Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics)
Audit Date: 2026-05-01
Subject: IBM Corporation (NYSE: IBM), including IBM Israel Ltd., Red Hat Inc., Kyndryl Holdings, HashiCorp, and IBM Consulting subsidiaries
IBM has maintained a continuous commercial presence in Israel since 1949, operating the IBM Research Lab in Haifa (established 1972)4 and a development centre opened in 2016 within the Be’er Sheva “CyberSpark” national cybersecurity campus3. The Be’er Sheva facility is co-located with units of the IDF’s C4I and Cyber Defence Directorate and the Israel National Cyber Directorate320; however, co-location on a shared campus is not itself probative of a direct defence contract and no contractual nexus between IBM’s campus tenancy and IDF operational activity has been documented in open sources. Both the Haifa Research Lab and the Be’er Sheva development centre are confirmed as continuing operations as of April 20263828.
IBM appears in the Israeli Government Procurement Authority’s enterprise software vendor registries as a licensed supplier of mainframe (z Series), middleware, and enterprise IT solutions to Israeli government bodies generally23. The publicly available tender records do not disaggregate awards by receiving ministry in a form that would allow reliable identification of Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) or IDF-specific IBM contract awards. No tender award specifically naming IMOD or IDF as end-user and IBM as prime contractor has been identified in open procurement databases23.
A 2015 MoU on cybersecurity cooperation between IBM and the Israeli government (National Cyber Bureau) was reported by Haaretz24; this agreement was framed around civilian and commercial cybersecurity capacity-building and national cyber resilience, not military procurement. Its current status — whether renewed or extended beyond 2015–2016 — has not been confirmed in open sources reviewed and remains unverified as of April 2026. IBM’s 2022 partnership with the Israel Innovation Authority is also documented as a civilian innovation and R&D initiative22.
IBM Watson Health’s engagement with the Israeli Ministry of Health, reported in 2021, was a civilian healthcare analytics contract and does not fall within the V-MIL domain25.
IBM maintains a publicly advertised Defence and Intelligence consulting practice globally19. No evidence has been identified of this practice holding a specific, verified Israeli defence ministry client engagement as of April 2026.
IBM does not appear as a listed defence export entity in the publicly available SIBAT (Israel’s defence export agency) directory17. SIBAT listings primarily cover Israeli-domiciled defence manufacturers; IBM Israel is not a defence manufacturer, and IBM does not appear in Israeli defence exhibition catalogues (e.g., ISDEF, Eurosatory) as an exhibitor in connection with Israeli state defence contracts.
IBM holds multiple US Department of Defense enterprise IT contracts, including DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency) framework contracts and cloud/AI modernisation programmes37[^37a]. These contracts are US domestic DoD programmes. DSCA Foreign Military Sales notifications for Israel reviewed through training data do not list IBM as a named contractor in any FMS letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) to Israel36. No FPDS record or DSCA FMS notification has been identified that includes a component specifically contracted for Israeli programme support, Israeli FMS case IT infrastructure, or joint US–Israel defence programme technical work3736.
IBM’s 2024 Annual Report on Form 10-K and 2024 Corporate Responsibility Report contain no Israeli defence-specific disclosure2838, consistent with the absence of any publicly alleged direct defence supply relationship at the level of IBM’s own filings.
No verified, publicly documented direct contract between IBM Corporation (or IBM Israel Ltd.) and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police has been identified in open procurement records, corporate disclosures, or investigative reporting as of April 2026126.
IBM’s core commercial portfolio — mainframe systems (z16), Power servers, hybrid cloud infrastructure, Red Hat OpenShift, and AI/consulting services (watsonx) — is enterprise and civilian-oriented. IBM does not publicly market ruggedised tactical, mil-spec, or battlefield-grade hardware variants equivalent to purpose-built military field computing platforms67. IBM markets its mainframe and enterprise server lines to government and public-sector clients, including ministries of defence in various countries, under standard government IT procurement frameworks as general-purpose enterprise systems19.
IBM Consulting’s Defence and Intelligence practice offers services including enterprise IT modernisation, cybersecurity, AI analytics, and supply chain management to defence ministries globally19. This constitutes a commercial services capability available to defence clients on standard terms; no evidence has been identified of this practice having a specific, verified engagement with Israeli defence or security ministries as of April 2026.
IBM’s products sold to Israeli government clients appear to be standard commercial catalogue items — enterprise software licences, cloud services, mainframe infrastructure — rather than contract-modified or mil-spec configurations. No end-user certificates or export licence filings specific to Israeli military end-users have been identified in open sources818. IBM files annual export compliance disclosures under the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)818. No publicly disclosed BIS licence application, denial, or enforcement action specific to IBM sales to Israeli military or security end-users has been identified. No equivalent regulatory proceedings in EU, UK, German, or Dutch jurisdictions specific to IBM–Israel defence sales have been identified.
Red Hat (wholly owned by IBM since July 2019) maintains an Israeli office and engineering presence32. Red Hat’s open-source software products (RHEL, OpenShift, Ansible) are enterprise platforms with broad commercial deployment. Red Hat Israel’s activities are integrated into IBM’s consolidated reporting28[^34a]. No evidence has been identified of Red Hat holding a specific contract with IMOD, IDF, or Israeli security forces as a named purchaser. Red Hat software is widely deployed in enterprise IT environments globally; it is possible but not verified in open sources that Israeli defence entities use RHEL or OpenShift as commercial off-the-shelf software within their enterprise infrastructure. No specific Israeli defence-sector contract for Red Hat has been identified in Elbit Systems, IAI, or Rafael annual reports or in Red Hat/IBM corporate disclosures2832.
The Be’er Sheva campus presence introduces a theoretical dual-use proximity risk given co-location with IDF C4I and cyber directorate entities320, but the precise contractual arrangements — including any data-sharing, facility access, or joint research with security-sector co-tenants — have not been publicly disclosed, and this proximity has not been evidenced as constituting a supply or service relationship with military end-users.
IBM is not a manufacturer or supplier of heavy construction equipment, earthmoving machinery, armoured vehicles, or demolition equipment. This section is structurally inapplicable to IBM’s product portfolio.
No evidence has been identified of IBM equipment or machinery being used in settlement construction, separation barrier construction, checkpoint construction, or demolition activity in occupied territories. IBM is not cited in any UN documentation — including the UN Human Rights Council database (A/HRC/43/71, 2020) — as a business with operations or supply relationships in Israeli settlements9. IBM’s absence from this 112-business list is noted as of the database’s 2020 publication date. The OHCHR has not published a formally updated full database list since 2020, though its mandate continues under HRC Resolution 53/25; no subsequent OHCHR document has been identified naming IBM in connection with settlement activity35.
IBM’s Smart City work in Israeli municipalities — documented academically and in press coverage — relates to Haifa and Be’er Sheva, both within sovereign Israeli territory as recognised internationally (pre-1967 Green Line), not within occupied territories438. No evidence has been identified of IBM Smart City or IoT contracts extending to settlement municipalities (e.g., Ariel, Modi’in Illit, Ma’ale Adumim) or to East Jerusalem municipal infrastructure under Israeli administration.
No public evidence has been identified of IBM holding contracts for construction, maintenance, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure. No NGO report (Who Profits, Al-Haq, AFSC, Corporate Occupation) has documented IBM equipment or services operating in settlement infrastructure122735.
Elbit Systems’ 2023 Annual Report lists primary suppliers drawn from specialised defence electronics, optics, and materials sectors. IBM is not named as a supplier or partner in Elbit Systems’ annual reports or investor disclosures11. No verified supply relationship has been identified between IBM and Elbit Systems for components, sub-systems, software, or materials.
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ 2023 Annual Review does not name IBM as a supplier or integration partner12. No verified supply relationship has been identified. No verified supply relationship between IBM and Israel Aerospace Industries has been identified in IAI corporate disclosures or Jane’s trade reporting.
IBM enterprise software (e.g., IBM Db2, Red Hat, IBM Cloud Pak) is widely deployed across global commercial and government sectors. It is possible, but not verified in open sources, that Israeli defence prime contractors use IBM commercial software as part of their general enterprise IT infrastructure. Such use would constitute incidental commercial software licensing rather than purpose-built military component supply; no evidence documenting such a relationship has been identified in the sources reviewed1112.
Kyndryl Holdings (spun off from IBM in November 2021) maintains Israeli operations31. Any Israeli government managed services contracts that IBM’s infrastructure services division held prior to November 2021 would have transferred to Kyndryl at spin-off. Kyndryl’s 10-K for FY2024 discloses government sector clients globally but does not specifically identify IMOD or IDF as named clients in public filings30. Kyndryl Israel’s client base in open sources appears to be commercial banks, telecommunications, and general government IT — consistent with IBM’s prior Israeli client profile. No verified Kyndryl contract with Israeli defence or security forces has been identified in open sources.3031 Kyndryl is a legally separate entity from IBM post-November 2021; IBM holds no board seats or controlling interest in Kyndryl following the spin-off.
HashiCorp (acquired by IBM, completed 2024)[^28a] has no documented Israeli defence sector contracts in open sources. This acquisition does not alter the V-MIL findings.
No verified joint development programme, co-production agreement, or technology transfer arrangement between IBM and any Israeli defence prime has been identified in open sources.
IBM does not operate in catering, fuel supply, waste management, or physical facilities maintenance. This section is partially inapplicable to IBM’s core business activities.
IBM provides IT infrastructure management and telecommunications-adjacent services (network management, enterprise IT) in global contexts. No verified contract to provide such services specifically to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations has been identified in open procurement records, NGO investigative reports, or corporate disclosures.
No evidence has been identified of IBM service contracts operating in or specifically serving installations within the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev in a military or security-installation context. IBM does not operate in shipping, freight forwarding, or port services.
IBM’s authorised business partners (resellers, system integrators) operate in Israel. No evidence has been identified of an IBM authorised business partner specifically deploying IBM products in military base infrastructure or settlement logistics. No public evidence identified.
IBM is not a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of any lethal weapons system globally. IBM does not manufacture small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, drones, naval vessels, guided munitions, or other lethal platforms for any customer. IBM does not manufacture ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, or warhead components.
No verified role by IBM in the manufacture, integration, maintenance, or supply of components for any Israeli missile defence system (Iron Dome, Arrow, David’s Sling), fighter aircraft programme (F-35, F-16I), main battle tank (Merkava), warship, or ballistic missile system has been identified in open sources.
IBM has historically provided IT services and software to US defence primes and the US Department of Defense under various programmes; IBM Consulting holds DoD client engagements19. However, no verified supply-chain link from IBM specifically into Israeli F-35 procurement, Israeli Air Force platform maintenance, or Israeli strategic weapons systems has been identified in open sources. No verified supply of guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, or warhead casings by IBM to any Israeli platform has been identified.
IBM does not appear as a named company in the PAX Netherlands June 2024 Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers report26. PAX’s methodology focuses on direct lethal supply chains; IBM’s enterprise IT profile falls outside this category. The financiers section of the PAX report lists major institutional investors in named arms companies; Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street appear as financiers of various named Israeli defence suppliers through index-fund holdings, but their IBM equity holdings are not the basis for their PAX listing26.
IBM is not named in §§28–47 of UN A/HRC/59/23 (Albanese, 2 July 2025) — the Special Rapporteur’s report to the HRC 59th session addressing the economy of occupation and corporate complicity — as a company with a verified military, weapons, or infrastructure supply relationship with Israeli forces or occupation infrastructure[^26a]. The report’s military and weapons supply sections focus on companies with direct lethal systems or munitions supply relationships; IBM’s profile does not place it within those named categories.
No public evidence identified.
IBM is subject to US EAR export controls for certain dual-use technology categories, including high-performance computing and encryption products. IBM publishes an annual export compliance commitment statement within its corporate responsibility disclosures8. IBM’s export compliance programme documentation confirms participation in BIS regulatory frameworks18.
No publicly known US BIS, EU, UK, or other government decision to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence specifically for IBM products to Israeli military or security end-users has been identified818. No enforcement action by BIS, OFAC, or any comparable regulatory body related to IBM’s sales to Israeli defence end-users has been identified. No UK Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) decision specifically concerning IBM products to Israeli military end-users has been identified in publicly available ECJU annual transparency data[^38a].
No court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges against IBM or against any government specifically concerning IBM’s defence supply relationship with Israel have been identified in open sources. No public evidence identified of IBM appearing in any sanctions list, restricted-party designation, or debarment order in any jurisdiction in connection with Israeli military supply activity.
Full EAR licence application data for IBM is not publicly available. A FOIA request to BIS could potentially surface any licence applications for high-performance computing or dual-use exports to Israeli government or security end-users; this gap cannot be closed from open sources alone18.
IBM’s 2024 Annual Report on Form 10-K contains no disclosure of material regulatory proceedings, governmental investigations, or legal actions in connection with Israeli defence or security end-use28.
Who Profits Research Center maintains a profile on IBM1. Their documented findings focus primarily on IBM’s civilian technology services to Israeli government bodies and IBM’s presence in the Be’er Sheva CyberSpark campus, rather than direct military procurement or weapons-system supply. Who Profits notes IBM’s general IT services to Israeli government clients and research-lab co-location near security-sector entities1. The updated Who Profits profile (reviewed through April 2026) does not add any new direct military contract finding beyond what was recorded in prior versions; Who Profits categorises IBM under technology/IT services rather than weapons or military equipment supply[^35a].
AFSC Investigate includes IBM in its Israel-related corporate database221. The AFSC’s stated basis for inclusion is IBM’s Israeli government technology contracts (including healthcare and general enterprise IT) and its Be’er Sheva campus presence adjacent to cybersecurity and security-sector entities221. The updated AFSC profile (2024–2025) maintains its inclusion of IBM on the same bases and has not added any new direct military supply finding in the 2024–2025 period[^35b].
No Tech for Apartheid, the campaign primarily targeting Google and Amazon over Project Nimbus1516, does not specifically target IBM as a primary campaign subject. IBM was not a Project Nimbus bidder or awardee — that contract was won by Google Cloud and AWS in 20215. IBM’s updated tracker page does not add IBM as a primary named target through April 2026[^35c].
The BDS National Committee’s published corporate target lists (through April 2026) do not include IBM as a primary designated target in the category of direct military or weapons supply to Israel10. IBM has not been the subject of a major sustained BDS campaign comparable to those targeting HP Inc./HPE, Elbit Systems, or Caterpillar.
Amnesty International’s 2023 Digital Repression Report and Human Rights Watch’s December 2023 reporting on technology companies and Israeli surveillance1314 address the broader landscape of surveillance technology in Israeli security contexts. These reports do not document IBM as a primary subject in connection with identified military targeting systems, IDF surveillance infrastructure, or weapons-programme supply.
Al-Haq’s July 2024 Business and Human Rights: Corporate Complicity in the Ongoing Nakba report documents corporate complicity across construction, logistics, technology, and financial sectors. IBM is not named as a subject of Al-Haq’s primary findings in the July 2024 report27. Al-Haq’s technology sector findings in this report focus on companies providing direct surveillance infrastructure, facial recognition, and biometric systems to Israeli security forces.
A 2023 Journal of Palestine Studies academic study on AI and occupation in the West Bank surveys surveillance technology firms; IBM is mentioned in a historical context regarding CCTV and Smart City work in Israeli municipalities but not in connection with military targeting systems or IDF weapons programmes14. IBM’s historical involvement in smart city infrastructure in Israeli municipalities (e.g., Haifa, Be’er Sheva) has been noted academically as dual-use civilian/security infrastructure, falling within a different domain boundary from direct military supply.
Controlling principals — no military-channel acts identified:
Arvind Krishna (Chairman and CEO since April 2020 / January 2021) has no publicly documented personal equity position in Israeli defence prime contractors, no board role at any Israeli defence company, no documented FIDF donation, and no identified public co-belligerency statement in support of Israeli military operations33[^35d]. IBM board member Admiral Michelle Howard (retired US Navy, former Vice Chief of Naval Operations) serves as an independent director; she has no publicly documented role on Israeli defence boards, and no other IBM board member has been identified as holding a directorship at an Israeli defence prime or making public co-belligerency statements post-October 20232934. IBM’s largest institutional shareholders as of Q4 2024 — Vanguard Group (~8–9%), BlackRock (~6–7%), and State Street (~4–5%) — do not individually reach the 10% threshold; no single controlling shareholder qualifying as a principal with documented military-channel acts in the Israeli defence sector has been identified[^35e][^35f].
Post-ICJ and post-ICC constructive notice:
IBM’s Israeli operations continued post-19 July 2024 (ICJ Advisory Opinion finding Israel’s presence in occupied Palestinian territory unlawful) without any announced policy response, withdrawal from Israeli operations, or public acknowledgment of the Opinion in any corporate disclosure or press release identified through April 20262838. Similarly, following the ICC’s November 2024 arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, no IBM corporate disclosure, press statement, or policy change has been identified2838.
Shareholder resolutions and employee actions:
IBM’s 2024 and 2025 proxy statements contain no shareholder resolution specifically addressing IBM’s Israeli military, defence, or occupation-related activities29[^35g]. This contrasts with Google (Alphabet) and Amazon, which faced material shareholder resolutions on Project Nimbus in 2024. No publicly documented open letter, walkout, or organised internal employee campaign specifically targeting IBM’s Israeli activities has been identified through April 2026[^35h].
No major institutional divestment decisions — by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, or university endowments — specifically citing IBM’s Israeli military or defence supply chain relationships have been identified in open sources21. IBM’s Human Rights Policy and annual ESG/Corporate Responsibility Reports do not specifically address Israeli military end-use, consistent with the absence of any publicly alleged direct defence supply relationship at the level of IBM’s own disclosures67838.
IBM Israel’s 2023 restructuring and layoffs, reported in the Israeli business press20, involved commercial and R&D workforce adjustments and have not been linked in any source reviewed to changes in defence-sector client exposure.
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2016-05-09-IBM-Opens-New-Research-and-Development-Center-in-Beer-Sheva-Israel ↩↩↩
https://www.timesofisrael.com/google-amazon-win-1-2b-cloud-contract-with-israeli-government/ ↩
https://www.ibm.com/investor/att/pdf/IBM_Annual_Report_2023.pdf ↩↩↩
https://www.ibm.com/investor/att/pdf/IBM_Annual_Report_2022.pdf ↩↩
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-reports ↩
https://bdsmovement.net/Act-Now-Against-These-Companies-and-Brands ↩
https://www.elbitsystems.com/media/Elbit-Systems-Annual-Report-2023.pdf ↩↩
https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Rafael-Annual-Review-2023.pdf ↩↩
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act10/7244/2023/en/ ↩
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/05/technology-companies-and-israeli-surveillance ↩
https://www.notechforapartheid.com/ ↩
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/apr/16/google-workers-no-tech-for-apartheid-project-nimbus ↩
https://www.mod.gov.il/Defence_and_Security/SIBAT/Pages/default.aspx ↩
https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-ibm-israel-1001436225 ↩↩↩
https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/news/ibm-innovation-authority-partnership ↩
https://www.ibm.com/il-en ↩
https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3900001,00.html ↩
https://paxforpeace.nl/publications/companies-arming-israel-and-their-financiers/ [^26a]: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5923-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-palestinian ↩↩
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000051143&type=10-K [^28a]: https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000051143&type=8-K ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000051143&type=DEF14A ↩↩
https://ir.kyndryl.com/financial-information/annual-reports ↩↩
https://www.ibm.com/leadership/arvind-krishna ↩
https://www.ibm.com/investor/governance/board-of-directors [^34a]: https://www.redhat.com/en/about/company ↩
https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-palestine/database-all-businesses [^35a]: https://whoprofits.org/company/ibm/ [^35b]: https://investigate.afsc.org/company/ibm [^35c]: https://www.notechforapartheid.com/ [^35d]: https://www.ibm.com/leadership/arvind-krishna [^35e]: https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000102909&type=13F [^35f]: https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000315066&type=13F [^35g]: https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000051143&type=DEF14A [^35h]: https://www.notechforapartheid.com/ ↩↩
https://www.fpds.gov/ [^37a]: https://www.disa.mil/Newsroom/News-and-Articles ↩↩
https://www.ibm.com/impact [^38a]: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data ↩↩↩↩↩↩
