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Uber

Key takeaways
  • Uber is classified as a Tier B "Severe Complicity" entity for materially enabling Israeli military-industrial capabilities.
  • Direct equity investment in Flytrex funded dual-use BVLOS drone tech during active conflict, increasing military-capable capacity.
  • Uber Eats allegedly "digitally launders" settlement produce, stripping origin labels and supplying UN-listed supermarket chains.
  • Corporate governance and vendors link Uber to Israeli defense cyberstack (Unit 8200), including SentinelOne, Wiz, and Project Nimbus.
  • "Uber Files" reveal state collusion: lobbying, legislative drafting, "Kill Switch" tactics, and asymmetrical humanitarian responses.
BDS Rating
Grade
D
BDS Score
285 / 1000
0 / 10
0.88 / 10
2.99 / 10
2.46 / 10
links for more information

Target Profile

  • Company: Uber Technologies, Inc.
  • Jurisdiction: Delaware, USA (incorporated); California, USA (operational HQ)
  • Headquarters: 1725 3rd Street, San Francisco, California 94158
  • Sector: Mobility technology, food and grocery delivery, freight brokerage
  • Relevant operating footprint: Active ride-hailing and Uber Eats operations in Israel; minority equity stake in Flytrex Aviation Ltd. (Tel Aviv); Careem subsidiary (Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, including historical West Bank presence); global platform operations across 70+ countries
  • Key executives or governance actors: Dara Khosrowshahi (CEO); Ronald D. Sugar (Non-Executive Board Chair; former Northrop Grumman CEO); Revathi Advaithi (Board Member; former BAE Systems board seat); John Thain (Board Member/Audit Chair; Pine Island Capital Partners); Turqi Alnowaiser (Board Member; Saudi PIF Deputy Governor)
  • BDS-1000 score: 285
  • Tier: D (200–399)

Executive Summary

Uber Technologies, Inc. is a US-incorporated mobility and logistics platform company with a commercially modest but multi-layered relationship with Israel. Its BDS-1000 score of 285 (Tier D) reflects three distinct categories of exposure: active commercial operations in Israel (ride-hailing and Uber Eats), a confirmed September 2025 strategic equity investment in Flytrex Aviation Ltd., a Tel Aviv-based drone delivery company, and documented high-level political engagement with Israeli governmental structures revealed in the July 2022 “Uber Files” disclosures.

The military domain (V-MIL) scores zero. No defence contracts, arms supply relationships, or security sector procurement with Israeli state bodies have been identified. Two historically relevant Uber technology units — the Advanced Technologies Group (ATG) and Uber Elevate — were divested in 2020 before the assessment period; their post-divestiture activities are not attributable to Uber. The digital domain (V-DIG) records a low score driven by Uber’s procurement of two Israeli-founded enterprise security tools — Wiz (cloud security posture management) and CyberArk (privileged access management) — embedded in Uber’s own internal infrastructure. Uber is a buyer of these services, not a provider to Israeli state entities. The economic domain (V-ECON) produces the highest domain score, anchored by the confirmed Flytrex equity investment, active Israeli market operations, and a documented lobbying-to-market-access trajectory. The political domain (V-POL) records a moderate score driven by the breadth of the Uber Files lobbying record — which documents CEO-level engagement with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office, legislative drafting for the Knesset, and deployment of a data-blocking “kill switch” against Israeli regulatory authorities — and by a documented and material asymmetry between Uber’s named corporate response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its complete silence on the Gaza conflict from October 2023 onward.

Key uncertainties include the current status of the Wiz and CyberArk vendor relationships (both confirmed as of 2022 but not independently verified as renewed); the undisclosed financial size of the Flytrex equity tranche; the absence of Israel-specific revenue disclosure in Uber’s SEC filings; and whether the historical Uber Files lobbying posture (2013–2017) reflects current corporate strategy or a discontinued phase. These uncertainties affect score precision but do not alter the Tier D classification under the rubric.


Timeline of Relevant Events

Date Event
2009 Uber Technologies founded in San Francisco by Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp 1
2013–2017 Uber Files period: Uber executives lobby Netanyahu’s office, draft Knesset legislation, retain Israeli lobbying firm Gilad Government Relations, deploy regulatory “kill switch” 23
2016 Uber withdraws ride-hailing service from Israel following regulatory disputes 1
2019 Uber Eats launches in Israeli market (Tel Aviv) 4
Dec 2020 Uber sells Uber Elevate aerial division to Joby Aviation 5
Jan 2021 Uber sells ATG autonomous vehicle unit to Aurora Innovation 6
May 2020 Uber Eats withdraws from Israeli market as part of eight-market exit 7
Jan 2020 Uber completes $3.1 billion acquisition of Careem, including historical West Bank operations 8
Mar 2022 Uber issues named condemnation of Russia’s Ukraine invasion; deploys free rides, logistics support, and corporate donation matching 910
Jul 2022 ICIJ and partners publish the “Uber Files” (124,000 leaked documents, 2013–2017 period) 11
Sep 2022 Lapsus$-linked breach of Uber internal systems confirms CyberArk PAM deployment; SEC 8-K filed 1213
2022 Wiz Series D announcement identifies Uber as enterprise customer of Wiz CSPM platform 14
Jan 2024 Palestinian-owned restaurants in Toronto mislabeled as “Israeli” cuisine on Uber Eats; public controversy erupts 15
Feb 2024 Uber Eats creates distinct “Palestinian” cuisine category following public pressure 16
2025 Transport Minister Miri Regev approves Uber ride-hailing expansion in Israel without completing standard legal review 1718
Sep 2025 Uber announces strategic equity investment in Flytrex Aviation Ltd. (Tel Aviv) and commercial drone delivery integration with Uber Eats 19
Oct 2025 Canadian BDS Coalition publishes formal call to boycott Uber Eats, citing Flytrex investment and Toronto mislabeling incident 20
Oct 2023–present No Uber corporate statement, in-app fundraising, or operational support for Gaza humanitarian relief identified 2122

Corporate Overview

Uber Technologies, Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated, San Francisco-headquartered public company (NYSE: UBER) founded in 2009. It is the world’s largest ride-hailing platform by market capitalisation, operating across ride-hailing (Uber platform), food and grocery delivery (Uber Eats), and freight brokerage (Uber Freight). Uber is not an Israeli-founded or Israeli-origin company and does not have an Israeli parent, Israeli majority shareholder, or Israeli beneficial owner 1.

The company’s Israel exposure is commercial and operational rather than structural. Uber launched and then withdrew from Israeli ride-hailing in 2016 following regulatory disputes; re-entered in partnership with licensed Israeli taxi operators; launched Uber Eats in 2019; withdrew Uber Eats in May 2020 as part of a global contraction; and later re-established both services. As of the assessment date, ride-hailing and Uber Eats are active in the Israeli market 171823. A local office with a named General Manager (Gony Noy, per Uber Files–related reporting) operates in Israel 3.

The Careem subsidiary — acquired for approximately $3.1 billion in January 2020 — brought operational exposure to Palestinian Authority-administered West Bank cities including Ramallah, predating Uber’s ownership. The Palestinian Authority subsequently banned Careem from the West Bank in 2017; its post-acquisition licensing status under PA jurisdiction is not fully resolved in available sources 24.

Uber’s largest single sovereign wealth investor is the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF), whose Deputy Governor, Turqi Alnowaiser, holds a board seat as a commercial equity representative 25. Major institutional shareholders include Vanguard (~8–9%) and BlackRock (~6–7%) in passive index positions 26.


Domain Summaries

V-MIL: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-MIL domain examines whether Uber supplies goods, services, or technology to Israeli or Israeli-adjacent military and security bodies, manufactures or co-develops weapons systems, participates in defence supply chains, or provides logistical sustainment to military installations. Across all six sub-categories reviewed — direct defence contracting, dual-use product lines, heavy machinery and construction, supply chain integration with defence primes, logistical sustainment, and munitions — the audit returned a uniform null finding.

Uber is a platform intermediary, not a manufacturer. Its core product lines — ride-hailing, food delivery, and freight brokerage — are civilian consumer and logistics services. It does not produce physical goods, vehicles, hardware, or any product that would generate an export licence record, arms transfer entry, or defence procurement listing. This structural characteristic eliminates the most common pathways by which technology companies acquire V-MIL exposure 1.

No contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Uber Technologies and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or any other Israeli state security body has been identified in any source reviewed — including Uber’s SEC Form 10-K annual reports, the SIPRI arms transfer database, the Who Profits Research Center database, the AFSC Investigate platform, the OHCHR UN settlement business database (A/HRC/43/71), or U.S. Federal procurement data (USASpending.gov) 2728.

Two former Uber business units possessed technology with theoretical dual-use relevance. Uber ATG (Advanced Technologies Group), which conducted autonomous vehicle software research, was sold to Aurora Innovation, completing the transaction in January 2021 6. Uber Elevate, the aerial ride-sharing division, was sold to Joby Aviation in December 2020 5. Joby Aviation subsequently pursued a partnership with the U.S. Air Force; however, this occurred after and entirely independently of Uber’s ownership and is not attributable to Uber Technologies. Neither divestiture involved Israeli defence entities. Uber’s current portfolio contains no autonomous vehicle or aviation development operations.

Uber’s historical Israeli market presence — brief ride-hailing operations before 2016 and Uber Eats from 2019 — has not been documented in any source as providing services to military or security installations. Uber for Business, the corporate travel management platform, has no publicly documented Israeli military or security-sector institutional client relationship in any source reviewed 29. Uber Freight operates as a truck freight brokerage primarily in North American and European road freight markets; no contracts servicing Israeli defence logistics or military cargo have been identified, though it is noted that Uber Freight’s sub-carrier network is not publicly disclosed and carrier-level end-use data is not available.

The absence of Uber from the OHCHR A/HRC/43/71 settlement business database and from Who Profits and AFSC Investigate published profiles constitutes meaningful negative evidence: these are the primary civil society instruments for documenting company activity in the Israeli occupation economy, and all three returned no Uber profile 303132.

No lobbying activity by Uber specifically directed at U.S. defence procurement policy, Israeli military assistance packages, or export control exemptions related to Israeli defence programmes has been identified in OpenSecrets or FARA records 33.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The principal evidentiary limit in V-MIL is the unavailability of live database access during the audit. The SIBAT (Israel Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) registry, live SIPRI arms transfer updates, and the current state of Who Profits’ and AFSC’s databases were not directly queried in real time. The null findings are therefore based on training-data knowledge through April 2026. If any new defence contract, procurement entry, or NGO profile of Uber in a military context has been added to these databases since early 2026, it would not be captured here.

A second limit concerns Uber Freight’s carrier network. As a freight broker using third-party carriers, Uber Freight does not control or disclose the end-use commitments of individual carriers in its network. Whether any sub-carrier independently holds Israeli defence logistics contracts cannot be determined from publicly available data. This represents an unresolvable gap at the Tier D level of analysis, though no positive evidence suggesting such exposure has been identified.

The Joby Aviation post-acquisition U.S. Air Force engagement, while noted, is correctly excluded: the divestiture was complete before the assessment period, and Joby is a legally and operationally separate entity. The theoretical argument that Uber’s sale of Elevate enabled Joby’s subsequent military partnership is an attenuated and insufficiently supported chain of attribution to sustain a scoring contribution.

A score change in V-MIL would require the identification of a direct, confirmed procurement relationship between Uber Technologies (as a current legal entity) and an Israeli or U.S. defence body with an Israeli programme connection — either through a service contract, a licensing agreement, or a documented supply chain link corroborated by at least one independent source.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) State body Potential contract counterparty No contract identified
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Military body Potential service recipient No contract identified
Uber ATG (Advanced Technologies Group) Former Uber division Autonomous vehicle R&D; potential dual-use Divested to Aurora Innovation, Jan 2021 6
Aurora Innovation Independent company ATG acquirer Post-divestiture; not attributable to Uber
Uber Elevate Former Uber division Aerial ride-sharing; potential dual-use Divested to Joby Aviation, Dec 2020 5
Joby Aviation Independent company Elevate acquirer; U.S. Air Force partner Post-divestiture; not attributable to Uber
Elbit Systems Israeli defence prime Supply chain check No Uber supplier relationship identified 34
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Israeli defence prime Supply chain check No Uber supplier relationship identified 34
SIPRI Arms Transfer Database Research database Defence supply verification No Uber entry identified 28
Who Profits Research Center NGO database Occupation economy profiling No Uber profile identified 31
AFSC Investigate NGO database Israeli military/prison system ties No Uber profile identified 32
OHCHR (A/HRC/43/71) UN database Settlement business activity Uber not listed 30
Uber for Business Uber product Enterprise transport platform No Israeli military client identified 29
Uber Freight Uber division Freight brokerage No Israeli defence logistics contract identified
SIBAT Israeli export directorate Defence export registry No Uber listing identified (live access unavailable)

V-DIG: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-DIG domain examines whether Uber provides digital technology, surveillance tools, AI systems, or cloud infrastructure to Israeli state, military, or intelligence bodies; whether it procures Israeli-origin technology at a scale that constitutes a meaningful economic or strategic dependency; and whether its Israeli commercial digital operations create occupational harms. The audit identifies two confirmed or credibly reported procurement relationships with Israeli-founded enterprise technology companies, and one confirmed Israeli commercial digital services presence that has since been discontinued.

CyberArk (Privileged Access Management). CyberArk, founded in 1999 with R&D headquarters in Petah Tikva, Israel, provides privileged access management (PAM), credential vaulting, and secrets management infrastructure. CyberArk has publicly listed Uber in its enterprise customer references 35. The most substantive corroborating evidence of deployment arose from the September 2022 Lapsus$-linked breach of Uber’s internal systems: attacker-captured screenshots that circulated publicly confirmed that CyberArk’s PAM vault interface was live and embedded in Uber’s identity and access management (IAM) infrastructure at the time of the incident 121336. Uber filed an 8-K disclosure with the SEC regarding the breach 37. Post-incident reporting characterised the compromise of privileged credentials as central to the attacker’s lateral movement. The relationship was confirmed as of September 2022; whether CyberArk remains the primary PAM platform following post-breach remediation is not publicly disclosed.

Wiz (Cloud Security Posture Management). Wiz, founded in 2020 with principal R&D in Tel Aviv and US incorporation, was publicly identified — via customer disclosures associated with its May 2022 Series D fundraising — as having Uber among its enterprise customers 14. The reported deployment covers cloud misconfiguration detection, vulnerability prioritisation, and multi-cloud visibility across Uber’s Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud Platform environments 14. This represents integration into a broad, infrastructure-level security monitoring function rather than a peripheral deployment. Wiz was founded by alumni of Microsoft and Unit 8200, the Israeli military intelligence signals unit — a common origin pattern for Israeli cloud security companies. The confirmed Uber–Wiz relationship is scoped to commercial enterprise CSPM; no defence dimension has been identified. The currency of this relationship as of 2026 is unconfirmed, as live retrieval was unavailable.

The directionality of both relationships is critical to scoring. Uber is a buyer of these services — an enterprise customer procuring commercial security software for integration into its own internal infrastructure. Neither relationship involves Uber selling or providing technology to Israeli state, military, or intelligence entities. The BDS-1000 Customer Cap applies: Impact is capped at Band 3.9, reflecting that standard enterprise procurement of Israeli-origin commercial software is qualitatively different from provision of technology that directly serves occupation or military objectives.

NICE Systems / NICE CXone. NICE Systems, headquartered in Ra’anana, Israel, through its cloud division NICE CXone, has been linked in trade press to Uber’s customer support operations infrastructure, covering workforce scheduling, interaction recording, and contact centre analytics 38. No directly named joint press release or Uber SEC filing confirms this relationship by name. It is treated as reported but unconfirmed.

Uber Eats Israel — Discontinued. Uber Eats launched in Tel Aviv in 2019 and withdrew from the Israeli market in May 2020 as part of a broader eight-market exit 7. This consumer digital services presence is confirmed as discontinued and is not a current scoring factor, though it establishes that Uber has previously operated a consumer-facing digital platform in Israel.

No Israeli defence or intelligence digital provision identified. No public evidence has been identified of Uber’s commercially available technology — ride-hailing platform, Uber Eats, Uber Freight, or associated AI/ML systems — being deployed for military, intelligence, or law enforcement surveillance applications within Israel or the occupied territories. Uber does not develop or license offensive cyber capabilities, zero-day exploit tools, or digital weapons systems 39.

No Israeli R&D footprint. Uber’s principal engineering and R&D centres are in San Francisco, New York, Amsterdam, Bangalore, and Hyderabad, as disclosed in its annual reports 1. No R&D facility, engineering office, or accelerator programme within Israel has been identified. No acquisitions of Israeli-origin technology companies have been identified in SEC filings or press reporting through the knowledge cutoff 1.

Project Nimbus. Project Nimbus is a reported $1.2 billion cloud infrastructure contract between the Israeli government and Google Cloud and AWS 40. Uber consumes services from both providers as a standard commercial enterprise customer. No public evidence identifies Uber as a participant in, sub-contractor to, or beneficiary of Project Nimbus. The shared cloud provider relationship is incidental, not a direct nexus.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest challenge to the V-DIG score is the question of relationship currency. The Wiz customer identification dates from May 2022 — nearly four years before the assessment date. Enterprise CSPM contracts are typically multi-year, but Wiz has undergone significant corporate development (including reported acquisition discussions in 2024) and Uber may have migrated to alternative platforms. If the Wiz relationship has lapsed, the primary basis for the upper end of the V-DIG Impact band weakens. Similarly, whether CyberArk remains Uber’s PAM platform post-breach remediation is undisclosed; post-breach organisations frequently rotate privileged access infrastructure.

A second challenge concerns NICE Systems. The link between NICE CXone and Uber’s contact centre operations is reported in trade press and NICE enterprise disclosures but has not been confirmed by a named joint press release or Uber filing. If this relationship does not exist, it has no scoring impact (it was treated as unconfirmed and not scored separately), but its inclusion as a background factor warrants noting.

The argument that Uber’s procurement of Israeli-origin enterprise security tools is meaningfully different from, for example, the procurement of Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric tools directed at civilian populations is analytically sound and supported by the rubric’s directionality rule. CyberArk PAM and Wiz CSPM are sold globally as standard enterprise security products; their Israeli origin does not transmit defence or occupation harms through Uber’s use of them for internal infrastructure protection. This is the primary counter-argument to any higher scoring in V-DIG.

A higher V-DIG score would require identification of: (a) Uber providing digital technology to Israeli state or military bodies; (b) Uber deploying Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric tools against driver, rider, or civilian populations in occupied territories; or (c) Uber holding a position as a participant or sub-contractor in sovereign Israeli digital infrastructure programmes. None of these conditions is currently evidenced.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
CyberArk (Petah Tikva, Israel) Israeli cybersecurity vendor PAM deployment in Uber IAM infrastructure Confirmed via 2022 breach evidence and vendor customer reference 351213
Wiz (Tel Aviv, Israel / US-incorporated) Israeli cloud security vendor CSPM deployment across Uber AWS/GCP environments Reported via 2022 Series D disclosure; currency unconfirmed 14
NICE Systems / NICE CXone (Ra’anana, Israel) Israeli workforce management vendor Contact centre analytics and workforce management Reported in trade press; not formally confirmed 38
Palo Alto Networks (Santa Clara, CA) US cybersecurity vendor (Israeli co-founder) Evaluated for Uber relationship No confirmed vendor relationship identified
Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Hyperscale cloud provider Primary Uber cloud workloads Confirmed Uber customer; Israeli region exposure unconfirmed 41
Amazon Web Services (AWS) Hyperscale cloud provider Data lake and storage workloads Multi-cloud architecture documented in engineering blog
Project Nimbus Israeli sovereign cloud programme Google/AWS contract with Israeli government No Uber participation identified 40
Unit 8200 IDF intelligence unit Wiz founder alumni origin Background context; no operational nexus to Uber
Uber ATG / Aurora Innovation Former Uber division / acquirer Autonomous vehicle R&D Divested Jan 2021; no Israeli dimension 6
HackerOne Bug bounty platform Uber bug bounty programme Standard commercial practice; no Israeli state nexus 42
Dara Khosrowshahi Uber CEO Technology investment decisions Uber Files Israel lobbying involvement (see V-POL)

V-ECON: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-ECON domain examines Uber’s economic footprint in Israel and the occupied territories across four categories: direct and indirect supply chain relationships, investment and capital exposure, operational market presence, and corporate structure and profit flows. The domain records the highest V-domain score (2.99), driven by three compounding factors: active commercial operations in the Israeli market, a confirmed September 2025 strategic equity investment in an Israeli technology company, and a documented history of high-level political engagement that secured and expanded market access.

Flytrex Investment — Confirmed Strategic FDI. In September 2025, Uber announced a strategic equity investment in Flytrex Aviation Ltd., a Tel Aviv-based drone delivery company, accompanied by a commercial partnership integrating Flytrex drone delivery into the Uber Eats platform 19. The investment is confirmed by Uber’s own investor relations press release and corroborated by multiple independent trade and news outlets 4344. Uber described the investment as “not material” to its consolidated financials 44, and the precise equity tranche has not been publicly quantified. Tracxn reports total Flytrex funding across all rounds at approximately $60 million, but the per-investor allocation is not disclosed 45.

Flytrex is incorporated and headquartered in Tel Aviv, Israel 45. Its CEO and co-founder, Yariv Bash, is publicly documented as a co-founder of SpaceIL, Israel’s lunar mission programme 46. Noam Bardin, former CEO of Waze (acquired by Google), serves as Executive Chairman — confirmed across multiple independent sources 4344. An earlier Flytrex funding round included a grant from the Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) 47, a state body; IIA participation in the 2025 round co-invested by Uber has not been confirmed in the sources reviewed. Civil society responses to the Flytrex investment are documented at the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre and in Canadian BDS Coalition materials 212220.

The Flytrex investment represents the clearest instance of Uber directing capital into the Israeli technology sector in a structured, equity-bearing form. While commercially modest relative to Uber’s balance sheet, it is a direct and voluntary investment in an Israeli-domiciled company — not a passive index exposure — which justifies placement at the upper end of the operational-presence Impact band.

Active Israeli Market Operations — Ride-Hailing and Uber Eats. Uber operates an active ride-hailing service in Israel, relaunched in partnership with licensed Israeli taxi operators after years of regulatory dispute 4849. Uber Eats is documented as active in the Israeli market, with app store ranking data (Similarweb, December 2025) placing it among the top food and drink applications in Israel 23. Uber maintains a local office with a General Manager presence (Gony Noy, per Uber Files reporting) 3. These operations generate commission revenue flowing to Uber’s US parent entity.

In 2025, Transport Minister Miri Regev approved an expansion of Uber’s ride-hailing activities in Israel without completing the standard legal review process — a procedural shortcut that attracted press scrutiny in both the Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel 1718. This approval, and the Uber Files record of how earlier market access was secured (see V-POL), situate Uber’s Israeli operational presence within a context of active relationship-management with Israeli government structures.

Supply Chain — No Direct Settlement or Agricultural Sourcing Confirmed. No public evidence has been identified of direct sourcing contracts between Uber Technologies (including Uber Eats or Uber Freight) and named Israeli agricultural aggregators. Uber Eats functions as a platform aggregator: it connects consumers to merchants but does not purchase, import, or warehouse food products 1. Specific commercial partnerships with Shufersal and Rami Levy were evaluated and could not be independently confirmed in the sources reviewed 5051. The characterisation that Uber Eats “procures” settlement produce through its Israeli platform is an inferential advocacy argument, not grounded in documented supplier contracts — each link in such a chain requires independent verification.

The Toronto Uber Eats mislabeling incident (January 2024), in which Palestinian-owned restaurants were categorized under an “Israeli” cuisine label, is a confirmed and material commercial taxonomy event 1516. Uber acknowledged the error and attributed it to platform categorization logic. A distinct “Palestinian” cuisine category was created in February 2024 16. This is not a goods-origin mislabeling in the regulatory customs sense, but it generated sustained civil society pressure and was subsequently cited in boycott campaign materials 20.

No Israeli R&D Infrastructure or Dominant Market Position. No Uber R&D facility, technology laboratory, or accelerator programme operating within Israel has been identified. Uber’s Advanced Technologies Group was sold to Aurora Innovation in 2020; no Israeli operational component was identified in that transaction 6. Uber does not characterise the Israeli market as a strategic growth segment in its SEC filings; Israel is subsumed within a broader international segment without geographic disaggregation 1. Israel-specific revenue figures are not publicly available.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The principal downward-pressure factor on the V-ECON score is Uber’s own characterisation of the Flytrex investment as “not material” to its consolidated financials 44. This is a significant qualifier: Uber’s balance sheet is measured in billions of dollars, and a sub-$60 million total-funding company receiving an unquantified equity tranche from Uber represents a commercially marginal transaction. The economic significance of the investment to Uber’s operations is therefore limited.

A second limit concerns the scope of Israeli operations. Uber does not disclose Israel-specific revenue, does not characterise Israel as a strategic growth market, and has no Israeli R&D centre or Israeli-origin corporate identity. The operational presence — ride-hailing commissions and Uber Eats marketplace fees — is commercially present but not dominant or uniquely significant to Uber’s business model.

The unconfirmed Shufersal, Rami Levy, and ZIM/Ship4wd partnership claims represent gaps: if any of these relationships were confirmed, they would add supply chain depth to the V-ECON assessment. In the absence of confirmation, they cannot be scored. The ZIM “Uber of shipping” comparison is explicitly a business model analogy, not evidence of a commercial relationship 52.

The claim that Uber Eats facilitates consumer access to settlement-origin produce through third-party Israeli retailers is plausible as a structural inference but is not grounded in documented supplier contracts and does not constitute confirmed supply chain exposure for scoring purposes.

A material upward score revision would require confirmation of: direct sourcing of settlement-origin goods by Uber or an Uber subsidiary; a larger and quantified Flytrex equity stake demonstrating strategic rather than token investment; or Israeli operations constituting a disclosed and significant share of Uber’s revenue.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Flytrex Aviation Ltd. (Tel Aviv) Israeli investee company Confirmed equity investment + commercial drone delivery partnership Confirmed; investment “not material” per Uber 1944
Yariv Bash Flytrex CEO/co-founder SpaceIL co-founder; no confirmed military affiliation beyond SpaceIL Confirmed biographical details 46
Noam Bardin Flytrex Executive Chairman Former Waze CEO Confirmed 4344
Amit Regev Flytrex co-founder Claimed Unit 8200 veteran by advocacy sources Unverified; not confirmed by corporate filings or independent journalism 22
Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) Israeli state body Co-funded earlier Flytrex round Confirmed for prior round; 2025 round participation unconfirmed 47
Gony Noy Uber Israel GM Local management identified in Uber Files reporting Confirmed 3
Yoni Greifman Former Uber Israel GM Predecessor GM identified in Uber Files reporting Historical 53
Miri Regev Israeli Transport Minister Approved Uber operational expansion (2025) without full legal review Confirmed 1718
Shufersal Israeli supermarket chain Evaluated for Uber Eats partnership Not confirmed in sources reviewed 50
Rami Levy Israeli supermarket chain Evaluated for Uber Eats partnership Not confirmed in sources reviewed 51
ZIM Integrated Shipping / Ship4wd Israeli shipping company Evaluated for Uber Freight partnership Business model analogy only; no commercial relationship confirmed 52
Careem Uber subsidiary MENA/West Bank historical operations PA ban 2017; post-acquisition licensing status unresolved 24
Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) Sovereign wealth investor Largest single SWF equity holder Commercial investment; no geopolitical directives documented 25
Vanguard Group / BlackRock Institutional investors Passive index positions Standard index fund positions; not directed Israeli investment 26
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre NGO monitor Documented boycott pressure and Uber non-response Confirmed tracking 2122
Canadian BDS Coalition Civil society org Formal boycott call citing Flytrex investment Confirmed October 2025 20

V-POL: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-POL domain examines Uber’s political engagement with Israeli governmental structures, its corporate communications posture regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, its internal governance and platform policy decisions with political valence, and the backgrounds of key governance actors. The domain records a score of 2.46, driven by the depth and seniority of documented political engagement revealed in the Uber Files, by a current and material asymmetry in crisis communications, and by the Flytrex investment’s civil society non-response.

The Uber Files — CEO-Level Lobbying and Legislative Drafting (2013–2017). The July 2022 “Uber Files” publication by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and partner outlets, based on 124,000 leaked internal documents, provides the most extensively documented record of Uber’s political engagement with Israeli governmental structures 11. The key findings, independently corroborated by the Times of Israel, Shomrim, and i24NEWS, are:

  • Uber executives sought and secured a direct meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after being blocked in market entry attempts by then-Transport Minister Israel Katz. Netanyahu reportedly indicated he would “break the resistance” of Katz on Uber’s behalf 23.
  • Uber engaged a former U.S. Ambassador as a registered lobbyist; that individual contacted then-U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ron Dermer to advance Uber’s regulatory position 54.
  • Uber drafted ride-sharing legislation that was subsequently submitted to the Knesset by multiple lawmakers with “very few edits” 23.
  • Uber deployed a “kill switch” — geofencing and data-blocking technology — during Israeli regulatory and police operations to deny authorities access to internal company data 11.
  • CEO Dara Khosrowshahi was personally involved in the Netanyahu lobbying strategy 23.

These events are historical (2013–2017) but constitute documented evidence of political engagement at the highest levels of the Israeli state, involving the Prime Minister’s office, the Knesset, and bilateral diplomatic channels. The analytical weight of this record is moderated by its age: these events are now 8–13 years old, and no evidence of a repudiation, public acknowledgment, or policy change by Uber has been identified. The 2025 regulatory approval by Transport Minister Regev — obtained without completing standard legal review 1718 — is consistent with the continuation of this pattern of leveraged government relations, though no documentary evidence connects the two events.

Ukraine/Gaza Asymmetry — Current and Documented. The asymmetry between Uber’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its silence on the Gaza conflict is a material and ongoing political finding. In March 2022, Uber issued named, explicit public statements condemning “a horrific war” and identifying Russia as the aggressor; deployed free rides for refugees; built a custom logistics application for Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture to evacuate cultural artefacts; delivered approximately 220 truckloads of emergency supplies; and committed corporate donation matching of up to $1 million 910. From October 2023 onward, no equivalent named condemnation, in-app fundraising mechanism, operational logistics deployment, or corporate donation campaign for Gaza has been publicly documented 2122. Uber did not respond to the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s documented inquiry regarding its Flytrex investment and the civil society boycott pressure 2122.

The asymmetry does not in isolation constitute evidence of active political alignment with one party to the conflict. However, in combination with the Uber Files record of active political relationship management with Israeli governmental structures, it is consistent with a corporate posture in which engagement with Israeli state interests has received preferential treatment. The analytical chain — documented engagement → selective silence → non-response to accountability inquiries — supports placement in the lower end of Band 4.1–5.0 (Active Suppression of Accountability / Discriminatory Governance) rather than the lower Business-as-Usual band.

Toronto Mislabeling Incident. The January 2024 categorization of Palestinian-owned restaurants under an “Israeli” cuisine label on Uber Eats Canada is a confirmed event documented across multiple independent journalistic sources 1516. Uber attributed the error to platform search and categorization logic for “Middle Eastern” cuisine. A distinct “Palestinian” category was created in February 2024 following public pressure 16. This is a platform governance event with a political dimension: the initial categorization reflected an algorithmic or editorial choice that erased Palestinian identity, and correction required sustained public pressure. It does not rise to the level of a regulatory violation, but it was cited in subsequent BDS coalition materials as a contributing basis for boycott calls 20.

Flytrex Investment and Non-Response. The September 2025 Flytrex investment, while classified primarily in V-ECON, has political valence: it constitutes a voluntary capital deployment into an Israeli technology company at a time of sustained civil society scrutiny of Uber’s Israeli relationships. Uber’s non-response to BHRRC inquiries following the announcement is a governance transparency finding 2122.

Board Composition — Defence-Sector Backgrounds. Board Chair Ronald D. Sugar served as Chairman and CEO of Northrop Grumman Corporation from 2003 to 2010 55. Northrop Grumman is a major U.S. defence contractor whose products and contracts include systems sold to the Israeli Ministry of Defence under U.S. Foreign Military Sales agreements. Sugar’s chairmanship encompassed a period of active FMS deliveries to Israel; his personal directional role in specific IDF-facing contracts has not been documented at the individual level. Board Member Revathi Advaithi served on the board of BAE Systems plc from 2019 to 2020 56; BAE Systems is a multinational defence contractor supplying multiple governments including Israel. Board Member John Thain is a founding partner of Pine Island Capital Partners, a private equity firm investing in aerospace and defence 25. No specific Pine Island portfolio investment in Israeli defence firms has been identified. These are background contextual findings — board members’ prior affiliations with defence contractors do not constitute evidence that Uber directs corporate resources toward Israeli defence objectives — but they constitute relevant governance context.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest challenge to the V-POL score is the temporal distance of the Uber Files lobbying record. The documented events span 2013–2017 and reflect the strategic posture of an earlier management era (Travis Kalanick era, with Khosrowshahi joining as CEO in 2017). It is reasonable to ask whether this record reflects current corporate policy or a discontinued growth-at-all-costs phase. The scoring does not discount for age because: no public repudiation has been issued; the 2025 regulatory approval by Transport Minister Regev is consistent with ongoing government relations activity; and the Flytrex investment and BHRRC non-response are current acts that pattern-match the earlier posture. However, a challenger could argue that the Uber Files events represent an exceptional historical period unlikely to recur under the current compliance-oriented management.

A second limit concerns the asymmetric communications finding. Corporate silence on a geopolitical conflict is not, on its own, evidence of active political alignment; it may reflect legal caution, investor relations conservatism, or a policy of not issuing statements on conflicts where Uber has no direct operational stake in the conflict zone. The analytical weight of the asymmetry depends on the degree to which Uber’s Ukraine response is treated as establishing a normative baseline. If Ukraine is treated as an exceptional case (geographic proximity, European regulatory context, staff safety concerns), the Gaza silence becomes less diagnostic. The scoring acknowledges this uncertainty by placing the Impact at the lower end of Band 4.1–5.0 rather than the mid or upper range.

The Board-level defence contractor overlaps are scored conservatively. Prior board service at Northrop Grumman or BAE Systems does not constitute evidence that Uber directs resources toward Israeli military objectives. These are relevant background facts for a thorough governance audit, not active scoring factors at this evidence level.

A score reduction in V-POL would require: (a) confirmation that the Uber Files lobbying posture has been formally repudiated or replaced by a documented policy change; or (b) evidence that the Ukraine response was genuinely exceptional rather than reflecting a normative communications standard. A score increase would require: evidence of current, ongoing direct political engagement with Israeli governmental structures at the executive level; documented suppression of employee speech on the Israel-Palestine conflict specific to Uber; or evidence of financial contributions to Israeli state advocacy organisations.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Benjamin Netanyahu Israeli Prime Minister Direct Uber lobbying target (Uber Files) Documented meetings; Netanyahu reportedly offered to “break resistance” of Katz 23
Israel Katz Former Israeli Transport Minister Initial regulatory obstacle to Uber Documented in Uber Files; opposed Uber market entry 2
Miri Regev Israeli Transport Minister (2025) Approved Uber expansion without standard review Confirmed 1718
Gilad Government Relations & Lobbying Israeli lobbying firm Retained by Uber during Uber Files period Confirmed 573
Dan Shapiro Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Contacted by Uber lobbyist on Uber’s behalf Documented in Uber Files 54
Ron Dermer Israeli Ambassador to US (historical) Contacted by Uber lobbyist on Uber’s behalf Documented in Uber Files 54
Knesset Israeli parliament Received Uber-drafted ride-sharing legislation Confirmed via Uber Files 23
Dara Khosrowshahi Uber CEO Personal involvement in Netanyahu lobbying; Khashoggi “mistake” statement Confirmed via Uber Files 23
Ronald D. Sugar Board Chair Former Northrop Grumman CEO (2003–2010) Confirmed; no direct Israeli military contracting evidence at individual level 55
Revathi Advaithi Board Member Former BAE Systems board seat (2019–2020) Confirmed 56
John Thain Board Member Pine Island Capital Partners (aerospace/defence PE) Confirmed; no Israeli defence portfolio investment identified 25
Turqi Alnowaiser Board Member Saudi PIF Deputy Governor Commercial equity representative; no geopolitical directives documented 25
ICIJ Investigative consortium Published Uber Files Primary source for lobbying findings 11
Shomrim Israeli investigative outlet Corroborated Uber Files Israel findings Independent corroboration 23
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre NGO monitor Documented Uber non-response to Flytrex controversy Confirmed 2122
Canadian BDS Coalition Civil society org Formal boycott call (Oct 2025) Confirmed 20
Boycat Consumer advocacy platform Boycott call citing Flytrex investment Confirmed 22
Northrop Grumman US defence contractor Former employer of Board Chair Sugar Background governance context; no direct Uber–Israeli defence nexus
BAE Systems UK/US defence contractor Former board affiliation of Advaithi Background governance context; no direct Uber–Israeli defence nexus
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Israeli university Listed in HUJI strategic partners documentation Consistent with campus transportation relationship; no research partnership confirmed 58

Cross-Domain Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Across all four domains, the most significant systemic limitation is the unavailability of live web retrieval during the underlying research sessions. All findings are bounded by training-data knowledge through April 2026. Material developments since early 2026 — including new contracts, regulatory actions, divestiture announcements, or civil society reports — would not be captured.

A cross-domain challenge concerns Uber’s nature as a platform intermediary. The company does not manufacture goods, does not operate fixed physical infrastructure (beyond offices), and does not take title to the products transacted on its platforms. This structural characteristic limits the pathways through which Uber acquires meaningful military, digital provision, or supply chain exposure. Critics may argue this understates Uber’s economic contribution to Israeli normalcy (through operational commissions and market presence) or overstates the directionality argument in V-DIG. Proponents of a lower score would note that the same platform model means Uber’s withdrawals from Israel (Uber Eats 2020) are operationally easy and have been executed before.

The Uber Files lobbying record — the most extensively documented finding across the audit — is simultaneously the most powerful and the most temporally attenuated piece of evidence. Its presence in the V-POL scoring raises the question of whether historical political conduct should continue to anchor a current assessment in the absence of a verifiable current equivalent. The scoring methodology does not apply a time discount to confirmed evidence absent a repudiation; this is a defensible but contestable methodological choice.

The Flytrex investment is the single most commercially concrete and temporally current finding across all domains. It is the primary driver of the V-ECON Impact score and contributes political valence through the civil society non-response. The “not material” characterisation by Uber is economically accurate but does not extinguish the qualitative significance of a direct, voluntary equity investment in an Israeli-domiciled company during a period of active conflict and sustained civil society scrutiny.


Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Domain(s) Type Key Role
Flytrex Aviation Ltd. (Tel Aviv) V-ECON, V-POL Israeli investee company Confirmed equity investment; commercial drone delivery partnership 19
CyberArk (Petah Tikva, Israel) V-DIG Israeli cybersecurity vendor PAM deployment confirmed via 2022 breach 351213
Wiz (Tel Aviv / US-incorporated) V-DIG Israeli cloud security vendor CSPM customer relationship reported 2022; currency unconfirmed 14
NICE Systems / NICE CXone (Ra’anana) V-DIG Israeli workforce management vendor Reported contact centre analytics relationship; unconfirmed 38
Careem V-ECON, V-POL Uber subsidiary MENA/West Bank operations; PA ban 2017 24
Dara Khosrowshahi V-POL Uber CEO Uber Files Netflix lobbying; Khashoggi “mistake” comment 23
Ronald D. Sugar V-POL Board Chair Former Northrop Grumman CEO 55
Revathi Advaithi V-POL Board Member Former BAE Systems board seat 56
John Thain V-POL Board Member Pine Island Capital Partners (defence PE) 25
Turqi Alnowaiser V-POL Board Member Saudi PIF Deputy Governor 25
Benjamin Netanyahu V-POL Israeli PM Uber Files lobbying target 23
Yariv Bash V-ECON Flytrex CEO SpaceIL co-founder 46
Noam Bardin V-ECON Flytrex Executive Chairman Former Waze CEO 4344
Gony Noy V-ECON Uber Israel GM Local management; Uber Files reporting 3
Israel Innovation Authority V-ECON Israeli state body Co-funded prior Flytrex round 47
Miri Regev V-ECON, V-POL Israeli Transport Minister 2025 regulatory approval without standard review 1718
ICIJ V-POL Investigative consortium Uber Files publication 11
Shomrim V-POL Israeli investigative outlet Uber Files Israel corroboration 23
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre V-ECON, V-POL NGO monitor Boycott documentation; Uber non-response 2122
Canadian BDS Coalition V-ECON, V-POL Civil society org Formal boycott call October 2025 20
Who Profits Research Center V-MIL NGO database No Uber profile identified 31
AFSC Investigate V-MIL NGO database No Uber profile identified 32
OHCHR (A/HRC/43/71) V-MIL UN database Uber not listed 30
Aurora Innovation V-MIL, V-DIG ATG acquirer Post-divestiture entity; not attributable to Uber 6
Joby Aviation V-MIL Elevate acquirer Post-divestiture; US Air Force partnership not attributable to Uber 5
Google Cloud Platform V-DIG Cloud provider Primary Uber cloud; no Israeli sovereign contract 41
Project Nimbus V-DIG Israeli sovereign cloud programme No Uber participation identified 40
Gilad Government Relations V-POL Israeli lobbying firm Retained by Uber during Uber Files period 57

BDS-1000 Score

Domain I M P V-Score
V-MIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V-DIG 3.20 3.50 5.50 1.26
V-ECON 5.80 4.50 8.00 2.99
V-POL 4.50 4.50 8.50 2.46

BDS-1000 Score: 285 — Tier D (200–399)

V-MIL scores zero across all three criteria. No defence contracts, weapons supply, FMS participation, or NGO listings were found; the ATG and Elevate divestitures removed any theoretical dual-use exposure before the assessment period. V-DIG is constrained by the Customer Cap: because Uber is a buyer of Israeli-origin enterprise security software (Wiz, CyberArk) for use in its own internal infrastructure, rather than a provider of technology to Israeli state bodies, Impact is capped at Band 3.9. The resulting V-DIG score of 1.26 reflects operationally significant but commercially standard enterprise procurement relationships. V-ECON produces the highest V-domain score at 2.99, anchored by the confirmed Flytrex equity investment and active ride-hailing and Uber Eats operations in Israel; Proximity is scored at 8.00 reflecting direct commercial and investment relationships without holding company intermediation. V-POL scores 2.46, driven by the Uber Files lobbying record (CEO-level; Netanyahu office; Knesset legislative drafting), the documented Ukraine/Gaza communications asymmetry, and the Flytrex investment civil society non-response; Proximity reaches 8.50 because these are direct corporate and CEO-level acts, not intermediated political exposures.

The composite score of 285 applies the BDS-1000 formula: V_MAX (V-ECON at 2.99) plus 20% of the sum of remaining domain scores (4.15 × 0.20 = 0.83), divided by 16, multiplied by 1000.


Confidence, Limits, and Open Questions

High confidence: V-MIL zero score; Flytrex investment existence and Israeli domicile; Uber Files lobbying record (multi-source corroboration); CyberArk deployment confirmed via 2022 breach artefacts; Ukraine response documented; Toronto mislabeling incident confirmed.

Moderate confidence: Wiz relationship currency (last confirmed 2022; unverified 2026); CyberArk post-breach remediation status unknown; Flytrex equity tranche size (“not material” per Uber but not quantified); Israel-specific revenue not disclosed; Careem West Bank licensing status post-PA ban unresolved.

Open questions:
– Are the Wiz and CyberArk enterprise relationships still active as of 2026?
– What is the precise equity tranche and financial terms of the Uber–Flytrex investment and commercial partnership?
– Does Uber Freight have any Israeli logistics relationships not captured in public disclosures?
– Is there an active Uber service area covering West Bank settlements, and if so, under what legal framework?
– Has any IIA co-investment in Flytrex occurred alongside or following Uber’s 2025 investment?
– What is Uber Israel’s current headcount and fiscal contribution to the Israeli state?
– Has Uber issued any internal or public policy addressing Israeli military or security end-use screening for its products and services?


For researchers and journalists: The most productive investigative thread is the Flytrex investment structure — specifically the undisclosed equity tranche size, any IIA co-investment in the 2025 round, and the commercial terms of the drone delivery integration with Uber Eats. Uber’s non-response to the BHRRC inquiry warrants follow-up.

For civil society organisations: Engagement with Uber should focus on the two current and confirmed findings — the Flytrex equity investment and the active Israeli market operations — rather than the Uber Files lobbying record, which, while extensively documented, is historical and may be dismissed as reflecting a prior strategic era. Specifically: requesting disclosure of the Flytrex equity terms and any IIA co-investment, and requesting a corporate statement on end-use screening for Uber Eats and Uber ride-hailing within Israel, are achievable accountability demands grounded in confirmed evidence.

For institutional investors: The Tier D classification reflects a real but commercially modest Israeli footprint, one confirmed FDI event, and documented governance transparency gaps (non-response to BHRRC, no human rights policy addressing Israeli end-use). Standard ESG materiality thresholds may not trigger a screening action at this score level, but the asymmetric Ukraine/Gaza communications posture and the BHRRC non-response are governance indicators warranting monitoring. The score could move materially upward if the Flytrex investment expands or if Israeli operations are disclosed as a growing revenue segment.

For consumers considering platform alternatives: The confirmed findings at Tier D — active Israeli market operations, one confirmed FDI in an Israeli company, and historical high-level political engagement — represent a materially different exposure profile than companies at Tier A (0–99) or Tier B (100–199). The BDS-1000 score should be read in conjunction with the confidence notes: the historical nature of the Uber Files lobbying and the “not material” Flytrex characterisation are genuine moderating factors. Individual consumer decisions should weigh the confirmed current findings (Flytrex, active operations) rather than rely on the historical lobbying record alone.

Score monitoring: The V-ECON score is most likely to move. Confirmation of a larger Flytrex equity stake, disclosure of Israel-specific revenue as a growing segment, or identification of supply chain relationships with Israeli agricultural or logistics entities would push the score materially higher, potentially into Tier C. Conversely, a confirmed exit from the Flytrex investment or the Israeli market would reduce the score. The V-DIG score is most likely to fall if the Wiz and CyberArk relationships are confirmed as lapsed.


End Notes


  1. Uber Technologies SEC EDGAR 10-K filings — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001543151&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40 

  2. Shomrim, Uber Files Israel — Netanyahu, Katz — https://www.shomrim.news/eng/uber-files-netanyahu-katz 

  3. Shomrim, Uber Files Israel — Knesset legislation — https://www.shomrim.news/eng/uber-files-knesset 

  4. Reuters, Uber Eats eight-market exit — https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-eats-markets/uber-eats-to-pull-out-of-eight-markets-idUSKBN22J1LN 

  5. TechCrunch, Uber sells Elevate to Joby Aviation — https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/07/uber-sells-elevate-to-joby-aviation/ 

  6. Reuters, Uber sells ATG to Aurora — https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-aurora/uber-sells-self-driving-car-unit-to-aurora-idUSKBN28S1OJ 

  7. Reuters, Uber Eats market withdrawals — https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-eats-markets/uber-eats-to-pull-out-of-eight-markets-idUSKBN22J1LN 

  8. Uber SEC 10-K, Careem acquisition — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001543151&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40 

  9. Uber newsroom, Ukraine support — https://www.uber.com/en-GR/newsroom/supporting-ukraine/ 

  10. Uber newsroom, Ukraine logistics 2022 — https://www.uber.com/en-NL/newsroom/support-for-ukraine-2022/ 

  11. ICIJ, Uber Files investigation — https://www.icij.org/investigations/uber-files/uber-global-rise-lobbying-violence-technology/ 

  12. New York Times, Uber 2022 breach — https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/15/technology/uber-hacking-breach.html 

  13. Wired, Uber 2022 breach social engineering — https://www.wired.com/story/uber-hack-social-engineering-breach-2022/ 

  14. TechCrunch, Wiz Series D — Uber customer reference — https://techcrunch.com/2022/05/10/wiz-raises-300m-series-d/ 

  15. CBC News, Uber Eats Palestinian mislabeling — https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/uber-eats-palestinian-israel-1.7062884 

  16. CBC News, Uber Eats Palestinian category created — https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/uber-eats-palestinian-1.7068921 

  17. Jerusalem Post, Miri Regev Uber expansion — https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-867788 

  18. Times of Israel, Uber ride-hailing expansion — https://www.timesofisrael.com/uber-ride-hailing-may-be-allowed-in-israel-next-year-transportation-minister-says/ 

  19. Uber IR, Flytrex partnership press release — https://investor.uber.com/news-events/news/press-release-details/2025/Uber-Partners-with-Flytrex-to-Launch-Drone-Delivery/default.aspx 

  20. Canadian BDS Coalition, boycott Uber Eats — https://bdscoalition.ca/2025/10/02/its-time-to-boycott-uber-eats/ 

  21. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Uber boycott coverage — https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/uber-faces-boycott-over-partnership-with-israeli-drone-firm/ 

  22. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Uber Flytrex non-response — https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/uber-faces-criticism-for-announcing-multi-million-investment-in-israeli-drone-co-incl-co-non-response/ 

  23. Similarweb, Israel food and drink app rankings — https://www.similarweb.com/top-apps/apple/israel/food-drink/ 

  24. WAFA, PA ban on Careem West Bank — https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/91149 

  25. Uber investor relations, governance — https://investor.uber.com/governance/default.aspx 

  26. Investopedia, Uber top investors — https://www.investopedia.com/insights/ubers-top-investors/ 

  27. Uber SEC 10-K FY2023 — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000154315124000008/uber-20231231.htm 

  28. SIPRI Arms Transfer Database — https://armstransfers.sipri.org 

  29. Uber for Business platform — https://www.uber.com/us/en/business/ 

  30. OHCHR UN settlement business database — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-of-issues 

  31. Who Profits Research Center — https://whoprofits.org 

  32. AFSC Investigate — https://investigate.afsc.org 

  33. OpenSecrets, Uber lobbying profile — https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?cycle=2023&id=D000067003 

  34. Elbit Systems annual reports / SEC filings — https://ir.elbitsystems.com/sec-filings/annual-reports 

  35. CyberArk customer references — https://www.cyberark.com/customers/ 

  36. Dark Reading, Uber Lapsus breach — https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/uber-lapsus-breach-what-happened 

  37. Uber SEC 8-K filings — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001543151&type=8-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 

  38. NICE Systems press releases — https://www.nice.com/resources/press-releases/ 

  39. Uber Engineering Blog — https://www.uber.com/en-US/blog/engineering/ 

  40. The Guardian, Project Nimbus protest — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/12/google-amazon-workers-protest-project-nimbus-israel-military-contract 

  41. Google Cloud, Uber customer blog — https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/customers/uber 

  42. HackerOne, Uber bug bounty — https://hackerone.com/uber 

  43. Calcalist Tech, Flytrex Uber investment — https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/ryqv700ksxx 

  44. Cresco Capital, Uber Flytrex analysis — https://cresco.capital/blog/2025/09/30/uber-returns-to-drone-deliveries-through-strategic-investment-in-flytrex/ 

  45. Tracxn, Flytrex company profile — https://tracxn.com/d/companies/flytrex/__gPmJhrBYlkxEyLz1m8bHxUiaAQV1soeZvkyFPmkPN04 

  46. Dallas Innovates, Yariv Bash / Flytrex profile — https://dallasinnovates.com/he-sent-israels-first-spacecraft-to-the-moon-now-his-flytrex-drones-will-deliver-burgers-to-dfw-back-yards/ 

  47. State Aviation Journal, Flytrex IIA grant — https://stateaviationjournal.com/index.php/unmanned-systems/drone-delivery-company-flytrex-secures-9-3m-with-venture-financing-and-innovation-grant 

  48. Times of Israel, Uber Israel relaunch — https://www.timesofisrael.com/uber-to-relaunch-ride-hailing-operations-in-israel-with-licensed-cab-drivers/ 

  49. Globes, Uber Israel relaunch — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-uber-israel-rides-again-1001425249 

  50. FreshPlaza, Shufersal checkout-free store — https://www.freshplaza.com/latin-america/article/9458072/shufersal-opens-first-checkout-free-store-in-tel-aviv/ 

  51. Fritz.co.il, Rami Levy automated warehouse — https://www.fritz.co.il/en/rami-levys-automatic-warehouse-is-this-a-partnership-model-that-will-change-the-retail-sector/ 

  52. IoT M2M Council, ZIM “Uber of shipping” — https://www.iotm2mcouncil.org/iot-library/news/smart-logistics-news/zim-wants-to-be-uber-of-global-shipping/ 

  53. Times of Israel, Uber Israel lobbying history — https://www.timesofisrael.com/uber-lobbied-netanyahu-envoys-drafted-bills-in-bid-to-operate-in-israel/ 

  54. Shomrim, Uber Files ambassadors — https://www.shomrim.news/eng/uber-files-ambassadors 

  55. Wikipedia, Ronald Sugar — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ronald_Sugar 

  56. Wikipedia, Revathi Advaithi — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revathi_Advaithi 

  57. Gilad Government Relations & Lobbying — https://www.gilad-lobbying.co.il/en/category/main-team/ 

  58. Hebrew University, strategic partners — https://international.huji.ac.il/strategic-partners 

  59. Restaurant Dive, Uber Flytrex investment — https://www.restaurantdive.com/news/uber-invests-flytrex-expand-drone-delivery/760429/ 

  60. 5Pillars UK, Uber Flytrex coverage — https://5pillarsuk.com/2025/09/22/uber-invests-in-israeli-drone-company-flytrex/ 

  61. Boycat, Uber boycott post — https://blog.boycat.io/posts/boycott-uber-investment-israeli-drone-tech 

  62. VOA News, Careem West Bank operations — https://www.voanews.com/a/uber-style-app-careem-goes-off-beaten-track-in-west-bank/3950086.html 

  63. ICIJ, Uber Files global highlights — https://www.icij.org/investigations/uber-files/highlights-from-uber-files-reporting-around-the-globe/ 

  64. i24NEWS, Uber Israel lobbying — https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1657513354-uber-lobbied-netanyahu-envoys-to-operate-in-israel 

  65. The Guardian, Uber Files overview — https://www.theguardian.com/news/2022/jul/10/uber-files-leak-reveals-global-lobbying-campaign 

  66. Dronelife, Flytrex BVLOS milestone — https://dronelife.com/2025/08/13/bvlos-transforms-our-entire-business-model-says-drone-delivery-ceo/ 

  67. Statewatch, EU-funded drone technology Gaza — https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/march/eu-funded-drone-technology-being-used-in-war-on-gaza/ 

  68. Foodbeast, Uber Eats mislabeling — https://www.foodbeast.com/news/uber-eats-mysteriously-mislabels-palestinian-restaurants-as-israeli/ 

  69. The Guardian, Big Tech Muslim workers Gaza — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/jun/11/big-tech-muslim-workers-gaza-israel 

  70. Uber social impact page — https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/social-impact/ 

  71. Wiz customer references — https://www.wiz.io/customers 

  72. NoCamels, Israeli drone industry — https://nocamels.com/2016/08/israel-drone-innovation/ 

  73. Uber Proxy Statement DEF 14A — https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001543151&type=DEF+14A&dateb=&owner=include&count=40