Audit Phase: V-DIG Domain Audit
Target Entity: Ferrari N.V. (NYSE: RACE; registered in the Netherlands; principal operations in Maranello, Italy)
Audit Date: May 2026
Basis: Research memo compiled from verified training-data knowledge and public sources through April 2026. No new research conducted.
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari holding any licensing, subscription, integration, or managed-services relationship with Israeli-origin enterprise technology vendors. A review of Ferrari’s annual reports (2021–2023), SEC Form 20-F filings, official technology partner pages, and cybersecurity trade press identified no engagements with Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE Systems, Verint, Claroty, or any comparable Israeli-origin cybersecurity, analytics, or enterprise software vendor.1 2 3
Ferrari disclosed a ransomware attack in March 2023, confirming that customer data — including names, addresses, email addresses, and telephone numbers — had been exfiltrated prior to the company receiving a ransom demand.4 5 6 No post-incident disclosure, forensic report, or trade-press account identified an incident-response or endpoint-security vendor of Israeli origin engaged in the remediation.4 5 6 This constitutes a material evidence gap: the identity of Ferrari’s post-breach forensic and IR vendors has not been publicly disclosed, and one or more could carry Israeli R&D heritage (for example, CrowdStrike, which maintains significant R&D presence in Israel, or Sygnia, an Israeli-founded incident response firm).
Palo Alto Networks — co-founded by Israeli national Nir Zuk and headquartered in Santa Clara, California — was reviewed as a candidate vendor. No confirmed public announcement, partner listing, or trade-press reference establishes Palo Alto Networks as a Ferrari vendor. This source was explicitly excluded from findings as unconfirmed.
Ferrari’s disclosed technology partner ecosystem is composed exclusively of US-origin and European vendors:
No Israeli-origin technology has been identified in Ferrari’s disclosed or inferable vendor stack. A scale-of-dependency assessment is therefore not applicable at this time.1 2 3
No public evidence has been identified that Ferrari’s IT outsourcing partners, systems integrators, or sub-tier managed-service providers have deployed Israeli-origin technology as part of Ferrari-specific engagements. Source classes reviewed include Ferrari annual reports, technology partner announcements, and trade press covering the period 2020–2024.1 2 3
Material evidence gap: Ferrari does not publicly disclose its full enterprise IT vendor list in its annual reports or SEC 20-F filings beyond named commercial partners. The internal cybersecurity vendor stack — including endpoint detection and response (EDR), SIEM, and network monitoring tooling — is not publicly disclosed. This is standard practice for large corporates and means it is not possible to confirm or rule out use of Israeli-origin products at the infrastructure layer without access to procurement records.1 2 3
AWS supply-chain gap: Ferrari’s AWS partnership creates an indirect dependency on the AWS Marketplace ecosystem, which includes Israeli-origin SaaS integrations (e.g., Check Point CloudGuard, Wiz) available to AWS customers. Whether Ferrari has procured any such add-on services is not documented in any public source reviewed.7
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari deploying facial recognition, biometric identification, behavioural analytics, gait analysis, or emotion-recognition technologies of Israeli origin. Vendors reviewed as candidates include Trigo, BriefCam (Canon subsidiary with Israeli origins), AnyVision (now Oosto), and Trax Retail. None appears in any Ferrari press release, retail technology trade publication, privacy watchdog report, or NGO investigation reviewed.1 2
Ferrari’s primary customer touchpoints are its Maranello factory, dealer network, and Formula 1 hospitality environments. No deployment of biometric screening or automated surveillance at these venues has been reported in any source reviewed.
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari deploying Israeli-origin predictive policing tools, sentiment analysis platforms, social media monitoring services, or workforce surveillance systems (e.g., Palantir-integrated Israeli analytics, Cellebrite-derived monitoring). Source classes reviewed include HR technology trade press and Ferrari sustainability and governance reporting.10
No public evidence has been identified of Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric technology reaching Ferrari indirectly through third-party platform providers, managed security service providers, or bundled enterprise suite deployments. No evidence exists either confirming or excluding this possibility at the sub-tier vendor level.
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari operating, leasing, or co-locating data centre infrastructure within Israel. Ferrari’s primary cloud infrastructure is built on AWS, and no AWS region in Israel has been identified as a designated Ferrari data-processing location in any public disclosure.7 1
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari participating in Project Nimbus — the Israeli government’s multi-cloud programme awarded to AWS and Google — or in any comparable Israeli state-backed digital infrastructure programme.7 Ferrari is a luxury automotive manufacturer and has no known government cloud services business of any kind.
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari providing data residency, sovereign cloud, or managed infrastructure services to any government entity, including Israeli state institutions. Ferrari does not operate as a cloud provider, managed services provider, or technology services company.1 2
No public evidence has been identified of any contracts, partnerships, service agreements, or commercial relationships between Ferrari and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israeli intelligence agencies (Mossad, Shin Bet, Unit 8200 alumni ventures in an institutional capacity), or any other Israeli state security body.1 2 3
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari’s technology — including its automotive engineering, aerodynamics, materials science, or data analytics capabilities — being deployed for military, intelligence gathering, or law enforcement surveillance applications within Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories.1 2 10
No public evidence has been identified. Ferrari is a luxury automotive manufacturer and does not maintain a cybersecurity product portfolio, offensive or defensive. Ferrari has no known technology licensing or co-development relationships with Israeli defence contractors (Elbit Systems, Rafael, IAI, ELTA, or NSO Group affiliates).1 2
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari providing artificial intelligence, machine learning, computer vision, or autonomous decision-support systems to Israeli state entities, military bodies, or security agencies.1 2
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari AI or ML models being trained on, or granted access to, datasets derived from civilian population surveillance, intercepted communications, or intelligence-collection activities within Israel or the occupied territories.1 2
No public evidence identified. Ferrari’s publicly documented AI and autonomous-systems activities are confined to the automotive domain: Formula 1 race-strategy algorithms, aerodynamics simulation, driver assistance systems, and performance modelling developed in partnership with AWS and IBM.7 8 10 No provision of these capabilities to any military actor has been documented in any source reviewed.
Formula 1 sub-tier gap: Scuderia Ferrari’s F1 technical operations involve numerous sub-tier technology vendors not individually disclosed in official partner listings. Sub-tier vendors in areas such as telemetry processing, simulation software, or computational fluid dynamics could theoretically include Israeli-origin products. No evidence exists either confirming or excluding this.11
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari operating research and development facilities, engineering offices, innovation laboratories, accelerator programmes, or co-working arrangements within Israel. Ferrari’s primary R&D campus is located in Maranello, Italy, with ancillary Formula 1 engineering activity conducted at the Fiorano test circuit and Mugello. No Israeli presence is referenced in any corporate filing or press release reviewed.1 2
No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari acquiring any Israeli-origin technology company or making strategic equity investments in Israeli technology startups, accelerators, or venture capital funds. This assessment is based on a review of Ferrari annual reports (2018–2023), SEC 20-F filings, and publicly available M&A records from financial and technology press.1 2 3
No public evidence has been identified of significant patent portfolios, technology licensing agreements, or co-development arrangements between Ferrari and Israeli-domiciled entities or Israeli academic research institutions (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Weizmann Institute of Science). A review of publicly available USPTO and EPO filing summaries cross-referenced with Israeli institutional co-applicants returned no identified matches.1 2
No NGO investigations, academic studies, UN Special Rapporteur reports, or civil society research specifically addressing Ferrari’s technology relationships with the Israeli state or its operations in the occupied Palestinian territories have been identified. Source classes reviewed include BDS National Committee publications and campaign pages, the Who Profits research database (reviewed via available published summaries), Amnesty International technology investigations, Human Rights Watch technology and business-and-human-rights reporting, and Stop the Wall reports covering the period 2018–2024.12 13
Who Profits evidence gap: The Who Profits Research Center (Tel Aviv/Ramallah) maintains a database of companies identified as profiting from the Israeli occupation. A direct, targeted search of the Who Profits database for Ferrari entries was not possible in this session due to search-tool unavailability. This represents a material evidence gap for this section.13
No public evidence has been identified of organised boycott, divestment, or sanctions (BDS) campaigns targeting Ferrari specifically in relation to technology provision to Israel, operations in occupied territories, or business relationships with Israeli state entities. Ferrari does not appear on the BDS National Committee’s targeted companies list as of the most recent available data.12
No public evidence has been identified of regulatory inquiries, legal challenges, export-control actions, or sanctions-related investigations involving Ferrari’s technology sales or services to Israeli state entities. Source classes reviewed include EU regulatory registers, SEC enforcement actions and EDGAR disclosures, US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) export control notices, and publicly available summaries of Italian UAMA (Unità per le Autorizzazioni dei Materiali d’Armamento) export licensing records.1 3
Italian export control gap: Detailed UAMA records are not comprehensively available in the public domain and could not be independently verified in this session. This is a structural limitation of public-source audit methodology for Italian domiciled entities.
https://www.ferrari.com/en-EN/corporate/investors ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001673481&type=20-F&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ferrari-confirms-data-breach-after-receiving-ransom-demand/ ↩↩
https://www.reuters.com/technology/ferrari-says-it-was-hit-by-ransomware-attack-2023-03-20/ ↩↩
https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/ferrari/ ↩↩↩↩↩
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2023-02-14-Scuderia-Ferrari-HP-and-IBM-Renew-Partnership ↩↩
https://press.ext.hp.com/us/en/press-releases/2024/hp-ferrari.html ↩
https://www.ferrari.com/en-EN/formula1/partners ↩
