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Surfshark MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-06-17
Military Score 0.00 /10 E Surfshark - BDS-1000 39
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

Surfshark - Military Audit

Company: Surfshark B.V. Audit Phase: Military Audit Research Memo Basis: Surfshark Military Audit (internal) Date of Preparation: Based on research memo findings

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified that Surfshark or any group entity has held contracts, tender awards, framework agreements, or memoranda of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or other Israeli state security bodies 1234. No public evidence identified that Surfshark appears in SIBAT’s publicly accessible defence export directories or Israeli defence procurement registries in connection with Israeli state contracts 25. No public evidence identified of corporate press releases, government announcements, or trade press reports documenting defence cooperation, joint ventures, or partnership agreements between Surfshark and Israeli defence entities 678. Surfshark is not listed in Francesca Albanese’s UN A/HRC/59/23 (July 2025) §§28–47 named-company list or its preceding Special Rapporteur reports 2. Surfshark is not listed in the UN OHCHR settlement business database (HRC res. 31/36 / 53/25) 1.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence identified that Surfshark manufactures or markets ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants of its VPN products 91011. Surfshark markets exclusively consumer and enterprise privacy and security software 91011. No public evidence identified of purpose-built, military-specified, or contract-modified products supplied to Israeli state defence or security bodies 12. No public evidence identified of publicly known export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews related to Surfshark products sold to Israeli defence or security end-users 1312. Surfshark’s Trust Center documents 100% rented infrastructure, RAM-only servers, no-logs architecture, and Dutch legal jurisdiction 12. No defence-specification certifications are documented in Surfshark’s publicly available technical disclosures 12.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified of Surfshark equipment, vehicles, or machinery being used in construction, maintenance, or demolition activity within Israeli settlements, the separation barrier, military installations, or occupied territories 1011. Surfshark is a software company that does not manufacture or supply physical infrastructure equipment 1011. No public evidence identified of Surfshark holding contracts for the construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure 51434.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of verified supply relationships where Surfshark provides components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Israeli defence prime contractors including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries 253. No public evidence identified of joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between Surfshark and Israeli defence firms 6710. Surfshark Impact Report 2024 does not disclose Israeli defence-adjacent supply chain components or military end-user policies 10.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of contracts to provide catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other support services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations 91011. No public evidence identified of shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, or arms shipments 34. Surfshark operates 8 VPN servers in Tel Aviv, Israel, hosted via DataCamp, a Belgian hosting provider 151316. Surfshark does not own physical server hardware in Israel; all infrastructure is rented 1317. DataCamp, Belgium, is Surfshark’s sole Israeli point-of-presence partner per Netify’s Surfshark infrastructure map 16. DataCamp does not appear in Israeli data centre market operator listings including Business Wire/Arizton 2023 and Arizton 2024 market reports 1819. DataCamp’s physical Israeli colocation vendor is not publicly documented in available market research 1819. Top10VPN classifies Surfshark’s overall server ownership model as “Rented” 17.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of any role by Surfshark as a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or other lethal platforms supplied to Israeli forces 1011. Surfshark is a software (VPN) company 1011. No public evidence identified of supply of ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to Israeli defence end-users 25. No public evidence identified of any role in the manufacture, integration, maintenance, or supply of components for strategic defence platforms including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems 25.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of publicly known government decisions to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences for Surfshark products to Israeli military or security end-users in any jurisdiction 12. No public evidence identified of investigations, citations, or enforcement actions related to Surfshark’s compliance with arms embargoes, export control regimes, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel 20. No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges brought against Surfshark regarding defence supply relationships with Israel 21. NordVPN US litigation, including the Hanscom class action and New York class action, names Surfshark B.V. as a corporate family member within the Nord Security/Cyberspace B.V. structure 222324. This confirms Surfshark is not legally ring-fenced from NordVPN’s legal disputes 222324. No Surfshark-specific defence-related litigation was identified in available court filings 222324.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Surfshark is not listed in the UN OHCHR settlement business database 1. Surfshark is not listed in Francesca Albanese A/HRC/59/23 (July 2025) §§28–47 or preceding Special Rapporteur reports 2. Surfshark is not listed in Who Profits’ database of companies linked to Israeli occupation 3. Surfshark is not listed in Don’t Buy Into Occupation (DBIO) coalition company lists including the V Report, November 2025 144. Surfshark is not listed in PAX “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” (June 2024) 5. Surfshark is not listed in AFSC investigate.afsc.org Israeli military-industrial supply chain investigations 3. No OECD National Contact Point complaint filed against Surfshark was identified in the OECD Watch complaints database 20. OECD NCP cases related to Palestinian territories involved G4S, JCB, CAF, and PwC with no VPN companies identified 20. No Surfshark entity appears in South Africa v. Israel ICJ proceedings (Case 192) or ICC OTP Israel-Palestine proceedings 21. Surfshark appears in Reddit community discussions (r/BDS, July 2025) as a potential boycott consideration due to its Israeli server presence, rated lower risk than NordVPN or PIA given the rented/virtualised infrastructure model 25. Surfshark is not confirmed as a BDS Movement boycott target 25. Surfshark has not published post-October 2023 policy statements, contract reviews, or operational reviews regarding Israel in its blog, press releases, or investor communications 8. No shareholder resolutions, employee letters, or NGO calls specifically targeting Surfshark’s Israeli operations were identified from public sources 34.

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  3. https://www.whoprofits.org ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  4. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  5. https://paxforpeace.nl/publicatie/companies-arming-israel ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  6. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nord-security-and-surfshark-join-forces ↩ ↩2

  7. https://surfshark.com/blog/surfshark-merges-with-nord-security ↩ ↩2

  8. https://surfshark.com/about-us ↩ ↩2

  9. https://surfshark.com/corporate-social-responsibility ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://surfshark.com/media/Surfshark_Impact_Report_2024.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  11. https://surfshark.com/media/Surfshark_Annual_Wrap-up_2025.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  12. https://surfshark.com/trust-center ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  13. https://www.netify.ai/resources/vpns/surfshark ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  14. https://www.alhaq.org/publications/26931.html ↩ ↩2

  15. https://surfshark.com/servers/israel ↩

  16. https://www.netify.ai/resources/vpns/surfshark (“Israel | Tel Aviv - DataCamp”) ↩ ↩2

  17. https://www.top10vpn.com/what-is-a-vpn/virtual-server-locations ↩ ↩2

  18. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230116005208/en/Israel-Data-Center-Market-Investment-Analysis-Report-2022-2027 ↩ ↩2

  19. https://www.arizton.com/market-reports/israel-data-center-colocation-market ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.oecdwatch.org/complaints-database ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  21. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192 ↩ ↩2

  22. https://www.classaction.org/media/nord-security-complaint.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  23. https://truthinadvertising.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Kandeh-v-NordVPN-complaint.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://clover-deer-sjwz.squarespace.com/s/050-FAC-073124.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  25. https://www.reddit.com/r/BDS/comments/1m9omzv/is_your_vpn_israeli_or_in_occupied_lands_more_for ↩ ↩2