Palantir Military Audit

Audit Phase: V-MIL
Target Company: Palantir Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ: PLTR)
Registered Jurisdiction: United States (Delaware incorporation; principal offices Denver, Colorado and New York)
Audit Evidence Base: Research memos compiled from training data through April 2026; all claims sourced to identified publications and corporate disclosures. No new research was conducted for this audit document.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Palantir Technologies is among the most extensively documented AI and data analytics companies supplying defence services globally, with a substantial and growing footprint across US, UK, NATO-allied, and Israeli government military contracts.

US Government & Military Contracts

Palantir’s 10-K filings consistently identify the US government as its largest customer, with US government revenue accounting for the majority of its government segment income ¹. Palantir holds active contracts with US Army, US Air Force, US Special Operations Command, and the US Intelligence Community. The company publicly disclosed its role as prime contractor on the Maven Smart System (MSS) programme for the US Army — a large-scale AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) analytics platform — positioning Palantir as a significant prime in the DoD’s AI modernisation effort ¹⁸. The MSS contract was expanded in 2023–2024, with the Army increasing the ceiling value of the task order, further evidencing Palantir Gotham and AIP as purpose-built, actively contracted military targeting support systems ⁵¹. Palantir’s 10-K for full-year 2024 (filed February 2025) reaffirms the centrality of US defence and intelligence community revenue to corporate growth strategy, with full-year 2024 government revenue reported at approximately $1.1 billion ¹³⁹.

Israeli Defence Forces — Emergency & Operational Contracts

Following the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023, Palantir reportedly signed an emergency contract with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) providing access to Palantir AIP and Palantir Gotham platforms for battlefield data integration and intelligence analytics ⁵²⁶. Israeli business press reported the arrangement as an accelerated agreement structured to enable rapid operational deployment; Calcalist (October 2023) and Haaretz (November 2023) each reported on the contract’s existence and its connection to active IDF intelligence operations in Gaza ⁵²⁶. The precise financial value, contract duration, and specific platform modules covered by this agreement have not been disclosed in any public record. Palantir’s SEC filings do not disaggregate Israel as a separate revenue geography; Israel-related revenue is subsumed within broader “rest of world” or “allied government” disclosures ¹⁴¹.

Haaretz reported that Palantir’s platform was providing data integration and targeting-decision support to IDF intelligence corps units involved in the Gaza campaign ⁵. +972 Magazine (2024), citing IDF and technology sources, described Palantir AIP as embedded in IDF decision-support infrastructure, with the platform characterised as supporting human-target generation workflows ⁶. Middle East Eye (2024) further reported that Palantir held contracts with components of the Israeli intelligence community beyond the IDF proper, though the precise contracting entities were not named in available public reporting ²⁰. Israeli technology press (Walla Tech, Ynet Business) reported in 2024 on the ongoing nature of Palantir’s IDF engagement and potential expansion of the platform relationship beyond the initial emergency contract ⁴⁹.

No public announcement of IDF contract termination, expiration, or non-renewal has been identified as of the training data cutoff (April 2026). Palantir’s Q3 2024, Q4 2024, and Q1 2025 earnings calls each reported continued or record government revenue growth with no disclosure of IDF contract modification or suspension ³²³⁹⁴⁰. The IDF contract relationship is characterised as ongoing / not publicly discontinued as of April 2026.

Israeli Corporate Subsidiary

Palantir operates a registered subsidiary — Palantir Technologies Israel Ltd — listed in the Israeli Companies Registrar ⁵⁸. This entity is a wholly owned subsidiary (not an independent licensee or franchisee) providing the corporate vehicle through which Palantir conducts its Israeli government and commercial operations, including the IDF contract relationship, under central group direction. Acts of the Israeli subsidiary are attributable to the Palantir group ⁵⁸.

UK Ministry of Defence

Palantir holds a contract with the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) for data analytics services, documented in the UK Government Contract Finder system. The MoD relationship was confirmed through 2024–2025 contract announcements, with Palantir providing AI-enabled data analytics services under the UK’s Defence AI Strategy ⁵⁷. OpenDemocracy (2024) reported on the dual-use concerns arising from Palantir’s concurrent UK NHS data contracts and MoD engagement, noting that the same underlying platform architecture serves both civilian health analytics and military intelligence functions in the UK context ³³.

NATO Integration

Palantir has been engaged in NATO AI interoperability programmes, including work with Allied Command Transformation on AI-enabled ISR and targeting standards ⁵⁹. This NATO engagement further documents Palantir’s positioning as a core military AI infrastructure provider to allied defence communities, within which Israel maintains significant defence cooperation relationships.

Executive Acknowledgment of Active Defence Relationships

Palantir CEO Alex Karp publicly stated in 2024 that the company was “proud” to be supporting Israel’s military operations and that Palantir’s tools were being deployed in the conflict ²¹²². These statements — made in media interviews and in the 2024 shareholder letter — constitute direct executive acknowledgment of an active defence supply relationship with the IDF. Karp’s shareholder letter explicitly framed Palantir’s defence mission as central to company identity, referencing support for “democratic allied militaries” in language widely understood to encompass Israel, and stated that Palantir was “built for this moment” in reference to great power conflict and democratic defence, explicitly rejecting calls for the company to withdraw from defence contracting ¹. At AIPCon 4 (April 2024), Karp publicly demonstrated Palantir AIP targeting capabilities and stated that critics of Palantir’s weapons work were “living in a liberal fantasy” ⁴⁸⁴¹.

Palantir President and co-founder Stephen Cohen made public statements in 2023–2024 supporting Palantir’s defence mission and IDF engagement, consistent with Karp’s public posture ⁵⁵.

Defence Trade Exhibitions

Palantir exhibited at DSEI 2023 (London) and Eurosatory, marketing Palantir AIP for Defence and Palantir Gotham to NATO and allied defence ministries ³⁴. Israeli defence procurement delegations are routine attendees at both exhibitions. Israel Defence magazine (2023) reported Palantir’s participation in Israeli defence-sector engagement contexts, including forums associated with SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) ²⁹. No formal listing of Palantir in a SIBAT export directory has been independently verified from primary source documentary evidence; Palantir is a US-headquartered firm exporting to Israel rather than an Israeli defence exporter.

Defence-Specific Press Releases

Palantir issued a formal press release in April 2023 announcing Palantir AIP for Defence, explicitly describing applications in targeting support, logistics, and intelligence analysis ¹⁹. Breaking Defense (2023) covered a Palantir AIP military demonstration using live wargame scenarios to illustrate course-of-action generation and targeting decision support for military customers ²⁸.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Core Military Platform Suite

Palantir’s government-facing product portfolio comprises three principal platforms relevant to this audit:

• Palantir Gotham: Originally developed for the US intelligence community; now marketed as a military intelligence, targeting analytics, and ISR fusion platform. Deployed in classified and unclassified government environments; not commercially available ². Gotham is designed for entity resolution, pattern-of-life analysis, and multi-source intelligence fusion at scale.
• Palantir AIP (Artificial Intelligence Platform) for Defence: Launched April 2023; integrates large language models (LLMs) into military decision support, including course-of-action generation, target pattern-of-life analysis, logistics optimisation, and ISR task management ³¹⁹. The defence variant includes targeting decision support capabilities absent from the commercial version. AIPCon 4 (April 2024) included live demonstrations of Palantir AIP in targeting and course-of-action decision support scenarios, with explicit marketing to allied government defence customers, occurring after the October 2023 IDF emergency contract was in place ⁴¹⁴⁸.
• Palantir MetaConstellation: Integrates satellite imagery, sensor fusion, and battlefield situational awareness data, marketed to defence customers for space-domain and multi-domain operational awareness ²⁷.

These platforms are purpose-built for government and defence use. Palantir formally segments its business into Government and Commercial divisions in SEC filings, with defence customers placed under the government segment ¹.

Civilian-to-Military Distinction

Palantir Foundry (commercial/enterprise product) and Palantir Gotham/AIP for Defence constitute distinct product lines. Gotham is not commercially available; it is sold exclusively to government and defence customers under controlled conditions ²³. The defence variant of AIP includes targeting decision support capabilities not present in the commercial Foundry/AIP stack. No public evidence has been identified of standard commercial Foundry product being independently adapted or resold to Israeli security forces outside of Palantir’s formal government contracting channel.

UK Dual-Use Context

OpenDemocracy (2024) identified a structural dual-use concern in the UK context: the same Palantir platform architecture and the same corporate entity hold concurrent contracts for NHS health data analytics and UK MoD military intelligence, raising questions about platform boundary management and data governance in a dual-use operating environment ³³. This is not a documented violation but a structural dual-use exposure noted by civil society.

Export Control Classification

Palantir’s software platforms with military applications are subject to US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Software platforms of this type are typically controlled under ECCN 4E001 or related categories. No public evidence has been identified of a specific export licence application, end-user certificate, or BIS licensing decision related to Palantir’s software exports to Israeli defence end-users. Such licences, where they exist, may be classified or exempt from public disclosure.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified.

Palantir is a software and data analytics company. It does not manufacture or supply physical machinery, construction equipment, vehicles, armoured engineering vehicles, or hardware of the type deployed in settlement construction, separation barrier construction, checkpoint infrastructure, or demolition activity in occupied territories.

Source classes checked: Who Profits construction and infrastructure database ¹⁰; Corporate Occupation database ²⁴; UN OHCHR reports on business and human rights in occupied Palestinian territories; NGO fieldwork reports. None identify Palantir involvement in physical construction or infrastructure supply chains relevant to occupied territory operations. This finding correctly reflects Palantir’s software-only product profile.

UN OHCHR Settlement Database

Palantir Technologies Inc. is not listed in the UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in settlement activity (Res. 31/36 / 53/25) in any publicly documented iteration through 2023 ³⁶. The database primarily covers companies involved in physical settlement infrastructure — construction, banking, real estate, tourism, utility supply, and equipment provision directly servicing settlements. Palantir’s software-only product profile does not map onto the primary settlement-infrastructure categories that populate the OHCHR database. No credible public source has asserted that Palantir appears in the OHCHR settlement database. Source classes checked: OHCHR official communications, NGO commentary on database composition, PAX and Who Profits cross-reference databases.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Relationship to Israeli Defence Manufacturers

No public evidence has been identified of Palantir serving as a direct component supplier to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries/IMI in the sense of providing hardware sub-systems, electronic assemblies, or physical components ³¹.

Defence News (2024) reported on intersecting capability domains between Palantir and Israeli defence primes — specifically AI-enabled targeting and sensor fusion — and defence trade press has noted that Palantir and Elbit Systems operated in overlapping domains at DSEI 2023 and Eurosatory ²⁷³⁴. However, no formal supply contract, sub-system delivery agreement, co-production arrangement, or technology transfer licence between Palantir and any Israeli defence prime has been publicly documented.

PAX — “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” (June 2024)

The PAX June 2024 report covers companies providing equipment, technology, and services directly supporting IDF military operations and their financial investors. Palantir is not listed in the primary “Companies Arming Israel” tier of the PAX report as a direct arms or equipment supplier — consistent with its software-only profile and PAX’s methodology, which focuses on hardware and munitions supply chains ³⁷. Palantir appears in adjacent civil society research as a tech-enablement company rather than an arms company under PAX’s typology.

Software Integration Layer

Palantir’s potential integration with Israeli defence primes, if it exists, would operate at the software and AI layer — data integration APIs, AI model hosting, analytics pipelines — rather than in physical component categories. Elbit Systems’ SEC filings (Form 20-F) do not identify Palantir as a named software supplier or partner in any publicly available annual report ³¹.

Joint Development & Co-Production

No public evidence has been identified of a formal joint development programme, technology transfer arrangement, or licensed manufacturing agreement between Palantir and any Israeli defence prime. Source classes checked: Elbit Systems SEC filings ³¹; IAI press releases; Rafael corporate announcements; Israeli Ministry of Economy export approvals.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified.

Palantir does not provide catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, or other logistical sustainment services to military installations. Its government service contracts are for software platform licences and associated data engineering and implementation services.

Palantir does deploy embedded engineers (forward-deployed implementation personnel) to some military customers to support platform operationalisation, a practice documented in US Army contexts in connection with the Maven Smart System programme ¹⁸⁵¹. Whether Palantir has deployed forward-deployed engineers to IDF or Israeli intelligence community facilities is not publicly documented; this constitutes an evidence gap.

No public evidence has been identified of Palantir service contracts geographically specified to West Bank installations, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Negev military facilities. The October 2023 IDF emergency contract does not have a publicly disclosed installation-level geographic scope ⁵²⁶.

No evidence identified of Palantir involvement in shipping, freight, or port services. Source classes checked: Israeli port authority records; US Maritime Administration filings. Not applicable to Palantir’s product category.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal Systems Manufacturing

No public evidence identified. Palantir is not a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of lethal platforms: small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or airframes. It is a software and AI analytics company with no hardware manufacturing capability in this domain.

Munitions & Precursor Materials

No public evidence identified. Palantir does not manufacture, supply, or distribute ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, or munitions precursor materials.

Strategic & Existential Defence Systems

No public evidence identified of Palantir involvement in the manufacture, integration, or maintenance of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence components, or fighter aircraft sub-systems for Israeli programmes. Source classes checked: Rafael Systems press releases; IAI corporate announcements; US DSCA notifications.

Targeting & Decision-Support Software — Critical Boundary Analysis

This sub-category warrants specific attention under this audit’s domain boundary instruction, which treats software whose designed output produces a targeting decision as falling within this section’s scope.

Palantir’s AIP for Defence and Palantir Gotham platforms have been reported across multiple independent sources as supporting:

• Target generation and pattern-of-life analysis for IDF operations in Gaza ⁵⁶¹⁶.
• Course-of-action decision support in kinetic military planning contexts, including wargame demonstrations explicitly marketing this capability ³¹⁹²⁸.
• Human-target identification pipeline support, as described by +972 Magazine (2024) citing IDF and technology sources ⁶.
• AIPCon 4 live demonstrations (April 2024) of targeting and course-of-action decision support scenarios, with explicit marketing to allied government defence customers, constituting public corporate acknowledgment of targeting decision-support as a marketed product capability occurring after the October 2023 IDF emergency contract was in place ⁴¹⁴⁸.

Al Jazeera’s Investigative Unit (2024) examined Palantir’s AI tools specifically in the context of IDF operations in Gaza, citing current and former Palantir employees ⁹. The Electronic Intifada (2024) reported on Palantir’s tools in the context of AI-enabled mass targeting, drawing comparisons to the IDF’s internally developed “Gospel” and “Lavender” AI targeting systems and characterising Palantir’s platform as functionally integrated into the same targeting infrastructure ¹⁶. NBC News (2024) similarly reported worker accounts describing Palantir AIP as embedded in IDF targeting workflows ¹⁷.

Human Rights Watch (2024) published a report on AI in the kill chain that references Palantir’s role in targeting decision support for military customers and raises concerns about accountability gaps in AI-assisted targeting where human oversight may be insufficient to satisfy international humanitarian law standards ¹³.

Al-Haq (July 2024) references Palantir in the context of AI and surveillance technology enabling IDF targeting operations, situating it within a category of technology companies whose products facilitate what the report characterises as unlawful targeting and mass civilian harm ³⁸. The report addresses the digital supply chain enabling military operations rather than physical presence in occupied territories.

The precise technical architecture of Palantir’s integration into IDF targeting workflows is not publicly disclosed. Whether Palantir AIP functions as a direct targeting output system or as a broader intelligence analytics layer from which human operators derive targeting decisions remains unresolved in public reporting and constitutes a substantive evidence gap. The company has not issued a technical disclosure clarifying this distinction in the IDF operational context. What is documented across multiple independent sources ^56916171338 is that Palantir’s platforms were operationally deployed within IDF targeting and intelligence infrastructure during the Gaza campaign.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export Licence Decisions

No public evidence has been identified of a specific US government export licence decision — grant, denial, suspension, or revocation — related to Palantir’s software exports to Israeli military or security end-users. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) does not publish all individual licence decisions; classified licences are structurally inaccessible to public audit.

Palantir’s software platform exports to Israel as a close US treaty ally would typically qualify under licence exceptions or existing bilateral country arrangements, but no formal public licensing record confirming this has been identified. Source classes checked: BIS public order records; Federal Register export control notices; US State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) public disclosures.

Arms Embargo & Sanctions Compliance

No public evidence has been identified of any investigation, citation, or enforcement action against Palantir related to arms embargo or sanctions compliance in connection with Israel transactions. Israel is not subject to a US arms embargo, and no evidence of Palantir transactions with sanctioned entities has been identified.

No investigations by the US Department of Justice, BIS, or DDTC related to Palantir–Israel transactions have been publicly reported.

FOIA Disclosures

Tech Inquiry (Jack Poulson, 2024) disclosed records obtained via Freedom of Information Act requests relating to Palantir’s IDF contract arrangements ²³⁵². The FOIA disclosures confirmed the existence of a Palantir–IDF contracting relationship but did not resolve the scope or financial terms of the agreement. This represents one of the few documentary (rather than journalistic) primary source bases for the IDF contract’s existence.

Constructive Notice — Post-ICJ Advisory Opinion (19 July 2024)

The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 (on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories) constitutes a formal international legal determination relevant to the obligations of companies supplying the Israeli military in or in connection with occupied territories. For constructive notice purposes, any company that continued its IDF supply relationship after 19 July 2024 with knowledge of the Advisory Opinion is on constructive notice of its legal implications.

Palantir’s Q3 2024 earnings call (October 2024) reported continued growth in government revenue with no contract termination, suspension, or modification disclosed ³²⁴⁶. Karp made no public acknowledgment of the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the context of Palantir’s IDF relationship. The company’s public posture showed no modification in response to the July 2024 Advisory Opinion ⁴⁶.

Constructive Notice — Post-ICC Arrest Warrants (November 2024)

The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants on 21 November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in connection with alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in Gaza. Palantir’s Q4 2024 earnings call (February 2025) reported record annual government revenue with no disclosure of IDF contract modification or suspension ³⁹⁴⁷. No public statement from Palantir acknowledging the ICC warrants or modifying its IDF relationship in response has been identified. Palantir’s Q1 2025 earnings (May 2025) similarly showed continued government revenue growth with no IDF contract change disclosed ⁴⁰.

Prior to July 2024, Palantir received constructive notice of civil society, employee, and legal concerns through multiple channels: internal employee letter (Wired, 2024) ⁷; No Tech for Apartheid open letter to the Palantir Board (2024) ⁴²; Human Rights Watch report on AI kill chain (2024) ¹³; +972 Magazine and Al Jazeera investigations (2024) ⁶⁹; and investor shareholder resolutions (2024) ³⁵⁵⁰. None of these prompted any publicly documented contract modification, scope limitation, or policy change.

Shareholder Resolution — 2024 AGM

At Palantir’s 2024 Annual General Meeting, an investor coalition filed a shareholder resolution calling on the company to conduct and publish a human rights due diligence assessment of its defence contracts, specifically referencing the IDF relationship and AI-assisted targeting concerns ⁵⁰. The resolution was opposed by Palantir’s management and board. Due to Palantir’s multi-class share structure (Class A, B, and F shares with differential voting rights), founders including Karp and Thiel hold disproportionate voting power; the resolution did not pass ³⁵⁵⁰. Palantir did not publish a human rights due diligence assessment or impact assessment in response. The filing and defeat of this resolution constitutes documented constructive notice that was received and rejected by company governance.

Legal Challenges

No court proceedings or judicial reviews specifically challenging Palantir’s defence supply relationship with Israel have been identified in public records as of the training data cutoff (April 2026). Internal employee dissent (documented in the Civil Society section) has not, as of available evidence, resulted in formal legal proceedings against the company related to IDF contracts ⁷.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO Research & Investigative Reports

• Who Profits Research Center (2024) profiles Palantir in its corporate database under digital surveillance and AI enablement, citing the October 2023 emergency IDF contract and subsequent reporting as the basis for inclusion ¹⁰.
• Amnesty International (2023), in “Automated Apartheid: AI and Surveillance in Palestine,” addressed the broader ecosystem of AI companies supplying Israeli security infrastructure, within which Palantir is contextually situated; the report’s primary focus is facial recognition and population surveillance technologies, and addresses the broader AI and biometric surveillance infrastructure deployed across Palestinian territories including the West Bank and checkpoints ¹².
• Human Rights Watch (2024) published a dedicated report on AI in the kill chain referencing Palantir’s targeting decision-support role and raising concerns about accountability gaps under international humanitarian law ¹³.
• Al Jazeera Investigative Unit (2024) published a focused investigation on Palantir’s AI tools in IDF Gaza operations, drawing on current and former Palantir employee accounts and platform capability reviews ⁹.
• American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) — Investigate (2024/2025) lists Palantir as a company of concern for its AI defence contracts, specifically the IDF relationship; the database is used by institutional investors and faith-based funds in ESG screening ⁴³.
• The Intercept (2024) reported on Palantir and Google’s Project Nimbus in the context of Israeli military AI infrastructure, framing Palantir’s role within the broader “tech for apartheid” analytical framework ⁸.
• +972 Magazine (2024) produced the most operationally detailed reported account, describing Palantir AIP as embedded in IDF targeting infrastructure with sources characterising the platform as supporting human-target identification pipelines during Gaza operations ⁶.
• Electronic Intifada (2024) reported on Palantir’s tools in the context of AI-enabled mass targeting, referencing the Gospel/Lavender targeting system framework ¹⁶.
• Corporate Occupation database (2024) lists Palantir as a company with documented involvement in Israeli military operations infrastructure ²⁴.
• The Guardian (2024) published an investigation into Palantir’s role in the Israel-Gaza conflict, drawing on corporate documentation, employee accounts, and platform capability analysis ⁴.
• Bloomberg Technology (2024) reported on Palantir’s AI tools being provided to the Israeli military ⁴.
• Financial Times (2024) reported on CEO Alex Karp’s public defence of Palantir’s Israel weapons AI relationship ²².
• PAX — “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” (June 2024) covers Palantir in adjacent civil society research as a tech-enablement company; Palantir is not in PAX’s primary arms-supplier tier but the report’s financiers annex and adjacent research situate Palantir within the broader corporate supply chain analysis ³⁷.
• Al-Haq — “Business and Human Rights: Corporate Complicity in the Gaza Genocide” (July 2024) references Palantir in the context of AI and surveillance technology enabling IDF targeting operations and situates it within a category of technology companies facilitating what the report characterises as unlawful targeting and mass civilian harm ³⁸.
• UN Special Rapporteur Reports: UN A/HRC/55/73 (2024, “Anatomy of a Genocide”) examined the role of corporate actors in enabling the Gaza military campaign, addressing the broader ecosystem of AI and surveillance technology companies enabling IDF operations; it does not name Palantir explicitly in the publicly available text but its provisions addressing dual-use technology and AI-enabled targeting are contextually applicable to Palantir’s documented role ⁴⁴. Whether Palantir is explicitly named in the final text of A/HRC/59/23 (2 July 2025, “From Economy of Occupation to Economy of Genocide”) cannot be confirmed from training data — this constitutes an evidence gap requiring direct document review ⁴⁴.

Controlling Principals — Documented Positions

• Alex Karp (CEO, Director, Co-Founder): Holds significant equity through founder shares and the Class F supervoting structure, giving him effective voting control alongside co-founders ³⁵⁴³. Karp’s public statements on the IDF relationship are attributable as controlling-principal acts. In addition to statements noted in Section 1 above, Karp stated in a Times of Israel interview (2024) that “we are going to win this war” in reference to Israel’s Gaza campaign, explicitly positioning himself and Palantir as co-participants in the military effort rather than neutral technology vendors ²¹. No FIDF donation record, Israeli defence board role, or Israeli defence-sector equity position held personally by Karp has been identified in public disclosures. No public statement by Karp acknowledging the ICJ Advisory Opinion or modifying Palantir’s contractual posture in response has been identified ⁴⁶.

• Peter Thiel (Co-Founder, Board Member): Per proxy filings through 2023, Thiel is a member of Palantir’s Board of Directors and holds equity through direct holdings and through Founders’ Fund ⁴²⁵³. Thiel has publicly identified as a strong supporter of Israel and of Israeli military operations on multiple occasions ⁴²⁴⁵. Thiel has been documented as a donor to the Friends of Israel Defense Forces (FIDF), which funds welfare and support programmes for IDF soldiers, with donation records publicly documented through IRS Form 990 filings and press reporting ⁴⁵. The most recently confirmable Thiel FIDF donation records from training data are from the 2017–2019 period; post-2020 donation activity is not independently confirmable from available training data — this constitutes a temporal evidence gap. Founders’ Fund, Thiel’s VC vehicle, has invested in multiple US defence technology companies including Anduril Industries ⁵³; no direct Founders’ Fund investment in Israeli defence prime contractors (Elbit, IAI, Rafael) has been identified in public disclosures. Whether the IDF emergency contract was formally approved at board level or executed under management authority is not publicly disclosed.

• Stephen Cohen (President, Co-Founder): Holds equity through founder shares ³⁵⁵⁵. Cohen made public statements in 2023–2024 supporting Palantir’s defence mission and IDF engagement, consistent with Karp’s public posture ⁵⁵. No personal FIDF donation record, Israeli defence board role, or Israeli defence-sector equity position held by Cohen has been identified in public disclosures.

• Joe Lonsdale (Co-Founder, not current board): Co-founded Palantir but subsequently departed the company’s board, founding 8VC with significant defence technology portfolio investments ⁵⁴. Lonsdale has publicly advocated for US and Israeli military technology development ⁵⁴. As Lonsdale is not a current Palantir board member or officer, his post-departure activities are not attributable as corporate acts for the current audit period; his historical founding role is noted for context.

Settlement Nexus Assessment

No public evidence has been identified of Palantir software being specifically deployed in Israeli settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, or of Palantir holding contracts specifically scoped to settlement-based military or security infrastructure. Who Profits and Corporate Occupation databases do not list Palantir under settlement infrastructure categories ¹⁰²⁴⁵⁶. The OHCHR settlement database does not list Palantir ³⁶. The IDF emergency contract and subsequent IDF relationship do not have a publicly disclosed geographic scope at the settlement or installation level. IDF intelligence operations conducted using Palantir’s platforms include operations in Gaza (not a settlement) and may include West Bank operational command functions, but no settlement-specific deployment has been documented. Whether Palantir’s IDF-contracted platforms are operationally used in West Bank military command contexts cannot be determined from publicly available evidence, given the classified and non-disclosed scope of the IDF contract — this remains a partial evidence gap ⁵⁶.

Boycott, Divestment & Worker Campaigns

• No Tech for Apartheid campaign (2023–2024) lists Palantir as a primary target alongside Google, organising worker walkouts, petition drives, and public pressure campaigns citing the October 2023 IDF emergency contract and AIP’s reported targeting applications ¹⁴³⁰. A formal open letter was addressed to the Palantir Board of Directors in 2024 ⁴².
• BDS Movement has listed Palantir on its corporate target list specifically in relation to IDF AI contracts ¹⁵.
• Athena Coalition — a tech worker organisation coalition — runs the “Drop Palantir” campaign citing AI targeting support for IDF Gaza operations ¹⁴.
• University of Michigan student groups (2024) passed resolutions calling for institutional divestment from Palantir stock held in university endowments ²⁵. Similar campaigns have been reported at other US universities.
• No major pension fund or sovereign wealth fund divestment from Palantir specifically on grounds of IDF contracts has been publicly documented in available training data as of April 2026.

Employee Internal Dissent

Wired (2024) reported that a cohort of Palantir employees circulated an internal letter objecting to the IDF contract, citing concerns about AI-assisted targeting and civilian harm ⁷. NBC News similarly reported worker accounts describing internal dissent over the Gaza targeting role ¹⁷. The company did not publicly alter its position or contractual relationship in response to internal pressure.

Earnings & Corporate Posture Through Q1 2025

Palantir’s Q3 2024 earnings call confirmed continued growth in government revenue and made no reference to any contract modification, suspension, or review related to IDF operations ³². Q4 2024 earnings (February 2025) reported record annual government revenue of approximately $1.1 billion for full-year 2024, with no IDF contract modification disclosed ³⁹. Q1 2025 earnings (May 2025) similarly showed continued government revenue growth with no IDF contract change disclosed ⁴⁰.

Corporate Response

Palantir has not published an end-use monitoring policy, human rights due diligence framework, or impact assessment related to its IDF contract in the public domain. No contract termination, scope limitation, or product restriction has been announced in response to civil society pressure, employee dissent, the 2024 AGM shareholder resolution, the ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 2024, or the ICC arrest warrants of November 2024. Alex Karp’s repeated public statements defending the company’s defence and IDF relationship — in shareholder letters, media interviews, and public commentary — constitute the company’s effective public position ^2122148.

End Notes