INDEX / DIRECTORY / RADWARE

Radware🇮🇱

Cybersecurity & VPN 55 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-08-29 METHOD V6.4
BDS-1000 Score 799 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 0.00 Digital ↗ 5.10 Economic ↗ 9.00 Political ↗ 3.75
OWNERSHIP TREE 3 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Economic: Radware is an Israeli-incorporated, Nasdaq-listed cybersecurity company headquartered in Tel Aviv, with cloud-security centres opened in Israel in 2023 and 2025.1, 2, 3
  • Digital: Israel Post, described by Radware as a government/national postal-service customer, used Radware application-protection, Cloud WAF, bot-management and monitoring services; the case study does not identify military, intelligence, occupation-administration or settlement functions.4
  • Political: Radware issued an October 2023 cyber-threat advisory concerning the Israel–Hamas conflict, but presented it as threat intelligence and product/customer-support information rather than a disclosure of state or military support.5
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of a verified Radware contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, police, prison service or COGAT; nor of Radware-operated settlement or occupied-territory facilities.1, 6

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameRadware Ltd.
JurisdictionIsrael; organised as a corporation under the laws of the State of Israel.1
HeadquartersPrincipal executive office and global headquarters: 22 Raoul Wallenberg Street, Tel Aviv, Israel; the company also identifies a U.S. corporate headquarters in Mahwah, New Jersey.1
SectorCybersecurity and application-delivery solutions, including cloud DDoS protection, web-application firewalls, bot management, load balancing and cloud-security products.1, 4
OwnershipNasdaq-listed issuer (RDWR). Radware reports no controlling shareholder, while stating that Nava Zisapel, Roy Zisapel and the estate of Yehuda Zisapel may exert significant influence over director elections and shareholder matters.1
Key Executives / GovernanceYuval Cohen (chair); Roy Zisapel (president, CEO and director); Guy Avidan (CFO); David Roth (CRO); David Aviv (CTO); Gabi Malka (COO); Constance Stack (CGO); Riki Goldriech (CPO). Directors also include Yair Tauman, Stanley B. Stern, Naama Zeldis, Meir Moshe, Israel Mazin and Alex Pinchev.1
Israeli-Nexus SummaryIsraeli incorporation, Tel Aviv headquarters, Israeli R&D/manufacturing and cloud-security infrastructure, and Zisapel-family/RAD-Bynet commercial links establish a substantial economic and technological nexus; the reviewed record does not verify Radware’s own military, settlement or occupation-administration contracts.1, 7

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Radware is an Israeli-incorporated cybersecurity and application-delivery company with its global headquarters in Tel Aviv and a significant Israeli operational footprint. Its FY2025 filing describes Israeli principal offices, R&D and manufacturing activity, related-party dealings within the RAD-Bynet Group, and Israeli cloud-security locations as part of a wider global network.1 The company opened a Tel Aviv cloud application-security centre in March 2023 and announced a second Israeli centre in September 2025.2, 3

The strongest documented nexus is economic and technological rather than military. Radware’s products include DDoS protection, Cloud WAF, bot management, load balancing and cloud-security services; it operates Israeli infrastructure and receives Israeli Innovation Authority royalty-bearing R&D grants for an approved but unspecified project.1, 8 Its June 2025 case study identifies Israel Post as a government/national postal-service customer that had used Radware products for more than five years, including application protection, Cloud WAF, bot management, Alteon VA and emergency-response monitoring.4

The record also establishes relationships and proximity that require careful entity attribution. Radware engages in related-party sales, purchases, leases and distribution arrangements with RAD-Bynet companies, and director Naama Zeldis is disclosed as having “also served” on Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ board without dates or a disclosed Radware–Rafael transaction.1 Who Profits attributes checkpoint, Civil Administration and other occupation-related contracts to legally separate Bynet entities, not to Radware Ltd.; the audits therefore do not treat those sibling-company activities as Radware’s own operations.7

No public evidence identified verifies a Radware contract, tender, framework agreement or procurement relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, intelligence agencies, Israel Police, Israel Prison Service or COGAT.1 The reviewed materials likewise do not verify weapons integration, tactical or mil-spec products, military-base services, settlement facilities, occupation-territory deployments, or a Radware-specific boycott or official investigation concerning such conduct.1, 6 The fixed, human-vetted BRS result is 799, Tier B (Severe), driven by Economic rather than a verified military relationship.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
May 1996Radware was organised as a corporation under Israeli law.1
28 July 2013An Israeli Ministry of Transport sole-supplier notice recorded a civilian deployment and support/upgrade proposal for Radware DefensePro; it does not establish defence or security-force use.9
7–10 October 2023Radware’s subsequent threat advisory reported claimed cyberattacks on Israeli websites following 7 October; its figures were threat-intelligence characterisations, not independently verified incident totals.5
14 March 2023Radware announced a next-generation cloud application-security centre in Israel.2
February 2022Radware acquired the technology and operations of DC Security Ltd. (formerly SecurityDAM), a related-party cloud-DDoS network operator, for a reported US$42.5 million.1, 10
June 2025Radware published an Israel Post case study describing its application-protection deployment and more-than-five-year customer relationship.4
2 September 2025Radware announced a second next-generation cloud application-security centre in Israel.3
December 2025Radware states it settled an Israel Tax Authority examination of its 2019–2022 tax returns without material effect on consolidated operations or tax expense.1
January 2026Radware acquired Pynt, Inc., an API-security-testing company.1
March 2026Radware’s Cloud WAF data-processing profile listed an approved Tel Aviv point of presence at Binat’s Or Towers.8

Corporate Overview

Radware develops, manufactures and sells cybersecurity and application-delivery solutions for cloud, on-premises and software-defined data-centre environments.1 Its disclosed products include Cloud DDoS Protection, DefensePro X, Cloud WAF, bot-management services, Alteon load-balancing products, AI SOC Xpert and cloud-security products associated with subsidiaries such as SkyHawk.1, 4

The issuer is Israeli-incorporated and Nasdaq-listed, with its principal executive office in Tel Aviv. Radware Inc., its wholly owned New Jersey subsidiary, conducts sales and marketing principally in the United States and Canada and acts as the issuer’s U.S. representative and agent.1 Its subsidiary list includes entities in the United Kingdom, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Americas, including entities associated with SkyHawk, Pynt, Edgehawk, CSR Cloud Security, Overcast Security and Radyoos Media.1 RADWARE (UK) LIMITED is an active UK company with an information-technology-consultancy classification.11

Radware describes itself and certain Zisapel-family-linked firms as part of the RAD-Bynet Group, but explicitly says each member is independent and has different ownership and board structures; the filing does not identify RAD-Bynet as Radware’s parent.1 Bynet Data Communications is a non-exclusive distributor in Israel. Radware reported sales to Bynet and other RAD-Bynet companies of about US$3.3 million in 2023, US$5.7 million in 2024 and US$5.3 million in 2025, plus approximately US$3.4 million in specified related-party purchases in each of 2024 and 2025.1

The audited evidence distinguishes this commercial proximity from activities of separate companies. Who Profits attributes documented checkpoint, Israeli Civil Administration, prison-service and Ministry of Defense-related work to Bynet Systems Applications and Bynet Data Communications, not to Radware Ltd.7 No public evidence identified places those contracts within Radware’s own supply chain, customer base or operations.7

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a verified Radware contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum or procurement relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Police, Border Police, Israel Prison Service, Shin Bet, Mossad or COGAT.1 The bounded review also did not verify Radware supply, co-development, integration, technology transfer or licensed manufacturing with Rafael, Elbit, IAI, IMI or Elbit Land.1

Radware’s DefensePro is documented as an inline network-intrusion-prevention and attack-mitigation product. The reviewed technical documentation does not describe targeting, fire control, autonomous target generation, weapons integration or kinetic effects.12 A 2013 Ministry of Transport notice concerned civilian cybersecurity-system deployment and support, not a defence or security-force customer.9

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Radware’s business description and product record support a civilian cybersecurity characterisation rather than a weapons-system characterisation.1, 12 Historic encryption-technology approvals referenced as a condition in a 2005 asset transaction do not identify a customer or end user, and do not establish a sale to Israeli military or security bodies.13 Spain’s 2024 certification of a specified DefensePro configuration is a product-security certification, not an Israeli military end-user or export-licensing record.14

The absence findings are bounded: they reflect the reviewed sources and do not prove that no customer relationship exists outside those materials. Director Naama Zeldis’s disclosed former Rafael board service and CTO David Aviv’s former Israeli Air Force service are biographical facts, not evidence of a Radware defence contract or technology supply relationship.1

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Radware operates Israeli cloud-security infrastructure. Its March 2026 Cloud WAF data-processing profile lists a Tel Aviv point of presence at Binat’s Or Towers, while also listing locations across multiple global regions.8 The profile states that the security-log and configuration database is stored in the European Union, with encrypted access routed through a U.S. service portal; limited support data may be transferred to the United States, India and Colombia.8

The profile describes processing source IP addresses, cookies or session data, URLs, headers, attack payloads and other security-event metadata, with retention dependent on the feature used.8 The audit does not establish which customers’ traffic or data are routed through the Tel Aviv point of presence.8

Israel Post is documented as a Radware customer using application protection, Cloud WAF, bot management, Alteon VA, GEL licensing, security monitoring and emergency-response alerts.4 The case study calls bot management behavioural attack mitigation and does not describe biometric or person-identification capabilities.4

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Radware supplying facial recognition, biometric identification, predictive policing, social-media monitoring or offensive cyber tools to Israeli state actors.1 No public evidence identified that Radware’s AI or security products were supplied to Israeli military or intelligence bodies, trained on population or intercepted-communications datasets from Israel or the occupied territories, or used for autonomous targeting.1

No public evidence identified of Radware participation in Project Nimbus or another identified Israeli government cloud-procurement programme.1 The Israel Post case study establishes a state-linked civilian customer deployment, but does not identify military, intelligence, occupation-administration or settlement functions.4

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Radware’s Israeli nexus is direct and operational: Israeli incorporation, Tel Aviv headquarters, Israeli R&D and manufacturing activity, and two cloud application-security centres in Israel.1, 2, 3 Its FY2025 filing reports that an Israeli subsidiary received US$0.4 million in Israel Innovation Authority royalty-bearing R&D grants during FY2025 for an approved project, though it does not identify the project’s end use or customer.1

Radware leases Tel Aviv headquarters and R&D, administrative, finance, marketing and sales premises from private RAD-Bynet companies associated with Zisapel-family interests; it also leases Jerusalem development and manufacturing space from affiliated companies.1 It holds Israeli tax status described as Approved, Privileged and Preferred Enterprise status under Israeli law.1

The February 2022 DC Security transaction was a reported US$42.5 million acquisition of an Israeli-incorporated DDoS-technology business from Yehuda Zisapel, the father of Radware’s CEO.10 The company’s operational and capital links therefore substantiate an Israeli economic nexus independently of any military allegation.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Radware is a software and cloud-services vendor, not an agricultural, food or consumer-goods importer. No public evidence identified links it to settlement-origin produce, physical-goods sourcing, importer-of-record structures or occupied-territory product-labelling issues.1, 7 No public evidence identified of a Radware physical footprint in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights.1, 6

The reported DC Protection tax matter is an investigation and company response, not a finding against Radware. DC Protection denied tax evasion and stated that the matter had no connection to Radware or other RAD-Bynet companies.15 The audits also found no public evidence of Radware’s own disclosed Israeli sovereign-bond holdings or Israel-focused fund positions beyond ordinary institutional ownership of Radware equity.1

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Radware’s 11 October 2023 advisory described the 7 October Hamas attack, referred to the IDF response as “Operation Iron Swords,” and reported increased cyber activity targeting Israeli sites.5 It reported 143 claimed attacks between 2 and 10 October and described government websites as the largest stated category at approximately 36 percent.5 The advisory framed this material as cybersecurity threat intelligence and promoted security products and customer support.5

Radware’s Israeli incorporation, physical operations and government-linked Israel Post customer relationship form part of the political-economy context, but the reviewed record does not establish a corporate mission to advance Israeli state geopolitical objectives.1, 4 No public evidence identified of a corporate PAC, policy-lobbying registration, direct contribution to the IDF, FIDF, JNF/KKL, settlement bodies or military-welfare organisations.1

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The 2023 advisory’s attack figures were Radware observations and characterisations, not independently verified incident totals.5 The reviewed conflict-related communication did not state that Radware provided free crisis services, credits, physical logistics or infrastructure to an Israeli state or military entity.5

No public evidence identified of Radware-operated settlement facilities, occupied-territory contracts or named resellers/customer deployments in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights.6 Document-scoped checks found no Radware mention in the specified OHCHR settlement-business reports, the UN Special Rapporteur report, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch reports, or the cited BDS priority-target guide; these non-mentions do not establish absence from unsearched materials, affiliates or differently named entities.16, 6

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score (V4)

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military0.000.000.000.00
Digital5.107.009.005.10
Economic9.007.009.009.00
Political3.757.009.003.75

The fixed V4 result is driven by Economic’s documented Israeli incorporation, headquarters, infrastructure, R&D, tax status and related-party economic relationships.1 Digital reflects the verified Israeli digital footprint and Israel Post deployment, while Military remains zero because the audits did not verify a defence or security-force procurement nexus.1, 4 This is a scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted method using Impact × magnitude/proximity; the supplied final scores are reproduced without alteration.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094366/000117891326001923/zk2634899.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30 ↩31 ↩32 ↩33 ↩34 ↩35 ↩36 ↩37 ↩38 ↩39 ↩40 ↩41 ↩42 ↩43 ↩44 ↩45 ↩46 ↩47 ↩48 ↩49 ↩50 ↩51 ↩52 ↩53 ↩54 ↩55

  2. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2023/03/14/2626392/8980/en/Radware-Introduces-a-Next-Gen-Cloud-Application-Security-Center-in-Israel.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/09/02/3142424/8980/en/Radware-Introduces-Two-New-Next-Gen-Cloud-Application-Security-Centers-in-Israel-and-Columbia.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  4. https://www.radware.com/getattachment/2aa98fe7-ea17-4bd4-b431-846877645ec0/RWI-505_Israel_Post_Case_Study_06-19-25.pdf.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12

  5. https://www.radware.com/security/threat-advisories-and-attack-reports/cyber-aggression-rises-following-the-october-2023-israel-hamas-conflict/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  6. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  7. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/6526 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  8. https://www.radware.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?ID=3ec8d46c-bc9d-4e62-a6f0-6fe889d0c998 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  9. https://mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/he/p/543528 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-radware-buys-israeli-cybersecurity-co-securitydam-1001402922 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  11. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/03903389 ↩

  12. https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/Radware%20DefensePro%20Product%20Family%20Security%20Target.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. https://www.radware.com/workarea/downloadasset.aspx/?ID=6442451942 ↩

  14. https://boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2024-16749 ↩

  15. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/sjd6hrmmme ↩

  16. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2