Audit Phase: V-MIL Domain Audit
Target Entity: Samsung Group (Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and relevant subsidiaries including Samsung C&T Corporation, Samsung SDI Co., Ltd., Samsung SDS Co., Ltd., and Samsung Next LLC)
Evidence Base: Research memo dated within training data through April 2026; all claims drawn exclusively from sourced findings therein.
The strongest publicly identified evidence of Samsung hardware entering Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) service comes from a single trade press article. Israel Defense (ישראל דיפנס), an Israeli defence industry publication, reported circa 2019 on the launch of the Galaxy Tab Active Pro and stated that the launch had been “preceded by a long and comprehensive process of collecting demands and requirements from clients (including Israeli clients), pursuant to the successful assimilation of the previous tablet model of this family, Tab Active 2, in various IDF corps.” 1 The same article specifies intended operational environments as “armoured vehicles, trucks, forklifts.” 1 This is the sole publicly identified source explicitly naming IDF corps-level integration of Samsung hardware.
No formal contract document, tender award number, Ministry of Defence (IMOD) purchase order, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Samsung Electronics (or any Samsung Group subsidiary) and the IMOD, the IDF, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police has been identified in any publicly available procurement registry, corporate filing, or official government announcement. The “assimilation” claim rests entirely on the Israel Defense article.
IDF / IMOD Contracts — Temporal Refresh (Post-July 2024)
No new public evidence has been identified confirming, extending, or terminating any Samsung Electronics supply relationship with the IDF or IMOD in the period following the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 55 or the ICC arrest warrants of November 2024 54. The sole source naming IDF corps integration remains the 2019 Israel Defense article 1. Samsung has issued no statement acknowledging, affirming, or terminating IDF supply relationships in this period.
Samsung Electronics is not listed as a registered supplier in the SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) official export directory based on publicly available information. Samsung has exhibited products — including Knox-secured devices and the Tab Active series — at international defence exhibitions such as DSEI (UK), but participation in commercial defence exhibitions does not constitute registration in Israeli official defence procurement registries. 16
No public evidence identified of Samsung appearing in Israeli official defence procurement registries or SIBAT-linked supplier directories.
Samsung issued a press release in August 2024 announcing the Galaxy Tab Active5 Tactical Edition, describing the device as “designed for military operations” with features including Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) support, stealth mode, and a Night Vision Goggle (NVG)-compatible display. 15 The release does not name Israel or the IDF as a customer. Samsung also published an Insights article in August 2024 stating its Tactical Edition devices are “trusted by military forces and government bodies worldwide,” again without naming specific national customers. 16
No public evidence identified of any Samsung corporate press release or Israeli government announcement specifically confirming a named IDF or IMOD contract or partnership.
Samsung Knox’s inclusion on the NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) Components List has been maintained and updated through 2024. 60 Knox-equipped Samsung devices are authorised for use in US classified environments. The CSfC listing covers Samsung Knox Container and Knox Platform for Enterprise. This is a US-government certification, not an IDF/IMOD contract; however, it establishes that Samsung’s security architecture meets the threshold for classified military communications environments in allied militaries.
Samsung Electronics operates a research and development centre in Tel Aviv — Samsung Research Israel (SRIL) — established approximately 2011. 52 SRIL employs several hundred software engineers and researchers and focuses on computer vision, machine learning, augmented reality, and related fields. 46 53 SRIL is a corporate R&D facility, not a defence contractor entity; its output feeds Samsung Electronics’ consumer and enterprise product lines. No public evidence has identified SRIL as conducting defence-specific R&D under contract to IMOD or IDF. Samsung Next’s closure of its Tel Aviv physical office in April 2024 22 is distinct from SRIL, which as of available evidence continues to operate. 46
No new formal contract documentation identified.
Samsung manufactures and actively markets a tiered range of products with clear military and government applications.
Galaxy Tab Active series (Active 2, Active 3, Active Pro, Active5): ruggedised, MIL-STD-810H-certified, IP68-rated tablets marketed across defence, government, utilities, and industrial sectors. 14 The Israel Defense article identified the Tab Active 2 as having been assimilated into IDF corps prior to 2019. 1
Tactical Edition (TE) suite: The Galaxy S20 TE 17, Galaxy S23 TE, and Galaxy XCover6 Pro TE, and Galaxy Tab Active5 Tactical Edition 15 are purpose-configured for military and special operations use. Documented specifications include: Stealth Mode (hardware-level disabling of all RF emissions — LTE, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GPS — while maintaining operational functionality); NVG-compatible display mode; ATAK optimisation for battlefield situational awareness; multi-ethernet connectivity for drone feed integration; DualDAR (Dual Data-at-Rest) encryption meeting NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) requirements; and programmable PTT (push-to-talk) keys. 15 16 17 18 19 These capabilities have no significant civilian application and are sold through defence-specific channels, including CDW Federal in the United States. 18 19
Samsung Knox: Samsung’s enterprise security platform is publicly described as “defense-grade,” certified to NSA CSfC standards, and explicitly marketed to military and government customers globally. 32
The Galaxy Tab Active5 Tactical Edition was announced August 2024 15 and is actively sold through US defence channels as of the date of this run. 19 No evidence has emerged of any post-ICJ (post-19 July 2024) policy change by Samsung regarding the sale of Tactical Edition devices to Israeli security forces, nor any statement restricting such sales.
Samsung’s Tactical Edition devices are listed as compatible hardware on the TAK.gov platform (official ATAK documentation maintained by the US Air Force Research Laboratory). 61 ATAK compatibility is significant because ATAK is the foundational situational awareness application for US Army, Special Operations Command, and allied military forces. Samsung TE devices’ ATAK optimisation confirms they function as purpose-designed components in the US military’s tactical communications and battlefield management ecosystem. While IDF ATAK deployment is not independently confirmed in public sources, the IDF is a known consumer of COTS military technology and ATAK-compatible platforms have been reported in Israeli defence trade press as under evaluation. This remains contextual, not a confirmed named-customer finding.
As of 2024, Samsung Knox remains on the NSA CSfC Components List for both mobile devices and enterprise containers. 60 Defence and government channel reporting (Defense News, C4ISRNET, 2022–2024) confirms Samsung TE devices are procured by US military units and are integrated into tactical networks. 62 No IDF-specific procurement has been identified in US or Israeli defence procurement records.
A Latvian defence integrator, LMT Defence, published a product sheet offering Samsung Tactical Baseline Device configurations, confirming that Samsung TE devices reach military end-users through authorised reseller channels in at least one NATO-affiliated market. 28 This confirms the existence of a military reseller ecosystem for Samsung TE products, though this specific documented instance is Latvia/NATO rather than Israel.
The Tab Active series is commercially available through Samsung’s business channel and general retail distributors and is not exclusively sold to military customers. 14 The Tactical Edition suite occupies a distinct tier: while based on commercial hardware platforms, its firmware and hardware modifications — particularly the stealth mode hardware switch, NVG driver stack, DualDAR encryption layer, and ATAK optimisation — are purpose-built for military operational environments. 15 16 17
The Israel Defense article’s characterisation of Tab Active 2 deployment in IDF corps as “assimilation” (hatma’a) implies doctrinal integration rather than ad-hoc commercial purchase; however, the Active 2 itself is a commercially available product, not a military-exclusive variant. 1
No public evidence identified of any export licence application, end-user certificate (EUC), or government export control review specifically related to Samsung device sales to Israeli defence or security end-users.
Samsung Electronics is a manufacturer of consumer electronics and semiconductor products, not heavy construction machinery (excavators, bulldozers, cranes). The relevant Samsung subsidiary for construction and engineering activities is Samsung C&T Corporation.
No verified NGO investigation, UN documentation, photographic evidence, or official report has been identified specifically documenting Samsung C&T equipment being used in Israeli settlement construction, the separation barrier, military installations, or other occupied-territory infrastructure. Samsung C&T does not appear in Who Profits’ database as a profiled company in connection with occupied territory construction, nor in equivalent documentation from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or UN Special Procedures reports reviewed in the research memo. 50 51
Samsung Group entities are not listed in the UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in activities related to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (HRC res. 31/36), the most recent public iteration of which was published in February 2023 and covers 112 companies. 37 Samsung’s Israeli operations (SRIL R&D centre, Samsung Next investment vehicle) are conducted within the internationally recognised boundaries of Israel (Tel Aviv metropolitan area) rather than in settlements. Samsung C&T does not appear among the listed entities.
No public evidence identified of Samsung C&T activity in occupied territories.
Samsung C&T has been identified as a prospective participant in the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Metro project. Israeli legal and business publication Barnea Jaffa Lande & Co. reported in 2023–2024 that NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit System delegations had actively courted South Korean contractors — including Samsung C&T — citing expertise in tunnel boring and megaproject delivery. 25 The project is estimated at approximately NIS 150 billion (~$40 billion USD). 25 26
The NTA pre-qualification process (NTA tender PQ 589/2025) progressed through 2024. 63 South Korean contractors, including Samsung C&T and Hyundai E&C, were reported in Israeli business press as submitting pre-qualification documents. As of available evidence through April 2026, Samsung C&T’s participation remains at the pre-qualification and expression-of-interest stage. No contract award to Samsung C&T for the Tel Aviv Metro has been publicly confirmed. 25 26 63
All published NTA route maps show the three planned metro lines (M1, M2, M3) operating within the Tel Aviv metropolitan area (Gush Dan), entirely within pre-1967 internationally recognised Israeli territory. No evidence suggests planned extensions into the West Bank or East Jerusalem. This project, if awarded, would not constitute settlement-nexus activity under the rubric of the present audit framework.
Samsung C&T is ranked among the top global contractors in the ENR (Engineering News-Record) annual international contractor rankings, with significant infrastructure project experience in tunnelling and transit. 33 This is background context confirming Samsung C&T’s capacity and profile relevant to the Tel Aviv Metro pre-qualification. It does not constitute new evidence of settlement or military construction.
No verified contracts for Samsung C&T (or any Samsung subsidiary) for construction, maintenance, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure have been identified. No public evidence identified.
Samsung Electronics (Samsung Foundry division) publicly announced a Design Service Partner (DSP) agreement with Avnet ASIC Israel (AAI). The Samsung Semiconductor news page confirms AAI operates as a turn-key ASIC design and manufacturing partner, with Samsung Foundry fabricating the resultant chips. 9 AAI’s own published market descriptions identify “defense,” “homeland security,” and “government” among its served sectors. 9 64 This structure means Israeli customers — including potential defence-sector customers engaging AAI for custom chip design — may have those chips fabricated at Samsung Foundry facilities.
The Samsung Foundry DSP programme structure means Samsung Foundry manufactures chips designed by DSP partners such as AAI; Samsung Foundry does not typically have visibility into end-customer identities for chips designed through DSP intermediaries, nor does it publish end-customer lists. 64 No specific named Israeli defence prime (Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI Systems) has been publicly confirmed as an AAI/Samsung Foundry customer for defence application ASICs. The defence-sector characterisation rests on AAI’s own marketing materials, not on named end-user contract disclosures. 9 64 This pathway is plausible but unconfirmed at the named-customer level.
The research memo evaluates a claim that design patent US-D729162-S1 — a design patent for a “Battery Pole” assigned to Elbit Systems of America — establishes a Samsung SDI supply relationship with Elbit. 24 This claim is assessed as [UNVERIFIED — GEMINI ONLY]: the cited document is a design patent protecting the ornamental appearance of a connector component; it does not disclose a bill-of-materials supplier relationship and does not confirm that Samsung SDI is a supply-chain vendor to Elbit. Samsung SDI’s 2023 Annual Report (DART filing, March 2024) discloses revenue by segment and geography; Israel does not appear as a named revenue geography and no Israeli defence client is named in Samsung SDI corporate disclosures. 44 No Samsung SDI supply agreement with Elbit or any other Israeli defence prime appears in Samsung SDI annual reports, Elbit Systems annual reports or SEC 6-K filings, or any independently verified investigative report. 10 44
A 2016 Elbit Systems quarterly 6-K SEC filing is cited in the research memo as the source for a claimed partnership between Samsung SDS and Cyberbit (an Elbit Systems subsidiary active in industrial cybersecurity). 10 The 6-K is a financial report rather than a press release, and no independently verified Samsung SDS press release or Cyberbit announcement confirming a specific ICS security partnership has been located. Samsung SDS Co., Ltd.’s annual reports and press release archive (2016–2024) do not contain a press release specifically confirming a partnership with Cyberbit. 45 This claim remains [UNVERIFIED — GEMINI ONLY] pending identification of the specific source document.
No public evidence identified of joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between any Samsung subsidiary and Israeli defence firms.
Bynet Data Communications, part of the RAD-Bynet Group, is documented by the Who Profits Research Center as a company holding contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) for IT infrastructure maintenance at checkpoints and at COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) facilities, including biometric systems serving the military administration of the West Bank. 7 Separately, Bynet’s own corporate website lists the company as an authorised Samsung solutions partner and integrator for audio-visual and display systems. 8
The Who Profits profile documents Bynet’s role in maintaining IT infrastructure for the Civil Administration (COGAT) in the West Bank and at military checkpoints. 7 The profile does not specifically name Samsung-branded products as the equipment deployed at these facilities. The inference that Samsung-branded hardware flows through Bynet into IMOD/COGAT installations is plausible given the confirmed distributor relationship, but unverified at the product-specific level. No inventory list, procurement schedule, or investigative report has been identified confirming that specific Samsung-branded devices — as opposed to generic IT equipment — are installed at checkpoint or COGAT facilities via Bynet.
The Who Profits profile on Rad-Bynet 7 remains active and current as of 2024. No update has been identified indicating that Bynet has terminated its IMOD/COGAT contracts or that its Samsung distributor relationship has changed. The indirect pathway — Samsung authorised A/V partner → Bynet → IMOD/COGAT checkpoint infrastructure — therefore continues to be plausible but unverified at product-specific level.
Bynet’s documented COGAT contracts, as profiled by Who Profits, involve installations in the West Bank. 7 The West Bank geography of Bynet’s COGAT installations places any Samsung hardware that may be present (if confirmed) within occupied territory, including in the context of the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024. 55 However, the product-specific link remains unconfirmed. This remains an inference.
Samsung is a manufacturer of electronic goods and does not operate as a shipping, freight, or port services company. No public evidence identified of Samsung holding shipping or freight contracts serving Israeli defence logistics.
Samsung Group was historically a prime contractor for lethal military platforms through two subsidiaries:
Both subsidiaries were sold to Hanwha Group in a transaction announced in November 2014 and completed in 2015, prior to the temporal scope of this audit. 11 12 These entities are now Hanwha Aerospace and Hanwha Systems respectively and are legally and operationally independent of Samsung Group. 12 The SGR-A1 autonomous sentry rifle — a system with documented deployment at the Korean DMZ — is now a Hanwha product. 13
Multiple South Korean business and defence trade sources confirm the Samsung Techwin / Samsung Thales → Hanwha Group transaction was completed in 2015, with full brand separation by 2016–2017 (Samsung Techwin renamed Hanwha Techwin, subsequently Hanwha Aerospace). 59 12 There is no residual Samsung Group equity interest in Hanwha Aerospace, Hanwha Systems, or Hanwha Defense as of 2024. The SGR-A1 sentry system, K9 Thunder, and related platforms are wholly Hanwha products. 13
Since the 2015 divestment, no Samsung Group subsidiary is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of lethal weapons platforms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, or tactical autonomous systems. No public evidence identified of any Samsung Group subsidiary supplying lethal systems to Israeli forces at any point.
No public evidence identified.
Samsung Group entities are not among the named companies in the PAX Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024) primary company list. 38 The PAX report’s company focus is on entities with verified direct weapons or weapons-component supply roles — a category Samsung does not occupy in verified public evidence.
No public evidence identified of Samsung Group involvement in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow anti-ballistic missile systems, F-35 programme sub-systems, Merkava main battle tank, or any other Israeli strategic platform.
Samsung SDI manufactures lithium-ion battery cells and battery systems and is an active participant in large-scale energy storage markets. 27 Samsung SDI has publicly announced a significant energy storage battery supply agreement with Tesla. 31 Samsung SDI’s 2023 Annual Report confirms revenue disclosure by segment (Energy Storage Systems, Automotive batteries, Small batteries) and by geography (Korea, Europe, Americas, China, Other); Israel does not appear as a named revenue geography. 44 No verified contract supplying Samsung SDI batteries to Israeli military platforms or defence primes has been identified. 30
No new evidence of Samsung involvement in lethal systems, munitions, or strategic platforms.
No public evidence identified of any government decision — in South Korea, the United States, the European Union, or any other jurisdiction — to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences specifically for Samsung products destined for Israeli military or security end-users. South Korean export control law (the Strategic Goods Export Control Act, administered by MOTIE — the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy) governs Samsung’s exports of dual-use and controlled items; no MOTIE enforcement action or licence denial related to Israeli military end-users has been identified in any publicly available record. 48
Following the October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military operations in Gaza, South Korea’s MOTIE did not impose specific export restrictions on defence or dual-use goods destined for Israel during 2023–2024. South Korea is not a party to any multilateral arms embargo on Israel. South Korea’s Strategic Goods Export Control Act requires individual licence applications for controlled items; no public enforcement action against Samsung has been identified. 48 49
The UK government suspended certain export licences for arms to Israel in September 2024 following legal challenges. These suspensions affected companies including BAE Systems and Leonardo for specific weapons components. Samsung is not a named licencee in UK ECJU records for Israeli military end-users. 47 49 This is sector context rather than a Samsung-specific finding.
US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) enforcement actions and annual reports to Congress (2022–2024) do not identify Samsung Electronics as a subject of investigation or citation for export control violations related to Israel. 47 No OFAC designation or notice involving Samsung has been identified.
No public evidence identified of investigations, citations, notices of violation, or enforcement actions against Samsung related to arms embargo compliance or export control violations involving Israel in any jurisdiction.
The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 55 established that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful under international law and that third-party states and other actors have obligations not to render aid or assistance. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants in November 2024. 54 These instruments constitute constructive notice that commercial activity sustaining Israeli military or occupation infrastructure may carry legal consequences under evolving international law. Samsung has not publicly acknowledged these instruments in the context of its Israeli business activities or supply relationships.
No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, arbitration proceedings, or legislative inquiries brought against Samsung, or against a government decision involving Samsung, specifically regarding defence supply relationships with Israel.
Who Profits Research Center profiles Rad-Bynet — Samsung’s Israeli authorised distribution and integration partner — as an occupation-complicit company on the basis of its documented IMOD and COGAT contracts. 7 Who Profits does not separately profile Samsung Group itself as an occupation-compliant company in its main database, though the Bynet profile creates an indirect associative link through the supplier-distributor relationship. 40 The indirect link runs through the Rad-Bynet profile; this absence is consistent with the evidentiary picture that Samsung’s connection to Israeli military and occupation infrastructure is mediated through local distributors and integrators rather than through direct contracts.
SMEX (Social Media Exchange), a Lebanese digital rights organisation, published an open letter to Samsung in 2022 2 and a companion investigative report 3 documenting the pre-installation of AppCloud — developed by Israeli-founded ad-tech firm ironSource (which merged with Unity Technologies in 2022 65) — on Samsung Galaxy A and M series devices sold in the WANA (West Asia and North Africa) region. SMEX documented the collection of device identifiers, IP addresses, and behavioural data from users in the region, including Palestinian users, without meaningful consent mechanisms, and called for Samsung to remove the software from regional devices. 2 3
Middle East Eye (2022–2023) reported on Samsung users in the MENA region experiencing AppCloud as an unremovable system-level application, citing SMEX’s findings and aggregated user complaints. 4
Malwarebytes published findings in November 2025 characterising AppCloud-type pre-installed software on budget Samsung devices as functionally spyware-equivalent, noting its privileged system access and resistance to removal by the device owner. 5
Al-Estiklal Newspaper (2022–2023) characterised Samsung’s Aura/AppCloud integration as “Israeli spyware in your pocket,” citing ironSource’s Israeli corporate origins and its positioning within the Israeli technology ecosystem. 6
Ethical Consumer (UK) includes Samsung Group in its ethical ratings assessments, referencing its military supply chain involvement and Israeli technology sector presence, and flags Samsung under categories including “arms & military supply” and “anti-social finance” primarily based on the Tactical Edition product line and historical Samsung Techwin connection (pre-divestment). Ethical Consumer acknowledges the Hanwha divestment but notes the commercial military product lines as a continuing concern. 20 This source is a consumer ethics rating service, not a primary investigative or documentary source.
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre documented Samsung Next’s April 2024 announcement to close its Tel Aviv physical office in the context of civil society pressure arising from the Gaza conflict. 22
AFSC Investigate (investigate.afsc.org) lists Samsung Electronics in the context of its Israeli R&D operations and Samsung Next investment activity in Israel, but does not document a direct verified weapons supply or IDF contract relationship. 41 The AFSC profile references the Galaxy Tab Active/Tactical Edition line as dual-use products potentially available to Israeli security forces through commercial channels, consistent with existing findings. The profile does not present new primary documentation beyond what is established in the existing evidence base.
Don’t Buy Into Occupation (DBIO) coalition periodic reports (2022–2024) address companies with activities in or connected to Israeli settlements. Samsung Group entities are not among the named companies in DBIO’s settlement-focused reports as of 2024. 42 DBIO’s focus is on companies with direct settlement-linked revenue streams; Samsung’s Israeli operations are in Tel Aviv (Green Line Israel), not settlements.
PAX Netherlands — Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (June 2024): Samsung Group entities are not among the named companies in the primary “arming Israel” list. 38 The PAX report references the broader electronics and semiconductor supply chain to Israeli defence primes, but does not name Samsung specifically in this context in its June 2024 edition.
Al-Haq — Business and Human Rights: Pillaging the Occupied Palestinian Territory (July 2024): Samsung Group entities are not among the primary named companies. Al-Haq’s business and human rights work on Samsung has focused primarily on the AppCloud/digital rights dimension (civil society engagement documented via SMEX), not on military hardware supply. 39
The UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in activities related to Israeli settlements (HRC res. 31/36), most recent public iteration published February 2023, does not include Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung C&T Corporation, Samsung SDI, Samsung SDS, or any other Samsung Group entity by name. 37 The 2023 iteration covers 112 companies. Samsung’s Israeli operations are conducted within the internationally recognised boundaries of Israel rather than in settlements.
UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s report A/HRC/59/23 (“From Economy of Occupation to Economy of Genocide,” 2 July 2025) 35 and its predecessor A/HRC/55/73 (“Anatomy of a Genocide,” March 2024) 34 do not name Samsung Group entities as primary subjects in the sections most relevant to V-MIL (addressing military and surveillance infrastructure, civilian heavy machinery, and carceral systems). The reports’ named-company references in these sections focus primarily on entities with documented direct supply relationships to the IDF or to settlement construction contractors. This does not exclude the possibility that Samsung appears in footnoted primary citations not individually accessible in available training data.
ironSource completed its merger with Unity Technologies in November 2022. 65 Post-merger, Unity Technologies (a US company listed on NYSE) became the responsible entity for the AppCloud/Aura platform. Samsung’s contractual relationship for AppCloud pre-installation would therefore be with Unity Technologies (post-November 2022) rather than with ironSource as an Israeli-headquartered entity. This is materially relevant to the “Israeli-founded bloatware” characterisation: while ironSource’s founders and origins are Israeli, the corporate counterparty in Samsung’s pre-installation agreement is a US public company post-November 2022. The Malwarebytes November 2025 finding 5 that AppCloud-type software on budget Samsung devices functions as spyware relates to the technical capability of the software (privileged access, data harvesting) regardless of the counterparty’s nationality.
Evidentiary note on AppCloud/ironSource: The characterisation, advanced by some civil society sources, that AppCloud constitutes a channel for Israeli state intelligence collection has not been established by publicly available technical forensic analysis or legal proceedings. This distinction is material to the weight attributed to these sources. 2 3
Samsung’s corporate venture arm, Samsung Next, maintained a Tel Aviv office since approximately 2014–2015 and made investments in Israeli technology companies. A confirmed early investment is a 2017 seed round participation in Intezer, an Israeli cybersecurity firm focused on code genetic analysis, at a $2 million raise. 21 The IVC Data & Insights database records Samsung Next LLC as an active Israeli-market investor. 29 Calcalist and Globes reporting (2021–2024) documents Samsung Next’s Israeli portfolio as including companies in enterprise software, AI, cybersecurity, and consumer applications. 66 Intezer Security is the one confirmed named Samsung Next investment with documented Israeli defence-ecosystem adjacency (Intezer’s technology has been adopted by government and defence-sector security teams globally, though Intezer is not a weapons or targeting company). 67 No Samsung Next investment in an Israeli company whose primary product is a kinetic military system, autonomous targeting tool, or IDF-specific platform has been identified in public sources.
In April 2024, Samsung Next announced the closure of its Tel Aviv physical office, citing restructuring. The announcement specified that existing relationships with portfolio companies and partners would be maintained and that Israeli operations would be managed from the US team, stating “Israel remains an attractive market.” 22 23 This announcement was documented by Business & Human Rights Resource Centre in the context of civil society pressure related to the Gaza conflict. 22 The closure was made approximately three months before the ICJ Advisory Opinion (19 July 2024) 55 and approximately seven months before the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants 54; Samsung Next did not cite legal, reputational, or human rights considerations in its public statement.
Samsung has been included in BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) campaign lists, primarily on the basis of its Israeli R&D presence (Samsung Research & Innovation Center in Tel Aviv, established 2011) and Samsung Next’s investment activities. 20 22 Samsung is not among the BDS Movement’s primary “top priority” campaign targets, which are more focused on entities with direct roles in weapons supply or settlement construction. No major institutional divestment decision by a pension fund, sovereign wealth fund, or public institution specifically citing Samsung’s Israeli defence supply has been publicly identified.
Samsung Electronics’ Sustainability Report 2023 (published 2024) 43 discloses Samsung’s human rights policy framework, referencing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The report does not contain specific disclosure about Israeli military or security sector supply, IDF hardware use, or the Gaza conflict. Human rights risk disclosures are presented at a high level of generality with no specific country-level disclosure regarding Israel/OPT.
Samsung’s published Human Rights Policy (revised 2021) 68 commits to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights framework and references non-involvement in conflict-affected areas. The policy does not contain specific commitments regarding Israeli security forces or occupied territories, and no conflict-specific addendum related to Gaza or the West Bank has been publicly issued.
Samsung Group’s de facto controlling principal is Lee Jae-yong (Jay Y. Lee), Vice Chairman and effective head of Samsung Electronics, with beneficial control through the Samsung Life Insurance → Samsung Electronics cross-shareholding structure. 56 57 Based on training data through April 2026, no public record has been identified of Lee Jae-yong holding a position on any Israeli defence company board, making a documented donation to Friends of the IDF (FIDF) or equivalent reservist funds, holding equity in Israeli defence primes (Elbit, IAI, Rafael), or making a public co-belligerency statement regarding the Gaza conflict or Israeli military operations. Lee Jae-yong’s public profile during 2023–2024 was dominated by his legal situation in South Korea (appeal proceedings related to earlier fraud and bribery convictions) and Samsung Group’s semiconductor investment strategy. No military-channel acts by controlling principals identified.
In response to SMEX’s 2022 open letter regarding AppCloud/ironSource, Samsung did not publicly commit to removing the software from WANA-region devices. No formal policy change, contract termination announcement regarding ironSource, or end-use monitoring commitment was publicly announced. 2 3 4 The operational status of the AppCloud platform and Samsung’s contractual relationship with the post-merger Unity Technologies entity is not clearly documented in public sources.
Samsung has issued no public statement specifically addressing concerns about the use of its hardware by the IDF or Israeli security forces. Beyond the Samsung Next office closure in April 2024 22, no public evidence has been identified of Samsung terminating any contract, modifying any product line, or issuing any policy commitment specifically in response to concerns about defence-related supply to Israel.
https://smex.org/open-letter-to-samsung-end-forced-israeli-app-installations-in-the-wana-region/ ↩↩↩↩
https://smex.org/invasive-israeli-software-is-harvesting-data-from-samsung-users-in-wana/ ↩↩↩↩
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/samsung-users-unremovable-israeli-bloatware-appcloud-devices ↩↩
https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/11/budget-samsung-phones-shipped-with-unremovable-spyware-say-researchers ↩↩
https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/samsung-s-aura-israeli-spyware-in-your-pocket ↩
https://www.bynet.co.il/en/solutions/audio-video/ ↩
https://semiconductor.samsung.com/news-events/news/samsung-electronics-partners-with-avnet-asic-israel-to-strengthen-customer-support-at-the-forefront-of-asic-design-services/ ↩↩↩
https://www.elbitsystems.com/sites/default/files/2025-03/prq32016-eng-final.pdf ↩↩
https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20141126000202 ↩
https://www.samsung.com/us/business/mobile/tablets/galaxy-tab-active/explore/ ↩↩
https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-introduces-galaxy-tab-active5-tactical-edition-new-tablet-delivers-behind-greater-functionality-security-precision-military-operations/ ↩↩↩↩↩
https://insights.samsung.com/2024/08/20/samsung-tactical-edition-supporting-modern-operators-and-missions-with-customized-cots-devices/ ↩↩↩↩
https://image-us.samsung.com/SamsungUS/samsungbusiness/pdfs/brochures/S20-tactical-brochure_FINAL_March21.pdf ↩↩↩
https://webobjects2.cdw.com/is/content/CDW/cdw/on-domain-cdw/brands/samsung/flyer-samsung-federal-5-solutions-tactical-edition.pdf ↩↩
https://www.samsung.com/us/business/solutions/industries/government/tactical-edition/ ↩↩↩
https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/company-profile/samsung-group ↩↩
https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israeli-cyber-security-co-intezer-raises-2m-1001167029 ↩
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/israelopt-samsung-next-announces-plans-to-shut-down-operations-in-israel-as-war-on-gaza-continues/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩
https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/by1p82me0 ↩
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/patents/patent/US-D729162-S1 ↩
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/israel-sets-in-motion-the-tel-aviv-metro-5965503/ ↩↩↩
https://www.geoengineer.org/news/tel-aviv-metro-enters-pre-qualification-stage-for-20-billion-project ↩↩
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