Microsoft Military Audit

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Ministry of Defence & IDF Contracts

• Microsoft publicly acknowledged on 15 May 2025 that it works with the Israel Ministry of Defense and provides “software, professional services, Azure cloud services, and Azure AI services, including language translation” to IMOD. ¹

• Associated Press reported on 28 February 2025 that a three-year Microsoft contract with Israel’s Ministry of Defense began in 2021 and was worth $133 million, based on internal documents reviewed by AP. ²

• Associated Press reported that Israel’s military account with Microsoft included at least 635 subscriptions under divisions, units, bases, or project code words, including “Mamram” and “8200.” ²

• Globes reported on 9 December 2002 that Israel’s Ministry of Defense signed a three-year framework agreement with Microsoft for desktop and enterprise software for the Israeli defense establishment, arranged with the MOD procurement delegation, the MOD Procurement and Production Directorate, the IDF teleprocessing brigade, and Mamram. ³

• Israel’s government procurement portal published a 2024 Israel Police tender titled “רכש רישוי מיקרוסופט AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY” / “Purchase of Microsoft AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY licensing,” under the Ministry of Public Security / Israel Police, publication number 4000590514. ⁴

• Israel’s government procurement portal published a 2024 Israel Police sole-supplier notice titled “שירותי ענן מיקרוסופט AZURE” / “Microsoft AZURE cloud services,” publication number 4000583014. ⁵

• “Mamram” — the IDF’s Computing and Information Systems Corps, responsible for managing military computing infrastructure — is identified by the AP investigation as a named subscription holder within the IMOD account. ² The 2002 MOD framework agreement explicitly names Mamram as a party ³, confirming a multi-decade continuous relationship with the IDF’s core IT corps.

• AFSC Investigate states that Microsoft products and services have been used by the Israel Prison Service and Israel Border Police. ¹³ No primary procurement document has been publicly identified for these relationships beyond AFSC’s statement; confidence: moderate, requires primary-document verification.

Wartime Contract Continuation & Constructive Notice

• The AP investigation establishes that Microsoft’s commercial relationship with IMOD was active and operationally supported throughout the first ten months of the Gaza war (approximately October 2023 – August 2024). Microsoft’s global Azure support team responded to approximately 130 direct military requests during that period. ² This places the relationship as confirmed active after 19 July 2024 (ICJ Advisory Opinion date), satisfying the constructive-notice temporal threshold.

• The following notice events are documented in the public record: employee campaign activity publicly active October 2023; employee terminations October 2024; ICJ Advisory Opinion on illegality of Israeli occupation 19 July 2024; ICC arrest warrants for Israeli leadership November 2024; Microsoft’s first public acknowledgement of the IMOD relationship 15 May 2025 ¹; Microsoft’s acknowledgement of Unit 8200 Azure use and disabling of specified subscriptions 25 September 2025 ⁷; ICCL filed Irish DPC complaint December 2025 ¹²; Microsoft Israel GM departed following internal inquiry May 2026 ¹⁶. The AP investigation and Guardian series establish that IMOD Azure support continued through at least mid-2024 — after employee protests, after the ICJ Advisory Opinion, and during the period when the ICC was considering arrest warrants — and that Microsoft’s first public acknowledgement came only in May 2025.

Unit 8200 Azure Access, Wartime

• Guardian reporting underlying Microsoft’s September 2025 update ⁷ and May 2026 report ¹⁶ established that Unit 8200 — Israel’s signals intelligence unit — used Microsoft Azure to store intercepted Palestinian communications gathered from Gaza and the West Bank. Storage was located in Microsoft’s Netherlands data centre. Microsoft confirmed it found evidence supporting this in its September 2025 update ⁷ and subsequently terminated Unit 8200’s access to the relevant cloud and AI services.

Post-Restriction Status

• Microsoft’s September 2025 update states it “ceased and disabled” specified subscriptions and services. ⁷ The May 2026 departure of Microsoft Israel general manager Alon Haimovich followed an internal inquiry. ¹⁶ Microsoft has not stated that the entire IMOD commercial relationship was terminated — only specified subscriptions were disabled. The scope of remaining active IMOD contracts post-September 2025 is not publicly confirmed as of the audit date.

Defence Trade Directory Listings

• SIBAT describes its official Defense and HLS Directory as a directory of over 200 Israeli defence industries across categories including aerospace, naval forces, land forces, electronics, optronics, military inventory, HLS, civil defense, NBC protection, and services. ⁶

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft is listed as an Israeli defence exporter in the reviewed SIBAT materials. ⁶

Press Releases & Official Announcements

• Microsoft’s 15 May 2025 statement confirmed a commercial relationship with IMOD and stated that IMOD’s use of Microsoft technology is governed by Microsoft’s Acceptable Use Policy and AI Code of Conduct. ¹

• Microsoft’s 25 September 2025 update stated that it had “ceased and disabled” specified IMOD subscriptions and services, including specific cloud storage, AI services, and AI technologies, after finding evidence supporting elements of Guardian reporting on Azure storage and AI use. ⁷

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Militarised Product Lines

• Microsoft markets “Microsoft for defense and intelligence” as a set of cloud, AI, Microsoft 365, Dynamics 365, Security, and HoloLens-related offerings for defence and intelligence missions. ⁸

• Microsoft and Anduril announced on 11 February 2025 an expanded partnership for the U.S. Army Integrated Visual Augmentation System, with Anduril assuming oversight of production, future development, hardware, software, and delivery timelines pending U.S. Department of Defense approval. ⁹

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft markets a ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade hardware variant confirmed as sold to Israeli security forces.

Azure OpenAI Service and IMOD

• Guardian reporting underlying ⁷ and ¹⁶ identified that the Azure AI services terminated in September 2025 included Azure OpenAI Service components. This is consistent with Microsoft’s 15 May 2025 statement confirming it provides “Azure AI services, including language translation” to IMOD. ¹ The specific AI capabilities provided to IMOD included language translation — publicly confirmed — and potentially other Azure AI cognitive services. The full scope of AI services provided is not publicly confirmed.

Civilian-to-Military Distinction

• Microsoft’s confirmed IMOD relationship concerns commercial software, professional services, Azure cloud services, and Azure AI services rather than a publicly identified Israel-specific military hardware variant. ¹

• Microsoft stated on 15 May 2025 that it “has not created or provided” surveillance or operational software solutions to IMOD, while also stating that it lacks visibility into how customers use on-premise software or non-Microsoft government cloud operations. ¹

HoloLens / IVAS and Dual-Use Defence Marketing

• The IVAS programme ⁹ is a U.S. Army programme; no public evidence has been identified of HoloLens or IVAS units supplied to Israeli forces. This distinction should be maintained.

Azure Government / Sovereign Cloud

• Microsoft operates Azure Government (U.S.) and has announced sovereign cloud arrangements in multiple countries. The “IDF’s cloud” reference in Elbit’s OneSim tank training announcement ¹¹ has not been publicly clarified as Microsoft Azure or a separate IDF-operated infrastructure. Status: ambiguous/unresolved.

End-User Certification & Export Licensing

• No public evidence identified of export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export-control reviews specifically concerning Microsoft sales to Israeli defence or security end-users.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment in Occupied Territories

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft equipment, vehicles, or heavy machinery were used in construction, maintenance, demolition, settlement construction, the separation barrier, or military installations in occupied territories.

Direct vs. Indirect Supply

• No public evidence identified of Microsoft direct or indirect supply of construction equipment, vehicles, or heavy machinery to Israeli end-users in occupied territories.

Construction & Engineering Contracts

• No public evidence identified of Microsoft contracts for construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Component Supply to Israeli Defence Manufacturers

• Elbit Systems announced in November 2022 that its OneSim simulation software infrastructure had become cloud native and that its services could be delivered to authorized users from a Microsoft Azure cloud. ¹⁰

• The same Elbit announcement stated that Elbit worked closely with Microsoft engineers to redesign OneSim’s architecture for cloud solutions and upload OneSim to Microsoft Azure. ¹⁰

• To be precise: the relationship documented is Elbit building its own OneSim product on Microsoft Azure as a cloud delivery platform — this is a cloud platform/customer relationship, not a co-production or component-supply arrangement in the traditional defence-prime sense. The distinction is material for audit categorisation.

Specific Component Categories

• The identified Microsoft-linked category is cloud infrastructure and engineering support for Elbit’s simulation software infrastructure, not a publicly identified physical weapons component. ¹⁰

Joint Development & Co-Production

• Public reporting identifies Microsoft engineering collaboration with Elbit on cloud architecture for OneSim, but No public evidence identified of Microsoft co-producing Israeli weapons, munitions, or platform hardware with Elbit, IAI, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land. ¹⁰

GitHub, LinkedIn, and Nuance — Subsidiary Assessment

• Microsoft acquired GitHub in 2018. GitHub is commercially used by Israeli defence-technology companies and startups. No specific verified contract between GitHub and Elbit, IAI, Rafael, or IMI as a formal supply relationship has been publicly identified. GitHub’s general commercial availability means Israeli defence-technology firms can and do use it; this does not constitute a formal supply relationship under the prompt’s evidentiary standard. No supply-chain finding established.

• Microsoft owns LinkedIn. LinkedIn is commercially used by Israeli defence companies for recruitment and professional networking. No formal supply or integration contract with Israeli defence primes has been publicly identified via LinkedIn. No supply-chain finding established.

• Nuance Communications (Microsoft subsidiary, acquired 2022) provides AI-powered speech recognition and clinical documentation software. No public evidence identified of Nuance products supplied to Israeli military or defence end-users. No finding established.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Service Contracts to Military Installations

• Associated Press reported that a Microsoft Azure support ticket about two weeks after 7 October 2023 requested delays to planned maintenance outages because downtime could directly affect “life-saving systems,” and the ticket was flagged as “Glilot – 8200.” ²

• Associated Press reported that Microsoft’s global Azure support team responded to about 130 direct requests from the Israeli military during the first 10 months of the war. ²

Geographic Specificity

• Associated Press identified “Glilot – 8200” as the source flag for one urgent Azure support request and described Glilot as a secure army base housing Unit 8200. ²

• No public evidence identified of Microsoft catering, transport, fuel, waste management, or facilities maintenance services to IDF bases, detention centres, or installations in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev.

Netherlands Data Centre as Operational Node

• The Unit 8200 surveillance data storage described in Guardian reporting and confirmed in Microsoft’s own September 2025 update ⁷ was hosted in Microsoft’s Netherlands Azure data centre region. A Microsoft commercial facility in the EU thereby served as operational infrastructure for IDF signals intelligence collection against Palestinian civilian communications. This constitutes a base-services and infrastructure-sustainment finding in a cloud context, with EU-jurisdictional implications.

Azure Support as Operational Sustainment

• The AP finding ² that Microsoft’s Azure support team responded to approximately 130 direct requests from the Israeli military in the first ten months of the war — including urgent “life-saving systems” maintenance deferral requests flagged from Glilot/8200 — constitutes documented operational-sustainment activity during active hostilities.

Shipping, Freight & Port Services

• No public evidence identified of Microsoft shipping, freight-forwarding, or port-handling contracts for Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, or arms shipments.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal Systems Manufacturing

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or lethal platforms supplied to Israeli forces.

Munitions & Precursor Materials

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft supplies ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to Israeli defence end-users.

Strategic & Existential Defence Systems

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft manufactures, integrates, maintains, or supplies components for Israeli missile defence systems, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems.

• Elbit Systems announced in January 2023 that it had won a $107 million Israeli MOD contract to provide, operate, and maintain IDF Armored Corps main battle tank simulation and training centres using Elbit’s OneSim simulation infrastructure. ¹¹

• Elbit’s OneSim cloud-native announcement separately states that OneSim services can be delivered from Microsoft Azure, but the January 2023 IDF tank training-centre announcement describes operation on “the IDF’s cloud” and does not publicly identify Microsoft as the IDF contract counterparty. ¹⁰¹¹ Whether the $107M IDF tank training contract runs on Microsoft Azure or a separate IDF-operated cloud remains ambiguous; primary clarification is needed.

Kill-Chain and Targeting Function — Unresolved

• The AP and Guardian reporting concerns cloud storage and AI language-processing services. Whether those AI capabilities constituted a functional input into a targeting decision chain is not publicly confirmed. Microsoft’s own September 2025 statement ⁷ acknowledged that the Azure storage and AI use it found evidence of related to “surveillance” but did not confirm a kill-chain or targeting-output function. Amnesty International’s September 2025 statement ¹⁴ called for investigation of all contracts but did not assert a confirmed targeting-output function for Microsoft’s specific services. This question remains unresolved pending further disclosure.

Sub-System & Critical Component Supply

• No public evidence identified that Microsoft supplies guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, warhead casings, or calibrated lethal-system sub-systems to Israeli forces.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export Licence Decisions

• No public evidence identified of government decisions to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences for Microsoft products to Israeli military or security end-users.

Arms Embargo & Sanctions Compliance

• No public evidence identified of sanctions or arms-embargo enforcement actions against Microsoft related to defence trade with Israel.

• Microsoft’s September 2025 service restriction was framed by Microsoft as enforcement of terms of service and its policy against facilitating mass surveillance of civilians, not as an export-licensing or sanctions action. ⁷

Irish Data Protection Commission Complaint

• The Guardian reported on 4 December 2025 that the Irish Council for Civil Liberties filed a complaint asking Ireland’s Data Protection Commission to investigate Microsoft over alleged unlawful data processing by the IDF using Azure. ¹²

• The Guardian reported that Ireland’s Data Protection Commission confirmed receipt of the ICCL complaint and said it was under assessment. ¹² As of the audit date (May 2026), no enforcement decision, preliminary finding, or formal investigation opening has been publicly reported. Status: pending.

Dutch Data Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens)

• Given that Unit 8200 data was stored in Microsoft’s Netherlands Azure data centre region, the Dutch Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens could potentially have jurisdiction. No Dutch DPA complaint or investigation has been publicly identified as of May 2026. No finding established; gap for verification.

U.S. Export Control (EAR/ITAR) Applicability

• Azure AI services and cloud computing may fall under U.S. Export Administration Regulations controls, particularly regarding AI software and certain cloud services. No public U.S. Commerce Department BIS enforcement action or licence review specifically concerning Microsoft’s IMOD Azure services has been identified. No public evidence identified.

UK Export Licensing

• Microsoft operates Azure UK regions. No UK export licensing decision concerning Microsoft services to Israeli military end-users has been publicly identified. No public evidence identified.

Legal Challenges & Judicial Review

• No additional legal challenges or judicial review proceedings beyond the Irish DPC complaint have been publicly identified in the reviewed sources as of the audit date.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO & Academic Reports

• AFSC Investigate identifies Microsoft as a company whose technologies are used by the Israeli military and police, and describes Microsoft Azure, AI, and cloud services as relevant to Israel’s 2023–2025 war in Gaza. ¹³

• AFSC Investigate states that Microsoft supplied the Israeli military with software licensing and related services under the 2002 MOD agreement and that Israel Police and Israel Prison Service have used Microsoft products and services. ¹³

• Amnesty International stated on 26 September 2025 that Microsoft’s restriction of Unit 8200 access should be followed by investigation of all Microsoft contracts, sales, and transfers of surveillance, AI, and related equipment to Israel. ¹⁴ Amnesty’s statement specifically characterised the Unit 8200 restriction as “a step” but called it insufficient, and called on Microsoft to: (i) publish a full list of all contracts, sales, and transfers of surveillance, AI, and related equipment to Israel; (ii) conduct and publish a human rights due diligence assessment; and (iii) extend any restrictions to all Israeli security-sector customers, not only Unit 8200. ¹⁴

• Who Profits maintains a Microsoft profile documenting the Azure and AI services relationship with IMOD and Israel Police procurement, consistent with and additive to existing findings. ²²

• Human Rights Watch has documented the Israeli military’s use of AI targeting systems (the “Lavender” and “Gospel” systems, attributed to Israeli military development) in the Gaza conflict in reports published in 2024–2025. HRW’s reporting on those systems does not name Microsoft as a component supplier; the systems are attributed to Israeli military and intelligence development. HRW has separately cited cloud providers’ obligations under the UN Guiding Principles in its broader technology-accountability work. No HRW report specifically naming Microsoft as a primary V-MIL subject has been identified in training data. ²⁰

• The OHCHR settlement database (most recent public iteration 2023, originally published February 2020 as A/HRC/43/71) lists 112 business enterprises. Microsoft Corporation is not listed in the published iteration of that database. No public evidence of a subsequent iteration adding Microsoft has been identified. ²⁵

Boycott & Divestment Campaigns

• The worker-led No Azure for Apartheid campaign publicly calls for Microsoft to end Azure and AI contracts with the Israeli military and cites Microsoft’s IMOD and Unit 8200 relationships as grounds for the campaign. ¹⁵

• Associated Press reported that Microsoft fired two workers in October 2024 after they helped organize an unauthorized lunchtime vigil for Palestinian refugees at Microsoft’s Redmond campus, and AP identified one fired employee as working with No Azure for Apartheid. ² Subsequent reporting identified the terminated workers as Ibtihal Aboussad and Vaniya Singh; Aboussad had publicly spoken at a Microsoft event prior to the firing about Gaza. Their terminations drew additional statements from the No Azure for Apartheid campaign and renewed media coverage of Microsoft’s IMOD contracts. ¹⁷

• Workers affiliated with the No Azure for Apartheid campaign, together with allied shareholders, submitted a shareholder proposal for Microsoft’s annual general meeting in late 2024 calling for an independent human rights audit of Microsoft’s cloud and AI contracts with the Israeli military. Microsoft’s board recommended shareholders vote against the proposal. The proposal received a minority of shareholder votes and did not pass. The primary source for the resolution text and vote count is Microsoft’s SEC DEF 14A proxy filing. ¹⁹

• No public evidence identified of a sovereign wealth fund or public pension fund divestment decision specifically and solely tied to Microsoft’s Israeli defence-sector activities.

Guardian Investigative Series

• The Guardian published a multi-part investigative series on Microsoft and the Israeli military running from at least early 2025 through May 2026, constituting the primary journalistic record driving Microsoft’s own September 2025 policy response. Key published instalments include: reporting establishing Unit 8200’s use of Azure for Palestinian communications surveillance (underpinning ⁷); reporting on the Netherlands data centre node; and the May 2026 report on Alon Haimovich’s departure. ¹⁶²¹

Corporate Response & Policy Statements

• Microsoft stated on 15 May 2025 that reviews had found no evidence to date that Microsoft Azure or AI technologies were used to target or harm people in Gaza, while acknowledging limited visibility into on-premise and non-Microsoft cloud use. ¹

• Microsoft stated on 25 September 2025 that it found evidence supporting elements of Guardian reporting about IMOD Azure storage consumption in the Netherlands and AI services, and that it disabled specified IMOD subscriptions and services. ⁷

• The Guardian reported on 12 May 2026 that Microsoft Israel general manager Alon Haimovich would step down after an inquiry scrutinising Microsoft Israel’s dealings with the Israeli military and Unit 8200. ¹⁶

• The Guardian reported that Microsoft’s inquiry followed revelations that Unit 8200 used Azure to store intercepted Palestinian communications from Gaza and the West Bank, and that Microsoft had terminated Unit 8200’s access to cloud and AI services used to support the surveillance project. ¹⁶

Controlling Principals

• No public evidence identified of CEO and Chairman Satya Nadella holding directorships on Israeli defence-industry boards, donating to the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces, holding declared equity in Israeli defence primes (Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMI), or making public co-belligerency statements. No Principle 4 finding established for Nadella.

• No public evidence identified of President and Vice-Chair Brad Smith holding Israeli defence directorships, FIDF donations, or declared equity in Israeli defence primes. Smith has been the public face of Microsoft’s policy responses including the May 2025 statement ¹. No Principle 4 finding established for Smith.

• Bill Gates resigned from the Microsoft board in March 2020 and his Microsoft shareholding as of 2026 is well below 10%; he is not a controlling principal under a standard ≥10% shareholder or board-member test. No publicly confirmed Gates Foundation equity stake in Israeli defence primes (Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMI) has been identified in training data. No Principle 4 finding established for Gates as a current controlling principal.

• Microsoft’s board as of 2025–2026 includes Satya Nadella, Reid Hoffman, Hugh Johnston, Teri List, Sandi Peterson, Penny Pritzker, Carlos Rodriguez, Charles Scharf, John Stanton, and Emma Walmsley. No public evidence identified of any current board member holding Israeli defence-industry directorships, documented FIDF donations, or declared equity in Israeli defence primes. No Principle 4 finding established for named board members.

• Major institutional shareholders (Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street) are passive index investors and do not exercise operational control over Microsoft. They are not “controlling principals” for Principle 4 purposes.

Group Attribution — Subsidiaries and Investments

• Microsoft has made substantial investments in OpenAI (minority economic interest of approximately 49%). Reporting in 2024 indicated OpenAI products including GPT-4 were being used by Israeli defence-technology companies. OpenAI separately modified its usage policies in January 2025 to permit certain national security use cases. OpenAI is a separate legal entity; Microsoft holds a minority economic interest, not operational control. Azure is the exclusive cloud provider for OpenAI’s training and inference infrastructure, creating an indirect infrastructure nexus with any OpenAI–Israeli military relationships. Finding: indirect/structural nexus only; not a direct Microsoft group-attribution finding. ²⁶

• No formal supply or services contract with Israeli defence entities has been identified for LinkedIn or GitHub beyond general commercial availability. No group-attribution finding for either subsidiary.

• No public evidence identified of Activision Blizzard (acquired January 2023) products or contracts with Israeli defence or security forces in a military-supply context. No group-attribution finding.

Settlement Nexus

• No public evidence has been identified of Microsoft entering into specific contracts with Israeli settlement authorities, settlement municipal councils, or settlement-based enterprises for cloud or software services.

• Israel’s government ministries, including those with administrative functions in the West Bank, potentially use Microsoft software under existing government licensing agreements. No primary document has been identified confirming Microsoft software is used specifically by the Civil Administration of the West Bank or settlement administration bodies. Gap: requires primary-document verification.

• Microsoft is not listed in the OHCHR settlement database (A/HRC/43/71 and subsequent iterations). ²⁵

End Notes