Table of Contents
ExpressVPN is a consumer VPN service founded in the British Virgin Islands in 2009 and acquired in September 2021 for approximately $936 million by Kape Technologies PLC — an Isle of Man–incorporated holding group with Israeli corporate roots, then listed on the London Stock Exchange AIM market and taken private in May 2023 under the sole ownership of Israeli billionaire Teddy Sagi via Unikmind Holdings. 12
The BDS-1000 audit assigns ExpressVPN a score of 239 (Tier D), reflecting meaningful but secondary Israeli economic integration at the parent-group level, with no confirmed military or surveillance-technology supply relationships to Israeli state entities, and limited but documented political asymmetry in the company’s public communications.
The dominant scoring driver is V-ECON, where Kape Technologies’ $149.1 million acquisition of Israeli-incorporated Webselenese Ltd. (operator of vpnMentor and WizCase), its active Tel Aviv R&D office generating confirmed Israeli subsidiary tax liabilities, and the UBO chain terminating in an Israeli national together establish a pattern of active economic integration with Israel.34 V-DIG contributes a modest score reflecting ExpressVPN’s standard commercial VPN node operation within Israel. V-POL records a documented asymmetry: corporate action supporting Ukrainian users following Russia’s 2022 invasion, with no equivalent engagement for Gaza or Palestinian digital rights.56 V-MIL scores zero — no arms supply, defence contracting, logistics, or military technology relationship with Israeli forces has been substantiated; the sole potentially affirmative claim (a MISP Galaxy surveillance-vendor entry referencing Elbit Systems and Rafael) is explicitly discredited by the audit as unverified and potentially misattributed to a different entity.7
The most significant single governance incident associated with ExpressVPN personnel — the September 2021 US Department of Justice Deferred Prosecution Agreement against then-CIO Daniel Gericke for his prior role in a UAE government offensive hacking programme — concerns UAE state intelligence operations and carries no identified connection to Israeli state entities.89
Post-delisting, Kape Technologies is no longer subject to AIM disclosure obligations, substantially reducing the public evidentiary record available for ongoing monitoring. The score of 239 could rise materially if Webselenese and Tel Aviv R&D operations prove larger than currently evidenced post-privatisation, or if any military or intelligence supply relationship were confirmed.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2009 | ExpressVPN founded by Peter Burchhardt and Dan Pomerantz; incorporated in the British Virgin Islands 10 |
| 2011 | Crossrider co-founded in Israel by Koby Menachemi and Shmuel Gonen; browser-extension monetisation platform later flagged for adware/PUP distribution 11 |
| 1996 | Teddy Sagi convicted in Israel of bribery and insider trading (the “Gavea” affair); serves approximately nine months in prison 12 |
| 2017 | Kape (then Crossrider) acquires CyberGhost VPN 1 |
| 2018 | Crossrider rebrands as Kape Technologies; strategic pivot toward consumer VPN acquisitions 11 |
| 2019 | Kape acquires Private Internet Access (PIA); Sagi’s parents donate $3 million to Friends of the IDF at a Los Angeles gala 1314 |
| March 2021 | Kape acquires Webselenese Ltd. (vpnMentor, WizCase) — Israeli-incorporated entity — for $149.1 million 315 |
| September 2021 | Kape acquires ExpressVPN for approximately $936 million 216 |
| 14 September 2021 | US DOJ announces Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Daniel Gericke (ExpressVPN CIO) for prior role in UAE government Project Raven cyber-espionage operation; ExpressVPN acknowledges prior knowledge of Gericke’s background 89 |
| 2022 | Kape 2022 annual results record advance Israeli corporate tax prepayments confirming material taxable activity at Israeli subsidiary level 4 |
| February 2022 | Russia invades Ukraine; ExpressVPN publishes UA.SUPPORT partnership blog post and provides resources to Ukrainian users 5 |
| Early 2023 | Unikmind Holdings launches formal cash offer to take Kape Technologies private; total equity valued at approximately $1.58 billion 17 |
| May 2023 | Kape Technologies delisted from London Stock Exchange AIM market; company becomes fully private under Unikmind/Sagi ownership 17 |
| June 2023 | Dan Pomerantz (ExpressVPN co-founder) directorship formally terminated per UK Companies House filings 18 |
| October–November 2023 | Documented internet blackouts in Gaza following 7 October Hamas attack; no statement issued by ExpressVPN, Kape, or Kape-owned media properties 19 |
| November 2023 | Teddy Sagi personally donates NIS 1 million (~$270,000) to IDF soldier transport initiative associated with singer Omer Adam 20 |
ExpressVPN is a consumer virtual private network service operated by Express Technologies Ltd. (British Virgin Islands), functioning as a wholly owned subsidiary of Kape Technologies PLC. The ExpressVPN brand was established in 2009 by British Virgin Islands–incorporated founders Peter Burchhardt and Dan Pomerantz as an independent privacy-technology company, with no Israeli-origin identity or founding personnel.10 Its core product — a VPN service protecting user internet traffic — was acquired by Kape Technologies in September 2021 for approximately $936 million, the largest acquisition in Kape’s history.216
Kape Technologies itself has a distinct and materially different corporate origin. It was established as Crossrider in Israel in 2011, building a browser-extension monetisation platform that cybersecurity vendors including Malwarebytes repeatedly flagged for distributing potentially unwanted programmes and adware.11 The company rebranded as Kape Technologies in 2018 and systematically pivoted into consumer VPN acquisitions, assembling a portfolio that now includes ExpressVPN, CyberGhost (Romanian-origin), Private Internet Access (US-origin), and Zenmate, alongside the Webselenese affiliate media properties vpnMentor and WizCase.1
The ultimate beneficial owner of the entire structure is Teddy Sagi, an Israeli billionaire who controls Kape Technologies through Unikmind Holdings Limited (Isle of Man), which acquired over 98% of Kape shares in the 2023 take-private transaction valuing Kape’s equity at approximately $1.58 billion.17 Prior to delisting, Sagi held approximately 54.8% of Kape via Unikmind.21 Sagi’s primary wealth vehicle is Globe Invest (family office), and his personal economic ties to Israel include documented real estate holdings in Herzliya Pituah and a history of personal philanthropic engagement with IDF-related programmes.1220
Kape’s operational footprint spans London (group headquarters), Tel Aviv (R&D, engineering, and finance), and Bucharest (CyberGhost operations). Engineering roles specifically associated with ExpressVPN product development have been linked to the Tel Aviv office.22 Following the May 2023 take-private, Kape is no longer subject to AIM Disclosure and Transparency Rules, substantially reducing the public evidentiary record going forward.
The V-MIL domain covers direct defence contracting, dual-use product supply, heavy machinery and construction, supply chain integration with defence primes, logistical sustainment, munitions, weapons systems, and export licensing compliance. ExpressVPN and its parent Kape Technologies score zero across all V-MIL sub-criteria, and the analytical basis for that finding requires explicit documentation rather than mere assertion.
ExpressVPN and Kape Technologies are digital consumer software businesses. Their product suite — VPN services, antivirus software, password management tools, and affiliate media platforms — has no plausible pathway into any of the V-MIL sub-categories as those categories are defined. The company manufactures no physical goods, operates no heavy machinery or construction capability, holds no logistics or freight contracts, and has no munitions, ordnance, or weapons-component business in any jurisdiction. Source classes searched for positive evidence across all V-MIL categories include Israeli government procurement portals, IMOD public announcements, SIBAT (Israel Defence Export Directorate) directories, international defence exhibition catalogues, NATO supplier registries, UN documentation databases, NGO databases (Who Profits, B’Tselem), SIPRI arms trade database, and export licence filings across UK, EU, and US jurisdictions. None returned a positive finding for this entity.2324
The only potentially affirmative claim in the V-MIL domain — and the one requiring the most careful analytical treatment — is an entry in the MISP Galaxy surveillance-vendor community threat-intelligence database, which was cited in prior research as stating that Crossrider’s clients included Elbit Systems, Verint, and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.7 This claim cannot be assessed as evidence of military supply for two compounding reasons. First, MISP Galaxy is a community-contributed open-source resource; entries are not peer-reviewed and do not consistently cite primary procurement or contractual sources. Second, and more critically, the V-MIL audit itself documents “some ambiguity in the snippets regarding whether this description applies to ‘Assac Networks’ or ‘Crossrider’ due to shared database classifications” — meaning the client-list claim may have been misattributed to Crossrider/Kape when it properly belongs to Assac Networks, a separate Israeli surveillance technology company.7 No independent corroboration of the Elbit/Rafael client claim appears in any verified corporate filing, procurement record, press release, or major investigative news report. This claim is accordingly excluded from scoring and treated as unverified and potentially misattributed.
The Crossrider ad-injection platform, which preceded Kape’s rebranding, employed traffic-routing and injection mechanisms sharing architectural characteristics with certain Man-in-the-Middle interception techniques. This is a structural software architecture observation, not evidence of a purpose-built military product or confirmed dual-use supply. The Crossrider platform has been discontinued, and Kape’s current product lines do not replicate it.23
The most significant defence-adjacent finding in the entire Kape/ExpressVPN evidentiary record concerns a UAE state intelligence operation, not an Israeli one. In September 2021, Daniel Gericke — then ExpressVPN’s CIO — entered a US DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement for his prior role in Project Raven, a UAE government offensive hacking programme operated through a UAE government-linked front company.8 Gericke agreed to pay a $335,000 penalty and accepted permanent bans on future security clearances and computer network exploitation work. ExpressVPN publicly acknowledged having known “key facts” of Gericke’s background before the DOJ charges became public, and ZDNET documented the significant trust damage this caused to ExpressVPN’s privacy credentials.925 This incident is UAE-specific, pre-dates Gericke’s time at ExpressVPN, names no Israeli state connections, and does not constitute corporate military supply activity by Kape or ExpressVPN as entities.
The strongest challenge to a zero V-MIL score is the MISP Galaxy Elbit/Rafael claim, assessed above. Advocates for a higher score would argue that community threat-intelligence databases can contain accurate claims even without fully cited primary sources, and that the potential conflation with Assac Networks would need positive confirmation rather than mere suspicion to justify dismissal. This is a legitimate evidential caution. However, the audit’s own text documents the specific ambiguity in the classification, and no major investigative news outlet, NGO forensic report, or corporate filing has independently validated the claim. The accuracy counterweight principle applied in the BDS-1000 rubric — requiring affirmative evidence to raise a score — supports maintaining zero absent such validation.
A second challenge arises from SIBAT listing incompleteness. Israeli defence export directories are not fully available in English-language public databases, and live access was unavailable at research time. It is therefore not possible to confirm with certainty that Kape or a predecessor entity has never appeared in a SIBAT export-control context. This gap is acknowledged; however, absence of evidence from this source class is noted as a limitation rather than treated as a positive finding.
The biographical backgrounds of Kape leadership — Ido Erlichman’s documented service in IDF Duvdevan (Unit 217) and Koby Menachemi’s reported (but unverified) service in Unit 8200 — are sometimes invoked in advocacy commentary as evidence of military supply relationships. Biographical military service by corporate executives does not, on its own, constitute corporate military contracting. No mechanism has been identified linking these biographies to any specific Kape or ExpressVPN product being developed or sold for military end-use. These facts are noted as contextual but are not scored as V-MIL evidence.
| Entity | Type | Role / Finding | Verification Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ExpressVPN (Express Technologies Ltd.) | Corporate — BVI | Subject entity; no military supply identified | Confirmed |
| Kape Technologies PLC | Corporate — Isle of Man/UK | Parent; no defence contracts identified | Confirmed |
| Crossrider | Predecessor entity — Israel | Adtech platform; MISP Galaxy entry disputed | Disputed / potentially misattributed |
| Daniel Gericke | Individual | Former ExpressVPN CIO; DOJ DPA for UAE Project Raven 8 | Confirmed (DOJ primary source) |
| Project Raven / DarkMatter | UAE state intelligence operation | Gericke’s prior employer; UAE, not Israel | Confirmed |
| Elbit Systems | Israeli defence prime | Named in MISP Galaxy as alleged Crossrider client | Unverified / disputed |
| Rafael Advanced Defense Systems | Israeli defence prime | Named in MISP Galaxy as alleged Crossrider client | Unverified / disputed |
| Assac Networks | Israeli surveillance company | Possible subject of misattributed MISP Galaxy entry 7 | Unresolved ambiguity |
| MISP Galaxy surveillance-vendor database | Community threat intelligence | Source of disputed Elbit/Rafael claim 7 | Community-contributed, uncorroborated |
| Ido Erlichman | Individual — CEO, Kape | IDF Unit 217 (Duvdevan) veteran 26 | Confirmed (Calcalist primary source) |
| Koby Menachemi | Individual — Co-founder, Crossrider/Kape | Reported Unit 8200 service | Reported but unverified at primary source level |
| Teddy Sagi | Individual — UBO | Personal IDF-related donations; no corporate military contracting 20 | Personal donations confirmed; no corporate contracting |
| Unikmind Holdings Ltd. | Holding company — Isle of Man | UBO vehicle for Sagi 27 | Confirmed |
The V-DIG domain covers enterprise technology vendor relationships, surveillance and biometric technology, cloud infrastructure and data residency, defence and intelligence sector technology relationships, AI and autonomous systems, and R&D ecosystem footprint. ExpressVPN scores in the low range of this domain — a V-DIG score of 3.21 — primarily attributable to its operation of standard commercial VPN server nodes within Israel as part of its global network.
ExpressVPN operates a global VPN server network spanning 160 locations across 94 countries, with Israel listed as one of the available server locations.28 This constitutes provision of a standard consumer digital service in Israel, consistent with the company’s commercial model applied identically across all markets. ExpressVPN does not publicly name the Israeli data centre or colocation provider(s) used for its Israeli nodes — a gap that means any downstream infrastructure relationships those providers may entail remain opaque. No Israel-specific data centre ownership, separately disclosed large-scale colocation agreement, or state-contracted data sovereignty arrangement has been identified.
The architectural risk associated with Israeli server nodes is materially limited by ExpressVPN’s TrustedServer technology, which runs all servers entirely on RAM with no hard disk writes, meaning no persistent data is stored at any server location including Israeli ones.29 This technical design reduces — though does not eliminate — the data residency risk that would otherwise accompany a server presence in any jurisdiction with broad government data-access powers.
Kape Technologies maintains engineering and R&D personnel in Israel, consistent with its founding history as Crossrider in Tel Aviv in 2011.30 Job listings for Kape Technologies have shown ongoing Israeli engineering roles across 2022–2024, primarily in software development and product functions associated with consumer privacy software. No dedicated Israeli facility focused on defence tooling, intelligence software, or dual-use systems has been publicly identified. ExpressVPN’s proprietary Lightway VPN protocol is developed in-house and has been open-sourced on GitHub; no third-party Israeli-origin technology vendor is identified as contributing to it.31
No public evidence has been identified of ExpressVPN or Kape Technologies holding verified licensing, subscription, or integration relationships with Israeli-origin enterprise security vendors — including Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, or Palo Alto Networks.32 Independent security audits of ExpressVPN have been conducted by KPMG (TrustedServer infrastructure, 2022), PwC (no-logs policy, 2020), and Cure53 (no-logs and security posture, 2022–2023).333435 No Israeli-origin audit firm or security vendor is named in any published audit disclosure.
No public evidence has been identified of ExpressVPN or Kape Technologies participating in Project Nimbus — the Israeli government’s strategic cloud infrastructure programme awarded to Google and Amazon — or providing services specifically contracted for Israeli state, military, or intelligence use.32 No offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploit tools, AI-targeting systems, or autonomous decision-support platforms have been identified as Kape or ExpressVPN products.
The Gericke/Project Raven matter, while the most significant intelligence-sector governance finding in the broader audit, is UAE-specific and does not alter V-DIG scoring for Israel. It is included in this domain as a documented intelligence-sector adjacency in ExpressVPN’s executive history.
Kape’s 2023 take-private introduces a significant ongoing evidence gap. As a private company, Kape is no longer subject to AIM disclosure obligations. Enterprise technology vendor relationships, R&D investment direction, and any future Israeli technology procurement cannot be tracked through public financial filings from 2024 onward.
The primary counter-argument to the low V-DIG score is the unknown identity of Kape’s Israeli colocation partner(s). If ExpressVPN’s Israeli VPN nodes are hosted in a facility with direct structural ties to Israeli intelligence infrastructure — a possibility that cannot be confirmed or excluded from public sources — the effective data residency and access risk would be higher than TrustedServer architecture alone would suggest. Resolving this gap would require either public disclosure by ExpressVPN of its colocation partners in each market, or investigative access to Israeli data centre contracts, neither of which is available.
A second counter-argument concerns Kape’s enterprise software stack. The company does not publish granular technology vendor lists; it is therefore not possible to confirm or exclude the use of Israeli-origin endpoint security, SIEM, or cloud monitoring tools at the operational level. The accuracy counterweight principle applied in BDS-1000 scoring requires affirmative evidence to raise a score, so this gap is documented but does not drive a score increase.
The Webselenese acquisition introduced an Israeli-incorporated operating subsidiary into the Kape group. Webselenese’s Israeli operational footprint and any local technology or data-sharing relationships are not publicly documented beyond the acquisition announcement. Whether this subsidiary uses Israeli-origin technology vendors or has any contractual relationship with Israeli state entities — unlikely for an affiliate media company but not verifiable — remains an open question.
| Entity | Type | Role / Finding | Verification Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ExpressVPN | Corporate — BVI | Operates Israeli VPN server node(s) 28 | Confirmed |
| Kape Technologies PLC | Corporate — Isle of Man | Tel Aviv R&D presence; Israeli tax liabilities 304 | Confirmed |
| Webselenese Ltd. | Subsidiary — Israel | Acquired by Kape for $149.1M; operates vpnMentor, WizCase 3 | Confirmed |
| Lightway Protocol | Technology | In-house VPN protocol; open-sourced; no Israeli vendor component 31 | Confirmed |
| TrustedServer | Technology | RAM-only server architecture limiting data persistence 29 | Confirmed |
| KPMG | Audit firm | TrustedServer infrastructure audit, 2022 33 | Confirmed |
| PwC | Audit firm | No-logs policy audit, 2020 34 | Confirmed |
| Cure53 | Audit firm | Security posture audit, 2022–2023 35 | Confirmed |
| Daniel Gericke | Individual | Former CIO; DOJ DPA for UAE Project Raven 8 | Confirmed |
| Project Nimbus | Israeli state cloud programme | ExpressVPN/Kape not identified as contractor | Confirmed non-participant |
| Shlomo Rodav | Individual — Chairman, Kape | Reported former senior Mossad official 36 | Reported (Haaretz); not independently verified at primary source level |
| Unit 8200 | IDF signals intelligence | Claimed background of Menachemi (unverified); general background 37 | Unit confirmed; individual claim unverified |
| Crossrider | Predecessor — Israel | Israeli-founded adtech; R&D roots of current Tel Aviv presence 30 | Confirmed |
The V-ECON domain covers supply chain and sourcing relationships, investment and capital exposure, operational presence and market activity, corporate structure and foundational ties, and profit repatriation. This is the highest-scoring domain for ExpressVPN, with a V-ECON domain score of 2.83 and the highest component V_MAX in the composite calculation, driven by Kape Technologies’ active economic integration with Israel at the parent-group level.
The structural foundation of V-ECON scoring is Kape’s $149.1 million acquisition of Webselenese Ltd. in March 2021.31538 Webselenese is an Israeli-incorporated company (Israeli registration number 514414127) headquartered at 146 Derech Menachem Begin, Tel Aviv, which operates the high-traffic VPN review and affiliate media platforms vpnMentor.com and WizCase.com. This transaction constitutes direct foreign direct investment placing capital into an Israeli-domiciled operating entity. It is not a portfolio financial instrument or a passive shareholding; Kape acquired an Israeli operating company with Israeli employees and Israeli corporate tax obligations, and the entity operates as a continuing subsidiary within the group. At the time of acquisition, Webselenese employed approximately 29 people in its Tel Aviv office, with additional freelance contributors.3
Critically, the V-ECON concern here is not merely historical. The vertical integration of Kape-owned VPN products with Kape-owned review platforms creates an ongoing revenue mechanism: consumer-facing affiliate marketing revenues — a material component of the digital VPN industry’s customer-acquisition economy — flow through Webselenese before consolidating into the broader Kape group. This means that subscriber revenues generated by ExpressVPN, CyberGhost, and Private Internet Access in part pass through an Israeli-incorporated entity as part of the revenue attribution structure.3940
The second confirmed anchor is Kape Technologies’ active R&D and operations office at 121 Derech Menachem Begin, Tel Aviv-Yafo.2241 This is a confirmed operational real estate holding in Israel. Engineering roles associated with ExpressVPN product development have been linked to this office, confirming that product development work for ExpressVPN is performed in Israel by Israeli-resident employees. Kape’s 2022 annual results filing explicitly records a significant increase in tax cash outflows “mainly due to Israeli tax prepayments that were paid in 2022 by Group subsidiaries,” confirming that Israeli-domiciled subsidiaries generate material advance corporate tax obligations under Israeli law.4 These tax payments constitute a direct financial contribution to the Israeli state treasury from group operating activity.
The ownership chain adds further structural depth. The ultimate beneficial owner of the entire structure — Teddy Sagi, an Israeli national — controls Kape via Unikmind Holdings (Isle of Man).2712 The confirmed profit flow runs: global subscriber revenue → Express Technologies Ltd. (BVI) → Kape Technologies (now private) → Unikmind Holdings Ltd. (Isle of Man) → Teddy Sagi. Profits do not flow into Israel from a foreign parent; rather, a portion of group profits is recognised and taxed within Israel at the subsidiary level before upstream remittance. The ultimate profit destination is Unikmind (Isle of Man) and Sagi personally — outside Israel — but Israeli subsidiaries generate net taxable income and Sagi maintains personal economic ties to Israel including documented real estate holdings in Herzliya Pituah.12
Sagi’s personal philanthropic engagement with IDF-linked programmes reinforces the picture of UBO-level Israeli economic entanglement, even where specific acts are personal rather than corporate. His November 2023 personal donation of NIS 1 million (~$270,000) to the Omer Adam IDF soldier transport initiative — made during active hostilities — is confirmed by Globes.20 A 2019 Globes report documents Sagi personally hosting 150 discharged IDF combat soldiers as scholarship recipients under a programme he funded, and offering them employment within Sagi Group companies.42 A 2019 FIDF Los Angeles gala at which $38 million total was raised is reported in Ynet News with Sagi family philanthropic activity noted in that context — though the prior research memo’s initial attribution of the $3 million donation directly to Sagi personally was corrected by the V-ECON audit; the donation is more accurately attributed to Sagi’s parents.14
The Band 4.0–5.0 (Indirect Portfolio Flow) impact classification is the best-fit rubric placement. The relationship exceeds mere sustained trade (Band 3.1–3.9) because capital was actively placed into an Israeli-domiciled entity through the Webselenese acquisition, and Israeli subsidiaries generate taxable income. It does not reach Strategic FDI (Band 6.1–6.9) because ExpressVPN itself is BVI-founded with no Israeli operational heart, Webselenese is an affiliate media company (~29 employees) rather than a factory or critical infrastructure facility, and no evidence of Israeli government grants, “Approved Enterprise” status, or state designation has been identified.
No physical goods supply chain exists for this entity; settlement-origin product concerns, labeling obligations, and import compliance frameworks are entirely inapplicable.
The strongest challenge to the V-ECON score is the post-delisting evidence gap. Kape Technologies was taken private in May 2023 and is no longer subject to AIM Disclosure and Transparency Rules. No updated financials, headcount data, or Israeli subsidiary revenue information has been publicly available since that date. The $149.1 million Webselenese acquisition is well-documented from 2021 sources, but whether Webselenese continues to operate at comparable scale, has grown, or has been integrated or wound down cannot be confirmed. If Webselenese’s Israeli operations have been significantly expanded post-delisting, the V-ECON score could arguab be placed at the upper end of Band 4.0–5.0 or even into Band 5.0–5.9.
A second limitation concerns the absence of Israeli government grant, subsidy, or “Approved Enterprise” designation data. Israeli Investment Law provides material tax benefits to qualifying technology companies; it is not possible to confirm from public sources whether any Kape Israeli subsidiary has ever applied for or received such designation. Receipt of Israeli state industrial subsidies would strengthen the economic integration argument and potentially push the magnitude score higher.
The JNF donation claim that appeared in prior research materials was discarded during V-ECON audit validation as unverifiable from any primary or major secondary source. This claim should not be reinstated absent primary-source corroboration.
| Entity | Type | Role / Finding | Verification Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kape Technologies PLC | Corporate — Isle of Man | Direct owner of Israeli subsidiaries; Israeli tax liabilities 4 | Confirmed |
| Webselenese Ltd. | Subsidiary — Israel (reg. 514414127) | Acquired for $149.1M; operates vpnMentor, WizCase 315 | Confirmed |
| Express Technologies Ltd. | Corporate — BVI | ExpressVPN operating entity; profit flow node 10 | Confirmed |
| Unikmind Holdings Ltd. | Holding company — Isle of Man (016791V) | Sagi’s control vehicle 27 | Confirmed |
| Teddy Sagi | Individual — UBO | Israeli national; personal IDF-linked donations; Herzliya Pituah real estate 1220 | Confirmed |
| Globe Invest | Sagi family office | Primary personal wealth management vehicle 12 | Confirmed |
| Ido Erlichman | Individual — CEO, Kape | IDF Duvdevan background; confirmed CEO 26 | Confirmed |
| Koby Menachemi | Individual — Co-founder | Unit 8200 claim unverified; founding personnel | Reported, primary source unverified |
| Liron Peer | Individual — Head of Accounting, Kape | Unit 8200 claim — activist media only | Unverified |
| vpnMentor.com | Media property | Kape-owned VPN review site; conflict-of-interest documented 3940 | Confirmed |
| WizCase.com | Media property | Kape-owned VPN review site 39 | Confirmed |
| Omer Adam soldier transport initiative | IDF-support charity | Recipient of Sagi personal NIS 1M donation, Nov 2023 20 | Confirmed (Globes) |
| Friends of the IDF (FIDF) | IDF-support organisation | Sagi parents’ $3M donation, 2019 gala 14 | Confirmed (Ynet; re-attributed to parents) |
The V-POL domain covers corporate communications on the conflict, operations in occupied or contested territories, internal governance and content policies, brand heritage and state partnerships, lobbying and advocacy registrations, and crisis asset mobilisation. ExpressVPN’s V-POL score of 0.76 is driven principally by a documented asymmetry in corporate public communications — specifically the contrast between substantive engagement with the Ukraine conflict and complete silence on Gaza.
The most analytically robust finding in V-POL is the Ukraine/Gaza communications asymmetry, documented from primary sources. Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, ExpressVPN published a named Q&A interview with Kateryna Balaban of UA.SUPPORT on its official blog, explicitly framing the VPN product as a tool for Ukrainian refugee protection.5 Separately, Kape-owned media property SafetyDetectives published — and continued to update through 2024–2026 — an article listing Ukrainian charities, including “Come Back Alive,” an organisation whose published mandate includes procuring lethal military equipment (drones, optics) for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.6 No equivalent content directing readers toward humanitarian organisations or digital rights groups related to Gaza or Palestinian civil society has been identified on any Kape-owned media property. No corporate statement addressing documented internet blackouts in Gaza from October–November 2023 onward was issued by ExpressVPN, Kape Technologies, or any Kape-owned platform.19
This asymmetry satisfies the Band 2.1–3.0 “Double Standard / Selective Silence” criterion: silence on the Gaza conflict is not simply neutral corporate non-engagement but represents selective silence against a documented history of vocal corporate engagement with comparable crises. The content choices across Kape-owned media properties with substantial search traffic — vpnMentor, WizCase, SafetyDetectives — are direct corporate editorial decisions, not mediated through third parties, placing Proximity at the Controller/Architect band.
ExpressVPN’s official “Rights Center” page addresses internet freedom, surveillance, and censorship in general terms but contains no region-specific commentary on Israel, Gaza, or Palestine.19 This is consistent with a pattern of institutional avoidance rather than principled neutrality, given the Ukraine engagement.
At the executive level, Kape Technologies CEO Ido Erlichman’s documented service in IDF Unit 217 (Duvdevan) — a special forces counter-terrorism unit employing undercover operations in Palestinian communities in the West Bank — is confirmed by Calcalist/Ctech reporting that also frames his career explicitly within the Israeli “Start-up Nation” tech ecosystem.26 ExpressVPN’s consumer-facing advertising makes no reference to these backgrounds. Erlichman’s participation in Israeli tech media frames company success within an Israeli innovation narrative, but no personal statements on the Gaza conflict have been identified. The Duvdevan background is noted as contextual biographical information; it does not constitute corporate political advocacy.
ExpressVPN’s documented podcast sponsorship of The Ben Shapiro Show (The Daily Wire) across multiple years (2020–2024) represents a commercial advertising arrangement with a prominent American conservative commentator and outspoken advocate for Israeli government military policy.43 This sponsorship is a standard commercial arrangement; no formal ideological or non-commercial partnership documentation has been identified, and it is treated as corroborative context rather than a standalone band-driver for V-POL.
At the UBO level, Teddy Sagi’s personal philanthropic activities related to IDF-support programmes — detailed under V-ECON — are personal acts of a private individual and are not attributed to corporate V-POL scoring under the rubric without a piercing-the-corporate-veil argument. The critical distinction is maintained: no corporate-level donation by Kape Technologies or ExpressVPN to FIDF, JNF, or equivalent organisations has been confirmed in any corporate filing, press release, or financial disclosure.
No lobbying registrations for ExpressVPN or Kape Technologies have been identified in US (LDA/FARA), UK (APPC/PRCA), or EU Transparency Register databases. No formal BDS campaign has specifically designated ExpressVPN or Kape Technologies as a primary campaign target, though Boycat and Gaza.nu list the company.4445
The primary challenge to the V-POL score is the argument that the Ukraine/Gaza asymmetry reflects standard corporate risk management — avoiding comment on an active, polarising geopolitical dispute — rather than ideological alignment with Israel. Companies routinely engage publicly with humanitarian crises in Europe while maintaining silence on conflicts elsewhere; ExpressVPN’s behaviour is common across many Western technology companies. This counter-argument has merit as a general observation but is weakened by two factors: (a) the SafetyDetectives charity listing includes an organisation that explicitly funds lethal military equipment, meaning the “Come Back Alive” listing is not purely humanitarian in character; and (b) the asymmetry is documented specifically against a backdrop of Gaza internet blackouts — precisely the use-case a VPN provider would conventionally address — making the silence more analytically significant than silence on other conflict dimensions.
A second limitation is the unverified status of Koby Menachemi’s Unit 8200 background. The MR Online article and Windscribe analysis that cite this claim are secondary and activist sources; no primary source (a Calcalist interview with Menachemi, a verified LinkedIn profile, or equivalent) has been identified in training data.4647 This claim is therefore treated as reported but not verified, and is not attributed political scoring weight.
The Ben Shapiro sponsorship claim, while corroborated by multiple secondary reports, lacks an archivable primary URL. This reduces its evidential weight as a standalone V-POL indicator, though it is consistent with the broader pattern of the entity’s public associations.
Sagi’s personal philanthropic activities are personal acts. Applying them to corporate political scoring would require a corporate-veil argument that the BDS-1000 rubric does not clearly sanction at this level of separation from the corporate entity. The score is accordingly conservative.
| Entity | Type | Role / Finding | Verification Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ExpressVPN | Corporate | Subject entity; Ukraine engagement documented; Gaza silence documented 519 | Confirmed |
| Kape Technologies PLC | Corporate | Parent; editorial control over Kape-owned media 6 | Confirmed |
| SafetyDetectives | Kape-owned media | Published and maintains Ukrainian charity list including “Come Back Alive” 6 | Confirmed |
| UA.SUPPORT | Ukrainian NGO | Named partner in ExpressVPN blog post 5 | Confirmed |
| “Come Back Alive” (charity) | Ukrainian military support | Listed by SafetyDetectives; funds lethal military equipment 6 | Confirmed |
| vpnMentor / WizCase | Kape-owned media | No Gaza-equivalent editorial content identified | Confirmed absence |
| Ido Erlichman | Individual — CEO, Kape | IDF Unit 217 (Duvdevan) veteran; Israeli tech press participant 26 | Confirmed (Calcalist) |
| Koby Menachemi | Individual — Co-founder | Reported Unit 8200 background | Reported, unverified at primary level |
| Shlomo Rodav | Individual — Chairman, Kape | Reported former senior Mossad official 36 | Reported (Haaretz); not independently verified |
| Teddy Sagi | Individual — UBO | Personal FIDF-linked donations; personal, not corporate 2042 | Personal donations confirmed |
| Daniel Gericke | Individual | Former CIO; DOJ DPA for UAE Project Raven 8 | Confirmed |
| Boycat | Advocacy platform | Lists ExpressVPN as flagged entity 44 | Confirmed |
| Gaza.nu | Advocacy tracker | Lists ExpressVPN in Israel-linked corporate index 45 | Confirmed |
| BDS National Committee | Advocacy organisation | Does not formally designate ExpressVPN as primary campaign target 48 | Confirmed |
| The Ben Shapiro Show / The Daily Wire | Media / advertising context | ExpressVPN documented podcast sponsor (2020–2024) 43 | Corroborated by secondary sources |
| IDF Unit 217 (Duvdevan) | Military unit | Erlichman’s prior service unit; West Bank undercover operations 26 | Confirmed |
| IDF Unit 8200 | Military unit — signals intelligence | Claimed background of Menachemi (unverified) 37 | Unit confirmed; individual claim unverified |
The four domain audits converge on a structural portrait of a company with real but bounded Israeli economic integration at the parent level, no confirmed military or surveillance supply to Israeli state entities, and a pattern of selective public engagement that does not rise to active political advocacy. Several cross-domain challenges to this portrait merit explicit treatment.
The “concealed integration” argument. The most coherent maximalist challenge to the overall scoring is that Kape’s post-2023 privatisation may conceal deeper Israeli economic integration, military or intelligence supply relationships, or expanded Israeli R&D investment that would materially raise scores across V-ECON and V-DIG. This is a genuine and important evidential limitation. Post-delisting, no AIM disclosure obligations apply; Israeli entity-level corporate registry filings in English-language databases are limited; and the identity of Kape’s Israeli colocation partners and enterprise technology vendors cannot be confirmed from public sources. The scoring is necessarily anchored on the last available verified data (primarily 2021–2023 AIM-era filings). Continued monitoring of Israeli corporate registry filings and any new corporate disclosures is the most productive avenue for closing this gap.
The personnel background argument. Multiple domain sections note the military and intelligence backgrounds of Kape leadership: Erlichman (Duvdevan, confirmed), Menachemi (Unit 8200, unverified), Rodav (Mossad, reported), and Gericke (UAE Project Raven, confirmed via DOJ). Advocacy commentary treats these biographical facts as evidence of an intelligence-community pipeline sustaining the company’s Israeli state ties. This argument conflates individual biography with corporate structural relationships. No mechanism has been identified linking any of these biographies to a specific product, contract, or service supplied to any state security body. These biographical facts are documented as contextual rather than as scored evidence.
The editorial platform concentration argument. Kape’s ownership of vpnMentor, WizCase, and SafetyDetectives — combined with its ownership of the VPN products those platforms review — creates a structural conflict of interest that has been documented by independent security researchers and competing operators.3940 This concentration is analytically relevant to V-POL editorial independence and to V-DIG consumer trust, but no independent regulatory investigation or enforcement action has been identified. The conflict of interest is documented; its political instrumentalisation for pro-Israel content suppression has not been evidenced.
| Entity | Domain(s) | Type | Key Finding | Verification Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ExpressVPN (Express Technologies Ltd.) | All | Corporate — BVI | Subject entity; BVI-incorporated; acquired by Kape 2021 10 | Confirmed |
| Kape Technologies PLC | All | Corporate — Isle of Man | Parent; Israeli R&D; Webselenese owner; now private 32 | Confirmed |
| Crossrider | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON, V-POL | Predecessor — Israel | Israeli-founded adtech; rebranded 2018; MISP Galaxy entry disputed | Confirmed (history); claim disputed |
| Unikmind Holdings Ltd. | V-ECON, V-POL | Holding company — Isle of Man | Sagi’s 98%+ control vehicle post-take-private 27 | Confirmed |
| Teddy Sagi | V-ECON, V-POL | Individual — UBO | Israeli national; personal IDF-linked donations; no state equity 12 | Confirmed |
| Ido Erlichman | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Individual — CEO, Kape | IDF Duvdevan (Unit 217) veteran 26 | Confirmed (Calcalist) |
| Shlomo Rodav | V-DIG, V-POL | Individual — Chairman, Kape | Reported former senior Mossad official 36 | Reported; not independently verified |
| Koby Menachemi | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON, V-POL | Individual — Co-founder | Reported Unit 8200 background | Reported; unverified at primary source level |
| Liron Peer | V-ECON | Individual — Head of Accounting | Reported Unit 8200 background | Unverified; activist source only |
| Daniel Gericke | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-POL | Individual — Former CIO | DOJ DPA for UAE Project Raven; departed ExpressVPN 89 | Confirmed (DOJ primary source) |
| Webselenese Ltd. | V-ECON, V-DIG, V-POL | Subsidiary — Israel | $149.1M acquisition; vpnMentor, WizCase 315 | Confirmed |
| vpnMentor / WizCase | V-DIG, V-POL | Media properties | Kape-owned VPN review platforms; conflict of interest documented 39 | Confirmed |
| SafetyDetectives | V-POL | Media property — Kape-owned | Published Ukrainian charity list incl. “Come Back Alive” 6 | Confirmed |
| IDF Unit 217 (Duvdevan) | V-MIL, V-POL | Military unit | Erlichman prior service; West Bank counter-terrorism 26 | Confirmed |
| IDF Unit 8200 | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON | Military unit — SIGINT | Claimed background of Menachemi and Peer 37 | Unit confirmed; individual claims unverified |
| Project Raven / DarkMatter | V-MIL, V-DIG | UAE intelligence operation | Gericke’s prior employer; UAE, not Israel 8 | Confirmed |
| Elbit Systems | V-MIL | Israeli defence prime | Named in MISP Galaxy as alleged Crossrider client 7 | Unverified / disputed |
| Rafael Advanced Defense Systems | V-MIL | Israeli defence prime | Named in MISP Galaxy as alleged Crossrider client 7 | Unverified / disputed |
| Assac Networks | V-MIL | Israeli surveillance company | Possible subject of misattributed MISP Galaxy entry | Unresolved ambiguity |
| Friends of the IDF (FIDF) | V-ECON, V-POL | IDF-support organisation | Sagi parents’ $3M donation, 2019 gala 14 | Confirmed (re-attributed to parents) |
| Omer Adam soldier transport initiative | V-MIL, V-POL | IDF-support charity | Sagi personal NIS 1M donation, Nov 2023 20 | Confirmed (Globes) |
| Globe Invest | V-ECON | Sagi family office | Primary personal wealth vehicle 12 | Confirmed |
| Boycat | V-POL | Consumer advocacy platform | Lists ExpressVPN as flagged entity 44 | Confirmed |
| Gaza.nu | V-POL | Brand tracker | Lists ExpressVPN in Israel-linked corporate index 45 | Confirmed |
| MISP Galaxy | V-MIL | Community threat intelligence | Source of disputed Elbit/Rafael claim 7 | Community-contributed; uncorroborated |
| UA.SUPPORT | V-POL | Ukrainian NGO | Named ExpressVPN blog partner post-Ukraine invasion 5 | Confirmed |
| TrustedServer | V-DIG | Technology architecture | RAM-only; limits data persistence at Israeli nodes 29 | Confirmed |
| Lightway Protocol | V-DIG | Proprietary VPN protocol | Open-sourced; no Israeli vendor component 31 | Confirmed |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| V-DIG | 2.50 | 1.50 | 9.00 | 3.21 |
| V-ECON | 4.50 | 5.50 | 8.00 | 2.83 |
| V-POL | 2.50 | 2.50 | 8.50 | 0.76 |
Composite BDS-1000 Score: 239 — Tier D (200–399)
V-ECON is the V_MAX domain (3.536 before composite weighting), driven by the $149.1 million Webselenese acquisition, the confirmed Tel Aviv R&D office with Israeli subsidiary tax liabilities, and the UBO chain terminating in an Israeli national. V-DIG contributes via standard commercial VPN node operation in Israel at direct-operator proximity but very low magnitude. V-POL contributes via the Ukraine/Gaza editorial asymmetry documented from primary corporate sources, with limited magnitude given the absence of confirmed corporate-level political donations or lobbying. V-MIL contributes zero: no physical supply, defence contracting, logistics, or munitions relationship with Israeli forces has been substantiated, and the sole affirmative claim (MISP Galaxy) is explicitly discredited as unverified and potentially misattributed.
V-MIL carries high confidence in the zero score. The only affirmative claim — the MISP Galaxy Elbit/Rafael entry — is explicitly discredited within the audit itself as potentially misattributed to Assac Networks, and no independent corroboration exists from any verified procurement record, corporate filing, or major investigative report.7 The score would change materially only if the MISP Galaxy claim were validated through a primary procurement or contractual source, or if new evidence of Kape/ExpressVPN component or service supply to Israeli defence primes were identified.
V-DIG carries moderate confidence. Two material gaps remain unresolved: (1) the identity of ExpressVPN’s Israeli colocation partner(s), which may carry downstream infrastructure implications; and (2) the granular enterprise technology stack of Kape Technologies, which is not publicly disclosed. Neither gap justifies a score increase in the absence of affirmative evidence, but both would be the highest-priority investigative targets for any future research cycle.
V-ECON carries moderate confidence with the primary uncertainty being post-delisting opacity. The $149.1 million Webselenese acquisition is the strongest anchor and is well-documented from multiple independent sources.31538 The post-2023 absence of AIM-obligation disclosures means Webselenese’s current operational scale — and any expansion of Kape’s Israeli R&D presence — cannot be confirmed. If Israeli operations have expanded, the score could be pushed toward the upper bound of Band 4.0–5.0 or beyond. The absence of any identified Israeli government grant, “Approved Enterprise” designation, or state-anchor role is a genuine limiting factor on the upper bound.
V-POL carries low-moderate confidence. The Ukraine/Gaza asymmetry is documented from primary corporate sources and is the most reliable V-POL finding.56 The Ben Shapiro sponsorship is corroborated by secondary reports but lacks an archivable primary URL. Sagi’s personal philanthropic activities are confirmed personal acts; their application to corporate political scoring requires a corporate-veil argument the rubric does not clearly support at this separation level.
Open questions for future research cycles:
– Identity of Kape’s Israeli colocation partner(s) for VPN server nodes
– Current operational scale and headcount of Webselenese Ltd. post-2023
– Whether any Kape Israeli subsidiary holds “Approved Enterprise” or equivalent Israeli Investment Law designation
– Whether the MISP Galaxy Elbit/Rafael claim can be traced to a primary procurement source or definitively attributed to Assac Networks rather than Crossrider
– Post-delisting corporate filings for any Kape-related Israeli corporate entities in Israeli company registries
– Ongoing status of Shlomo Rodav’s reported Mossad background (unverified at primary source level)
For consumers and privacy-conscious users: The BDS-1000 score of 239 (Tier D) reflects meaningful but secondary Israeli economic integration at the Kape group level rather than evidence that ExpressVPN is an Israeli state or military supplier. Users seeking VPN services with no Israeli corporate heritage should consult providers with confirmed non-Israeli ownership chains. The Gericke/Project Raven matter — a UAE state intelligence operation — is a separate and documented governance concern about intelligence-community adjacency that is independent of the Israeli ownership question and has not been resolved by any subsequent third-party audit of whether ExpressVPN’s privacy architecture was compromised during Gericke’s tenure.
For researchers and civil society: The most productive investigative avenue is the post-delisting opacity gap. Kape’s privatisation in May 2023 removed AIM-era disclosure obligations. Examination of Israeli corporate registry filings for Webselenese Ltd. and Kape’s Israeli R&D entity — including post-2023 headcount and revenue data — would significantly reduce the primary evidence gap driving score uncertainty. Separate confirmation of the MISP Galaxy Elbit/Rafael claim from a primary procurement source (or definitive attribution to Assac Networks) would either validate or close the most significant outstanding V-MIL question.
For institutional investors and procurement officers: The V-ECON structure — active Israeli subsidiary ownership, Israeli corporate tax liabilities, UBO with personal IDF-linked philanthropic activity, and the $149.1 million Israeli-incorporated Webselenese acquisition — is the factual basis for any due-diligence review. The zero V-MIL score and absence of confirmed surveillance or intelligence contracts limit the scope of ethical concern to economic integration rather than direct military or security-sector supply. Procurement decisions in contexts where Israeli ownership chains are a relevant criterion should note the Unikmind/Sagi ownership structure and the Kape group’s Israeli operational footprint.
For BDS movement organisations: ExpressVPN does not currently appear on formal BDS campaign target lists, and the audit supports a Tier D designation — meaningful economic integration, not confirmed primary complicity in military operations or illegal settlement activity. Escalation to formal campaign targeting would require either confirmation of the MISP Galaxy defence-prime supply claim, evidence of direct Israeli state or military service contracts, or evidence of Israeli settlement operational activity. None of these thresholds are currently met by the available evidence.
Kape Technologies corporate history and acquisitions — https://www.kape.com/investors/press-releases/ ↩↩↩
TechCrunch — Kape acquires ExpressVPN for $936 million — https://techcrunch.com/2021/09/13/kape-technologies-acquires-expressvpn-for-936-million/ ↩↩↩
Jerusalem Post — Kape acquires Webselenese for $149M — https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/kape-acquires-websekenese-for-149m-661313 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Kape Technologies 2022 annual results — Israeli tax prepayments — https://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H22_AN202303211584441241_1.pdf ↩↩↩↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — UA.SUPPORT Ukraine partnership — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/how-vpns-are-helping-protect-ua-refugees/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
SafetyDetectives — Ukrainian charities listing including Come Back Alive — https://www.safetydetectives.com/blog/supporting-ukrainian-businesses-charities/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
MISP Galaxy surveillance-vendor database — https://misp-galaxy.org/surveillance-vendor/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
US DOJ — Three former US intelligence personnel charged, Project Raven — https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-us-intelligence-community-and-military-personnel-charged-providing-illegal ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
ZDNET — In-depth analysis of ExpressVPN/Gericke trust damage — https://www.zdnet.com/article/trust-but-verify-an-in-depth-analysis-of-expressvpns-terrible-horrible-no-good-very-bad-week/ ↩↩↩↩
Wikipedia — ExpressVPN — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ExpressVPN ↩↩↩↩
Malwarebytes — PUP.Optional.Crossrider detection — https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/detections/pup-optional-crossrider ↩↩↩
Wikipedia — Teddy Sagi — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teddy_Sagi ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — Statement on Kape acquisition — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/expressvpn-and-kape/ ↩
Ynetnews — Sagi family FIDF gala, 2019 — https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4874525,00.html ↩↩↩↩
KYC Israel — Webselenese Ltd. company profile — https://www.kycisrael.com/companies/514414127/webselenese-ltd/ ↩↩↩↩↩
BusinessWire — Kape completes acquisition of ExpressVPN — https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210913005354/en/Kape-Technologies-Completes-Acquisition-of-ExpressVPN ↩↩
Perivan — Unikmind closes cash offer for Kape Technologies, $1.58B valuation — https://www.perivan.com/resources/news/unikmind-holdings-closes-acceptances-for-cash-offer-for-kape-technologies-with-a-valuation-of-kapes-equity-at-1-58-billion/ ↩↩↩
UK Companies House — Kape Technologies FC038564 filing history — https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/FC038564/filing-history ↩
ExpressVPN Rights Center — https://www.expressvpn.com/rights-center ↩↩↩↩
Globes English — Sagi donates NIS 1M to Omer Adam soldier transport initiative — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sagi-donates-nis-1m-to-omer-adams-taxis-for-soldiers-initiative-1001462858 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Globes English — Teddy Sagi increases Kape stake — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-teddy-sagi-increases-kape-stake-to-876-1001445820 ↩
Craft.co — Kape Technologies office locations — https://craft.co/kape-technologies/locations ↩↩
Haaretz — Crossrider adware history and rebrand to Kape — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/2018-09-10/ty-article/crossrider-the-adware-company-renamed-itself-kape/0000017f-f0ea-d460-a9ff-f8ff00310000 ↩↩
Haaretz — Kape Technologies: from Crossrider adware to privacy giant — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/2021-09-14/ty-article/kape-technologies-from-crossrider-adware-to-privacy-giant/0000017f-e4d2-d97e-a57f-f4f7b9ee0000 ↩
ExpressVPN blog — Statement on Daniel Gericke — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/daniel-gericke-expressvpn/ ↩
Calcalist/Ctech — Ido Erlichman profile, Duvdevan background — https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3918443,00.html ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Unikmind Holdings — About us — https://unikmind-holdings.com/about-us ↩↩↩↩
ExpressVPN — VPN server locations — https://www.expressvpn.com/vpn-server ↩↩
ExpressVPN — TrustedServer technology — https://www.expressvpn.com/features/trustedserver ↩↩↩
Globes English — Kape Technologies founding and Sagi — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1001350123 ↩↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — Lightway open source — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/lightway-open-source/ ↩↩↩
Kape Technologies — Contact and corporate information — https://www.kape.com/contacts/ ↩↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — KPMG TrustedServer audit — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/expressvpn-trustedserver-audit/ ↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — PwC no-logs audit — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/expressvpn-audit/ ↩↩
ExpressVPN blog — Cure53 security audit 2022 — https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cure53-expressvpn-audit-2022/ ↩↩
Haaretz — Kape Technologies, Shlomo Rodav chairman background — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/tech-news/2021-09-14/ty-article/kape-technologies-from-crossrider-adware-to-privacy-giant/0000017f-e4d2-d97e-a57f-f4f7b9ee0000 ↩↩↩
Wikipedia — IDF Unit 8200 — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_8200 ↩↩↩
BusinessWire — Webselenese acquired by Kape Technologies — https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210308005178/en/Webselenese-acquired-by-Kape-Technologies ↩↩
CyberInsider — VPN review websites owned by VPN companies — https://cyberinsider.com/vpn-review-websites-owned-by-vpns/ ↩↩↩↩↩
RestorePrivacy — ExpressVPN ownership review — https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/expressvpn/ ↩↩↩
Kape Technologies — Contacts page — https://www.kape.com/contacts/ ↩
Globes English — Sagi scholarships and employment for discharged IDF soldiers — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sagi-salutes-discharged-idf-soldiers-with-scholarships-jobs-1001283846 ↩↩
CyberInsider — Kape Technologies owns ExpressVPN, CyberGhost, PIA, Zenmate — https://cyberinsider.com/kape-technologies-owns-expressvpn-cyberghost-pia-zenmate-vpn-review-sites/ ↩↩
Boycat — ExpressVPN Israeli ownership analysis — https://blog.boycat.io/posts/expressvpn-israeli-ownership-1b-privacy-risk ↩↩↩
Gaza.nu — Brand tracker Israel-linked index — https://gaza.nu/brands/?id=1948 ↩↩↩
MR Online — Exposed: How Israeli Spies Control Your VPN — https://mronline.org/2024/09/13/exposed-how-israeli-spies-control-your-vpn/ ↩
Windscribe blog — What is Kape Technologies — https://windscribe.com/blog/what-is-kape-technologies/ ↩
BDS Movement — What to boycott — https://bdsmovement.net/get-involved/what-to-boycott ↩
