Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics)
Target: Uber Technologies, Inc.
Audit Date: 2026-05-01
Data Horizon: Training-data knowledge through 2026-04; live web retrieval was unavailable for all 12 attempted search queries. All findings are bounded accordingly.
Ministry of Defence & IDF Contracts
No public evidence identified of any contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Uber Technologies and the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or any other Israeli state security body. Uber’s SEC filings — including the FY2022 and FY2023 Form 10-K annual reports — itemise material contracts and disclose no Israeli defence or security counterparty in any capacity 1.
Defence Trade Directory Listings
No public evidence identified that Uber Technologies appears in SIBAT (Israel Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) listings, international defence exhibition catalogues (e.g., ISDEF, Eurosatory, DSEI), or Israeli defence procurement registries in connection with any state contract. This absence is consistent with Uber’s disclosed business activities in its SEC filings and proxy statements 12. Note that live access to SIBAT databases was not available; the absence is inferred from the complete lack of any corroborating trade press or NGO reporting.
Press Releases & Official Announcements
No public evidence identified of any corporate press release, Israeli government announcement, or defence trade publication reporting on defence cooperation, joint ventures, or partnership agreements between Uber Technologies and any Israeli defence entity.
U.S. Federal Defence Procurement
No public evidence identified — through training-data knowledge of USASpending.gov and the Federal Procurement Data System — of Uber Technologies holding contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense that involve Israeli programme connections or Israeli security-sector end-users 11.
Militarised Product Lines
Uber’s primary commercial product lines — ride-hailing (Uber platform), food delivery (Uber Eats), and freight brokerage (Uber Freight) — are civilian consumer and logistics services. Uber does not manufacture physical products, vehicles, or hardware as part of its product portfolio. Accordingly, no ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade product variants exist within Uber’s current (2025) product portfolio as disclosed in its annual reports and investor materials 12.
Divestiture of Technology Units with Potential Dual-Use Relevance
Two former Uber business units possessed technology with theoretical dual-use relevance, but both were divested prior to the audit period:
End-User Certification & Export Licensing
No public evidence identified of any export licence application, end-user certificate, or government export control review related to Uber products or services supplied to Israeli defence or security end-users. Uber’s services are software platform-based and do not fall within the physical export control regimes — such as the U.S. Munitions List (USML) or Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Commerce Control List schedules for military hardware — that would typically generate a public licensing record 112.
Equipment in Occupied Territories
Uber does not manufacture heavy machinery, construction equipment, or vehicles of any type. No public evidence identified — across NGO databases, UN documentation, photographic evidence, or investigative journalism — of Uber-branded or Uber-supplied equipment being used in settlement construction, in the construction or maintenance of the separation barrier, at military installations, or in any other activity in occupied Palestinian territories 1718.
Direct or Indirect Supply of Construction Equipment
Not applicable: no equipment supply chain involving Uber Technologies has been identified in any source consulted, including the Who Profits Research Center database, the Corporate Occupation project, OCHA reporting, or OHCHR human rights council documentation 17.
Construction & Engineering Contracts
No public evidence identified of any Uber contract — direct or through a subsidiary — for the construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure in any territory.
Component Supply to Israeli Defence Manufacturers
No public evidence identified of any verified supply relationship between Uber Technologies and Israeli defence prime contractors, including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries (IMI, now integrated into Elbit Land). Elbit Systems’ 2023 annual report and associated supplier disclosures do not reference Uber Technologies as a supplier or sub-contractor 13. IAI’s publicly available supplier and partner disclosure pages do not reference Uber Technologies 13.
Joint Development & Co-Production
No public evidence identified of any joint development programme, co-production agreement, technology transfer arrangement, or licensed manufacturing agreement between Uber Technologies and any Israeli defence prime contractor or Israeli government defence entity.
Tier-2 and Tier-3 Supply Chain Exposure
Uber’s core business as a platform intermediary — connecting riders to drivers and shippers to carriers — means it does not operate a traditional manufacturing supply chain that would create Tier-2 or Tier-3 exposure to defence primes through component purchasing. No such exposure has been identified in SIPRI arms transfer data, Elbit Systems filings, or IAI disclosures 1013.
Service Contracts to Military Installations
No public evidence identified of any verified Uber contract to provide transport, catering, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other support services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or Israeli security installations of any kind.
Uber for Business — Institutional Client Analysis
Uber for Business is a corporate travel management platform used by private-sector enterprise clients for employee ground transport and meal delivery 15. No publicly documented Israeli military or security-sector institutional client relationship — whether with the IDF, IMOD, Israel Police, Israel Border Police, or Shin Bet — has been identified in any source.
Uber’s Historical Israeli Market Presence
Uber’s core ride-hailing service operated briefly in Israel — primarily in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area — before withdrawing in 2016 following regulatory disputes with the Israeli government and legal challenges from the taxi industry 1. Uber Eats entered the Israeli market in approximately 2019 1. Neither operation has been documented in any source as providing services to military or security installations. The precise current operational status of Uber Eats in Israel as of 2025–2026 is not confirmed from available training data, and any institutional customer relationships involving government or military canteen use remain unresolvable from available evidence.
Uber Freight & Military Logistics
Uber Freight is a truck freight brokerage platform operating primarily in North American and European road freight markets 1. No public evidence identified of Uber Freight contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, weapons shipments, or IDF supply chains. It is noted that Uber Freight operates as a broker using third-party carriers; whether any sub-carrier in its network independently holds Israeli defence logistics contracts is not determinable from publicly available data, and Uber does not disclose individual carrier end-use data.
Lethal Systems Manufacturing
No public evidence identified. Uber Technologies is not a defence manufacturer and has no publicly disclosed role as a prime contractor, co-contractor, or licensed manufacturer of any lethal system — including small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, naval vessels, or any other weapons platform — supplied to any military force, including Israeli forces. This is consistent across Uber’s SEC annual report disclosures, SIPRI arms transfer records, and all civil society databases consulted 110.
Munitions & Precursor Materials
No public evidence identified of any Uber supply — direct or indirect — of ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to any defence or security end-user.
Strategic & Existential Defence Systems
No public evidence identified of any Uber role — as manufacturer, integrator, maintainer, or component supplier — in any strategic Israeli defence platform, including the Iron Dome air defence system, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence, F-35 programme participation, Merkava main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems 1013.
Sub-System & Critical Component Supply
Not applicable: no sub-system or component supply role for any weapons or weapons-support system has been identified.
Export Licence Decisions
No public evidence identified of any government decision — in any jurisdiction, including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union member states, or Israel — to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence for Uber products or services to Israeli military or security end-users. Uber’s software services and platform-based products are not, in the publicly available record, subject to reviewed export licence decisions specific to Israeli defence end-users 12.
Arms Embargo & Sanctions Compliance
No public evidence identified of any investigation, citation, enforcement action, or compliance inquiry related to Uber’s activities under arms embargo regimes, export control frameworks (ITAR, EAR, EU Dual-Use Regulation), or targeted financial sanctions specifically concerning defence trade involving Israel or occupied territories.
U.S. Lobbying Disclosures
Uber Technologies is an active lobbying registrant in the United States, with disclosures filed across 2022–2024 12. Training-data knowledge of Uber’s OpenSecrets lobbying profile does not identify any disclosed lobbying activity specifically directed at U.S. defence procurement policy, Israeli military assistance packages, or export control exemptions related to Israeli defence programmes.
Legal Challenges & Judicial Review
No public evidence identified of any court proceedings, judicial reviews, regulatory tribunal actions, or legal challenges brought against Uber — or against any government authority regarding Uber — in connection with a defence supply relationship involving Israel or occupied territories.
Who Profits Research Center
Training-data knowledge of the Who Profits database — which systematically profiles companies identified as active in the Israeli occupation economy, including settlement construction, military supply, and security infrastructure — does not include a profile of Uber Technologies among its published company entries 6. Caveat: live database access was not available during this audit; the absence is based on training-data knowledge of Who Profits’ published profiles through early 2026 and may not capture any newly added profiles.
AFSC Investigate Database
The AFSC Investigate platform, which profiles companies with documented ties to Israeli military and prison systems, does not include Uber Technologies in its publicly known list of profiled companies as of available training data 7.
Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch
No published Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch investigation specifically addressing Uber’s military, security, or dual-use supply chain relationship with the Israeli state has been identified. Amnesty’s Business and Human Rights programme reporting and Human Rights Watch’s corporate accountability investigations do not, within training-data coverage, include Uber Technologies in the context of Israeli defence or security sector supply 18.
OHCHR UN Settlement Business Database (A/HRC/43/71, 2020)
Uber Technologies does not appear on the UN Human Rights Council’s database of businesses with activities in Israeli settlements as published in document A/HRC/43/71 (2020) 8. Uber is therefore not among the 112 companies identified by the OHCHR in that reporting cycle as having operations raising concerns under international human rights standards in the occupied territories.
+972 Magazine & Investigative Tech-Sector Reporting
Coverage in +972 Magazine of technology companies and Israeli military systems — including reporting on AI-assisted targeting tools, mass surveillance infrastructure, and cloud computing contracts with Israeli military units — does not include Uber Technologies in identified military supply relationships within available training data 16.
BDS Movement & Boycott Campaigns
The BDS Movement’s official list of targeted companies and named campaigns does not include Uber Technologies as a campaign target 5. No institutional divestment decisions — by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endowments, or government investment bodies — specifically citing Uber’s Israeli defence sector activities have been identified in training data. No organised boycott, divestment, or shareholder exclusion campaign against Uber specifically related to Israeli military or security sector supply has been identified.
Corporate Response & Policy
No public evidence identified of any Uber corporate statement, policy change, contract termination, or end-use monitoring commitment made in response to civil society pressure regarding a defence supply chain relationship with Israel. Uber’s published human rights and ESG materials — including its Social Impact disclosures — address labour rights, driver welfare, data privacy, and accessibility, but contain no specific provisions regarding Israeli military or security end-use screening 14.
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001543151&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://investor.uber.com/financial-information/sec-filings/default.aspx ↩↩
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/19/22238840/uber-atg-aurora-acquisition-complete ↩
https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/07/uber-sells-elevate-to-joby-aviation/ ↩↩
https://bdsmovement.net/get-involved/what-to-boycott ↩
https://whoprofits.org ↩
https://investigate.afsc.org ↩
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-of-issues ↩
https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-occupied-palestinian-territories ↩
https://www.usaspending.gov ↩
https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2023&id=D000067003 ↩↩↩
https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/social-impact/ ↩
https://www.uber.com/us/en/business/ ↩
https://www.972mag.com ↩
