Very Military Audit

Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics)
Audit Date: 2026-05-01
Operating Brands: Very.co.uk; Littlewoods
Ownership (as of audit date): The Carlyle Group and International Media Investments (IMI), following the 2024–2025 ownership transition from the Barclay family

Preamble & Methodology Note

This audit is conducted on the basis of the research memo prepared for this engagement. All web search and URL-fetch tools returned null results during the research phase; accordingly, every factual claim is drawn from critical evaluation of a prior AI output against training knowledge current to 2026-04, as documented in the memo. Fabricated or materially inaccurate source URLs identified in the prior AI output have been excluded. Where the research memo concludes that a claim is unverifiable, unconfirmed, or rests on advocacy-sourced or misdirected citations, that assessment is preserved and reflected in this audit. No scores, tiers, BRS values, or scoring conclusions are assigned.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified that The Very Group holds, has held, or has sought any direct contract with the UK Ministry of Defence, the Israel Ministry of Defence (IMOD), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel Border Police, Israel Prison Service, or any other national armed force or security apparatus. ¹

TVG is a digital consumer retail and financial services business selling fashion, homeware, electronics, and toys under the Very and Littlewoods brands. This commercial profile is structurally inconsistent with direct military procurement. No TVG corporate press release, government procurement announcement, or trade press report documenting defence contracting activity with any Israeli or allied defence entity has been located. ^{1 2}

TVG does not appear in any known defence trade directory, SIBAT (Israeli defence export authority) listing, or NATO/UK defence procurement registry in available sources. The research memo notes that live verification against current SIBAT directories and the Israeli defence procurement registry was not possible during this research phase; absence of listing should be understood as absence of evidence in available sources rather than a confirmed negative.

The prior AI output, which formed the basis of the research memo, explicitly acknowledged there is no evidence of TVG holding such contracts. This is consistent with all available training-data knowledge of TVG’s commercial activities. ¹

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence identified. TVG manufactures no products. It is a digital retail intermediary and consumer credit provider. It does not design, produce, or distribute any dual-use goods as defined under UK, EU, or Wassenaar Arrangement export control schedules — including no ruggedised communications equipment, optical systems, unmanned vehicle components, explosive precursors, or materials with military application. ¹

The civilian-to-military product distinction is not applicable to TVG’s operations. TVG stocks consumer-grade electronics and household goods sourced from third-party suppliers. No militarised or tactical variants of any TVG-stocked product line have been identified. No end-user certificate, export licence application, or export control review relating to TVG sales to Israeli military, security, or defence-industrial end-users appears in any public record available to this audit.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified. TVG does not manufacture, supply, lease, or maintain heavy machinery, construction plant, armoured engineering vehicles, or infrastructure equipment of any type. No NGO report, UN Human Rights Council documentation, photographic evidence, or corporate filing places TVG-branded or TVG-sourced equipment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) or in any Israeli military construction or infrastructure project.

Source classes checked against training knowledge include: Who Profits corporate database, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Corporate Occupation reports, and UN Human Rights Council special procedure documentation. None identify TVG in connection with heavy machinery or construction activity in occupied or conflict-affected territories.

No construction or engineering contracts between TVG and any Israeli state entity, settlement construction project, or military infrastructure programme have been identified.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified that TVG has any direct supply chain relationship with Israeli defence prime contractors, including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI Systems (now part of Elbit Land).

TVG does not manufacture sub-systems, electronic components, structural materials, software, or raw materials of relevance to any Israeli defence prime’s production programmes. As a retail intermediary, TVG’s supply chain relationships are with consumer goods brands and logistics providers, not with defence-industrial manufacturers. ¹

Ownership-layer indirect exposure — Carlyle and ManTech:
The research memo identifies an indirect ownership-layer argument advanced by the prior AI: that The Carlyle Group, as TVG’s new majority owner, also owns ManTech International, a US government defence and intelligence services contractor acquired for $4.2 billion in October 2022. ^{5 6} ManTech’s confirmed contract portfolio includes ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) aircraft support programmes, including task orders attributed to maritime surveillance aircraft platforms. ¹¹ The prior AI also cited a 2016 contract claim for ManTech involvement in UAV facility construction in Israel, but the source URL for this claim used the domain war.gov, which does not correspond to any US government contract publication domain (the correct domain is defense.gov). That specific claim is therefore excluded as unverified and based on a fabricated source reference.

No verified document directly establishes a supply chain relationship between TVG and ManTech, or between TVG’s commercial operations and any Israeli defence prime contractor.

Ownership-layer indirect exposure — Carlyle and StandardAero:
Carlyle acquired StandardAero, an aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) provider, from Veritas Capital in 2019. ¹³ StandardAero holds documented contracts for military engine MRO work, including predictive maintenance for the USAF B-52/TF33 programme ⁹ and delivery of J85-5 engines for USAF T-38 training aircraft. ⁸ The Israeli Air Force operates F-35I “Adir” aircraft powered by Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, and StandardAero participates in the broader global F135 engine sustainment network. ⁷ The prior AI asserted a specific StandardAero FMS sub-contract for IAF engine support, but the source citations for this claim also relied on fabricated war.gov URLs and are excluded as unverified.

Critically, StandardAero completed an initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange (ticker: SAR) in September 2024, raising approximately $1.44 billion. Carlyle’s controlling ownership stake was substantially reduced through this offering. ¹³ The research memo therefore assesses the prior AI’s framing of StandardAero as a live Carlyle-controlled portfolio company generating revenue streams connected to TVG’s ownership as materially inaccurate as of 2025. The relationship between Carlyle, StandardAero, and any Israeli defence supply chain represents a historical and structurally attenuated connection at most — not an active supply chain integration for TVG.

No verified component supply, joint development, co-production, or sub-tier manufacturing agreement between TVG (or its parent entities in their TVG-holding capacity) and any Israeli defence prime has been identified.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified that TVG provides catering, transportation, fuel supply, waste management, IT infrastructure, or facilities management services to any military installation, forward operating base, or defence estate in Israel or any other jurisdiction.

TVG’s commercial logistics operations are a UK and Ireland-focused consumer parcel delivery network. Israel is not listed as a standard delivery destination in TVG’s published delivery policies. The research memo notes that the source the prior AI cited for TVG delivery policy (S26) was, in fact, the delivery page for The Berkeley hotel shop — an entirely different entity — and carries no evidentiary weight.

The research memo documents that third-party parcel forwarding services including DHL, Forward2Me, ParcelMonkey, and Qwintry offer routes from UK retail platforms, including Very.co.uk, to Israeli addresses. This reflects generic international parcel forwarding market access — a service offered by these third parties independently of any arrangement with TVG — and does not constitute a logistics contract, base services agreement, or military sustainment relationship. No shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling contract between TVG and Israeli defence logistics operators has been identified.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified. TVG has no role whatsoever in the manufacture, assembly, testing, integration, supply, or maintenance of munitions, explosive ordnance, armoured vehicles, combat aircraft, naval vessels, unmanned aerial systems, missile systems, or any other lethal platform or strategic defence asset. ¹

No munitions precursor materials, no propellant or energetic material supply, no weapons sub-system components, and no critical weapons-enabling technology have been linked to TVG in any source reviewed.

Ownership-layer argument — Carlyle, ManTech, and Israeli platforms:
The prior AI’s thesis regarding munitions and strategic platforms rests entirely on the indirect ownership chain through Carlyle. ManTech’s established portfolio includes ISR aircraft support and USAF technical services. ^{11 12} The prior AI cited a specific US-Israel APOT (Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching) blast-resistant hull collaboration involving ManTech, sourcing this to an army.mil article. ¹² The research memo assesses that while the army.mil article may describe a ManTech-Army collaboration, the specific claim of an explicit Israel co-development agreement within that article has not been independently confirmed. This claim should be treated as unverified.

The prior AI also cited the $8.5 billion Boeing F-15IA Foreign Military Sale to Israel announced in 2024, asserting a StandardAero sub-tier role. The FMS itself is a real and confirmed transaction. StandardAero’s potential participation in F-15 MRO work globally is consistent with its capabilities, but no verified document places StandardAero in a named sub-tier position on the specific IAF F-15IA programme. The source citations for this specific claim were fabricated URL references and are excluded.

No direct nexus between TVG’s commercial operations and any munitions or strategic platform programme has been established by any available evidence.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified that any government authority has granted, denied, suspended, or revoked export licences for TVG products to Israeli military, security, or paramilitary end-users.

TVG has not been subject to any enforcement action, investigation, or compliance proceeding under the UK Export Control Act 2002, the Export Control Order 2008, US Export Administration Regulations (EAR), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), or any equivalent EU or allied export control framework in connection with defence trade with Israel or any other sanctioned or restricted destination.

No judicial review, statutory appeal, or public law challenge related to TVG’s export or trade compliance has been identified. No customs or border enforcement action concerning TVG goods and Israeli end-users appears in publicly available records.

The research memo notes that Carlyle has historically engaged Covington & Burling for CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) advisory work. [The prior AI cited a Covington CFIUS capabilities brochure for the assertion that Carlyle used Covington to facilitate Elbit Systems’ US acquisitions.] The research memo correctly assesses this as an inferential leap unsupported by the cited document; a law firm’s general capabilities brochure does not establish that Carlyle retained Covington for Elbit-specific CFIUS matters. This claim is excluded.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO and academic reports:
No public evidence identified that TVG is named in any Who Profits corporate database entry, Amnesty International report, Human Rights Watch publication, AFSC Corporate Occupation report, or UN Human Rights Council special procedure document in connection with military or security supply chains relating to Israel or the OPT.

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaigns:
No public evidence identified that TVG has been the subject of any organised BDS campaign, institutional divestment decision, shareholder resolution, or exclusion screening specifically related to defence sector activities connected to Israel. TVG does not appear in training-data knowledge as a named or primary target of Palestinian solidarity or BDS campaigns. The research memo notes that live verification against the current Who Profits database and active BDS campaign lists was not possible; absence of listing reflects absence of evidence in available sources.

Open University divestment petition:
The prior AI cited an Open University divestment petition (S36) in the context of civil society scrutiny. The research memo correctly assesses this source as irrelevant: the petition concerns arms-industry divestment generically and does not name TVG. It has no evidentiary value for this audit.

Ownership-layer scrutiny — Carlyle and Elbit Systems:
The prior AI cited two pre-2020 advocacy publications — a Canadian Centre for Teaching Peace (COAT) web page and a 2018 Stop Explosive Investments “Hall of Shame” chapter — to assert that The Carlyle Group has held equity in Elbit Systems. ³ The research memo assesses both sources as advocacy-produced secondary documents, neither of which constitutes a primary financial disclosure. No Carlyle SEC 13-F filing, annual report, or verified investor disclosure confirming a meaningful Elbit equity holding appears in training data or in the sources available to this audit. This claim is flagged as unverified and should not be treated as a confirmed finding without primary source verification against Carlyle fund disclosures.

Ownership-layer scrutiny — Carlyle and Booz Allen Hamilton:
Carlyle’s 2008 acquisition of the government consulting division of Booz Allen Hamilton is historically confirmed. ¹⁰ Booz Allen was taken public via IPO in 2008 and has traded as an independent company (NYSE: BAH) since that time. Carlyle’s residual stake was reduced and exited many years before the TVG acquisition. This is a historical relationship with no current operational relevance to TVG.

Ownership-layer scrutiny — IMI and UAE-Israel normalisation:
The research memo confirms that International Media Investments (IMI), an Abu Dhabi-based vehicle associated with RedBird IMI, holds a stake in TVG per the company’s own 2025 press release. ² IMI is linked to UAE state capital. The Abraham Accords normalisation trajectory between the UAE and Israel — including confirmed investment fund announcements — is documented. ¹⁴ Commentary characterising the UAE as a vector for Israeli defence-economic relationships exists in the regional press. ¹⁵ However, no document reviewed for this audit establishes a direct military procurement, defence supply chain, or weapons-industry link between IMI’s investment in TVG and any Israeli defence operation. The characterisation of IMI’s TVG stake as constituting defence-sector complicity is an analytical and political argument rather than a finding of documented military supply. RedBird IMI’s attempted acquisition of The Daily Telegraph — a structurally separate transaction involving the Barclay family, not TVG — was blocked on UK national security grounds in 2024. ⁴ This finding relates to media ownership concerns and does not establish a defence supply chain nexus for TVG.

Vendor relationship claims — Riskified and BioCatch:
The prior AI asserted that TVG uses Riskified (an Israeli-founded e-commerce fraud prevention company) and BioCatch (an Israeli behavioural biometrics company) as technology vendors, framing these as supply chain links to Israeli tech-defence infrastructure. The research memo assesses both claims as unverified. The Riskified claim is sourced to tag-aggregation pages on a retail technology trade blog, which name neither a TVG contract nor any TVG-specific deployment. The BioCatch claim is explicitly described as unconfirmed by the prior AI itself. No TVG press release, technology partnership announcement, or procurement disclosure confirming a Riskified or BioCatch relationship appears in training data or available sources. Both claims are excluded as unverified.

Experian credit partnership:
TVG’s use of Experian for consumer credit bureau services in the UK is consistent with standard UK retail financial services practice. Experian’s Israel R&D centre is a confirmed fact. However, a standard commercial credit bureau relationship between a UK retailer and a global credit reference agency has no defence supply chain dimension. This relationship carries no evidentiary weight for V-MIL purposes.

End Notes