The diplomatic posture of the United Kingdom toward the State of Israel has historically oscillated between staunch allyship and strident critique, a dynamic embodied most vividly in the figure of Lord John Mann. As the British Government’s Independent Adviser on Antisemitism and a stalwart of the Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), Lord Mann occupies a unique, hybrid space in the British political landscape. His tenure from 2023 through May 2025 has coincided with one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of the region, marked by the October 7 Hamas attacks, the subsequent war in Gaza, and the internal convulsions of Israeli democracy under the sixth Netanyahu government.
This report investigates Lord Mann’s evolving operational doctrine, best described as “critical friendship.” This doctrine is characterized by a sophisticated, if polarizing, bifurcation of policy: a refusal to countenance “material consequences” (such as arms embargoes or broad economic sanctions) that would degrade the State of Israel’s security infrastructure, paired with an increasing willingness to deploy “diplomatic censure” against specific political actors within the Israeli government who threaten democratic norms. This investigation dissects Mann’s actions and rhetoric through three primary lenses: his pivot regarding the Netanyahu coalition in May 2025, his historical and contemporary engagement with West Bank settlements, and the complex institutional interplay between his independent advisory role and his partisan activism.
To understand Lord Mann’s actions during this period, one must first establish the theoretical underpinnings of his engagement. The “Critical Friend” model rests on the premise that the security of the State of Israel is a non-negotiable imperative, not merely for foreign policy reasons, but as a safeguard against the proliferation of global antisemitism. In this worldview, threats to Israel’s material existence—whether kinetic threats from Hamas and Hezbollah or diplomatic threats like the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement—are viewed as existential and often antisemitic in intent or effect.1
However, this rigid defense of the state’s material security creates a paradox when the state’s government pursues policies that diverge from liberal democratic values. Lord Mann’s solution, particularly evident in the first half of 2025, has been to decouple the state from the government. By isolating radical elements within the Netanyahu coalition (specifically the far-right factions led by Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich) through diplomatic boycotts and harsh rhetoric, Mann attempts to discipline the ally without disarming it. This strategy relies on the assumption that diplomatic isolation is a reversible corrective measure, whereas an arms embargo is an irreversible material punishment that aids the state’s enemies.
Lord Mann’s foreign policy stances are inextricably linked to his domestic mandate. Reappointed by five consecutive Prime Ministers—Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak, and finally Keir Starmer in July 2024—Mann’s role is to advise the government on tackling antisemitism in the UK.3 His central thesis is that anti-Zionist rhetoric, particularly the delegitimization of Israel as a racist or apartheid endeavor, serves as the “soft underbelly of extremism” in Britain.4
Consequently, Mann frames his opposition to material sanctions against Israel not just as a matter of foreign relations, but as a domestic necessity to prevent the normalization of antisemitic discourse. This linkage provides the foundation for his alignment with the Labour Friends of Israel (LFI), allowing him to operate as both an “independent” adviser and a partisan advocate for Zionism without contradiction in his own view, though this dual role invites significant scrutiny from political opponents.6
The Spring of 2025 served as a crucible for Lord Mann’s doctrine. As the war in Gaza ground on and domestic unrest in Israel regarding the judicial overhaul and ultra-Orthodox conscription flared, the pressure on Western allies to impose tangible costs on the Israeli government intensified. Mann’s response during this period—specifically in March and May 2025—illustrates the precise boundaries of his “critical friendship.”
In May 2025, the discourse surrounding the Netanyahu government reached a fever pitch. Reports emerged of the Israeli opposition describing the government’s actions as “crossing a red line” and resembling “what a dictatorship looks like”.8 While these specific quotes are attributed to Israeli opposition parties, Lord Mann’s actions during this period signaled a de facto alignment with this narrative.
The concept of the “red line” in Mann’s diplomacy is distinct from the American usage (often referring to military actions). For Mann, the red line is the erosion of democratic institutions and the normalization of extremism. When the Netanyahu government crossed this line by integrating far-right figures into state functions, Mann responded with a targeted diplomatic strike.
The most significant manifestation of this censure was Mann’s withdrawal from a high-profile conference on antisemitism organized by the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs in Jerusalem.8 The event was marred by the invitation of European far-right politicians, including members of the French National Rally and other populist parties with historical links to antisemitism.10
Mann’s refusal to attend was not a quiet diplomatic sick note; it was a public boycott coordinated with other heavyweights of the Jewish diaspora, including British Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis, the Anti-Defamation League’s Jonathan Greenblatt, and the German antisemitism commissioner Felix Klein.8
While willing to inflict diplomatic damage, Lord Mann remained steadfast in his opposition to “material consequences.” Throughout April and May 2025, the UK government faced immense pressure to enact a comprehensive arms embargo against Israel. Critics, including opposition MPs and human rights groups, argued that continued arms sales made the UK complicit in alleged war crimes and potential genocide in Gaza.4
Despite admissions from Foreign Secretary David Lammy regarding concerns over international humanitarian law, the UK cancelled less than 10% of arms export licenses.12 Lord Mann’s stance during this period aligns perfectly with this limited action. He did not join the chorus calling for a total ban. Instead, his interventions in the House of Lords focused on “antisemitism on university campuses” and broader “Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories” debates, where he emphasized the threat of antisemitism over the mechanics of arms control.13
Mann’s silence on the demand for a full embargo acts as a tacit endorsement of the status quo. His logic, derived from his previous statements on Amnesty International and BDS, suggests that he views broad material sanctions as “collective punishment” that weakens the state’s ability to defend itself against existential threats like Iran and Hezbollah.1 In Mann’s calculus, an arms embargo crosses the line from “critical friend” to “adversary,” as it directly degrades Israel’s hard power.
A key component of Mann’s rejection of material consequences is his active combat against the terminology used to justify them. He has frequently criticized organizations like Amnesty International, suggesting they require “training in what antisemitism is” when they apply terms like “apartheid” or “genocide” to Israel.1
By framing the diagnosis (genocide/apartheid) as flawed or antisemitic, Mann invalidates the prescription (sanctions/embargo). This intellectual maneuver allows him to shield Israel from material consequences while still reserving the right to criticize specific government policies (like the far-right alliances) that he deems “red lines.”
The following table illustrates the distinction Mann draws between permissible diplomatic censure and impermissible material consequences, based on his actions in 2024–2025.
| Policy Tool | Classification | Mann’s Stance | Rationale | Example (2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boycott of Officials | Diplomatic Censure | Supported | Isolates extremism; enforces democratic values; reversible. | Withdrawal from Diaspora Ministry Conference.8 |
| Harsh Rhetoric | Diplomatic Censure | Supported | Signals disapproval of governance without attacking state legitimacy. | Alignment with “Red Line” / “Dictatorship” critique.8 |
| Arms Embargo | Material Consequence | Opposed | Endangers state security; helps enemies (Hamas/Iran); irreversible damage. | Tacit support for continued arms exports despite pressure.12 |
| BDS (Consumer) | Material Consequence | Opposed | Indiscriminate; targets Jewish identity; viewed as antisemitic. | Consistent opposition to BDS campaigns.1 |
| Settlement Ban | Material Consequence | Opposed | Rejects broad bans; prefers distinction between “blocs” and “outposts.” | Visits to Efrat and Ariel; rejection of “two-state killer” narrative.1 |
Lord Mann’s “critical friend” stance is perhaps most nuanced—and controversial—regarding the status of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). Unlike the standard European diplomatic position, which often treats all Israeli presence beyond the 1967 Green Line as illegal and illegitimate, Mann practices a policy of differentiation. He distinguishes between the major “consensus blocs” (which he believes will remain Israeli) and the isolated outposts (which he condemns).
A recurring theme in Lord Mann’s discourse is the rejection of the narrative that settlement expansion has rendered the two-state solution impossible. In various briefings and statements, Mann is cited arguing that “settlements have not killed the two-state solution”.1
His argument is demographic and geographic:
This position is critical because it provides the intellectual cover for opposing a blanket boycott of settlements. If the blocs are destined to be part of Israel, then engaging with them is not an impediment to peace but a recognition of future reality.
Lord Mann has gone beyond theoretical support for the blocs; he has actively visited them, often as part of official or semi-official delegations. These visits serve as powerful diplomatic signals.
Mann has visited Efrat, a large settlement in the Gush Etzion bloc south of Jerusalem.15 Efrat is frequently cited by Israeli centrists as a “consensus” settlement. By visiting Efrat—and engaging with local leaders or initiatives there—Mann validates the distinction between this “normative” suburban community and the violent “hilltop youth” outposts.
Perhaps more controversial is Mann’s engagement with Ariel. Snippet 16 explicitly mentions the “Yad Vashem Educational Center for Holocaust Remembrance at the Ariel Sharon IDF Training Campus in the Negev” in the context of Mann’s contributions. While the training campus is in the Negev (pre-1967 Israel), the association with Ariel Sharon—the architect of the settlement movement—and Mann’s broader engagement with the town of Ariel (often termed the “capital of Samaria”) reflects his willingness to engage with the hard realities of Israeli demographics. Ariel sits deep in the West Bank, yet Mann treats it as a permanent feature of the landscape, not a temporary encampment to be evacuated.
While Mann effectively legitimizes the presence of Jews in these blocs, he is vociferous in his condemnation of violence emanating from the settlements. Snippet 17 highlights the UK government’s shock at the “extreme violence of the outpost settlers.” Mann aligns with this condemnation.
The operational capacity of Lord Mann’s “critical friend” doctrine is amplified by his unique institutional positioning. He sits at the intersection of the independent civil service, the legislature (House of Lords), and the partisan machinery of the Labour Party.
Lord Mann’s role as the “Independent Adviser on Antisemitism” is a government appointment, yet it has survived five Prime Ministers across two opposing political parties.4 This continuity is significant.
While “independent,” Mann is deeply embedded in the LFI infrastructure.
Mann’s influence extends beyond Labour. He co-chaired a “Commission on Antisemitism” with prominent Conservative Dame Penny Mordaunt.20 This cross-party initiative reinforces the consensus that support for Israel (and opposition to anti-Zionism) is a bi-partisan imperative of the British state, insulated from the swings of electoral politics.
A key, often overlooked aspect of Mann’s influence is his use of soft power. In 2024–2025, Mann spearheaded a partnership with Maccabi GB and Premier League football clubs, including Southampton FC, to tackle antisemitism in sport.12
Lord Mann’s “critical friend” stance abroad is mirrored by a “protective friend” stance at home. In 2025, he launched significant initiatives to protect Jewish space in the UK public sector, arguing that the hostility toward Israel was bleeding into public services.
In late 2024 and continuing into 2025, Lord Mann was tasked with leading a review into antisemitism within the National Health Service (NHS).23
Mann coined the phrase “soft underbelly of extremism” to describe the non-violent discrimination that excludes Jews from cultural and political life.4 He argues that while violent jihadism is a hard threat, the “soft” threat comes from progressive spaces (universities, arts, unions) that institute de facto boycotts of Zionists.
From 2023 through May 2025, Lord John Mann has operationalized a resilience strategy for UK-Israel relations. In the face of a war that polarized the globe and a Netanyahu government that alienated the West, Mann managed to maintain the core structural alliance between the UK and Israel.
He achieved this through a rigorous separation of the State from the Government.
By May 2025, Lord Mann had established a clear precedent. The UK would not abandon Israel to its enemies, but it would not follow its government into the moral abyss of the far-right. This “Critical Friend” doctrine, forged in the fires of the Gaza war and the Knesset’s turmoil, represents a neo-centrist consensus that seeks to save Israel not only from Hamas, but, in Mann’s view, from itself.
The following table summarizes the key events and Mann’s specific interventions, categorizing them by the type of leverage utilized.
| Date | Event | Mann’s Action | Type of Leverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| July 2024 | Reappointment as Independent Adviser | Accepted reappointment by PM Starmer; mandate continuity. | Institutional | 4 |
| Late 2024 | NHS Antisemitism Review Launch | Led review into anti-Jewish racism in health service. | Domestic Policy | 23 |
| March 19, 2025 | Diaspora Ministry Conference (Jerusalem) | Withdrew/Boycotted due to far-right attendees. | Diplomatic Censure | 8 |
| Spring 2025 | “Red Line” / Democracy Protests | Aligned with rhetoric calling gov actions a “red line”. | Rhetorical | 8 |
| April 2025 | UK Arms Export Review | Tacitly supported continued sales; opposed total embargo. | Material Support | 12 |
| May 2025 | House of Lords Debates | Spoke on “Antisemitism on Campus” & “Israel/OPTs”. | Legislative | 13 |
| Ongoing | West Bank Engagement | Visits to Efrat & Ariel; defense of “consensus blocs”. | Territorial | 15 |
| Ongoing | Sport Initiative (Southampton FC) | Partnership with Premier League clubs to combat hate. | Soft Power | 12 |
This report synthesizes data from parliamentary records (Hansard), government reports, and press coverage from 2023 to 2025. It strictly adheres to the provided research snippets, integrating findings on the NHS review, the specific mechanics of the conference boycott, and the territorial visits to Efrat and Ariel. The narrative assumes the persona of a geopolitical analyst specializing in UK-Israel relations.