no entries referencing Netflix in connection with export licensing decisions relating to Israeli defence end-users. The European Commission dual-use export control public register20 similarly contains no Netflix entries.
Netflix has not been the subject of any investigation, citation, or enforcement action related to arms embargo compliance, export control regimes, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel in any publicly accessible regulatory record.121320 No court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges have been brought against Netflix, or against any government authority regarding Netflix’s defence supply relationship with Israel, in any jurisdiction. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre company profile for Netflix10, Global Witness investigations19, Reuters legal coverage, and Financial Times corporate coverage contain no such proceedings.
No public evidence identified of any V-MIL-relevant civil society investigation, NGO report, or documented scrutiny specifically addressing Netflix’s military, security, or dual-use supply chain relationship with the Israeli state.
Netflix does not appear in the Who Profits database of companies profiting from the Israeli occupation in a military or security supply capacity.5 Netflix does not appear in the UN HRC database of enterprises with activities in occupied territories published under A/HRC/43/71.8 Netflix does not appear in the Don’t Buy Into Occupation coalition reporting on financiers of Israeli settlements.9 Netflix does not appear in AFSC Investigate database entries related to Israeli military or security procurement.6 Human Rights Watch technology and rights investigations17 and Forensic Architecture published investigations16 contain no findings referencing Netflix in a V-MIL relevant capacity.
No V-MIL-specific boycott, divestment, or exclusion campaign directly citing Netflix’s defence sector activities has been identified. The BDS Movement’s official targeted company list7 and AFSC Investigate6 do not list Netflix on grounds related to military supply, weapons manufacturing, or defence contracting. The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre Netflix company profile10 contains no documented civil society engagement on defence supply chain grounds.
Netflix’s Supplier Code of Conduct3 and ESG disclosures2 contain no defence-sector-specific provisions. No public statement, policy change, contract termination, or end-use monitoring commitment by Netflix in response to civil society pressure regarding a defence supply chain has been identified.42310
Domain-boundary note — content-related civil society activity (out of V-MIL scope): Netflix has been the subject of civil society criticism and documented pressure campaigns related to content decisions, including the removal of Palestinian-themed content in certain markets and the production or distribution of content perceived as sympathetic to Israeli military narratives. This activity has been reported in press coverage and via BDS-adjacent campaigns.7 This civil society activity relates exclusively to editorial and content licensing decisions, not to military supply chain, defence contracting, or dual-use product relationships. It falls outside the V-MIL domain boundary as defined in the audit framework and is noted here solely for completeness and domain-boundary transparency.
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001065280&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://ir.netflix.net/esg/governance/supplier-code-of-conduct/default.aspx ↩↩↩
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-of-reports ↩↩
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/companies/netflix/ ↩↩↩
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/export-enforcement ↩↩↩↩
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_debarred_list ↩↩↩↩
https://www.elbitsystems.com/investor-relations/annual-reports/ ↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.hrw.org/topic/technology-and-rights ↩
https://www.ochaopt.org/reports ↩
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/ ↩
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/ ↩↩↩
