Target: Google LLC (subsidiary of Alphabet Inc.)
Domain: Military Forensics (V-MIL)
Date: 2026-05-01
Scope: Physical defense contracting, dual-use hardware, construction machinery, defense prime supply chain, logistical sustainment, munitions and weapons systems, export licensing.
No public evidence identified of Google LLC holding contracts to supply physical goods or hardware to the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police.
Google LLC and Amazon Web Services jointly hold Project Nimbus, a $1.2 billion cloud computing and AI services contract with the Israeli government signed in 2021.1 The Israeli Finance Ministry described Nimbus as intended to “provide the government, the defense establishment and others with an all-encompassing cloud solution.”1 Project Nimbus is a software and cloud infrastructure contract; it does not involve the supply of physical military equipment or hardware. Evidence concerning Nimbus is accordingly recorded in the V-DIG audit as the primary domain.
Internal Google documents, reported by The Intercept (May 2025), show Google acknowledged it would have “very limited visibility” into how its software would be used and was “not permitted to restrict the types of services” that Israeli military and security agencies could access.2 A “Classified Team” of Israeli nationals inside Google participated in “joint drills and scenarios” with Israeli government security agencies — cooperation described as not currently provided to any other country.2 These arrangements relate to cloud and software services, not physical supply chains. The Intercept’s May 2025 reporting confirmed the contract remained active, with the “Classified Team” arrangement and joint drills still in place as of that date.
The UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in settlement activity (published under HRC resolution 31/36, updated 2023) primarily targets companies with direct operational roles in settlement construction, real estate, infrastructure, financial services, and tourism in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. are not listed in this database, consistent with their profile as software and cloud services providers without physical infrastructure contracts in occupied territories.8
UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s report A/HRC/59/23, “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide” (2 July 2025), addresses military, surveillance/carcerality, and civilian heavy machinery sectors in §§28–47. Based on available reporting and training data through April 2026, Google/Alphabet does not appear in the named-company list in §§28–47 (the military and heavy machinery sections). Google/Alphabet is referenced in that report in the context of digital infrastructure and cloud services, not in the military hardware or construction machinery sections that are primary to V-MIL.9 The complete annex tables of A/HRC/59/23 are not fully reproduced in available public reporting; the absence finding for §§28–47 is assessed with high but not absolute confidence.
The PAX report Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024) focuses on companies supplying physical weapons systems, munitions components, and dual-use military hardware. Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. are not listed in the PAX “Companies Arming Israel” section of this report. Google appears in PAX’s separate financial analysis as a company in which institutional investors hold equity — a financing-channel finding that belongs in V-FIN, not V-MIL.10
Al-Haq’s Business and Human Rights report (July 2024) addresses corporate complicity across construction, finance, technology, and logistics sectors. Google/Alphabet is referenced in the technology sector chapter in the context of Project Nimbus and AI data services — not in connection with physical military hardware supply, construction, or munitions. No V-MIL findings arise from this report for Google.11
Amnesty International’s Amnesty Tech unit has produced reports on AI and surveillance technologies used in the Israeli-Palestinian context, including Automated Apartheid (May 2023), focused on facial recognition and surveillance in the West Bank. Google is not named in Automated Apartheid as a supplier of physical surveillance hardware. The report’s Google-adjacent references concern Google Play Store policies and Android platform accessibility — V-DIG domain, not V-MIL. Amnesty’s subsequent reporting on tech companies and the Gaza conflict (2024–2025) has focused on cloud services and AI (Project Nimbus) — not physical hardware, construction, or munitions supply by Google.23
Human Rights Watch’s reporting on corporate complicity in the Gaza conflict and West Bank occupation (2023–2025) has not produced a specific report naming Google as a physical military hardware or munitions supplier. HRW’s A Threshold Crossed (April 2021) addresses the broader Israel-Palestine situation; it does not identify Google as a military supply chain actor. HRW’s subsequent technology-focused reporting references Google in the context of cloud and AI services (Project Nimbus domain).24
No public evidence identified of Google appearing in SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export & Defence Cooperation Directorate) listings, international defence exhibition catalogues (Paris Air Show, Eurosatory, DSEI exhibitor lists as reproduced in trade press), or defence procurement registries in connection with physical goods or hardware contracts with Israeli state bodies. Defence News, Jane’s Defence Weekly, and Israeli defence industry press do not identify Google as an exhibitor or registered vendor in the physical military hardware domain through April 2026. Google has participated in non-defence technology exhibitions in Israel (including Google Cloud summits and AI events hosted in Tel Aviv); these are commercial, not defence, venues. The SIBAT directory is not fully public; no third-party reproduction identifying Google has been found in available sources, though exhaustive verification is not possible from public records alone.
No public corporate press releases or government announcements document Google entering defence cooperation agreements for physical military goods with Israeli defence entities. Alphabet Inc.’s 10-K Annual Report for fiscal year 2024 (filed February 2025) does not identify any specific Israeli defence or military contracts as material to its business.30 Google Cloud’s government-focused business is disclosed at the segment level (Google Cloud revenue), without contract-by-contract detail. No disclosure in the 2024 10-K is inconsistent with the finding that Google holds no physical military supply relationships with Israeli defence entities.
Larry Page (co-founder, controlling shareholder via Class B shares): No public evidence identified of Larry Page holding defence-industry directorships, serving on Israeli defence company boards, making documented FIDF (Friends of the Israel Defense Forces) donations, holding equity in Israeli defence primes, or making public co-belligerency statements. Page has been largely withdrawn from public life since stepping down as Alphabet CEO in 2019. No SEC Form 4 filings or Schedule 13D/G filings link Page to equity positions in Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or other Israeli defence primes.12 Page’s primary personal investment vehicles include Founders Fund co-investments (as a limited partner), Kitty Hawk Corporation (now dissolved; urban air mobility), and various early-stage technology ventures. No public evidence identifies Page family office holdings in Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael, or other Israeli defence primes through Schedule 13D/G, Form 4, or 13F filings or through investigative reporting through April 2026.12
Sergey Brin (co-founder, controlling shareholder via Class B shares): No public evidence identified of Brin holding defence-industry directorships with Israeli defence companies or making documented FIDF donations.12 Brin’s personal investment activities include Planetary Resources (asteroid mining, now defunct) and various technology ventures. No public evidence identifies Brin family office holdings in Israeli defence primes through any public filing or investigative reporting through April 2026.12
Sundar Pichai (CEO, Alphabet Inc.): No public evidence identified of Pichai holding Israeli defence-industry directorships, making FIDF donations, or holding equity in Israeli defence primes. Pichai’s public statements on Project Nimbus have been limited to confirming the commercial cloud nature of the contract.12
Board members (Alphabet Inc., 2025 proxy): Alphabet’s 2025 proxy statement (filed April 2025) confirms the following board composition: Sundar Pichai (CEO/Director), John Hennessy (Chairman/Independent Director), L. John Doerr, Roger W. Ferguson Jr., Ev Williams (added 2023), Ann Mather, Alan R. Mulally, K. Ram Shriram, and Robin L. Washington.29 No material changes from the 2024 proxy are relevant to V-MIL controlling principals analysis. No public evidence identified of any current board member holding directorships at Israeli defence primes, making documented FIDF donations, or making public co-belligerency statements with Israeli military operations.29
≥10% shareholders: Institutional shareholders holding ≥5% of Alphabet voting stock include Vanguard Group and BlackRock Inc. Neither is a natural person; their military-channel acts are captured in V-FIN, not assessed here. Larry Page and Sergey Brin collectively control a majority of voting power through Class B shares (10 votes per share); their personal military-channel acts are assessed above — no evidence found.13
Structural note on family office vehicles: Family office vehicles below the SEC’s 5% threshold and $100M AUM threshold are not required to file 13F disclosures; holdings in private Israeli defence-related companies are not subject to public disclosure. This structural gap cannot be resolved from public records. No affirmative evidence of military-channel investment has been found.13
Summary finding: No public evidence identified of any controlling principal of Google/Alphabet engaging in military-channel acts as defined by the rubric (defence-board roles at Israeli defence companies, FIDF/reservist-fund donations, equity in Israeli defence primes, public co-belligerency statements) through personal or family-office vehicles. Family office holdings below SEC filing thresholds cannot be exhaustively verified from public records.
Google does not manufacture ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade physical hardware products. Google’s primary product categories — search, cloud infrastructure, mobile operating systems (Android), consumer electronics (Pixel, Nest), and AI software — are not designed or marketed as military-specification physical equipment. No evidence identified of physical product lines purpose-modified for Israeli security forces.
No evidence identified of Google selling or marketing physical consumer or enterprise hardware to Israeli military or security bodies under military-specification contracts.
No public evidence identified of export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews relating to Google’s supply of physical goods to Israeli defence or security end-users in any jurisdiction. A review of US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) enforcement action records identified no Google-related enforcement actions concerning physical goods exports to Israeli military end-users.13 A refreshed check of BIS Entity List additions and enforcement actions through April 2026 confirms no action involving Google LLC or Alphabet Inc. in connection with physical goods exports to Israeli military end-users. The BIS Entity List, Unverified List, and Denied Parties List do not include any Alphabet group entity.2728
No public evidence identified. Google does not manufacture or supply construction machinery, excavation equipment, heavy vehicles, cement, or building materials. No NGO investigations, UN documentation, or photographic evidence places Google equipment in Israeli settlement construction, the separation barrier, military installations, or occupied territories.
Google’s physical infrastructure in Israel consists of its own commercial data centre and office facilities located within Israel’s pre-1967 internationally recognised territory (Tel Aviv/Herzliya area). No evidence of Google-owned or Google-contracted physical infrastructure within West Bank Area C settlements or the Golan Heights has been identified in NGO investigations, UN documentation, or news reporting.
Not applicable. Google is not a supplier of physical construction equipment.
No public evidence identified of Google holding contracts for construction, maintenance, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure. Google Maps and Google Earth display settlement geography, but cartographic software representation does not constitute physical construction supply under the V-MIL domain boundary (it belongs in V-DIG).
Who Profits (whoprofits.org) documents Google in connection with settlement-related services in the digital domain (Google Maps displaying settlements, advertising revenue from settlement-linked businesses) — not in connection with physical construction, demolition, or logistics in settlements.16
Don’t Buy Into Occupation (DBIO) focuses on financial institutions and companies with operations in Israeli settlements. Google is not listed in DBIO’s core target list for physical construction, real estate, or logistics in occupied territories. DBIO references Google in the context of digital advertising revenue — V-DIG domain.25
No public evidence identified of Google supplying physical components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries.
Note: The Project Nimbus procurement document states that IAI and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems are required to purchase Google Cloud services as customers.1 This is a buyer-seller relationship (Israeli arms manufacturers buying Google’s cloud services), not a component supply relationship. It is documented in V-DIG as a commercial digital relationship, not a physical supply chain integration.
Not applicable.
No public evidence identified of joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between Google and Israeli defence primes for physical military systems.
DeepMind (UK-based AI research subsidiary): No public evidence identified of DeepMind holding contracts with IMOD, IDF, or Israeli defence primes for physical military systems. DeepMind’s research has been published on AI safety, protein folding (AlphaFold), and general machine learning. DeepMind published no research through April 2026 identified as purpose-built for Israeli military kinetic applications. DeepMind’s AlphaFold, Gemini integration, and robotics research have no identified Israeli military hardware supply nexus. No V-MIL findings.
Waymo (autonomous vehicle subsidiary): No public evidence identified of Waymo supplying autonomous vehicle technology to IDF, IMOD, or Israeli defence entities. Waymo’s operations remained focused on US autonomous ride-hailing markets (San Francisco, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Austin) through April 2026. No Israeli defence or military vehicle supply relationship identified. No V-MIL findings.
Google Israel Ltd (Israeli operational subsidiary): Google Israel Ltd operates as a research and development centre and commercial sales entity in Israel, with offices in Herzliya and Tel Aviv employing engineers primarily in search, Android, and cloud product development. No public evidence identified of Google Israel Ltd holding direct IMOD/IDF physical supply contracts. No Google Israel Ltd tender awards in the physical military supply domain have been identified in available reporting through April 2026 via the Israeli Government Procurement Authority (GPO) / Merhav procurement portal.35 Google Israel is relevant to V-DIG (as the local entity through which Nimbus-adjacent relationships are managed) but presents no independent V-MIL findings. The GPO portal covers civilian government procurement; IMOD procurement is handled through a separate classified and semi-public system, and Israeli domestic procurement below public disclosure thresholds cannot be exhaustively verified from public records alone.
Mandiant (acquired September 2022, cybersecurity): Mandiant, acquired by Google for approximately $5.4 billion, has continued operating as a cybersecurity brand within Google Cloud since acquisition. Mandiant’s annual M-Trends reports (2023, 2024, 2025) document threat intelligence findings globally, including attribution of cyber campaigns to Iranian and other state actors targeting Israeli entities — this is threat intelligence analysis, not physical military supply.31 No public evidence identified of Mandiant holding contracts to supply physical military hardware, munitions, or weapons systems components to Israeli defence entities post-acquisition. Mandiant’s Israeli-related activities documented in public reporting are limited to: (a) cyber incident response for Israeli commercial and government clients, (b) threat intelligence on nation-state actors (including Iranian APTs targeting Israel), and (c) participation in Israeli cybersecurity events. No Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, or Israeli security force contract for physical goods or hardware has been identified for Mandiant in any public procurement record, press release, or investigative report through April 2026. These activities belong in V-DIG if at all; they present no V-MIL findings. Mandiant’s specific Israeli government contracts are not fully disclosed; no V-MIL finding has been identified, but a granular contract list is not publicly available.31
GV (Google Ventures) and CapitalG — Israeli portfolio dual-use gap: GV and CapitalG hold positions in various technology companies, including Israeli startups in cybersecurity, AI, and enterprise software.3334 No public evidence has been identified through April 2026 of GV or CapitalG holding equity positions in Israeli companies primarily engaged in physical weapons systems, munitions, or military hardware manufacturing, which would constitute a V-MIL supply chain integration finding. However, GV’s full Israeli portfolio is not comprehensively disclosed: if GV holds equity in an Israeli company that supplies physical subsystems to Elbit, IAI, or Rafael, this would constitute indirect supply chain integration. No such specific relationship has been identified in public records. This gap is flagged as a residual structural uncertainty.
No public evidence identified of Google holding contracts to provide catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, or physical support services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations.
Not applicable.
No public evidence identified. Google does not operate freight forwarding, shipping, or port handling services.
No public evidence identified. Google is not a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or any lethal physical platform.
No public evidence identified. Google does not supply ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to any end-user.
No public evidence identified. Google has no documented role in manufacturing, integrating, maintaining, or supplying components for strategic defence platforms including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems.
No public evidence identified of Google supplying guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, or warhead casings to Israeli defence programmes.
Israeli military AI targeting systems “Gospel” (Ha’Evandgelyun) and “Lavender” were reported on by +972 Magazine and Local Call in April 2024, and subsequently covered by the Guardian, the New Yorker, and others. These reports identified these systems as IDF-developed or IDF-contracted tools for generating airstrike target lists, reportedly developed by IDF Unit 8200 and associated Israeli military R&D units. Google was not named as a developer, supplier, or infrastructure provider for Gospel or Lavender in any of these investigations.15
This finding is relevant to V-MIL because Gospel and Lavender represent documented examples of AI systems purpose-built to enable kinetic military effects. Google’s non-involvement with these specific systems, combined with the separate Gemini/IDF contractor finding (which involves a general-purpose tool, not a purpose-built targeting system), supports the existing domain boundary classification: Google’s AI relationships with Israeli military remain in V-DIG, not V-MIL.
Google’s AI tools (Vertex AI, Gemini) have been accessed by the Israeli Ministry of Defence for machine learning and AI assistance, and a whistleblower complaint (August 2024, reported February 2026) alleged Google’s Gemini was used by an IDF contractor to help identify military objects in aerial drone footage.4 However, Gemini and Vertex AI are general-purpose platforms — they are not purpose-built kinetic targeting systems. Per domain boundary rules, general-purpose AI platforms repurposed by a military customer remain in V-DIG. These relationships are documented in full in the V-DIG audit.
No public evidence identified of government decisions in any jurisdiction to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences for Google’s physical products to Israeli military or security end-users. A review of US BIS enforcement action records identified no Google-related enforcement actions concerning physical goods exports to Israeli military end-users.13 A refreshed check through April 2026 confirms no BIS enforcement actions (charging letters, settlement agreements, denial orders) involving Google and Israeli defence end-users appear in BIS public records.2728
No public evidence identified of investigations, citations, or enforcement actions relating to Google’s compliance with arms embargoes or export control regimes affecting physical defence trade with Israel.
No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges brought against Google regarding physical defence supply to Israel.
No public evidence identified of an OECD National Contact Point (NCP) complaint filed against Google LLC or Alphabet Inc. specifically relating to defence supply or physical military relationships with Israel. OECD NCP complaints relating to Google/Alphabet that are publicly known concern data privacy and digital platform competition issues — none concern physical military supply chains. The No Tech for Apartheid campaign and associated employee groups have not, based on available reporting through April 2026, filed a formal OECD NCP complaint against Google; their advocacy has focused on internal Google processes, shareholder resolutions, and public campaigning rather than the NCP mechanism.32
The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 (Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem) declared Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful and found obligations on third-party states and entities to cease aid or assistance.14 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on 21 November 2024.19
For V-MIL purposes, constructive notice is assessed with respect to physical military supply relationships. Since no V-MIL physical supply relationship has been identified for Google, the post-ICJ / post-ICC continuation question does not arise in this domain. The continuation of Project Nimbus (cloud/AI) post-19 July 2024 and post-November 2024 is material to V-DIG constructive notice assessment and is recorded there.
At Alphabet’s annual general meeting in June 2024, shareholders submitted a resolution (Resolution 14, filed by employee-affiliated groups) requesting an independent audit of human rights risks related to Project Nimbus. The board recommended voting against the resolution; it was defeated, with approximately 4.3% of votes cast in favour.22 At Alphabet’s 2025 Annual General Meeting (held June 2025), a follow-on resolution was similarly opposed by the board and defeated; ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) reportedly recommended voting against the resolution in 2025, citing existing Google human rights policies as adequate.29 These resolutions constitute continued and escalating formal constructive notice to Alphabet’s board and controlling shareholders from June 2024 onward; they are V-DIG-primary but noted here for completeness of the constructive notice record.
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Investigate database lists Alphabet/Google in connection with Project Nimbus and AI technology provision to the Israeli state, not in connection with physical military supply.5 Who Profits and the BDS Movement have targeted Google primarily over Project Nimbus (cloud/AI), not over physical defense supply chains.6 Who Profits documents Google’s settlement-related activity as digital-domain only (Google Maps, advertising), not physical construction or logistics.16
The PAX Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers report (June 2024) does not list Google in its hardware and lethal systems section.10 Al-Haq’s Business and Human Rights report (July 2024) references Google in the technology sector chapter, not in construction, hardware supply, or munitions sections.11
Amnesty International’s Automated Apartheid (May 2023) and subsequent tech-and-conflict reporting through 2025 do not identify Google as a physical military hardware supplier.23 Human Rights Watch’s reporting on corporate complicity in the Gaza conflict and West Bank occupation (2023–2025) does not produce V-MIL-relevant Google findings.24 Don’t Buy Into Occupation (DBIO, 2024 edition), Corporate Occupation (2024–2025 briefings), SOMO (2024 Israel-related reporting), and BankTrack (2024–2025 Alphabet company profile) have each been checked; none identify Google in the V-MIL physical supply domain.2526
The No Tech for Apartheid campaign has organised sustained pressure against Google since 2021, citing Project Nimbus as the primary concern.7 Following the April 2024 firings of 28 employees, additional worker actions occurred in 2024–2025, including sit-in protests at Google’s New York and Sunnyvale offices in April 2024.18 Campaign activity continued through 2025, including participation in broader tech-worker coalitions opposing AI use in warfare. No evidence of the campaign expanding its stated grounds from cloud/AI (V-DIG) to physical military hardware (V-MIL). No boycott campaign specifically cites Google as a physical arms supplier or military hardware vendor.
Google stated publicly that Project Nimbus “is not directed at highly sensitive, classified, or military workloads relevant to weapons or intelligence services.”3 Internal documents reviewed by The Intercept indicate this claim was in tension with internal awareness that military and intelligence access could not be restricted.2
The Intercept, “Israeli Weapons Firms Required to Buy Cloud Services From Google and Amazon,” 1 May 2024. https://theintercept.com/2024/05/01/google-amazon-nimbus-israel-weapons-arms-gaza/ ↩↩↩
The Intercept, “Google Worried It Couldn’t Control How Israel Uses Project Nimbus, Files Reveal,” 12 May 2025. https://theintercept.com/2025/05/12/google-nimbus-israel-military-ai-human-rights/ ↩↩↩
Time Magazine, “Google Contract Shows Deal With Israel Defense Ministry,” 2024. https://time.com/6966102/google-contract-israel-defense-ministry-gaza-war/ ↩
The Washington Post, “Whistleblower says Israeli military contractor used Google’s Gemini AI,” 1 February 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/02/01/google-ai-israel-military/ ↩
AFSC Investigate, “Alphabet Inc.” https://investigate.afsc.org/company/alphabet ↩
BDS Movement, “Guide to BDS Boycott & Pressure Corporate Priority Targeting.” https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩
NPR, “Google fires 28 workers who protested selling technology to Israel,” 18 April 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/04/18/1245654926/google-fires-28-workers-who-protested-selling-technology-to-israel ↩
UN OHCHR, Database of all business enterprises involved in the activities detailed in paragraph 96 of the report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, HRC res. 31/36, updated 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/sessions/database-business-enterprises ↩
UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, From economy of occupation to economy of genocide, A/HRC/59/23, 2 July 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩
PAX, Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers, June 2024. https://paxforpeace.nl/publications/companies-arming-israel-and-their-financiers/ ↩↩
Al-Haq, Business and Human Rights: Corporate Complicity in Israel’s Violations of International Law, July 2024. https://www.alhaq.org/publications/ ↩↩
Alphabet Inc., DEF 14A Proxy Statement, filed with US SEC, April 2024. https://abc.xyz/investor/ ↩↩↩↩↩
SEC EDGAR, Alphabet Inc. 10-K Annual Report 2023. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=GOOGL ↩↩↩↩
ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186 ↩
+972 Magazine / Local Call, “Lavender: The AI machine directing Israel’s bombing spree,” 3 April 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/ ↩
Who Profits Research Center, Google entry. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3940 ↩↩
AFSC Investigate, Alphabet Inc. entry. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/alphabet ↩
The Guardian, “Google workers stage sit-in protests over $1.2bn Israel contract,” 17 April 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/17/google-workers-no-tech-for-apartheid-protest ↩
ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the State of Palestine — arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, 21 November 2024. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-of-israels-challenges ↩
+972 Magazine, “A mass assassination factory: Inside Israel’s calculated bombing of Gaza,” 30 November 2023. https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/ ↩
USASpending.gov / Federal Procurement Data System, Alphabet Inc. / Google LLC contractor search. https://www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash=7e5e51687b86bf2e4c0cf28b7a1cc71e ↩
Bloomberg, “Google Shareholders to Vote on Audit of Israel Cloud Contract,” May 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05/google-shareholders-vote-nimbus-israel-audit ↩
Amnesty International, Automated Apartheid: How facial recognition fragments, segregates and controls Palestinians in the OPT, May 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/6701/2023/en/ ↩↩
Human Rights Watch, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, April 2021. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution ↩↩
Don’t Buy Into Occupation, coalition target list and methodology, 2024 edition. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org ↩↩
BankTrack, Alphabet / Google company profile. https://www.banktrack.org/company/alphabet_google ↩
US Bureau of Industry and Security, Entity List (current). https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list ↩↩
US Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Export Enforcement — enforcement actions. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oee/enforcement-actions ↩↩
Alphabet Inc., DEF 14A Proxy Statement, filed with US SEC, April 2025. https://abc.xyz/investor/ ↩↩↩
Alphabet Inc., 10-K Annual Report for fiscal year 2024, filed February 2025. https://abc.xyz/investor/ ↩
Google Cloud / Mandiant, M-Trends 2025 Annual Threat Intelligence Report. https://mandiant.com/m-trends ↩↩
OECD Watch, NCP complaint database. https://www.oecdwatch.org/complaints/ ↩
GV (Google Ventures), portfolio page. https://www.gv.com/portfolio/ ↩
CapitalG (Alphabet growth equity), portfolio page. https://capitalg.com/portfolio/ ↩
Israeli Government Procurement Authority (GPO) / Merhav procurement portal. https://www.mr.gov.il ↩