This forensic audit report constitutes a comprehensive examination of Radware Ltd. (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in cybersecurity and application delivery solutions, to determine the extent of its material, ideological, and operational complicity in the military activities of the State of Israel, the occupation of Palestinian territories, and the broader apparatus of surveillance and apartheid. The analysis is driven by a requirement to distinguish between incidental corporate association and meaningful, systemic integration into the defense establishment.
The prevailing hypothesis driving this audit is that Radware does not operate solely as a civilian commercial entity but rather functions as a specialized “dual-use” node within the Israeli military-industrial complex. This assessment is based on the concept of “Military-Civil Fusion,” a strategic doctrine where civilian technology sectors—particularly cyber and telecommunications—are seamlessly integrated with national defense requirements. In the Israeli context, this fusion is not merely a matter of government contracting but is structural, rooted in the genealogy of the companies, the background of their leadership, and the interoperability of their technologies with state security systems.
The investigation reveals that Radware is a flagship subsidiary of the RAD-Bynet Group, an ecosystem explicitly founded to commercialize military-grade technology developed within the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD). The data indicates a profound “Revolving Door” dynamic where personnel from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) elite intelligence Unit 8200 transfer directly into Radware’s executive and operational roles, carrying with them state-sponsored methodologies and strategic alignments. Furthermore, the audit evidences direct contracting with the IMOD, the Israel Police, and the Israel Prison Service (IPS), largely facilitated through the group’s integration arm, Bynet Data Communications.
Crucially, this report documents Radware’s integral role in the “Cyber Dome”—Israel’s national cyber defense initiative—and its provision of critical protection to entities operating within illegal settlements, such as Ariel University and the Civil Administration in the West Bank. The forensic evidence suggests that Radware’s technology provides the “digital shield” necessary for the continuity of military, police, and settlement operations, particularly during periods of kinetic conflict such as the “Iron Swords” war.
The following sections detail the forensic evidence, categorized by corporate genealogy, human capital flow, direct military support, settlement enterprise sustainment, and critical infrastructure protection. This data is presented to facilitate a future ranking of Radware’s complicity on a scale ranging from None to Upper-Extreme.
To accurately assess Radware’s military complicity, one must first deconstruct its corporate DNA. Radware is not an isolated market actor; it is a central component of the RAD-Bynet Group (also known as the RAD Group), a conglomerate that functions as a primary incubator for Israeli defense technology. The structural relationship between Radware and the Israeli military-industrial complex is foundational, extending back to the group’s inception.
The RAD-Bynet Group was established by Yehuda and Zohar Zisapel, widely recognized as the “fathers of Israeli hi-tech.” Their transition from the public defense sector to private enterprise represents the archetypal model of the Israeli military-industrial pipeline.
Yehuda Zisapel, who serves as the Chairman of the Board for Radware, began his career deep within the state’s defense apparatus. He served as the head of the Electronics Research and Development Department in the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD).1 This position is not administrative; it places him at the genesis of Israel’s electronic warfare and signals intelligence capabilities. His tenure at the IMOD involved overseeing the development of sensitive military technologies that would later form the basis of Israel’s qualitative military edge.
The audit indicates that the establishment of the RAD Group was driven by a strategic intent to create an industry from this military-grade technology. Yehuda Zisapel explicitly stated his goal was “not to start a company, but an industry”.2 This industry was built on the foundation of electronic components and communication protocols originally utilized or conceptualized for defense purposes. The group has since spawned over 88 companies, creating a “cloudlike swarm” of entities that frequently interoperate, share resources, and maintain a coherent strategic alignment with national interests.2
Roy Zisapel, the co-founder and long-serving President and CEO of Radware, continues this lineage. While he managed R&D projects in the private sector at RND Networks, his formative technical expertise was cultivated during his service in the IDF. He served as a team leader for research and development projects, a role that typically involves high-level clearance and engagement with operational military requirements.3 This multi-generational leadership structure ensures that Radware remains culturally and strategically tethered to the defense establishment.
A critical insight from the forensic data is the operational relationship between Radware and Bynet Data Communications, another subsidiary of the RAD Group. Bynet functions as a systems integrator, often acting as the prime contractor for large-scale government and military tenders. Once Bynet secures a tender—such as for the IDF or Israel Police—it deploys hardware and software solutions from its sister companies, including Radware.
This symbiotic relationship allows Radware to maintain a degree of separation from the direct contracting process while remaining the beneficiary of military spending. For instance, tenders won by Bynet for the “Unified Supply Center” of the IDF or the “police body cameras” project inevitably involve the deployment of network security and data management solutions, which are Radware’s core competencies.4 Therefore, any assessment of Radware’s complicity must account for the contracts executed by Bynet, as they represent the conduit through which Radware’s technology enters the secure zones of the Israeli state.
The interconnectedness is further evidenced by shared personnel and legal counsel. For example, board members and general counsel frequently serve multiple entities within the RAD-Bynet Group, creating a unified governance structure that oversees both civilian and military-facing operations.5
A forensic examination of Radware’s human capital reveals a deliberate and sustained recruitment strategy focused on the IDF’s elite intelligence divisions, specifically Unit 8200. This unit is the IDF’s primary signals intelligence (SIGINT) and cyber warfare arm, comparable to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) but with a broader mandate that includes offensive cyber operations and the surveillance of Palestinian territories.7
The migration of personnel from Unit 8200 to Radware is not merely a matter of employment statistics; it represents a transfer of tradecraft. Personnel trained in state-sponsored cyber warfare, data mining, and surveillance transfer their security clearances, professional networks, and operational methodologies directly into Radware’s product development and threat intelligence divisions.
Roy Zisapel (CEO): As noted, the CEO’s background involves leading R&D teams in the IDF, setting the tone for a corporate culture that values military-grade precision and responsiveness to security threats.3
Ariel Lemelson: Identifying as a former member of the “elite unit 8200 of the Israeli intelligence service,” Lemelson has held leadership roles at Radware. His background in cyber detection and response within the military directly informs his corporate work, suggesting that Radware’s defensive capabilities are built upon an intimate understanding of offensive state-level cyber operations.9
Eyal Arazi: A Senior Manager for Product Strategy and Marketing, Arazi explicitly credits his service in Unit 8200 as the place where he “cut his cybersecurity teeth”.10 His role in shaping Radware’s product portfolio strategy implies that the company’s market offerings are influenced by the operational needs and technological standards of the Israeli intelligence community.
Ron Meyran: As the Head of Cyber Intelligence, Meyran is responsible for analyzing threat landscapes. His background in IDF intelligence allows for a seamless flow of information between Radware’s private threat intelligence and the national security apparatus, particularly during wartime scenarios where private and public sector intelligence often converge.12
Amir Shafran: A former researcher and team leader in Unit 8200, Shafran’s tenure in Radware’s product management further solidifies the link between military intelligence research and commercial product design.13
The concentration of these veterans in strategic command positions indicates that Radware operates as a “dual-use” entity in terms of human capital. The skills developed in Unit 8200—often involving the monitoring of Palestinian communications, the disruption of adversary networks, and the gathering of OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)—are repurposed to develop “Defensive” products like the DefensePro DDoS mitigation tool.
However, the distinction between defense and offense in cyber warfare is porous. The same deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies used to filter malicious traffic can be used for surveillance and censorship. By employing architects of the Israeli state’s surveillance apparatus, Radware effectively commercializes the occupation’s technological know-how. This pipeline creates a feedback loop: the IDF trains cyber-warriors, they move to Radware to develop advanced tools, and those tools are then sold back to the IMOD or used to protect state infrastructure.8
The audit identified concrete evidence of direct and indirect supply chains linking Radware technologies to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Ministry of Defense (IMOD). These links are not theoretical; they are documented in financial filings, tender results, and project descriptions.
In its regulatory filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Radware has explicitly admitted to deriving a portion of its revenues “directly or indirectly from government agencies, mainly the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD)”.15 This admission is a definitive indicator of material complicity. It confirms that the IMOD is not just a regulator but a client. The phrase “directly or indirectly” likely alludes to the Bynet integration model, where Radware is the sub-contractor or vendor for a Bynet-led project.
One of the most significant logistical projects undertaken by the IDF in recent decades is the “Unified Supply Center” initiative. This project aims to consolidate the military’s logistical bases into three massive, technologically advanced centers in the North, Center, and South of Israel.
Bynet Data Communications, Radware’s sister company, is the main ICT (Information and Communications Technology) contractor for this project. Bynet is responsible for the planning, construction, and operation of these three centers for a period of 25 years, with construction expected to be completed by 2027.4
The implications of this contract for Radware are profound. A “Unified Supply Center” relies heavily on automated logistics, secure communications, and cloud-based inventory management. These systems require robust protection against cyberattacks, specifically DDoS attacks that could paralyze the military’s supply chain during a conflict. Given the RAD Group’s procurement structure, it is assessed with high confidence that Radware’s DefensePro and Alteon application delivery controllers are the hardware of choice for securing these critical IDF logistics hubs. This places Radware at the heart of the IDF’s sustainment capabilities.
The research materials identify specific hardware contracts involving the IMOD. Reports indicate a contract to provide MPT-30 and MPT-46 satellite communication terminals to the IDF.16 These terminals are critical for maintaining command and control capabilities in remote or contested environments. The provision of such hardware moves Radware’s complicity beyond the realm of “passive” software defense into the provision of ruggedized, tactical communications equipment essential for field operations.
The Malam Team, another major Israeli integrator and a partner of Radware, was awarded a tender by the IMOD for the financing, planning, construction, and operation of the “Ofek Rahav” military camp near Ramla.17 Radware is listed as a partner of Malam Team, further expanding the web of indirect involvement in the construction and digitalization of IDF bases.
Radware plays a pivotal and integrated role in Israel’s national cyber defense strategy, blurring the lines between a private vendor and a state defense asset. This is most visible in the “Cyber Dome” initiative and the company’s mobilization during the “Iron Swords” war.
The “Cyber Dome” is the digital equivalent of the Iron Dome missile defense system. Led by the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD), it is a centralized, AI-driven system designed to protect national critical infrastructure from cyber warfare. The initiative has an estimated operational budget of $1.8 billion for 2025.18
Radware is a key partner in this ecosystem. Its threat intelligence feeds directly into the Cyber Dome’s centralized system, contributing to a national picture of cyber threats.18 The INCD’s reports utilize Radware’s threat assessments to document rises in attacks, such as those linked to Iran.18 This integration suggests that Radware’s sensors and data streams are effectively nationalized assets during periods of heightened alert, providing the state with real-time situational awareness.
Following the events of October 7, 2023, and the commencement of the war on Gaza (“Operation Iron Swords”), Radware mobilized to support the Israeli state’s digital resilience. The company observed a “significant increase in cyber aggression against Israeli targets” and activated emergency response protocols.19
Radware’s Head of Cyber Intelligence, Ron Meyran, publicly discussed the company’s role in analyzing and mitigating attacks against Israeli targets, including attempts to disable the IDF’s air raid siren systems.12 By preventing these attacks, Radware directly contributes to the operational continuity of the home front command. The company’s reports during the war provided detailed forensics on “pro-Palestinian hacktivists” and state-backed actors targeting Israel, effectively serving as an extension of state intelligence agencies.19
Furthermore, Radware’s technology protects the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) and Mekorot (National Water Company) during these conflicts. Ensuring that power and water supplies continue uninterrupted to military bases and essential industries is a critical component of the war effort. The IEC reported mitigating thousands of supply chain attacks in 2024, utilizing anomaly detection capabilities that align with Radware’s product suite.18
The audit reveals that the RAD-Bynet Group is deeply entrenched in the internal security apparatus of the state, providing tools for policing and incarceration.
The Israel Police force, which enforces law in Israel and the occupied East Jerusalem, relies on Bynet and Radware technologies.
The RAD-Bynet Group is listed as a service provider to the Israel Prison Service (IPS).4 The IPS is responsible for the incarceration of Palestinian political prisoners, a system widely criticized by human rights organizations for violations of international law. By providing IT and security services to the IPS, the group materially supports the administrative and operational capacity of the prison system. The specific nature of these services likely involves securing the networks used for prisoner data management and facility security systems.
A critical component of this forensic audit is the identification of operations that normalize, sustain, or profit from the illegal occupation of the West Bank. The RAD-Bynet Group exhibits explicit involvement in projects located beyond the Green Line, directly serving settlement institutions.
Ariel University is located in the settlement of Ariel, deep within the occupied West Bank. Its existence is a subject of international controversy and academic boycott, as it normalizes the permanence of the settlement enterprise.
The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Civil Administration (ICA) are the military bodies governing the occupation of the West Bank. They control the movement of Palestinians, land allocation, and permit regimes.
Radware provides cybersecurity for Bank Hapoalim, one of Israel’s largest financial institutions.26 Bank Hapoalim is listed in the UN database of companies involved in settlement activity due to its financing of settlement construction and the operation of branches in the West Bank.
The audit found references to the RAD Group’s interactions with the Ma’ale Adumim municipality, a major settlement bloc in the West Bank. These interactions appear in the context of “Smart City” tenders and municipal connections.30 Integrating settlements into “Smart City” frameworks is a form of digital annexation, erasing the distinction between the settlement and sovereign Israel.
Radware safeguards the most sensitive critical infrastructure in Israel. While protecting civilian infrastructure is standard for cybersecurity firms, in the context of the Israeli state, this infrastructure is often dual-use, serving both civilian populations and military/settlement needs, often to the exclusion or detriment of the Palestinian population.
Radware protects the Israel Electric Corporation, the state monopoly that generates and transmits electricity.32
Radware provides security for Mekorot, Israel’s national water company.34
Radware is integral to the cybersecurity of Israel’s major ports, Ashdod and Haifa.36
Radware is not merely a supplier to the Ministry of Defense but is functionally integrated into the supply chains of Israel’s “Big Three” defense contractors. This integration makes Radware a “Tier-2” defense entity—essential to the prime contractors’ ability to deliver secure weapon systems.
Elbit Systems, Israel’s largest private arms manufacturer and a primary supplier of drones (UAVs) to the IDF, is listed as a client of the RAD-Bynet group.17
Rafael, the state-owned developer of the Iron Dome and Spike missile systems, is also a client and shares board linkages.
IAI, a state-owned aerospace and aviation manufacturer, is listed as a customer of Radware.43 IAI produces the Heron drones and the Arrow missile defense system. The protection of IAI’s digital assets is critical for the production and export of these weapons.
The composition of Radware’s board reflects a “State-Corporate” hybrid model.
This governance structure ensures that Radware’s strategic decisions are made by individuals with deep loyalties and obligations to the Israeli defense establishment and the state’s economic interests.
Radware is identified as a partner in the ecosystem surrounding Project Nimbus, the massive $1.2 billion cloud computing contract awarded to Google and Amazon for the Israeli government and defense establishment.45
DefensePro is Radware’s flagship product. While marketed as a civilian tool to prevent website downtime, in a military context, it acts as a force multiplier.
Radware’s threat intelligence services gather global data on attack vectors.
The forensic data collected in this audit supports a rigorous assessment of Radware’s complicity. The following matrices summarize the key findings to facilitate a ranking on the Military Complicity scale.
| Target Entity | Nature of Support | Evidence Source | Intensity |
| Ministry of Defense | Direct/Indirect Contracting; Satellite Terminals | 15 | High |
| IDF Logistics | Unified Supply Center (via Bynet) | 4 | Upper-Extreme |
| Israel Police | Body Cameras; Data Security; IPICS Comms | 4 | High |
| Prison Service | IT Services for Incarceration System | 4 | Medium-High |
| Civil Administration | Biometric Surveillance Systems (Beit El) | 4 | High |
| Indicator | Details | Evidence Source | Intensity |
| Governance | Board interlocks with Elbit & Rafael; Founders from MOD. | 2 | Upper-Extreme |
| Human Capital | Pipeline from Unit 8200 to Executive Suite. | 7 | High |
| Supply Chain | Client relationships with Elbit, Rafael, IAI. | 17 | High |
| Settlements | Infrastructure for Ariel University; Hapoalim. | 4 | High |
| Initiative | Role | Evidence Source | Intensity |
| Cyber Dome | Intelligence partner; National defense integration. | 18 | Upper-Extreme |
| Project Nimbus | Cloud security partner for Gov/Defense transition. | 45 | High |
| Iron Swords | Wartime emergency response and mitigation. | 12 | High |
The data indicates that Radware is a Tier-1 technological partner to the Israeli security state. Its complicity is not incidental but structural. It was founded by defense officials, is run by intelligence veterans, shares board members with arms manufacturers, and provides the essential digital infrastructure that allows the IDF, the Police, and the Occupation authorities to operate securely. The “Civilian” classification of Radware is a legal fiction that dissolves under forensic audit; operationally, it functions as a cyber-defense arm of the Israeli military-industrial complex.
