INDEX / DIRECTORY / SUBARU

Subaru

Car Manufacturers 54 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-07-10
BDS-1000 Score 73 /1000 E Tier E - Limited
Military ↗ 0.05 Digital ↗ 0.00 Economic ↗ 1.10 Political ↗ 0.31

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BDS-1000 Main Dossier: Subaru Corporation

Key Findings

  • Economic: Subaru (as Fuji Heavy Industries) entered the Israeli market in 1968–69 in defiance of the Arab League boycott - a commercially motivated decision, since it had little Arab-market revenue at risk - which made it Israel’s dominant car brand for roughly fifteen years; the relationship has always run through independent Israeli importers (Japanauto, then Samelet from 2013), never a Subaru-owned entity, and Subaru’s current Israeli volume is a small and declining share of global sales.12
  • Military: In 2016, Japanese authorities reportedly approached Fuji Heavy Industries (now Subaru), alongside NEC and Mitsubishi Electric, about a possible joint military-drone development project with Israel; Subaru did not respond to the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s inquiry, and no public evidence confirms whether the approach proceeded, was declined, or lapsed.34
  • Political: Subaru issued no public statement on the October 2023 Hamas attack or the Gaza war, in contrast to its documented €1 million UNHCR donation for Ukraine relief in March 2022 and subsequent suspension of Russia exports.56
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of any Subaru contract, sale, or technology-supply relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Police, or Israel Prison Service; no Subaru entry in the UN OHCHR settlement-business database or the Who Profits database; and no confirmed digital, surveillance, or cloud-infrastructure nexus to Israel.78

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameSubaru Corporation (formerly Fuji Heavy Industries)
JurisdictionJapan
HeadquartersTokyo, Japan (Subaru’s AI/software R&D hub, “Subaru Lab,” is Shibuya-based; manufacturing is centred in Gunma, Japan and Indiana, USA)9
SectorAutomotive manufacturing (passenger vehicles); aerospace and defence components (license-built military aircraft and UAVs for the Japan Self-Defense Forces)
OwnershipPublicly held; Toyota Motor Corporation holds approximately 20% as a minority, non-controlling shareholder, alongside Japanese institutional investors and foreign institutional holders. No Israeli state, sovereign-wealth, or institutional stake was identified.10
Key Executives / GovernanceNo public evidence identified of named Subaru executives or board members making statements, donations, or advocacy regarding Israel-Palestine. Internal governance includes an unnamed CIO-led “Cybersecurity Meeting” and an internal “SBR-SIRT” incident-response function, last revised July 2024; no external security vendor is named.11
Israeli-Nexus SummaryA historic civilian-market pioneer in Israel via arm’s-length independent importers (no Subaru-owned Israeli entity), with no confirmed military, security, or settlement contract; the single unresolved thread is a 2016 report that Japan approached Subaru about joint drone development with Israel, to which Subaru never responded and whose outcome is unconfirmed.

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Subaru Corporation’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus is overwhelmingly historical and commercial rather than military, digital, or overtly political. The company’s most consequential and best-evidenced act is its 1968–69 decision, as Fuji Heavy Industries, to enter the Israeli market in open defiance of the Arab League boycott at a time when larger Japanese manufacturers - Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi - stayed out to protect Arab-market and oil-supply interests. Because Fuji Heavy had little Arab-market revenue to lose, the decision is documented across sources as commercially rather than politically motivated, but its effect was to make Subaru the dominant passenger-car brand in Israel for roughly fifteen years, with peak sales exceeding 20,000 units in 1987 and lasting cultural prominence (the brand name became a Hebrew colloquialism for “car”).114

That commercial relationship has, across its entire history, been conducted through independent, non-Subaru-owned Israeli importers - Japanauto from 1968, acquired by the Zeevi Group in 1998, and then by the Levi family’s Samelet Group in 2013 - with no Subaru equity stake in any importer and no Subaru-owned manufacturing, R&D, or distribution entity in Israel identified in any of the four domain audits.215 Subaru’s current Israeli sales volume is a small and declining fraction of its roughly one-million-unit global output, a marked contrast to its historical market dominance.16

Across the military, digital, and economic domains, the audits converge on an absence of confirmed defence, security, or settlement-infrastructure involvement. Subaru holds no contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Police, or Israel Prison Service; its confirmed defence-manufacturing relationship (license-built Bell/Boeing helicopters, fixed-wing trainers, and an experimental MUM-T UAV delivered to Japan’s ATLA in July 2025) runs exclusively through the Japanese government, with no Israeli technology or partner named in that program.1317 Subaru’s EyeSight driver-assistance platform sources image sensors from ON Semiconductor rather than the Israeli-founded, Intel-owned Mobileye - a sourced negative finding distinguishing Subaru’s ADAS supply chain from an Israeli-technology pathway.1819 Subaru is absent from both the UN OHCHR database of businesses linked to Israeli settlements and the Who Profits database.78

The strongest documented vector - and the only genuinely unresolved thread - is a 2016 report that Japanese authorities approached Fuji Heavy Industries (by then rebranded Subaru Corporation), alongside NEC and Mitsubishi Electric, about participating in a reported Japan-Israel joint military-drone development project. Subaru did not respond to the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s inquiry, and no public evidence establishes whether the approach was accepted, declined, or simply lapsed; the audits carry this strictly as unconfirmed.34 Separately, low-severity historical items - a 2011 Facebook image referencing a settler’s use of a Subaru in an East Jerusalem incident (disavowed by the importer), a 2012 advertisement criticized for “price tag” wordplay, and a 2019 Facebook ad depicting a Subaru driven by a settler striking Palestinian children (denied by Subaru’s Israeli spokesperson) - are documented as importer- or third-party-level matters rather than Subaru corporate acts.202122

Weighed together, the evidence record supports a Base Risk Score of 73 and a Tier E (“Minimal”) classification. The score is driven almost entirely by the historical-commercial Economic vector (the boycott-defying market entry and enduring, if declining, importer relationship), with the Military, Digital, and Political vectors each anchored by an absence of confirmed contracts, technology transfers, or corporate political positioning, and by explicit sourced negative findings (e.g., no Mobileye link, no OHCHR/Who Profits listing, no Project Nimbus participation).

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
1968–69Fuji Heavy Industries (now Subaru Corporation) enters the Israeli market via importer Japanauto, defying the Arab League boycott while larger Japanese automakers stayed out.114
1987Subaru’s Israeli sales peak at over 20,000 units, its high-water mark of market dominance.16
1998Japanauto (the Israeli Subaru importer) is acquired by the Zeevi Group.15
2010The Israeli importer (Japanauto) is acknowledged as a sponsor of the Herzliya Conference, an Israeli national-security policy forum - an importer-level, not Subaru-corporate, act.23
2010–2011A 2011 Facebook image referencing an October 2010 incident (a settler organization director striking Palestinian children in Silwan while driving a Subaru) circulates on the Israeli importer’s page; the importer disavows and removes it.20
2012A Subaru-Israel advertisement using “price tag” wordplay evoking settler-violence graffiti draws criticism from +972 Magazine.21
2013Samelet Group acquires the Israeli Subaru importer franchise from the Zeevi Group; remains the current franchised importer.2
8 Oct 2016BHRC reports that NAJAT (Network Against Japan Arms Trade) raised concerns that Japan had approached Fuji Heavy Industries (now Subaru), NEC, and Mitsubishi Electric about a reported Japan-Israel joint military-drone development project; Subaru does not respond to BHRC’s inquiry.34
2019A Facebook advertisement on a “Subaru-Israel” page depicts a Subaru driven by a settler striking Palestinian children in East Jerusalem; Fatah condemns it, and Subaru’s Israeli spokesperson denies producing it.22
29 Mar 2022Subaru announces a €1 million donation to UNHCR for Ukraine relief and later suspends exports to Russia.56
20 Nov 2024A researcher-disclosed vulnerability in Subaru’s STARLINK connected-vehicle admin panel, allowing tracking and remote control of individual vehicles, is patched within roughly 24 hours.1224
Feb 2025Subaru opens “Subaru Lab,” an AI/software R&D hub, in Shibuya, Tokyo.9
Jul 2025Subaru selects Hewlett Packard Enterprise (US) infrastructure to accelerate AI training for its next-generation EyeSight driver-assist system.25
9 Jul 2025Subaru delivers an experimental UAV to Japan’s ATLA for manned-unmanned-teaming (MUM-T) research.13
Sep 2025OHCHR updates its database of businesses linked to Israeli settlements; Subaru does not appear.7
24 Nov 2025Reporting on MUM-T flight trials names only Japan’s ATLA and a September 2025 US-Japan AI-research MOU as partners; no Israeli technology or partner is referenced.26
Jan 2026NAJAT protests a Japan Ministry of Defense tender for small attack drones over concern it could include Israeli-made models; reporting does not name Subaru.27

Corporate Overview

Subaru Corporation is a Japanese automotive manufacturer (the successor entity to Fuji Heavy Industries) whose core business is the design and manufacture of passenger vehicles, with a secondary aerospace/defence division that license-builds Bell/Boeing helicopters, fixed-wing trainers, and experimental UAVs exclusively for the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA).1713 Manufacturing is based in Gunma, Japan and Indiana, USA; no Subaru-owned manufacturing, R&D, or office facility in Israel or the occupied territories was identified in any audit.28

Subaru’s principal shareholders are Toyota Motor Corporation (~20%, a minority, non-controlling stake) and Japanese institutional investors, with foreign institutional holders also present; no Israeli state or institutional shareholding was identified.10 Because Toyota is not a parent or controlling entity, Toyota’s own separately documented Israeli-market activities - Who Profits lists Toyota as a supplier of Hilux/Land Cruiser-based vehicles, including armored “David”/“Jackal” platforms, to Israeli security forces operating in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, via a 2021 settlement-vehicle contract and 2018–2022 IMOD/Israel Police tenders through its Israeli distributor Union Motors - are documented in the audits as group-adjacent context only and are explicitly not attributed to Subaru.29

Subaru has never owned an Israeli subsidiary or distribution entity. Its Israeli market presence has run continuously through independent, franchised local importers: Japanauto (from 1968), acquired by the Zeevi Group in 1998, and then by the Levi family’s Samelet Group (also the Israeli importer for Fiat, Jeep/Stellantis, Ferrari, and Maserati) in 2013, which remains the current importer.215 No public evidence identified of a Samelet or Japanauto dealership located inside a West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights settlement.30 Neither Subaru Corporation, Fuji Heavy Industries, Samelet, nor Colmobil (a separate, unrelated Israeli importer of Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, and Hyundai, with no Subaru-brand distribution role) appear on the UN OHCHR settlement-business database or the Who Profits database.7831

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of any contract, tender award, or agreement between Subaru (or Fuji Heavy Industries) and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police. Subaru’s confirmed defence-manufacturing relationship - license-built Bell 412/UH-2 helicopters, fixed-wing trainers, and an experimental MUM-T UAV delivered to ATLA on 9 July 2025 - runs exclusively through the Japanese government.1713 The civilian Subaru Forester was named by Israel Police (not the IDF) as one of several candidate models for a roughly 300-vehicle, ~NIS 45 million urban patrol-vehicle tender, alongside the Kia Sportage and Hyundai Santa Fe; no public evidence identified confirms an actual purchase resulted.32 The one substantive nexus is a reported 2016 approach: Japanese authorities reportedly approached Fuji Heavy Industries (now Subaru), NEC, and Mitsubishi Electric about a possible joint Japan-Israel military-drone development project, per NAJAT and BHRC reporting; Mitsubishi Electric responded to BHRC’s inquiry, Subaru did not, and no public evidence confirms whether the project proceeded, was declined, or lapsed.34

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Subaru’s defence-sector work is documented as running exclusively through Japan’s government procurement system, with reporting on the November 2025 MUM-T flight trials naming only ATLA and a US-Japan AI-research MOU as partners - no Israeli technology or partner appears in that program.26 Israel’s own historical Bell-205 helicopter fleet was procured directly from the United States and Agusta-Bell in Italy, not from Fuji’s Japan-licensed production line, per the Israeli Air Force’s own historical account - a direct negative finding against any Fuji/Subaru-to-Israel helicopter supply pathway.3334 Subaru’s EyeSight ADAS platform sources image sensors from ON Semiconductor rather than the Israeli-founded Mobileye.1819 The 2016 drone-development approach remains unconfirmed as to outcome; Subaru’s non-response to BHRC’s inquiry is itself the extent of the documented record, and no subsequent joint program, product, or contract has been identified. Subaru, Fuji Heavy Industries, Samelet, and Colmobil do not appear in the UN OHCHR settlement-business database or the Who Profits database.7831

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of Subaru holding licensing, subscription, or integration relationships with Israeli cybersecurity, biometric, or surveillance vendors (e.g., Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE, Verint, Claroty, Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, or Trax).11 Subaru’s STARLINK connected-vehicle backend suffered a researcher-disclosed vulnerability (admin-panel access allowing tracking and remote control of vehicles), disclosed in November 2024 and patched within roughly 24 hours; the underlying cloud/hosting provider was not identified by the disclosing researchers.241235 Subaru’s Starlink GEN2 partner is WirelessCar, a Sweden-registered, Volkswagen-Group-owned company with no Israeli ownership or technology link.3637 Subaru of America’s Starlink IaaS platform runs on Oracle Cloud (via integrator Centroid), a relationship with no Israeli nexus identified.38 Subaru’s EyeSight AI training uses Hewlett Packard Enterprise (US) infrastructure, with no Israeli-origin component specified.25

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Subaru operating data-centre infrastructure in Israel, or of participation in Project Nimbus or any comparable Israeli state-backed cloud program.39 No public evidence identified of Subaru’s AI or ADAS systems being provided to Israeli state, military, or security bodies, or of any Israeli-domiciled company acquisition, investment, or research partnership (e.g., with Technion, Hebrew University, or Weizmann Institute).40 Subaru does not appear in the Al Jazeera summary of UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s report A/HRC/59/23, nor in a full-text keyword search of that report; it is also absent from the OHCHR’s September 2025 settlement-business database update.417 The two historical advertising controversies (2012 “price tag” wordplay; 2019 Facebook ad) predate the audit’s 2020 threshold, concern advertising content rather than technology provision, and show no evidence of recurrence in 2024–2026 sources.2122

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Subaru’s foundational economic act is its 1968–69 entry into the Israeli market (as Fuji Heavy Industries) in defiance of the Arab League boycott, a commercially motivated decision - Fuji Heavy had little Arab-market revenue to lose - that nonetheless made Subaru Israel’s dominant car brand for roughly fifteen years, peaking above 20,000 units sold in 1987.114 The Israeli importer chain has always been an independent Israeli company: Japanauto (1968), acquired by the Zeevi Group (1998), then by Samelet (2013), which holds roughly 3% of the Israeli vehicle market across all brands it distributes, with Subaru’s own volume a small and declining fraction of that.216 Subaru is paid the wholesale export price by the importer, which retains in-market retail margin; profits accrue to Subaru Corporation in Japan with no profit-repatriation mechanism into Israeli-domiciled entities.42

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of any Subaru-owned manufacturing plant, R&D centre, office, or fixed asset in Israel or the occupied territories; Subaru’s manufacturing is confined to Japan and the United States.28 No public evidence identified of a named Israeli-domiciled supplier providing components into Subaru production, of Subaru investment in an Israeli company or startup, or of Israeli state/sovereign-wealth ownership in Subaru.43 Subaru is not listed in the UN OHCHR settlement database, and no Subaru entry was found in the Who Profits database.78 Given the importer’s ~3% all-brands market share and Subaru’s sharp 2026 volume decline, Subaru’s current Israeli presence is a de minimis share of its roughly one-million-unit global sales - a marked contrast with its historical 1970s–80s market dominance, and no assessment characterises Subaru as a current significant employer or sector anchor in the Israeli economy.16

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of any Subaru Corporation statement on the October 2023 Hamas attack, the Gaza war, or a related humanitarian position - a documented silence that contrasts with Subaru’s affirmative March 2022 response to Ukraine (a €1 million UNHCR donation and subsequent suspension of Russia exports).56 Subaru’s most documented political dimension remains historical-commercial: its 1968–69 boycott-defying market entry, widely read in Israeli public culture as an Israel-aligned stance despite being commercially motivated.114 One importer-level item - Japanauto’s acknowledged sponsorship of the 2010 Herzliya Conference, an Israeli national-security policy forum - is documented but not repeated in more recent records and is not a Subaru-corporate act.23

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Subaru Corporation accepting Israeli state honours, entering formal partnerships with Israeli government bodies, lobbying on Israel-Palestine policy, or directing corporate donations to Israeli parastatal, settlement, or military-welfare bodies; US lobbying records for Subaru concern automotive-sector matters only, with no Israel dimension.44 No public evidence identified of any Subaru dealership located within a West Bank settlement, or of any executive or board member statement, donation, or advocacy regarding Israel-Palestine.30 Two contested-territory items resolve against a Subaru corporate nexus: a 2011 Facebook image referencing a settler’s use of a Subaru in the October 2010 Silwan incident, disavowed and removed by the Israeli importer (the underlying incident was a private individual’s use of a civilian vehicle, not a Subaru corporate act); and a rumour that Subaru distributed world maps excluding Israel, investigated and found false by the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the ADL.2045

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score (V4)

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military1.501.001.500.05
Digital0.000.000.000.00
Economic4.003.004.501.10
Political2.502.003.000.31

V_MAX is set by Economic (1.10), reflecting Subaru’s sole substantively documented vector - its historical, boycott-defying entry into the Israeli civilian market and the enduring (if now de minimis and declining) independent-importer relationship - while Digital registers a full zero across all three factors given the consistent absence of any confirmed Israeli technology, cloud, or surveillance nexus. The Tier E (Minimal) classification reflects that even the strongest vector scores low on Impact, Magnitude, and Proximity, and that the Military and Political domains contribute only marginal residual scores (0.05 and 0.31) built on unconfirmed or importer/third-party-level items rather than confirmed Subaru corporate conduct. Scoring follows the scale-free Impact × Magnitude/Proximity method applied uniformly across the BDS-1000 corpus, with all inputs drawn from the vetted domain audits.

Methodology Note

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.hagerty.com/media/automotive-history/how-subaru-became-the-peoples-car-of-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samelet ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  3. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/japan-reported-joint-drone-development-with-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  4. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/companies/subaru-corporation-formerly-fuji-heavy-industries/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  5. https://www.subaru.co.jp/news-en/2022_03_29_102444/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  6. https://leave-russia.org/subaru ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  8. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/all ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  9. https://www.autonews.com/subaru/an-subaru-lab-artificial-intelligence-software-0311/ ↩ ↩2

  10. https://www.untaylored.com/post/who-owns-subaru ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://www.subaru.co.jp/en/csr/governance/risk/security.html ↩ ↩2

  12. https://www.securityweek.com/subaru-starlink-vulnerability-exposed-cars-to-remote-hacking/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  13. https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/08/subaru-delivers-experimental-uav-to-japans-atla-for-manned-unmanned-teaming-research-nsbt/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  14. https://www.jta.org/archive/japanese-want-to-sell-to-israel-but-are-afraid-to-break-boycott ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  15. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000803861 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  16. https://www.ynetnews.com/sport/article/hknw5z6b11x ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  17. https://www.subaru.co.jp/en/outline/about/aerospace/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  18. https://embeddedcomputing.com/application/automotive/subaru-selects-on-semiconductor-image-sensing-technology-for-its-new-generation-eyesight-driver-assist-platform ↩ ↩2

  19. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobileye ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.jpost.com/international/subaru-we-have-no-link-to-ad-showing-kids-hit-by-car ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  21. https://www.972mag.com/subaru-ad-makes-light-of-west-bank-price-tag-attacks/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  22. https://imemc.org/article/61107/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  23. https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/boycotts-and-boycotts/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://samcurry.net/hacking-subaru ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  25. https://www.hpe.com/us/en/newsroom/press-release/2025/07/subaru-selects-hpe-to-accelerate-ai-development-for-next-generation-eyesight-driver-assist-system.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  26. https://theaviationist.com/2025/11/24/japan-mum-t-and-autonomous-flight-trials/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  27. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/japan-protest-held-against-defense-ministrys-planned-procurement-of-israeli-made-drones-over-concern-of-supporting-international-law-violation/ ↩

  28. https://www.centroid.com/customer_stories/subaru-success-story/ ↩ ↩2

  29. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/4175?toyota-motor-corporation= ↩ ↩2

  30. https://openintel.uk/v-econ/jeep-economic-audit/ ↩ ↩2

  31. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/4219 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4226338,00.html ↩ ↩2

  33. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_204/205 ↩

  34. https://www.iaf.org.il/208-18305-en/IAF.aspx?indx=1 ↩

  35. https://www.fastcompany.com/91266251/subaru-security-vulnerability-exposed-millions-of-cars-to-tracking-risks ↩

  36. https://www.wirelesscar.com/proven-by-our-customers/subaru/ ↩ ↩2

  37. https://www.volkswagen-group.com/en/press-releases/volkswagen-to-take-over-telematics-specialist-wirelesscar-from-volvo-16608 ↩ ↩2

  38. https://www.centroid.com/customer_stories/subaru-success-story/ ↩ ↩2

  39. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩

  40. https://global.nissannews.com/en/releases/231228-01-e ↩

  41. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/1/un-report-lists-companies-complicit-in-israels-genocide-who-are-they ↩

  42. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samelet ↩

  43. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/subaru-corp/summary?id=D000073772 ↩

  44. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/subaru-corp/summary?id=D000073772 ↩

  45. https://www.just-auto.com/news/usa-subaru-rejects-world-maps-excluding-israel-rumour/ ↩