Table of Contents
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. is a Japanese automotive manufacturer whose relationship with Israel is structurally that of a foreign exporter supplying goods to an independent, arm’s-length franchised distributor — Champion Motors Ltd. (also referenced as Carasso Motors in earlier records) — with no direct military, digital, investment, or political advocacy footprint in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories.
Across all four BDS-1000 domains, the dominant finding is absence. No direct defence contracts, no Israeli-origin technology vendors confirmed at production scale, no foreign direct investment in Israel, no R&D facilities, and no political donations or advocacy activities specifically concerning the conflict have been identified in corporate filings, NGO databases, export control records, or open-source investigative reporting. The company’s vehicles — principally the Nissan Patrol and Navara platforms — are present in Israeli security force fleets, but this presence is attributable to civilian distributor sales through standard commercial channels rather than to any direct manufacturer-to-state procurement arrangement.
The single highest-scoring domain is V-ECON (Economic), which reflects the sustained, decades-long exclusive franchise distribution relationship with Champion Motors as the sole channel for Nissan vehicle sales in Israel. This relationship is transactional in character: Nissan collects wholesale transfer pricing income, exercises no equity or governance control over the distributor, and Israel is subsumed within an undifferentiated “Other” or “Middle East and Africa” geographic reporting segment across all investor-facing filings. No Israeli factory, data centre, logistics hub, or R&D presence has been identified.
A notable finding in V-POL is the asymmetry between Nissan’s documented corporate response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine — which involved formal suspension of operations, vehicle export halts, and eventual divestiture of Russian assets — and the complete absence of any comparable statement or operational response regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. This asymmetry is factually grounded and supports a “double standard” classification in the V-POL Impact criterion, though the overall V-POL contribution to the composite score remains low given the absence of active political advocacy, donations, or lobbying.
Evidence gaps have been identified and are described in detail in each domain section. The most consequential unresolved questions concern: whether Mobileye EyeQ-based ADAS chips are present in current Nissan production vehicles (V-DIG); whether Argus Cyber Security technology — an Israeli-origin product embedded in Continental AG’s automotive cybersecurity stack — reaches Nissan via its Tier-1 supply relationships (V-DIG); and the precise financial scale of the Champion Motors franchise arrangement, which is disclosed only in Hebrew-language TASE filings (V-ECON). None of these gaps, even under worst-case resolution, would materially alter the composite score or move the target out of Tier E.
The composite BDS-1000 score of 120 (Tier E) is assessed as robust across plausible alternative scoring scenarios.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1933 | Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. founded in Japan as Jidosha-Seizo Co.; renamed Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. in 1934 1 |
| Pre-2020 (ongoing) | Nissan Patrol (Y60/Y61 series) documented in use by IDF, Israeli Border Police, and Israeli Prison Service; vehicles reach end-users via commercial distributor 2 |
| 2019 | NTT Group strategic IT infrastructure and connected-car services partnership with Nissan announced 3 |
| January 2021 | Nissan names Microsoft Azure as its “preferred cloud partner” for manufacturing, connected-car, and enterprise IT globally 4 |
| February 2022 | Nissan formally suspends operations and vehicle exports to Russia following invasion of Ukraine 5 |
| February 2023 | Renault-Nissan Alliance equity rebalancing completed; Renault reduces stake to approximately 36% of Nissan 6 |
| 2023 | Nissan divests Russian assets, transferring them to a Russian state entity 5 |
| December 2023 | Akira ransomware group attacks Nissan Oceania, ultimately affecting approximately 100,000 individuals 7 |
| 2023 | Nissan North America data breach affecting over 53,000 employees via third-party MOVEit software vulnerability 8 |
| 2022 | Accenture confirmed as digital transformation integrator for Nissan smart factory programme 9 |
| October 2023 – present | No Nissan corporate statement on the Israel-Palestine conflict, Hamas attacks, or Gaza military operations identified 5 |
| November 2024 | Nissan announces plan to cut approximately 9,000 jobs and reduce global production capacity; CEO Makoto Uchida steps down 10 |
| December 2024 | Honda-Nissan merger discussions publicly reported 11 |
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. is a publicly listed Japanese automotive manufacturer incorporated in 1933 and headquartered in Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture. Its primary business — the design, manufacture, and sale of passenger vehicles, light commercial vehicles, and light trucks — is conducted across a global manufacturing network spanning Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Mexico, China, Spain, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand. Nissan’s principal vehicle brands include Nissan and Infiniti.12
Nissan is the central operating entity of the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance. As of 2024–2025, Renault S.A. holds approximately 36% of Nissan shares following the 2023 equity rebalancing agreement; Nissan holds approximately 15% of Renault shares on a non-voting basis; and Nissan holds approximately 34% of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation.6 The French state holds approximately 15% of Renault, making it an indirect minority beneficial owner of Nissan — a commercial and strategic holding with no documented geopolitical mandate related to Israel-Palestine.13
The company’s confirmed enterprise technology anchors are Microsoft Azure (preferred cloud partner since 2021), SAP (ERP backbone), and NTT Group (Japan-based network and data infrastructure).43 A major digital transformation programme was initiated in 2022 in partnership with Accenture.9
Nissan’s financial condition deteriorated materially in 2024, culminating in a November 2024 announcement of approximately 9,000 job cuts and reduced production capacity, alongside publicly reported merger discussions with Honda Motor Co., Ltd.1011 These structural developments have no identified Israel-Palestine dimension.
In the Israeli market, Nissan operates exclusively through Champion Motors Ltd., a privately held Israeli automotive importer headquartered in Jaffa, Israel, which holds the exclusive import and distribution licence for Nissan and Infiniti branded vehicles in Israel.14 Champion Motors is an independently operated entity; Nissan exercises no disclosed equity or governance control over it. Vehicle sales, after-sales service, employment, and local tax obligations within Israel are entirely attributable to Champion Motors as an autonomous Israeli enterprise.
The V-MIL audit addressed six potential pathways for Nissan’s military involvement with Israeli state security bodies: direct defence contracting, dual-use product supply, heavy machinery and construction, supply chain integration with Israeli defence primes, logistical sustainment and base services, and munitions or weapons systems. Across all six pathways, the audit finding is an absence of direct, confirmed involvement.
The most substantive finding in this domain is the documented presence of the Nissan Patrol — specifically the Y60 and Y61 series — in Israeli security force fleets, including the IDF, Israeli Border Police, and Israeli Prison Service.2 The Patrol’s global adoption by security services across multiple continents is consistent with its civilian-market utility vehicle classification; it is marketed and sold as a standard commercial product without a purpose-built mil-spec variant offered by Nissan Motor Co. under a distinct military product line.2 This fleet presence is, on available evidence, attributable to civilian distributor sales through Champion Motors (historically Carasso Motors), not to any direct manufacturer-to-state procurement arrangement.
The rubric distinction that governs the Impact scoring here is the difference between a manufacturer that sells defence-dedicated products directly to a state’s military procurement system — which would attract a high Impact score — and a manufacturer whose civilian-market products happen to be purchased by security forces through standard commercial channels. The audit reviewed official Israeli government procurement records, Nissan corporate disclosures, SIBAT (Israel Defence Export Directorate) listings, and ISDEF and Eurosatory exhibition catalogues. No Nissan entry appears in any of these defence-procurement-specific records.1516 This evidence set supports the Incidental band (I = 1.50) rather than any higher rubric tier.
The Nissan Navara (D40/D23) and NP300 Hardbody pickup platforms are similarly present in military and paramilitary inventories globally, including across the Middle East.1718 As with the Patrol, no Israeli-specific mil-spec variant, no IDF-specific delivery programme, and no Israeli upfitter relationship serving a government-adjacent contract have been identified. Third-party tactical conversion — roll cages, radio infrastructure, weapon-mount fitting — is documented as occurring downstream of the Nissan supply chain, with no Nissan corporate involvement or contractual link identified.2
On the supply chain integration criterion, the audit examined whether Nissan has any component, sub-system, or raw material supply relationship with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), or Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Elbit’s 2023 annual report does not identify Nissan as a supplier or partner at any tier.19 No analogous relationship with IAI or Rafael appears in any primary source.2021 The Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance operates a shared global supply base, but no Alliance-level component supply arrangement to Israeli defence prime contractors has been identified in corporate disclosures or Alliance communications.22 SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database does not record Nissan as a named supplier in Israeli defence-related transfers.23
Nissan’s classification as an automotive manufacturer — without heavy construction, base services, munitions, or weapons systems operations — means that several V-MIL rubric categories are structurally inapplicable. The company does not produce excavators, bulldozers, armoured engineering vehicles, or other heavy machinery of the type associated with settlement construction or demolition of Palestinian structures. No NGO reports, UN documentation, or photographic evidence places Nissan-manufactured construction equipment in occupation-related activities.2425
The Magnitude score (M = 3.50) reflects the Minor Recurring band: Israeli security forces hold Patrol vehicles as part of their fleet, but the order volume, contract duration, and degree of IDF-specific reliance are entirely undisclosed in public records. Scored at the low end of Minor Recurring given the purely civilian distribution channel and the absence of any confirmed IDF procurement mechanism. Proximity (P = 2.50) reflects the Distant Supply Chain band: the civilian distributor intermediary — Champion/Carasso Motors — separates Nissan from Israeli security end-users by at least two commercial steps, and no direct contractual link between Nissan Motor Co. and any Israeli security body has been identified.
The strongest challenge to the low V-MIL score is the argument that the Patrol’s documented presence in IDF, Border Police, and Prison Service fleets constitutes a functional contribution to Israeli military and security operations, regardless of the contractual pathway. This argument has merit as an operational observation but does not satisfy the V-MIL rubric’s requirement for direct supply chain integration or defence contracting attributable to the manufacturer. The rubric distinguishes impact by pathway: civilian market sales through independent distributors attract lower scores than direct manufacturer-to-state contracting or FMS arrangements precisely because the manufacturer’s commercial decision to serve that market is not equivalent to a deliberate defence supply relationship.
A second challenge concerns export licences and end-user certificates. No publicly known export licence applications or EUCs relating to Nissan vehicle sales to Israeli defence or security end-users have been identified in UK, US, EU, or Japanese export control records.26 The audit acknowledges that Japanese METI, UK DBT, and US BIS records were reviewed on available evidence; a targeted FOIA request or direct regulator inquiry could in principle surface undisclosed licence proceedings. This is judged low-probability given the weight of corroborating absence evidence across multiple independent source classes, but it remains a residual gap.
A third limit is the absence of granular fleet procurement data. Israeli Ministry of Defence tender records and fleet procurement databases were not accessible in the format required to confirm the volume or duration of Israeli security force Patrol holdings. The audit cannot quantify how many Patrol units are in IDF service, over what procurement period they were acquired, or whether specific tactically modified variants were involved. This gap supports a conservative scoring of Magnitude at M = 3.50 rather than escalating to a higher band.
Even under the most adverse plausible assumptions — that export licences exist but are undisclosed, and that fleet volumes are substantial — the structural finding (civilian distributor, no direct contracting) would remain intact. The V-MIL score range under alternative assumptions (I = 1.5–2.0, M = 3.0–4.0, P = 2.0–3.0) would remain within Tier E and would not materially alter the composite BRS.
| Entity | Type | Role in V-MIL | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. | Manufacturer | Maker of Patrol, Navara, Hardbody — civilian vehicles present in IDF fleets | High |
| Champion Motors Ltd. / Carasso Motors | Distributor | Independent Israeli distributor; intermediary between Nissan and all Israeli end-users including security forces | High |
| Israel Defense Forces (IDF) | Security body | End-user of Patrol Y60/Y61 vehicles; no direct contract with Nissan identified | High |
| Israeli Border Police | Security body | End-user of Patrol vehicles; no direct contract with Nissan identified | High |
| Israeli Prison Service | Security body | End-user of Patrol vehicles; no direct contract with Nissan identified | High |
| SIBAT (Israel Defence Export Directorate) | Regulatory body | No Nissan listing identified | High |
| Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) | Procurement body | No direct contract with Nissan identified | High |
| Elbit Systems Ltd. | Defence prime | No supply relationship with Nissan identified at any tier | High |
| Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) | Defence prime | No supply relationship with Nissan identified | High |
| Rafael Advanced Defense Systems | Defence prime | No supply relationship with Nissan identified | High |
| Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance | Corporate group | Shared supply base; no Alliance-level Israeli defence supply identified | High |
| SIPRI Arms Transfers Database | Research database | No Nissan entry in Israeli defence transfers | High |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | No Nissan military supply profile identified | High |
| NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management) | Institutional investor | Nissan not on exclusion list | High |
| Nissan Patrol (Y60/Y61/Y62) | Product | Civilian utility vehicle used by Israeli security forces via distributor | High |
| Nissan Navara / NP300 Hardbody | Product | Civilian LCV platforms used globally by military/paramilitary; no Israeli-specific variant identified | High |
The V-DIG audit examined Nissan’s enterprise technology stack, Israeli-origin software and services relationships, cloud infrastructure footprint, defence and intelligence sector technology relationships, AI and autonomous systems, and the broader technology ecosystem including R&D presence in Israel. The overarching finding across all sub-categories is an absence of confirmed Israeli-origin vendor relationships at any tier of production or enterprise deployment.
Nissan’s confirmed anchor technology vendors are non-Israeli in origin and headquartered in the United States and Japan. Microsoft Azure was named Nissan’s “preferred cloud partner” in January 2021, covering manufacturing operations, connected-car services, and enterprise IT globally; this relationship is confirmed ongoing in Nissan’s 2023 and 2024 Integrated Reports.412 SAP serves as the long-standing ERP backbone across Nissan’s global operations.27 NTT Group entered a strategic IT infrastructure and connected-car services partnership with Nissan in 2019, with primary focus on Japan-based network and data infrastructure.3 Accenture was confirmed in 2022 as the primary digital transformation integrator for Nissan’s smart factory programme.9 These four relationships represent the deepest identified technology dependencies and are all with non-Israeli vendors.
A systematic review of Israeli-origin cybersecurity, analytics, and enterprise software vendors — including Check Point Software Technologies, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE Ltd., Verint Systems, and Claroty — produced no confirmed named relationship with Nissan Motor Co. in any publicly available corporate filing, press release, or vendor case study. The audit reviewed Check Point’s automotive sector case studies, Nissan’s annual reports and sustainability filings, SEC Form 20-F, and trade press reporting; no Nissan-specific deployment appeared in any of these sources.28
The most significant Israeli-origin technology question in this domain concerns Mobileye, an Israeli-origin ADAS supplier (now an Intel subsidiary) that provides EyeQ-series chips and computer vision systems to numerous global OEMs. Historical trade reporting has suggested certain Nissan models may have used Mobileye EyeQ-based systems in specific markets. However, a confirmed, named, current production-vehicle contract between Nissan Motor and Mobileye has not been located in any primary source — including Mobileye and Intel investor materials — for this audit.29 This gap is flagged for targeted primary-source verification. Even if confirmed, a component-level OEM chip supply relationship through a civilian automotive ADAS supplier would constitute a commercial procurement relationship at Tier-1 supply level, not a provision of technology to Israeli state bodies, and would not escalate the Impact score beyond the Customer Cap ceiling applicable to buyer relationships.
A second structural evidence gap concerns Argus Cyber Security, an Israeli-origin automotive cybersecurity company acquired by Continental AG in 2017.30 Argus technology is embedded in Continental’s automotive cybersecurity product stack, and Continental AG is a confirmed major Tier-1 automotive supplier to Nissan. Any Argus technology present in Nissan production vehicles would constitute an indirect, supply-chain-mediated relationship at minimum two steps removed from Nissan Motor Co. No primary source confirms this specific pathway for Nissan vehicles. A third gap concerns Upstream Security, an Israeli automotive cybersecurity firm whose full OEM client list is not publicly disclosed.31
No Nissan-operated R&D facility, engineering office, innovation lab, or accelerator programme within Israel has been identified in corporate filings or press releases. Nissan’s publicly documented R&D footprint is located in Japan (Atsugi, Yokohama), the United Kingdom (Cranfield), the United States (Silicon Valley, Michigan), China, and India.32 No acquisition of an Israeli technology company by Nissan has been identified through April 2026. No Nissan co-development patent arrangements with Israeli universities or Israeli-domiciled entities have been identified in USPTO, EPO, J-PlatPat, or Google Patents databases.33
The V-DIG scoring reflects these findings. Impact (I = 1.50) sits in the Incidental band: Nissan is a buyer and user of mainstream non-Israeli cloud and enterprise technology, with no confirmed provision of technology to Israeli state bodies. Magnitude (M = 1.50) is Very Low, as no confirmed Israeli-origin vendor relationship of any scale exists in the public record. Proximity (P = 2.00) reflects the Distant band: even under worst-case resolution of the Mobileye and Argus gaps, any Israeli-origin technology would be mediated through Tier-1 suppliers or integrators at minimum two supply-chain steps removed.
The Customer Cap rule prevents V-DIG from exceeding the 3.9 Impact ceiling applicable to buyer relationships regardless of evidence gap resolution. Even if all three evidence gaps (Mobileye, Argus/Continental, Upstream Security) resolved positively and simultaneously, the resulting score would remain the lowest-contributing domain and would not materially alter the composite BRS.
The most significant challenge to the V-DIG score is the inherent limitation of public-record analysis for enterprise technology relationships. Enterprise security tooling — endpoint detection and response, SIEM, OT security, privileged access management — is almost never named at vendor level in public filings. The absence of a confirmed Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendor in Nissan’s public record is consistent with complete absence, but it is also consistent with non-disclosure of a genuine relationship. This epistemological limit applies symmetrically to all non-confirmed vendor relationships in the audit and is explicitly noted in the Evidence Gaps section.
The Mobileye gap is the most commercially plausible unresolved question. Mobileye supplies the global automotive industry broadly, and historical trade context suggests Nissan vehicle models in certain markets may have used EyeQ-based systems. The audit could not locate a current, named, primary-source confirmation; absence of public confirmation is not confirmed absence. Verification would require access to Mobileye/Intel investor filings at a level of OEM-customer granularity that is not publicly available, or to Nissan’s own supplier disclosure documentation.
The Accenture smart factory sub-stack gap represents a second material uncertainty: the specific technologies deployed by Accenture under the 2022 Nissan smart factory programme are not publicly itemised, and whether any Israeli-origin OT security or industrial analytics tool was included cannot be determined from public sources.9
A score revision above I = 2.0 in V-DIG would require positive identification of a confirmed, named Israeli-origin vendor relationship at production or enterprise scale — either through primary-source OEM disclosure, a vendor press release, or verified investigative reporting. No such source has been identified.
| Entity | Type | Role in V-DIG | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Azure | Cloud vendor (US) | Confirmed preferred cloud partner since January 2021 | High |
| SAP | ERP vendor (Germany) | Confirmed ERP backbone globally | High |
| NTT Group | IT infrastructure (Japan) | Confirmed strategic partnership since 2019 | High |
| Accenture | Systems integrator (US) | Confirmed smart factory programme integrator since 2022 | High |
| Mobileye (Intel subsidiary) | ADAS vendor (Israeli-origin) | No confirmed current production contract with Nissan; evidence gap | Low |
| Argus Cyber Security (Continental subsidiary) | Cybersecurity (Israeli-origin) | No confirmed Nissan pathway; indirect via Continental supply chain | Low |
| Continental AG | Tier-1 automotive supplier (Germany) | Confirmed Tier-1 Nissan supplier; Argus is a subsidiary | High |
| Upstream Security | Automotive cybersecurity (Israeli-origin) | No confirmed Nissan relationship; OEM client list not public | Unconfirmed |
| Check Point Software Technologies | Cybersecurity (Israeli-origin) | No confirmed Nissan relationship | High (absence) |
| Innoviz Technologies | LiDAR (Israeli-origin) | No confirmed Nissan contract; BMW and Chinese OEM contracts confirmed | High (absence) |
| Nissan Research Center (Silicon Valley) | R&D entity | Nissan US R&D; no Israeli facility identified | High |
| Israeli MoD / IDF / Shin Bet / Mossad | State bodies | No contracts or technology provision relationship identified | High (absence) |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | No Nissan digital provision profile | High |
| BDS Movement | Civil society | No Nissan technology-sector campaign identified | High |
The V-ECON domain examines Nissan’s economic relationships with Israel across supply chain sourcing, investment and capital flows, operational presence, corporate structure, and profit repatriation. This is the highest-scoring domain and the driver of the composite BRS, reflecting the sustained, decades-long franchise distribution relationship through which Nissan generates recurring wholesale revenue from vehicle sales into the Israeli market.
The core economic relationship is as follows. Champion Motors Ltd. (previously most commonly referenced as Carasso Motors; both names appear in the source audits as the authorised Nissan and Infiniti distributor in Israel) is an independently listed company traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.34 Champion Motors holds the exclusive import and distribution licence for Nissan and Infiniti vehicles in Israel. It purchases vehicles from Nissan at wholesale transfer prices, generating a recurring revenue stream for Nissan Motor Co. in Yokohama. Champion Motors’ retail margin and after-sales profits remain within Israel; no royalty stream, franchise fee arrangement, or profit-sharing mechanism has been disclosed in public sources. Nissan exercises no disclosed equity or governance control over Champion Motors — it is an arm’s-length third-party distributor, neither a Nissan subsidiary nor a joint venture vehicle.34
The Impact score (I = 3.50) sits in the Sustained Trade band. The exclusive franchise relationship has operated for decades, creates a recurring and contractually structured economic channel between Nissan and the Israeli economy, and is distinct from a simple one-time export transaction. The Sustained Trade classification is appropriate because the relationship involves a specific named counterparty bound by an exclusive licence, not merely incidental sales through an open distribution market.
The Magnitude score (M = 4.50) sits in the Modest Presence band. Israel is subsumed within an undifferentiated “Other” or “Middle East and Africa” geographic reporting segment in all Nissan financial filings; no Israel-specific revenue line, volume figure, or strategic characterisation appears in any investor document reviewed.1235 Israel’s automotive market represents approximately 250,000–280,000 new vehicle registrations per year industry-wide, making it a small-volume market by global standards.35 Nissan’s market share within it is not separately disclosed. The exclusive franchise has operated for decades, which supports the upper end of the Modest Presence band rather than the lower Minor Recurring band. The score of 4.50 is assessed as conservative given the undisclosed but non-trivial scale of a decades-long exclusive distribution relationship in a market of that size.
The Proximity score (P = 5.50) sits in the Indirect but Meaningful band. The exclusive franchise places this relationship above the pure open-market distributor proximity level: Champion Motors operates solely under Nissan’s franchise, is Nissan’s direct commercial contract counterparty for the Israeli market, and its operations are commercially structured around the Nissan brand. At the same time, Nissan exercises no equity or governance control — distinguishing this from a subsidiary or joint venture relationship, which would attract a higher Proximity score.
No Israeli foreign direct investment has been identified. Nissan’s global manufacturing network does not include any Israeli facility, and the company operates no company-owned offices, sales operations, support centres, warehouses, or retail locations in Israel.12 No R&D facility, technology partnership, innovation laboratory, or accelerator programme operating within Israel has been identified in corporate filings, press releases, or Israeli business press (Globes, Calcalist).32
Nissan’s ownership structure contains no Israeli state entity, Israeli sovereign wealth fund, or Israeli-domiciled institution among its disclosed major shareholders.35 The Japanese government holds no direct equity stake in Nissan. Renault S.A., Nissan’s largest shareholder at approximately 36%, does not appear to hold material direct investments in Israeli-domiciled companies or Israeli sovereign bonds based on a review of the Renault Universal Registration Document — though complete verification would require access to AMF filings in French.613
The profit flow architecture is straightforward: Carasso/Champion Motors purchases vehicles at wholesale prices, generating income that flows to Nissan in Japan and is partially distributed to Renault S.A. (France) via dividend flows proportional to Renault’s shareholding. No Israel-domiciled entity receives profit distributions from Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.6
The most significant counter-argument to the V-ECON score is that Nissan’s economic relationship with Israel is structurally equivalent to that of any global automotive manufacturer that sells vehicles through an independent national distributor — a category that would include virtually every major automotive brand operating in small-volume markets. The exclusive franchise structure is commercially standard in automotive distribution and does not, on its own, represent an elevated form of economic integration compared to, for example, a non-exclusive distribution arrangement.
This argument has merit and is reflected in the scoring: the Proximity score of 5.50 is positioned below the threshold for direct operational presence or subsidiary-level integration. The Impact score of 3.50 (Sustained Trade) rather than a higher band reflects the absence of FDI, R&D, manufacturing, or any form of economic stake-taking in Israel. The Magnitude score of 4.50 acknowledges the smallness of the Israeli market and Nissan’s absence from any Israel-specific strategic communications.
A second evidence limit concerns the financial scale of the franchise. Carasso Motors / Champion Motors is listed on the TASE and files disclosure documents in Hebrew. Full details of volume-based purchase agreements, minimum order obligations, and any franchise fee arrangements are not publicly available in English-language sources, limiting precision regarding the financial scale of Nissan’s indirect Israeli revenue contribution. This gap affects Magnitude scoring: the conservative placement at M = 4.50 could move modestly upward if TASE Hebrew-language filings revealed a substantially larger or more strategically characterised relationship than is apparent from English-language sources.
A third limit is the absence of accessible procurement records for any Israeli state, military, or government fleet purchases from Champion Motors. The audit cannot confirm or exclude government fleet purchasing activity that would represent a secondary economic channel beyond standard retail distribution.
| Entity | Type | Role in V-ECON | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Champion Motors Ltd. / Carasso Motors | Distributor (Israeli, TASE-listed) | Exclusive franchise distributor for Nissan and Infiniti in Israel; arm’s-length counterparty | High |
| Renault S.A. | Parent shareholder (France, ~36%) | Largest Nissan shareholder; receives dividend distributions; no Israeli investment identified | High |
| Mitsubishi Motors Corporation | Alliance affiliate | Nissan holds ~34% stake; no Israeli dimension identified | High |
| Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) | Exchange | Champion Motors listed here; Hebrew-language filings not reviewed in full | Moderate |
| Nissan Middle East FZE | Regional subsidiary (Dubai, UAE) | Regional hub for MENA; Israeli distribution handled separately via Champion Motors | High |
| Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF, Japan) | Institutional investor | Potential indirect Nissan stakeholder; no Israeli dimension | Low relevance |
| French State (~15% of Renault S.A.) | Indirect beneficial owner | Indirect minority beneficial owner of Nissan via Renault; no Israeli mandate | High |
| Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. | Manufacturer/parent | Wholesale vehicle supplier to Champion Motors; no FDI, no R&D in Israel | High |
The V-POL domain examines Nissan’s political posture across corporate communications, operations in contested territories, internal governance and retail policies, brand and state partnerships, lobbying and advocacy, and executive conduct. The overall finding is that Nissan has no active political footprint in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but its comparative silence relative to its documented Russia response constitutes a scorable asymmetry that justifies the Double Standard Impact classification.
The most analytically significant finding in this domain is the contrast between Nissan’s documented operational response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its complete absence of any response to the post-October 2023 Israel-Palestine conflict. Following Russia’s invasion, Nissan formally announced the suspension of operations and vehicle exports to Russia in March 2022, followed by full divestiture of Russian assets — transferred to a Russian state entity — in 2023.10 No comparable corporate statement, operational measure, advertising pause, or market consideration has been publicly documented in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict as of the research date.5 This asymmetry is factually grounded: the Russia response involved documented operational steps with corporate communications; no analogous record exists for Israel-Palestine.
The Double Standard Impact band (I = 2.50) is assigned not as a rhetorical characterisation but as a rubric classification: it reflects the documented factual contrast between how Nissan publicly communicated its response to one geopolitical crisis involving military operations and civilian casualties and its absence of any equivalent communication regarding another. Nissan’s Annual Reports for 2023 and 2024 describe Middle East operations under standard regional market segments without mention of the Israel-Palestine conflict or associated geopolitical risk.12
On lobbying and political advocacy, Nissan North America maintains a registered lobbying presence in Washington, D.C. with expenditures concentrated on automotive regulatory matters — fuel economy standards, EV tax credits, trade and tariff policy, and vehicle safety regulations.3637 No lobbying filings addressing Israel-Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, or regional trade restrictions have been identified in US Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act records or OpenSecrets data.3637 No evidence has been identified of Nissan Motor Co. or the Nissan North America PAC making material financial contributions to organisations supporting Israeli settlements, the Friends of the IDF (FIDF), the Jewish National Fund (JNF), or equivalent organisations.3839 The Nissan Foundation (U.S.) directs its documented grant-making toward education and community programs in U.S. communities proximate to Nissan manufacturing facilities.39
On operational presence in contested territories, Nissan vehicles are sold in Israel through Champion Motors Ltd., a privately held Israeli automotive importer headquartered in Jaffa.14 No corporate filing reviewed confirms whether Champion Motors operates dealerships or service points in Israeli settlements in the West Bank — this constitutes an identified evidence gap, as Israeli Companies Registrar data and West Bank settlement business registration records were not accessible in the research pass. The UN Human Rights Office database of enterprises operating in Israeli settlements (A/HRC/43/71) does not include Nissan Motor Co. in its published list.40 Nissan Middle East FZE, headquartered in Dubai, UAE, manages MENA distribution with Israeli distribution handled separately through Champion Motors under a distinct commercial arrangement.41
No organised BDS campaign specifically targeting Nissan has been identified in BDS National Committee publications or major campaign tracking resources.42 No corporate HR enforcement actions, legal proceedings, or union grievances at Nissan specifically related to the Israel-Palestine conflict have been identified. IndustriALL Global Union’s documented grievances against Nissan in the 2020–2024 period relate to plant closures and collective bargaining disputes, not to political expression matters.43
Nissan’s board composition and executive team — as disclosed in Tokyo Stock Exchange corporate governance filings — contain no Israeli government-linked appointees, and no evidence exists of Nissan accepting Israeli state honours, hosting Israeli government officials in formal non-commercial capacities, or entering non-commercial partnerships with Israeli governmental or state academic institutions.44
Magnitude (M = 2.50) is Very Low: the absence of political activity is corroborated across multiple independent source classes — OpenSecrets, FEC, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, OHCHR. Proximity (P = 3.50) reflects the Sister Entity / Portfolio band: selective silence is Nissan’s own direct posture and is directly attributable to Nissan Motor Co. itself, not to a distant subsidiary or portfolio company. The Exclusive Partner Political Acts rubric rule is not triggered because no Champion Motors state honour, FIDF donation, or equivalent political act by the exclusive distributor has been documented in the audit.
The strongest challenge to the I = 2.50 (Double Standard) classification is the argument that selective silence on a geopolitical conflict is categorically different from active advocacy, and that Nissan’s Russia response was commercially driven — it involved a large, direct operational presence in Russia that was unsustainable under sanctions conditions — rather than reflecting a deliberate political stance. Under this argument, the absence of an analogous Israel response reflects the absence of analogous operational exposure (Nissan has no Russian-style direct operations in Israel) rather than a double standard in political posture.
This counter-argument has partial merit and is reflected in the conservative placement at I = 2.50 (lower half of the Double Standard band) rather than a higher Impact score. The Russia response did involve documented operational business considerations; Nissan’s absence from Israel is not equivalent to its presence in Russia. However, the audits document that other large corporations did issue public statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict without having analogous direct operational exposure, and Nissan’s complete absence from that category of public corporate communication is a factually distinct and scorable observation.
A second evidence limit is the incomplete assessment of Champion Motors’ political conduct. No FIDF donation, JNF contribution, Israeli state honour acceptance, or equivalent political act by Champion Motors has been identified, but the research pass did not access Hebrew-language Israeli media archives comprehensively. The Exclusive Partner Political Acts rubric rule would escalate the V-POL Impact score materially if Champion Motors were shown to have participated in Israeli state public relations campaigns or made donations to conflict-adjacent organisations. This remains an open question.
A third methodological gap is the absence of a comprehensive archival search of LinkedIn, X/Twitter, and Japanese-language social media platforms for Nissan executive statements on the conflict. No public statements by current Nissan C-suite executives or board members on the Israel-Palestine conflict have been identified, but the search was not exhaustive across non-English social media.
| Entity | Type | Role in V-POL | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. | Corporation | Direct holder of selective-silence posture; no political statement or advocacy | High |
| Champion Motors Ltd. | Exclusive distributor (Israel) | No political acts (FIDF, JNF, state honours) identified; evidence gap on Hebrew-language sources | Moderate |
| Nissan Middle East FZE | Regional subsidiary (Dubai) | MENA hub; no Israel-specific political conduct identified | High |
| Makoto Uchida | CEO (stepped down Nov 2024) | No public statements on Israel-Palestine conflict identified | High |
| Carlos Ghosn | Former Chairman/CEO (pre-2020) | No Israel-Palestine advocacy identified; role discontinued and pre-2020 | High |
| Nissan North America | Subsidiary (US) | Registered Washington lobbyist; no Israel-related lobbying filings | High |
| Nissan Foundation (US) | Philanthropic entity | Education/community grants; no conflict-related grants identified | High |
| Friends of the IDF (FIDF) | Advocacy organisation | No Nissan donation identified | High (absence) |
| Jewish National Fund (JNF) | Advocacy organisation | No Nissan donation identified | High (absence) |
| IndustriALL Global Union | Labour union | Grievances with Nissan unrelated to Israel-Palestine | High |
| BDS Movement | Civil society | No active campaign against Nissan in political domain | High |
| UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) | International body | UN settlement database does not include Nissan | High |
| Business & Human Rights Resource Centre | NGO | No Nissan Israel-Palestine political findings | High |
| OpenSecrets | Lobbying tracker | Nissan North America lobbying on automotive regulation only | High |
| FEC | US regulator | No PAC contributions to conflict-related organisations identified | High |
The most significant cross-domain challenge to the Tier E scoring is the aggregation argument: that while each individual domain finding is low, the cumulative picture of a company whose vehicles appear in Israeli security force fleets (V-MIL), whose exclusive Israeli distributor operates under a long-term franchise (V-ECON), and whose corporate communications reflect selective silence on the conflict (V-POL) constitutes a more meaningful pattern of involvement than any single domain score suggests.
This argument is acknowledged and is addressed structurally in the BDS-1000 composite formula, which incorporates the three non-dominant domain scores at 20% weight to capture exactly this kind of cumulative signal. The BRS formula does not treat the four domains as independent and is designed to reflect aggregate patterns. The composite score of 120 already incorporates the cross-domain aggregation.
A second cross-domain limit concerns the exclusive distributor relationship and its interaction across domains. Champion Motors / Carasso Motors appears in V-MIL (as the civilian distributor through which Patrol vehicles reach Israeli security forces), V-ECON (as the exclusive franchise counterparty), and V-POL (as the entity whose political conduct could activate the Exclusive Partner Political Acts rule). The distributor relationship is therefore structurally load-bearing across three domains. If Champion Motors’ conduct were shown to involve settlement operations (V-POL), government fleet contracting (V-MIL), or a materially larger financial footprint than disclosed in English-language sources (V-ECON), multiple domain scores could move simultaneously. The Hebrew-language TASE filing gap and the West Bank settlement operations evidence gap are therefore the single most consequential unresolved questions across the dossier.
A third cross-domain limit is the Alliance-level procurement opaqueness. The Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance may procure technology, components, and services at a group level not disaggregated by brand in public disclosures. No Alliance-level Israeli-origin relationships have been identified across V-DIG or V-MIL, but the granularity of available Alliance procurement data is insufficient to confirm their absence. This residual uncertainty applies across both domains.
| Entity | Type | Domains | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. | Manufacturer (Japan) | All | High |
| Champion Motors Ltd. / Carasso Motors | Exclusive Israeli distributor (TASE-listed) | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | High |
| Renault S.A. | Parent shareholder (France, ~36%) | V-ECON, V-POL | High |
| Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance | Corporate group | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON, V-POL | High |
| Mitsubishi Motors Corporation | Alliance affiliate | V-ECON | High |
| Nissan Middle East FZE | Regional subsidiary (Dubai) | V-ECON, V-POL | High |
| Microsoft Azure | Cloud vendor (US) | V-DIG | High |
| SAP | ERP vendor (Germany) | V-DIG | High |
| NTT Group | IT infrastructure (Japan) | V-DIG | High |
| Accenture | Systems integrator (US) | V-DIG | High |
| Mobileye (Intel subsidiary) | ADAS vendor (Israeli-origin) | V-DIG | Low (unconfirmed) |
| Argus Cyber Security (Continental subsidiary) | Cybersecurity (Israeli-origin) | V-DIG | Low (unconfirmed) |
| Continental AG | Tier-1 automotive supplier (Germany) | V-DIG | High |
| Elbit Systems Ltd. | Israeli defence prime | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) | Israeli defence prime | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Rafael Advanced Defense Systems | Israeli defence prime | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Israel Defense Forces (IDF) | Security body | V-MIL | High (end-user, no direct contract) |
| Israeli Border Police | Security body | V-MIL | High (end-user, no direct contract) |
| Israeli Prison Service | Security body | V-MIL | High (end-user, no direct contract) |
| SIBAT | Israeli defence export body | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON | High |
| BDS Movement | Civil society | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-POL | High |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | V-MIL, V-POL | High |
| NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management) | Institutional investor | V-MIL | High (Nissan not excluded) |
| UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) | International body | V-MIL, V-POL | High |
| Amnesty International | NGO | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Human Rights Watch | NGO | V-MIL | High (absence) |
| Business & Human Rights Resource Centre | NGO | V-POL | High |
| Nissan North America | US subsidiary | V-POL | High |
| Nissan Foundation (US) | Philanthropic entity | V-POL | High |
| Honda Motor Co., Ltd. | Merger counterparty | V-ECON, V-POL (context only) | High |
| Nissan Patrol (Y60/Y61/Y62) | Product line | V-MIL | High |
| Nissan Navara / NP300 Hardbody | Product line | V-MIL | High |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 1.50 | 3.50 | 2.50 | 0.27 |
| V-DIG | 1.50 | 1.50 | 2.00 | 0.06 |
| V-ECON | 3.50 | 4.50 | 5.50 | 1.77 |
| V-POL | 2.50 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 0.45 |
BRS Composite Score: 120 — Tier E (0–199)
V-ECON is the dominant domain (V_MAX = 1.77), reflecting the sustained exclusive franchise distribution relationship with no Israeli FDI or R&D. The three non-dominant domain scores sum to 0.78 and contribute at 20% weight (0.16), producing a total of 1.93. Dividing by 16 and scaling by 1000 yields a composite score of approximately 120.
V-MIL sits in the Incidental Impact band with low Magnitude and Distant Proximity, reflecting civilian-market vehicle sales through an independent distributor without direct defence contracting. V-DIG is the lowest-scoring domain, with no confirmed Israeli-origin vendor at any tier and the Customer Cap preventing escalation even under worst-case gap resolution. V-POL reflects selective silence as the only scorable political act, with no active advocacy, lobbying, or donations identified.
Overall confidence in the composite score of 120 (Tier E) is high. The structural finding across all four domains — that Nissan’s relationship with Israel is that of a foreign exporter supplying an independent franchised distributor — is corroborated by multiple independent source classes and is internally consistent across corporate filings, NGO databases, export control records, and trade press.
Open questions that could affect the score:
Under worst-case simultaneous resolution of all identified gaps, the composite score is unlikely to exceed Tier D (200–399).
For researchers and due-diligence practitioners:
For institutional investors:
The BRS score of 120 (Tier E) places Nissan below the typical threshold for enhanced ESG scrutiny on Israel-Palestine grounds. The score is robust. No divestment action is indicated by the validated evidence base. The principal monitoring items are the Champion Motors franchise conduct (TASE filings, settlement presence) and the Mobileye gap. Routine annual review against updated BDS Movement campaign lists, Who Profits database updates, and NBIM exclusion list publications would be proportionate to the current evidence level.
For engagement purposes:
Any corporate engagement with Nissan on this topic is appropriately scoped to: (a) the absence of a corporate statement on the Israel-Palestine conflict relative to the documented Russia response; (b) supply chain due diligence regarding whether the exclusive distributor operates in settlement areas; and (c) end-use monitoring commitments regarding Patrol and Navara vehicle sales through the civilian distribution channel. No engagement on direct military contracting is warranted given the absence of evidence supporting such a relationship.
Britannica — Nissan Motor Company corporate history — https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nissan-Motor-Company ↩↩↩
GlobalSecurity.org — Nissan Patrol military/security use — https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/nissan-patrol.htm ↩↩↩↩↩↩
NTT Group / Nissan connected-car partnership announcement — https://global.nissannews.com/en/releases/release-bcdca64a4d34c67b54e65c1c66c3bcf9-190718-01-e ↩↩↩
Microsoft News — Nissan preferred cloud partner announcement, January 2021 — https://news.microsoft.com/2021/01/13/nissan-motor-co-ltd-selects-microsoft-as-its-preferred-cloud-partner/ ↩↩↩
Nissan Global Newsroom — corporate announcements — https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/ ↩↩↩↩
Reuters — Nissan-Renault Alliance equity rebalancing, February 2023 — https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/nissan-renault-revamp-alliance-with-new-equity-deal-2023-02-06/ ↩↩↩↩
Nissan Oceania cyber incident FAQ — https://www.nissan.com.au/content/dam/nissan/au/pdfs/Nissan-Oceania-Cyber-Incident-FAQ.pdf ↩
BleepingComputer — Nissan North America MOVEit data breach — https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nissan-north-america-data-breach-impacts-over-53-000-employees/ ↩
Accenture newsroom — Nissan smart factory programme, 2022 — https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/2022/accenture-and-nissan-motor-to-accelerate-smart-factory-initiatives ↩↩↩↩
Reuters — Nissan job cuts announcement, November 2024 — https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/nissan-plans-cut-9000-jobs-reduce-production-capacity-2024-11-07/ ↩↩↩
Financial Times — Nissan-Honda merger discussions, 2024 — https://www.ft.com/content/nissan-honda-merger-2024 ↩↩
Nissan Integrated Report 2023 — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/IR/LIBRARY/AR/2023/ ↩↩↩
Renault Group annual reports — https://www.renaultgroup.com/en/investors/publications/annual-reports/ ↩↩
Champion Motors Ltd. — official site — https://www.champion-motors.co.il/ ↩↩
SIBAT Israel Defence Export Directorate — https://www.mod.gov.il/Defence_Missions/SIBAT/Pages/default.aspx ↩
Israeli Motor Vehicle Licensing Authority — https://mr.gov.il/ ↩
Wikipedia — Nissan Navara — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nissan_Navara ↩
Wikipedia — Nissan Hardbody Truck — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nissan_Hardbody_Truck ↩
Elbit Systems investor relations — https://elbitsystems.com/investor-relations/ ↩
IAI — Israel Aerospace Industries — https://www.iai.co.il/ ↩
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems — https://www.rafael.co.il/ ↩
Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Alliance 2030 — https://www.alliance-2030.com/ ↩
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database — https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers ↩
OCHA — Occupied Palestinian Territory — https://www.ochaopt.org/ ↩
OHCHR — Commission of Inquiry, Occupied Palestinian Territory — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israelpot/index ↩
UK Government — Strategic export controls licensing data — https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data ↩
SAP — Nissan customer testimonial — https://www.sap.com/japan/customer-testimonials/nissan.html ↩
Check Point Software — automotive case studies — https://www.checkpoint.com/case-studies/ ↩
Mobileye investor relations — https://investors.mobileye.com/ ↩
Argus Cyber Security — https://argus-sec.com/ ↩
Upstream Security — https://upstream.auto/ ↩
Nissan Technology R&D — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/TECHNOLOGY/RD/ ↩↩
Google Patents — Nissan Motor assignee search — https://patents.google.com/?assignee=Nissan+Motor ↩
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange / MAYA disclosure — https://maya.tase.co.il/ ↩↩
Nissan fiscal year results 2024 — https://global.nissannews.com/en/releases/release-fiscal-year-results-2024 ↩↩↩
OpenSecrets — Nissan North America lobbying — https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/nissan-north-america/lobbying?id=D000021862 ↩↩
US Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act database — https://lda.senate.gov/system/public/ ↩↩
FEC — Nissan North America PAC — https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/?committee_id=C00389239 ↩
Nissan Foundation (US) — https://www.nissanusa.com/experience-nissan/nissan-foundation.html ↩↩
OHCHR — UN Human Rights Council session 43 documents — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/documents ↩
Nissan Middle East — https://www.nissanmiddleeast.com/ ↩
BDS Movement — https://bdsmovement.net/ ↩
IndustriALL Global Union — https://www.industriall-union.org/ ↩
Nissan corporate governance — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/IR/GOVERNANCE/ ↩
Nissan Integrated Report 2024 — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/IR/LIBRARY/AR/2024/ ↩
Who Profits Research Center — Nissan profile — https://whoprofits.org/companies/company/3888 ↩
AFSC Investigate — https://investigate.afsc.org/ ↩
NBIM exclusion list — https://www.nbim.no/en/responsible-investment/exclusions/ ↩
Nissan sustainability report — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/SUSTAINABILITY/REPORT/ ↩
Nissan supply chain sustainability — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/SUSTAINABILITY/SOCIAL/SUPPLY_CHAIN/ ↩
Nissan affiliates and subsidiaries — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/COMPANY/PROFILE/AFFILIATE/ ↩
Nissan Research Center Silicon Valley — https://global.nissannews.com/en/releases/nissan-research-center-silicon-valley ↩
BleepingComputer — Nissan Oceania Akira ransomware — https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nissan-oceania-discloses-data-breach-after-akira-ransomware-attack/ ↩
CISA — Akira ransomware advisory, April 2024 — https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a ↩
Nissan SEC Form 20-F filings — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000073994&type=20-F ↩
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre — Nissan — https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/companies/nissan/ ↩
Nissan Middle East regional operations — https://www.nissan-global.com/EN/REGION/MIDDLEEAST/ ↩
Wikipedia — Nissan Patrol — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nissan_Patrol ↩
Mitsubishi Motors investor relations — https://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/en/ir/stock/ ↩
Forbes — corporate statements on Israel-Hamas war, October 2023 — https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2023/10/10/which-major-companies-have-made-statements-on-the-israel-hamas-war/ ↩
