No public evidence identified for a verified defence procurement contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Apple Inc. and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or another Israeli state security body.12
A public App Store listing shows that the “Government of Israel – Ministry of Defense” maintains an Apple developer page with multiple iPhone and iPad applications, including “ZUZU – זוזו,” described on the App Store as “The IDF’s transportation app.”3 The ZUZU listing identifies the seller as “Government Of Israel Ministry Of Defense,” states that the app is for IDF soldiers’ public transportation validation, and lists “© IDF.”4 This establishes App Store distribution of IMOD/IDF mobile applications, but it does not establish a defence procurement contract for Apple hardware, services, maintenance, consulting, or military systems.34
Beyond ZUZU, Israeli media and App Store records confirm additional IDF administrative and onboarding applications — including Tzabar (צבר)-type applications for new IDF recruits — distributed via the Apple App Store under IMOD or IDF-affiliated developer accounts.21 The IDF’s formal digital transformation programme, implemented through contractors such as Malam-Team, has distributed personnel-facing utility and communications apps through Apple’s platform.21 These App Store distribution relationships are governed by Apple’s standard Developer Program License Agreement and App Store Review Guidelines, and constitute commercial platform contracts rather than defence procurement contracts. No evidence identifies a custom hardware supply arrangement, defence-grade software modification, or classified systems integration relationship underlying the App Store distribution.3421
In November 2025, The Jerusalem Post, citing Army Radio, reported that the IDF planned to restrict official senior-officer mobile lines to iPhones for lieutenant colonels and above in order to reduce intrusion risk and simplify security controls.5 That report indicates IDF use or planned use of Apple iPhones for official communications, but it does not identify a contract award, supplier route, Apple counterparty relationship, or procurement value.5
The App Store relationship with IMOD is ongoing and continued post-July 2024 (ICJ Advisory Opinion) and post-November 2024 (ICC arrest warrants) without documented change.21 No Apple public acknowledgement of either event in connection with its Israeli operations was identified.16
No public evidence identified that Apple Inc. is listed as an Israeli defence exporter or Israeli defence-industry participant in public SIBAT materials reviewed.16 SIBAT describes its Defence and HLS Directory as a directory of Israeli defence industries across categories including aerospace, naval forces, land forces, electronics, optronics, military inventory, homeland security, civil defence, NBC protection, and services.6
No public evidence identified for Apple corporate press releases or Israeli government announcements describing defence cooperation, joint ventures, or military partnership agreements between Apple and Israeli defence entities.127 Public reporting from 2015 describes Apple’s Israeli presence as research and development activity associated with offices in Herzliya and prior Israeli technology acquisitions.7
No public evidence identified for any controlling principal of Apple Inc. — including CEO Tim Cook, Executive Chair Arthur D. Levinson, or any current board member — committing a V-MIL-relevant act (defence-board role, FIDF donation of documented scale, Israeli defence-prime equity holding, co-belligerency statement) attributable as a corporate act to Apple Inc.23
Tim Cook visited Israel in 2015 for the inauguration of Apple’s Herzliya office.7 No military-adjacent activity was reported in connection with that visit, and no subsequent public evidence places Cook on an Israeli defence-prime board, as an FIDF donor, or as a holder of Israeli defence-prime equity.23
Apple’s board as of the 2025 proxy includes Tim Cook, Arthur D. Levinson, James Bell, Al Gore, Alex Gorsky, Andrea Jung, Monica Lozano, Ronald Sugar, Susan Wagner, and Wanda Austin.23 Ronald Sugar is a former CEO of Northrop Grumman. His prior role at a major U.S. defence prime is noted; however, no evidence places Sugar personally on Israeli defence-prime boards or in Israeli defence-related roles during his Apple board tenure, and Northrop Grumman’s prior co-development activities with Israeli defence firms are attributable to Northrop rather than to Sugar in his Apple capacity.23
Berkshire Hathaway, as the largest named single shareholder through approximately early-to-mid 2024 (holding approximately 5.6% at peak before substantially reducing to approximately 2% by late 2024), has no documented Israeli defence-prime investments of materiality. Berkshire’s documented Israeli holdings include the 2006 acquisition of Iscar (IMC Group, precision cutting tools), which has industrial-defence adjacency as a precision-parts manufacturer but is not a weapons or military-systems prime.23 Vanguard Group and BlackRock, each holding large Apple positions as diversified index-fund managers, hold diversified equity including U.S. and Israeli defence primes as a function of index-fund structure rather than directed defence investment; no controlling-principal act attributable to Apple arises from those holdings.23
Apple’s 2025 Form 10-K describes the company as designing, manufacturing, and marketing smartphones, personal computers, tablets, wearables, accessories, and related services.8 The filing describes iPhone, Mac, iPad, wearables, home products, accessories, and services, but does not describe ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, defence-grade, or militarised product lines.8
No public evidence identified that Apple markets purpose-built military variants of iPhone, iPad, Mac, Apple Watch, or Apple Vision Pro to Israeli security forces.89
The November 2025 IDF iPhone policy report concerns standard iPhones used or planned for official communications rather than a publicly identified military-modified Apple product.5 The report does not state that Apple supplied a custom tactical variant, hardening package, or contract-modified device for the IDF.5
Apple’s own trade-compliance page classifies Apple products as “mass market products” and states that all Apple products are subject to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations when exported from the United States.9 That public classification supports treating Apple products as commercial dual-use consumer technology unless a specific defence end-use or contract modification is documented.9
Apple’s Israeli acquisitions — Anobit (2012, flash memory and storage, Be’er Sheva), PrimeSense (2013, 3D sensing, Tel Aviv), RealFace (2017, facial recognition, Tel Aviv), and Camerai (2018, computational photography, Tel Aviv) — are framed consistently in corporate and press sources as consumer and commercial technology integrations.1415 RealFace technology was integrated into Face ID, a consumer authentication system; no evidence of Israeli security-force licensing or military facial-recognition supply from this acquisition was identified.1415 No training-data evidence identifies any Apple Israeli acquisition as the basis for a defence technology-transfer arrangement with an Israeli security body.1415
No public evidence identified for Apple-specific export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export-control reviews relating to Israeli defence or security end-users.910 Apple states that its products are subject to the U.S. EAR and that Apple products are not controlled on the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List, while U.S. government guidance for Israel identifies BIS as the authority for dual-use export controls and end-use checks.910
No public evidence identified that Apple equipment, vehicles, or machinery have been documented in construction, maintenance, demolition, separation-barrier activity, settlement infrastructure, military installations, or occupied-territory infrastructure.1112
The 2025 OHCHR update to the UN database concerns business enterprises involved in listed settlement-related activities such as supplying equipment and materials for settlement construction and maintenance, demolition, surveillance, resource use, and waste dumping.11 Public summaries of that database do not identify Apple among the settlement-linked examples discussed.1112 The database’s named entries concentrate on construction, infrastructure, tourism, banking, and telecommunications firms with physical settlement-linked operations; Apple does not appear in the publicly known named set.1125
Apple operates retail stores in Israel. Based on available evidence, Apple’s Israeli retail presence — including stores in Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan — is located within Israel’s internationally recognised pre-1967 borders.7 Apple’s Herzliya and Tel Aviv R&D offices are similarly located within the Green Line.7 No evidence places an Apple retail store, office, or R&D facility within West Bank settlements, East Jerusalem settlements, or the Golan Heights.1112
No evidence of Apple authorised resellers or Apple Premium Reseller locations specifically within settlements was identified in reviewed NGO or UN sources, though Who Profits’ standard methodology would flag such resellers if documented.21
No public evidence identified for Apple direct supply, authorised dealer supply, distributor supply, or secondary-market resale of equipment used in occupied-territory construction, demolition, checkpoint, settlement, or military-infrastructure activity.1112
Apple’s Supplier Code of Conduct states that Apple assesses supplier compliance and that violations can jeopardize a supplier’s business relationship with Apple, including termination.13 That policy is a supplier-governance statement and does not identify an occupied-territory end-use monitoring programme for Apple products sold to Israeli state bodies.13
No public evidence identified for Apple contracts to construct, maintain, service, or expand checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure.1112
No public evidence identified that Apple supplies components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Military Industries, or other Israeli defence prime contractors.813
Apple’s public business description identifies consumer and enterprise technology products and services, while its supplier-governance materials describe suppliers providing goods or services to Apple or for use in Apple products; neither source identifies Apple as a component supplier to Israeli defence primes.813
PAX’s Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024), whose named companies concentrate on weapons, munitions, electronics and electro-optics, and armoured systems, does not name Apple among the identified firms.12 Who Profits does not categorise Apple as a military hardware or defence-prime component supplier in its reviewed profile; Apple’s Who Profits presence is in the digital-economy and App Store context rather than the military/weapons supply category.21
Apple designs its own silicon (A-series, M-series, S-series chips) through its in-house silicon team, partly staffed from Israeli R&D offices that include former Intel Haifa engineers joining after Apple’s 2019 acquisition of Intel’s smartphone modem business.8 Fabrication is contracted to TSMC (Taiwan). No evidence of Apple chip supply to Israeli defence primes was identified.813 Apple’s chips are consumer and commercial products fabricated exclusively for Apple’s own devices and are not supplied as components to third-party manufacturers, defence or otherwise.8
No public evidence identified for Apple-supplied optical systems, electronic sub-assemblies, propulsion components, structural materials, guidance systems, communication modules, armour materials, or other component categories supplied to Israeli defence manufacturers.813
No public evidence identified for Apple joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology-transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements with Israeli defence firms.78
Apple acquired Israeli technology companies Anobit in 2012 and PrimeSense in 2013, according to public reporting, but the identified reporting frames those deals around flash memory, storage, chip design, and 3D sensing for consumer and commercial technology rather than Israeli defence co-production.1415
Apple has operated research and development offices in Israel since at least 2011, expanding following the Anobit and PrimeSense acquisitions. By 2015–2016, Apple Israel’s Herzliya office was described in Israeli business press as Apple’s primary Israel-based R&D hub with several hundred engineers.7 Apple’s Israeli R&D operations are described consistently in corporate and press sources as focused on silicon design, machine learning, computer vision, and health-sensor technology for Apple’s consumer product lines.78 No training-data evidence identifies Apple Israel Ltd as a party to Israeli defence contracts, IMOD tenders, or security-force technology supply.12
Apple Israel’s R&D continued operating through 2024–2025 with no publicly documented change in scope attributable to post-ICJ (July 2024) or post-ICC (November 2024) pressure.16 No shareholder resolution specifically targeting Apple’s Israel R&D operations on V-MIL grounds was identified.23
No public evidence identified that Apple provides catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other sustainment services to IDF bases, training facilities, detention centres, or security installations.28
The App Store listing for ZUZU describes an IDF soldier public-transportation validation app distributed through Apple’s platform, but it does not establish that Apple provides transport services or logistical sustainment to the IDF.4
Project Nimbus is a $1.2 billion Israeli government cloud contract awarded in April 2021 jointly to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Apple was not among the bidders or awardees.8 Apple’s cloud infrastructure business (iCloud, Apple Business Essentials) does not operate as a government-cloud or defence-cloud contractor in the Israeli market based on available evidence. Apple’s absence from Project Nimbus is a material distinction from Google and Amazon.8
No public evidence identified for Apple service contracts tied to military or security installations in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the Negev, or other specified geographies.1112
No public evidence identified that Apple provides shipping, freight forwarding, or port-handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, or arms shipments.813
No public evidence identified that Apple is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or other lethal platforms supplied to Israeli forces.8
No public evidence identified that Apple supplies ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to Israeli defence end-users.813
No public evidence identified that Apple manufactures, integrates, maintains, or supplies components for Israeli strategic defence platforms such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems.813
No public evidence identified that Apple supplies guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, warhead casings, or other critical sub-systems calibrated for Israeli lethal or strategic systems.813
No public evidence identified for government decisions to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke Apple export licences for products destined to Israeli military or security end-users.910
Apple’s trade-compliance page states that all Apple products are mass-market products, are not controlled on the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List, and are subject to the EAR when exported from the United States.9
No public evidence identified for investigations, citations, or enforcement actions against Apple relating to arms embargoes, export controls, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel.916
Apple’s compliance policies state that Apple is committed to complying with applicable export and sanctions laws, and BIS describes its Export Enforcement function as investigating export-control and antiboycott violations.1617
No public evidence identified for court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges against Apple or governments concerning an Apple defence-supply relationship with Israel.1617
No public evidence identified in reviewed NGO and UN materials that specifically documents an Apple military, security, or dual-use supply-chain relationship with the Israeli state in the V-MIL domain.1118
AFSC Investigate describes its database as focused on companies with demonstrated links to Israeli military occupation, apartheid, ethnic cleansing, genocide, or other grave human-rights violations, and its methodology states that it uses sources such as Who Profits, the UN database, public records, corporate reports, government databases, media, academic reports, industry publications, and field research.1819 Public AFSC listings reviewed identify other technology and defence-linked firms, but no Apple V-MIL profile was identified in reviewed results.181924
Who Profits maintains a company profile for Apple Inc.21 Based on available evidence, Who Profits documents Apple primarily in connection with App Store distribution of Israeli state and settlement-economy applications (including navigation apps covering settlements) and Apple’s role in the digital economy supporting Israeli state infrastructure; Who Profits does not categorise Apple as a military hardware supplier, munitions supplier, defence-prime component supplier, or heavy-equipment operator in occupied territories in its reviewed profile.21
PAX’s Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024) concentrates on weapons, munitions, electronics and electro-optics, and armoured systems manufacturers and financiers; Apple is not among the named firms.12 Al-Haq’s July 2024 business and human rights reporting focuses on heavy industry, construction, and technology firms with documented equipment presence in occupied territories; Apple is not in the identified named set.12 Amnesty International’s corporate accountability work on Israel and Gaza in 2024–2025 has focused on surveillance technology (NSO Group/Pegasus ecosystem), weapons manufacturers, and financial institutions; no Amnesty report specifically targeting Apple for V-MIL activities was identified.18 Human Rights Watch’s 2024–2025 corporate accountability reporting on the Israeli occupation focuses on construction, agriculture, banking, and surveillance technology; no HRW report specifically targeting Apple for V-MIL activities was identified.18
No public evidence identified for organised boycott, divestment, or exclusion campaigns targeting Apple specifically for defence-sector activities with Israel.181920
The BDS movement’s stated targets list includes Apple in the context of Apple’s investments (via institutional shareholders holding Israeli bonds and equity) and App Store policies, not defence manufacturing or weapons supply. The BDS national committee has not published a dedicated military-supply campaign against Apple.18
Public reporting in April 2024 described Apples4Ceasefire, a group of current and former Apple employees, alleging discipline or termination of employees for pro-Palestinian expression and calling on Apple leadership to acknowledge Palestinian deaths in Gaza.20 That reported employee campaign concerns workplace speech and corporate response to Gaza rather than documented Apple defence contracting with Israeli military bodies. No follow-up campaign specifically targeting V-MIL activities was identified.20
No public evidence identified for Apple public statements, contract terminations, or end-use monitoring commitments specifically addressing defence supply-chain relationships with Israel.916
Apple’s general policies state commitments to human rights, supplier conduct, and export-and-sanctions compliance, but the reviewed policies do not identify Israel-specific defence-supply restrictions or remediation steps.1316 No Apple public statement acknowledging the July 2024 ICJ Advisory Opinion or November 2024 ICC arrest warrants in the context of its Israeli operations was identified.16
https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Industries/directory/Pages/default.aspx ↩↩↩↩
https://mod.gov.il/en/departments/defense-procurement-directorate-dpd ↩↩↩↩
https://apps.apple.com/us/developer/government-of-israel-ministry-of-defense/id650521066 ↩↩↩
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/zuzu-%D7%96%D7%95%D7%96%D7%95/id1661151281 ↩↩↩↩
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-876327 ↩↩↩↩
https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-tim-cook-inaugurates-apple-israel-headquarters-1001014134 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000032019325000079/aapl-20250927.htm ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://images.apple.com/legal/more-resources/gtc.html ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-us-export-controls ↩↩↩
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/business-database-26sep25/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/un-publishes-list-of-112-companies-operating-in-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territories/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.apple.com/euro/supplier-responsibility/h/generic/pdf/Apple-Supplier-Code-of-Conduct.pdf ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/01/apple-confirms-purchase-of-flash-memory-design-firm-anobit/ ↩↩↩↩
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/apple-acquires-israels-primesense-350-064313626.html ↩↩↩↩
https://www.wired.com/story/apple-store-employees-disciplined-supporting-palestinians/ ↩↩↩
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-10-14/ty-article/.premium/idf-digitization-apple ↩
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000320193&type=DEF+14A&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://investigate.afsc.org/company/apple ↩
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/advance-versions/a-hrc-56-crp-2.pdf ↩
