Table of Contents
Siemens AG is a German industrial conglomerate with a confirmed and multi-decade operational presence in Israel. Its BDS-1000 score of 421 (Tier C) reflects a pattern of substantive economic and infrastructural engagement with the Israeli state and its infrastructure, without any identified direct military supply, weapons systems provision, or digital technology contracts with Israeli defence or intelligence bodies.
The dominant driver of the score is V-ECON (5.11), grounded in Siemens’ wholly-owned Israeli subsidiary, its directly contracted rail and energy infrastructure projects — most notably the Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR) expansion and the Israel Railways national electrification programme — and a multi-year technology partnership with the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC). V-MIL (4.18) reflects the dual-use character of Siemens’ rail infrastructure supply and its routing through or connection to occupied East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement areas, even in the absence of any direct defence procurement instrument. V-POL (2.57) captures Siemens’ documented asymmetry between its public suspension of Russian business on stated principle in March 2022 and its continued silence and commercial reaffirmation during the 2023–2024 Gaza conflict, along with a formal cooperation agreement with the Israel Innovation Authority signed in September 2022. V-DIG (1.37) is the lowest-scoring domain: the sole confirmed Israeli-origin technology relationship is an OT security partnership held by Siemens Energy AG, a separately listed entity in which Siemens AG held less than 25% by 2023.
The four audits identify no direct contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defence Forces, or Israeli intelligence agencies; no supply of weapons systems, munitions, or military-channel components; and no participation in Project Nimbus or surveillance technology provision to Israeli state bodies. The principal civil society concern — and the most thoroughly evidenced — is Siemens Mobility’s role as a direct contractor for rail infrastructure that traverses or connects to occupied East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements, a role publicly maintained despite sustained BDS, NGO, and parliamentary scrutiny. The score of 421 is assessed as a conservative floor: full disclosure of Israel revenues and a confirmed characterisation of the 2019 Israeli Embassy honour could push the composite materially higher.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1847 | Siemens AG founded in Berlin by Werner von Siemens and Johann Georg Halske 1 |
| 1950s | Siemens establishes its first documented commercial presence in Israel 2 |
| Early 2000s | Siemens divests Siemens Defence Electronics; defence contracting ceases as a primary business segment 1 |
| Sep 2020 | Siemens Energy AG spun off and separately listed; Siemens AG’s stake falls below 25% by 2023 3 |
| 2019 | Next47 Tel Aviv venture hub reported as opened; Siemens receives recognition at Israeli Embassy in Berlin (nature unconfirmed) 2 |
| 2021 | Siemens Mobility wins contract for electrification of Israel Railways national network 4 |
| 2021 | Siemens Mobility wins Jerusalem Light Rail expansion contract (Green and Blue lines; reported value €180–220M) 56 |
| Jun 2021 | Siemens and Microsoft announce strategic Azure cloud partnership for industrial IoT 7 |
| 2021 | Siemens Energy and Claroty announce OT cybersecurity go-to-market partnership 8 |
| Mar 2022 | Siemens AG issues public statement suspending all new business in Russia following invasion of Ukraine 9 |
| 2022 | European Parliament written question submitted to Commission querying whether Siemens’ Israeli rail contracts constitute activity in occupied territory under EU law 10 |
| Sep 2022 | Siemens AG signs formal cooperation agreement with Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) covering joint R&D and industrial digitalisation 11 |
| 2022 | European NGO coalition publishes open letter calling on Siemens to withdraw from Jerusalem Light Rail contract 12 |
| 2022 | Palestinian trade unions issue parallel public call for Siemens to exit JLR project 13 |
| 2023 | Israel Electric Corporation partnership extended; Siemens confirms multi-year technology relationship 14 |
| Oct 2023 | Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023; Siemens issues no standalone public statement on the subsequent Gaza conflict 15 |
| 2024 | Employee protests at Siemens facilities documented; Siemens management responds with reference to Code of Conduct, announces no contract changes 15 |
Siemens AG is one of the world’s largest industrial technology companies, headquartered in Munich with a secondary registered office in Berlin, and listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (ticker: SIE). Founded in 1847, the company operates across industrial automation, rail mobility, smart infrastructure, building technologies, and — through its ~75%-owned subsidiary Siemens Healthineers — medical imaging and diagnostics. Siemens Energy AG, spun off in September 2020, operates in power generation and grid infrastructure; Siemens AG’s residual stake fell below 25% by 2023, making it a separate legal entity for attribution purposes.3
Siemens’ global revenues exceeded €76 billion in fiscal year 2023. The company does not disclose standalone Israel revenues; Israel falls within the broader Europe/CIS/Africa/Middle East reporting segment.1 Its largest institutional shareholders include BlackRock (~5–6%), Vanguard (~4%), and DWS (~3–4%). No Israeli-domiciled entity holds a controlling or significant disclosed stake. The German Federal Government holds no golden share or special voting right; Siemens is not a state-owned enterprise.1
In Israel, Siemens operates through Siemens Israel Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary based in Tel Aviv, serving as the local platform for project delivery across rail, energy, and building technology verticals.16 Siemens Mobility and Siemens Smart Infrastructure are operational divisions of Siemens AG executing direct contracts in Israel. Siemens Healthineers maintains a separate operational and commercial presence supplying medical imaging equipment to Israeli public hospitals.17 The Next47 corporate venture arm opened a Tel Aviv hub in 2019 focused on Israeli technology start-ups; its current operational status is unknown as of mid-2026.2
Siemens divested its dedicated defence electronics business in the early 2000s and is not listed in SIPRI’s annual ranking of the top 100 arms-producing companies.18 Its current brand positioning centres on industrial digitalisation, sustainable infrastructure, and smart mobility — framing consistent with the civilian character of its documented Israeli operations.
The V-MIL domain assessment is grounded in one primary area of documented engagement and a comprehensive series of confirmed absences. The central finding is that Siemens Mobility operates as a direct contractor for civilian rail infrastructure with material dual-use characteristics and documented settlement connectivity — but without any identified military-channel procurement instrument, direct defence contract, or weapons supply relationship.
Israel Railways electrification (2021): Siemens Mobility confirmed in 2021 that it had won a contract to electrify Israel’s national railway network, supplying overhead line equipment and traction power supply systems to Israel Railways (Rakevet Israel), a state-owned enterprise under the Israeli Ministry of Transport.4 This is a direct commercial contract between Siemens Mobility and a state-owned civilian operator. The Palestinian BDS National Committee, Who Profits Research Center, and Palestine Solidarity Campaign UK have characterised this contract as materially contributing to settlement infrastructure on the grounds that the Israel Railways network connects West Bank settlements to Israeli cities and routes through or adjacent to occupied territory.1920
Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR) expansion (2021): Siemens Mobility holds a direct contract with the CityPass/NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit System consortium for the JLR expansion (Green and Blue lines), supplying Mireo tram-train rolling stock and associated rail systems infrastructure.56 The JLR Red Line traverses East Jerusalem, territory classified as occupied under international law per UN Security Council Resolution 478. Who Profits, an open letter from a European NGO coalition, and Palestinian trade union statements all characterise this contract as delivering infrastructure into occupied territory.191213 Siemens has not publicly disputed the geographic routing but has not engaged substantively with the occupation-law characterisation. As of early 2025, Siemens Mobility has not cancelled or withdrawn from the contract in response to civil society pressure.4
Dual-use analysis: Siemens’ core product categories in Israel — rail electrification systems, traction power supply, signalling, and rolling stock — carry recognised dual-use potential under international export control classifications. National rail networks serve military logistics functions in armed-conflict contexts. The relevant product classes are also listed under EU dual-use control classifications (Regulation 2021/821) and comparable national regimes.21 Critically, however, none of these products has been marketed or configured as mil-spec for IDF use; no military-specified product variant has been identified; and no military end-user certificate or export licence decision specifically governing Siemens products for Israeli security end-users has appeared in public records.22
Direct vs. indirect supply characterisation: The 2021 rail electrification and JLR expansion contracts represent direct Siemens Mobility-to-state-enterprise supply relationships, not secondary-market or dealer transactions.45 This directness is relevant to proximity scoring and to the civil society concerns about the network’s settlement connectivity. Siemens Israel Ltd, as the wholly-owned subsidiary, executes on-ground delivery, further cementing corporate proximity.
Confirmed absences across the military spectrum: Comprehensive source review — spanning SIPRI arms transfers and industry databases, the Who Profits database, AFSC Investigate, UN OHCHR settlement database, Elbit Systems and IAI public disclosures, German parliamentary records, and Siemens’ own press releases — finds no public evidence of: (a) direct contracts with IMOD, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Border Police; (b) supply of weapons, munitions, or military-specified components; (c) integration into the supply chains of Israeli defence primes (Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMI); (d) logistical sustainment services to IDF installations; or (e) export licence violations or regulatory sanctions related to defence-relevant trade with Israeli entities.181922
Civil society documentation: Who Profits profiles both Siemens AG and Siemens Israel in the context of the Israeli railway network.19 The AFSC Investigate database lists Siemens primarily in connection with the 2021 railway electrification contract.23 War on Want references Siemens in the context of infrastructure in or connected to occupied territory.24 The BDS campaign’s publicly stated grounds for targeting Siemens are the railway contracts’ settlement connectivity and the economic legitimisation argument — not weapons supply.1920 The European Parliament submitted a formal written question to the Commission in 2022 querying whether the Siemens Mobility Israeli rail contract constitutes activity in occupied territory under EU law.10
UN OHCHR Settlement Database: Siemens AG does not appear in the UN OHCHR database of businesses engaged in specific activities relating to Israeli settlements, as published in 2020 and its subsequent updates.25 This database covers a defined set of activity categories; the JLR contracts may fall outside the listing criteria even where the infrastructure routes through occupied territory, representing a formal-definition gap rather than a substantive absence finding.
The strongest counter-argument to the V-MIL impact score is that Siemens’ Israeli contracts are civilian infrastructure supply relationships with a state-owned transport operator, structurally indistinguishable from comparable rail contracts in other jurisdictions. The Israeli partner — Israel Railways, CityPass/NTA — is a civilian entity under the Ministry of Transport, not a military or security body. The products supplied (overhead line equipment, traction power, tram-train rolling stock) are standard civilian rail products and do not differ technically from those Siemens supplies in Germany, France, or Spain.4 There is no confirmed military end-use certificate, no IMOD procurement instrument, and no technical modification for military application.
The JLR rolling stock question introduces material evidentiary uncertainty. The primary documented rolling stock suppliers for the JLR Red Line are Alstom and CAF; Siemens’ role is in signalling and electrification systems rather than primary rolling stock for the Red Line specifically.19 The precise Siemens scope within the JLR contract has not been conclusively resolved in English-language open sources, and attribution of broader JLR involvement to Siemens rather than to other European suppliers carries some risk of error. This ambiguity affects the placement of the impact score within the 4.0–5.0 band but does not change the band assignment.
A second structural limit is the inaccessibility of BAFA export licence data at the company level. Germany’s Federal Office of Economics and Export Control publishes aggregate statistics but not company-level decisions.22 It is therefore impossible to confirm or exclude from public sources alone whether Siemens has applied for, received, or been denied any export licence for dual-use goods destined for Israeli security end-users. The absence of public BAFA decisions naming Siemens is not equivalent to a confirmed absence of export licence activity. This gap is unresolvable from open sources.
Third, the claim that Israel Railways’ network “materially serves settlements” requires verification at a route-level rather than network-level granularity. Civil society organisations make this argument at the network level; official Israeli project documentation does not publicly disaggregate settlement-serving route segments from core civilian urban connections. Whether the specific Siemens-supplied electrification scope covers settlement-serving route sections specifically has not been officially confirmed or denied.
| Entity | Type | Role | Evidence status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Siemens Mobility GmbH | Division of Siemens AG | Direct contractor, Israel Railways electrification and JLR expansion | Confirmed 45 |
| Siemens Israel Ltd | Wholly-owned subsidiary | On-ground delivery, all Israeli divisions | Confirmed 16 |
| Israel Railways (Rakevet Israel) | Israeli state-owned enterprise | Electrification contract counterparty | Confirmed 4 |
| CityPass / NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit System | Israeli government-owned rail consortium | JLR expansion contract counterparty | Confirmed 56 |
| Who Profits Research Center | Israeli NGO | Documents Siemens AG and Siemens Israel in rail context | Confirmed 19 |
| AFSC Investigate | US NGO database | Lists Siemens; primary concern is 2021 electrification contract | Confirmed 23 |
| BDS National Committee (PACBI) | Palestinian civil society | Active targeted campaign citing JLR settlement connectivity | Confirmed 20 |
| Palestine Solidarity Campaign UK | UK NGO | Sustained campaign, 2021–2024, citing electrification and JLR | Confirmed 20 |
| War on Want | UK NGO | References Siemens in infrastructure/occupation context | Confirmed 24 |
| UN OHCHR | UN body | Settlement database: Siemens not listed | Confirmed 25 |
| SIPRI | Research institute | Arms industry/transfers databases: Siemens not listed as arms producer | Confirmed 18 |
| European Parliament (EP) | Legislative body | Written question to Commission on JLR/occupied territory, 2022 | Confirmed 10 |
| BAFA (German Federal Export Office) | Regulatory body | No company-level Siemens/Israel decision in public records | No public evidence 22 |
| Elbit Systems / IAI / Rafael / IMI | Israeli defence primes | No confirmed Siemens supply relationship identified | No public evidence 18 |
| Alstom / CAF | European rolling stock suppliers | Primary documented rolling stock suppliers for JLR Red Line | Partially confirmed; Siemens scope uncertain 19 |
The V-DIG domain presents the lowest confirmed engagement of the four domains. The audit’s primary finding is a single confirmed Israeli-origin technology partnership — held not by Siemens AG proper, but by Siemens Energy AG, a separately listed entity — alongside a small Israeli engineering office operated by Siemens Digital Industries Software and portfolio-level engagement with Israeli technology start-ups through Next47.
Siemens Energy–Claroty OT security partnership (2021): Siemens Energy and Claroty, an Israeli-founded OT cybersecurity company with Israeli R&D operations, announced a formal go-to-market and technology integration partnership in 2021.8 The arrangement integrates Claroty’s OT network monitoring and asset visibility platform with Siemens Energy’s industrial infrastructure offerings in a co-sell and technical integration structure. This is the most clearly evidenced Israeli-origin vendor relationship in Siemens’ extended technology ecosystem identified in the audit. The partnership was confirmed as ongoing as of 2023. However, this relationship is held by Siemens Energy AG — a separately listed public entity since 2020, in which Siemens AG’s stake fell below 25% by 2023 — introducing structural distance from Siemens AG proper. Whether Siemens AG’s other divisions hold separate Claroty relationships is not publicly documented.
Siemens Digital Industries Software — Israeli engineering presence: Siemens Digital Industries Software maintains engineering and software development staff in Israel, associated with EDA (Electronic Design Automation) toolchain development.26 This presence is documented through LinkedIn corporate records and Israeli job postings for Tel Aviv area locations. Trade sources describe the scale as a small-to-mid-size engineering office; specific headcount has not been confirmed in any primary corporate filing. This is a directly attributable Siemens AG divisional presence in Israel in a technology development (rather than purely commercial) capacity.
Next47 — Israeli startup ecosystem engagement: Next47, Siemens’ corporate venture and growth investment platform, has engaged with Israeli technology start-ups through its global portfolio activities, including through a Tel Aviv hub reported as opened in 2019.27 Next47 does not maintain a formally named Israeli office in any reviewed public corporate disclosure. Specific named Israeli portfolio companies are not confirmed with sufficient precision in available public records to list individually without risk of error. The relationship is confirmed at the level of engagement with the Israeli start-up ecosystem; individual portfolio company identification requires primary source verification.
Microsoft Azure partnership (2021): Siemens and Microsoft announced a strategic partnership in June 2021 centred on the Azure cloud platform, targeting industrial IoT, digital twin, and manufacturing execution use cases through MindSphere and Xcelerator.7 This partnership pertains to Microsoft’s global Azure infrastructure; no Israeli data residency or Israeli Azure region specifics have been documented in connection with this arrangement. No Siemens participation in Project Nimbus (the Israeli government’s national cloud programme, awarded to AWS and Google) has been identified.
Israeli-origin vendor assessment — other vendors: The audit assessed CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, NICE, Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, and Verint as probable or possible deployments within Siemens’ enterprise IT environment, consistent with Siemens’ scale and documented security strategy. None of these relationships has been confirmed through a primary source. The Customer Cap applies: Siemens is not providing digital technology to the Israeli state or military in any confirmed capacity, nor does it hold equity in Claroty or other Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendors. The impact score of 3.50 correctly reflects the band ceiling imposed by the Customer Cap for a procurement-oriented (rather than provision-oriented) relationship.
Confirmed absences: No verified contracts with Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Shin Bet, or Mossad for IT systems, communications infrastructure, or analytics have been identified.19 No participation in Project Nimbus. No use of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric, or predictive surveillance tools. No Siemens provision of AI/ML systems, autonomous decision-support, or offensive cyber capabilities to Israeli state or security bodies.26 Sources checked include Who Profits, Forensic Architecture, Amnesty Tech, and Access Now databases.
Civil society scrutiny — digital dimension: The Who Profits profile of Siemens does not separately document digital technology supply chains to Israeli state or military bodies; its focus is the physical rail and infrastructure contracts.19 No BDS campaign specifically targeting Siemens’ digital technology relationships has been identified. The civil society evidentiary record on V-DIG is therefore thin — an absence that cuts both ways: it reduces the upward scoring pressure but also means civil society documentation cannot be used to confirm or deny vendor relationships that may exist in non-public procurement records.
The most significant counter-argument is that enterprise software and cybersecurity vendor relationships — PAM, SIEM, endpoint security, network monitoring — are routinely non-disclosed in annual reports and investor presentations. The probability that Siemens deploys additional Israeli-origin enterprise software beyond the confirmed Claroty (Siemens Energy) relationship is assessed as high by the audit, given Siemens’ enterprise scale and the market dominance of CyberArk and Palo Alto Networks in the industrial and DACH enterprise segments. The V-DIG score may therefore understate actual Israeli-origin vendor dependency if full procurement records were available. The current score is the correct floor given confirmed evidence.
A second structural limit is the Siemens Energy attribution issue. The Claroty partnership is with a separately listed entity in which Siemens AG held a minority stake by 2023. For group-level analysis this introduces ambiguity: the OT cybersecurity risk surface of Siemens Energy’s industrial operations is relevant to understanding Siemens AG’s extended ecosystem, but attributing it directly to Siemens AG overstates the corporate-level relationship. The scoring correctly places this at indirect-but-meaningful proximity (P=5.50).
The Next47 Israeli start-up engagement is confirmed at the level of structural engagement but unquantified at the investment level. Individual portfolio companies cannot be named with confidence from available public records. This gap is material: if Next47 holds significant Israeli-origin investments in defence-adjacent AI or cybersecurity companies, the V-DIG impact score could be revised upward. The audit correctly flags this as an open question rather than scoring it.
The Technion–Siemens academic collaboration referenced in trade and institutional sources has not been confirmed as a formal IP co-development or technology licensing arrangement. Informal research collaboration and student exchanges exist at sector level but do not constitute documented IP relationships justifying a higher score.
| Entity | Type | Role | Evidence status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Siemens Energy AG | Separately listed entity (<25% Siemens AG stake by 2023) | Holds confirmed Claroty OT security partnership | Confirmed 8 |
| Claroty | Israeli-founded OT cybersecurity company | Technology integration and co-sell partner (Siemens Energy) | Confirmed 8 |
| Siemens Digital Industries Software | Division of Siemens AG | Small-to-mid-size engineering office (EDA toolchain), Tel Aviv area | Confirmed — scale unquantified 26 |
| Next47 | Siemens AG venture arm | Tel Aviv hub (2019); Israeli start-up portfolio engagement | Confirmed — individual investments unconfirmed 27 |
| Microsoft | US technology company | Azure cloud strategic partnership (global; no Israel-specific scope confirmed) | Confirmed (partnership); Israel scope unconfirmed 7 |
| CyberArk | Israeli-founded PAM company | Assessed as probable but not primary-source confirmed | Unconfirmed 28 |
| Palo Alto Networks | US company; Israeli co-founders | Assessed as possible; no primary-source contract identified | Unconfirmed |
| NICE Ltd | Israeli enterprise software company | No verified Siemens relationship identified | No public evidence |
| Project Nimbus (AWS/Google) | Israeli sovereign cloud programme | No Siemens participation identified | No public evidence |
| Who Profits Research Center | Israeli NGO | Profiles Siemens; no digital supply chain documentation to Israeli state | Confirmed absence 19 |
| Solido Design Automation | EDA company acquired 2021 | Canada-headquartered; not Israeli-origin | Confirmed (non-Israeli) 29 |
| Brightly Software | US asset management software, acquired 2022 | US-headquartered; not Israeli-origin | Confirmed (non-Israeli) 30 |
The V-ECON domain is the highest-scoring of the four and reflects Siemens AG’s most robustly evidenced area of engagement with Israel: a wholly-owned subsidiary, direct divisional contracts with Israeli state-owned enterprises, and a multi-year operational physical footprint across rail, energy, and healthcare verticals.
Siemens Israel Ltd — wholly-owned subsidiary: Siemens operates Siemens Israel Ltd as a wholly-owned subsidiary registered in Israel with offices in Tel Aviv.16 This constitutes a confirmed direct equity investment in the Israeli market — an operational trading subsidiary, not a passive portfolio holding. The parent actively manages the asset; it is not a legacy holding awaiting divestment. Siemens Israel serves as the local platform for sales, service, and project delivery across divisions. This direct equity ownership structure drives the high Proximity score (P=8.00) and grounds the Operational Presence impact band (I=5.50).
Jerusalem Light Rail expansion contract — direct divisional contract: Siemens Mobility (a division of Siemens AG, not a subsidiary) holds a direct contract with CityPass/NTA for the JLR expansion, supplying Mireo tram-train rolling stock and rail systems infrastructure.56 The reported contract value of €180–220 million for Siemens Mobility’s scope — sourced from trade media and unconfirmed by Siemens — represents the largest single documented project-level revenue event in Siemens’ Israeli portfolio.56 NTA is a government-owned rail authority; CityPass is the operating consortium. The JLR Red Line traverses East Jerusalem, and the Green Line extension routes toward West Bank settlement periphery areas.19 Who Profits, the European NGO coalition open letter, and Palestinian trade unions characterise this as infrastructure materially contributing to the Israeli settlement enterprise.1213
Israel Railways national electrification — direct divisional contract: Siemens Mobility’s 2021 contract for the electrification of Israel Railways’ national network is a direct commercial contract with a state-owned enterprise.4 The project scope encompasses overhead line equipment and traction power supply for the national network. Civil society characterises the national network as serving settlements through its wider route connectivity.1920
Israel Electric Corporation partnership — multi-year government-entity relationship: Siemens holds a technology partnership with Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), Israel’s dominant state-owned electricity utility, covering grid modernisation, power infrastructure, and energy management systems.14 This partnership was extended in 2023 and represents one of Siemens’ most substantive and long-standing Israeli government-entity relationships, providing recurring rather than one-off economic contribution to the Israeli electricity sector.14
Siemens Healthineers — hospital supply: Siemens Healthineers (~75% owned by Siemens AG) supplies medical imaging equipment to Israeli public hospitals under procurement contracts with Israel’s Ministry of Health system.17 Specific contract values and procurement counterparties are not publicly disaggregated from Healthineers’ global reporting. The operational presence is confirmed through corporate distributor-locator materials.
Siemens Smart Infrastructure — building technologies: Siemens Smart Infrastructure has documented building-technology and energy-management project engagement in Israel, confirmed via a 2022 press release.31
Profit repatriation structure: Siemens Israel Ltd, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens AG, repatriates dividends and intercompany profits to Munich under standard multinational treasury arrangements. The ownership direction is German parent to Israeli subsidiary; no Israeli-domiciled entity receives profit flows from Siemens AG’s global operations. No transfer-pricing concern or Israel-to-Germany profit flow anomaly has been identified in public reporting or regulatory enforcement records.
Structural features relevant to magnitude calibration: Israel is not identified as a named strategic growth market in Siemens AG’s Annual Reports 2023 or 2024.1 Israel falls within the broader Europe/CIS/Africa/Middle East regional segment; no standalone Israel revenue figure is disclosed. Multiple substantive multi-year contracts are documented, indicating a material but non-dominant contribution to Siemens’ global portfolio. Departure from the Israeli market would cause friction for Israeli partners (particularly in rail and grid infrastructure) without threatening Siemens AG’s overall financial position — consistent with the Moderate (Lower End) magnitude assignment.
Scope boundary — Siemens Energy AG: Siemens Energy AG (separately listed, <25% Siemens AG stake by 2023) maintains Israel-facing grid infrastructure operations documented in its own reporting.3 These activities are legally attributable to a separate listed entity and are not directly attributable to Siemens AG, though they remain relevant to a group-level analysis.
Who Profits pre-2020 allegation — prison CCTV: Who Profits alleged that Siemens supplied CCTV and security infrastructure to Israeli prison facilities prior to 2020.19 This allegation dates to 2018; no post-2020 confirmation or rebuttal has been identified. It is treated as an open question rather than a confirmed finding for scoring purposes.
The principal counter-argument on economic impact is that Siemens’ Israeli operations are structurally analogous to its operations in any other mid-sized export market: a wholly-owned sales and service subsidiary, divisional contracts with state-owned enterprises, and product supply to healthcare institutions. The German parent retains all material commercial risk and profit; Israel is an export market, not a core operational hub. This framing would support a lower impact score than the assigned 5.50 (Operational Presence), though the multi-year IEC partnership, the directly contracted JLR and Israel Railways projects, and the combined Siemens/Healthineers physical footprint taken together justify Operational Presence over a mere “sales office” characterisation.
The most significant evidence gap in V-ECON is the absence of standalone Israel revenue disclosure. The JLR contract value (€180–220M) is trade-press sourced and unconfirmed by Siemens.56 Total Israeli revenue — including IEC, Healthineers, Smart Infrastructure, and Digital Industries — is structurally invisible in public filings. This means the magnitude score (M=6.50) is a calibrated estimate from confirmed contract anchors rather than a verified revenue figure. If full revenue data were disclosed, the magnitude score could be revised upward, potentially pushing the composite BRS above the current 421.
The pre-2020 prison CCTV allegation by Who Profits, if confirmed in a post-2020 context, would strengthen the impact score and potentially move it toward the 6.0–7.0 band (direct services to detention/security infrastructure). Its current unconfirmed status prevents scoring on this basis.
The Siemens Energy attribution issue also creates a boundary question: to what extent should a separately listed, minority-owned entity’s Israeli operations contribute to the Siemens AG V-ECON assessment? The scoring conservatively treats Siemens Energy as out of direct attribution scope while noting its relevance to group-level analysis.
| Entity | Type | Role | Evidence status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Siemens Israel Ltd | Wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens AG | Local platform for all Israeli divisional operations | Confirmed 16 |
| Siemens Mobility (division) | Division of Siemens AG | Direct contractor, JLR expansion and Israel Railways electrification | Confirmed 456 |
| Siemens Smart Infrastructure (division) | Division of Siemens AG | Building technology and energy management, Israel | Confirmed 31 |
| Siemens Digital Industries (division) | Division of Siemens AG | Industrial automation partnerships, Israel | Confirmed 19 |
| Siemens Healthineers AG | ~75% owned by Siemens AG; separately listed | Medical imaging supply to Israeli public hospitals | Confirmed 17 |
| Siemens Energy AG | <25% Siemens AG stake by 2023; separately listed | Grid infrastructure, Israel (separate legal entity) | Confirmed (separate entity) 3 |
| Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) | Israeli state-owned electricity utility | Multi-year grid modernisation partnership, extended 2023 | Confirmed 14 |
| CityPass / NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit System | Israeli government-owned rail consortium | JLR expansion contract counterparty | Confirmed 56 |
| Israel Railways (Rakevet Israel) | Israeli state-owned enterprise | National electrification contract counterparty | Confirmed 4 |
| Next47 | Siemens AG venture arm | Tel Aviv hub (2019); Israeli start-up engagement | Confirmed — current status unknown 27 |
| Israeli Ministry of Health system | Israeli government body | Healthineers hospital equipment procurement counterparty | Confirmed — values undisclosed 17 |
| BlackRock / Vanguard / DWS | Institutional shareholders | Major shareholders of Siemens AG; no Israeli-state beneficial ownership | Confirmed 1 |
| Who Profits Research Center | Israeli NGO | Primary civil society documentation of Israeli economic footprint | Confirmed 19 |
The V-POL domain captures Siemens’ political posture toward Israeli state partnerships, its response to civil society pressure, its communications asymmetries, and its formal non-commercial government relationships. The domain score of 2.57 reflects a pattern of business-as-usual normalisation with one documented instance of active engagement at government-tier level — but without the lobbying, financial contributions to advocacy organisations, or explicit public diplomacy activity that would push the score into higher bands.
Russia-Ukraine vs. Gaza communications asymmetry: The most analytically significant finding in V-POL is the documented asymmetry between Siemens’ communications postures on two geopolitically comparable situations. In March 2022, Siemens AG issued an explicit public statement announcing the suspension of all new business in Russia, describing the decision as a matter of principle and publishing it prominently on the Siemens press portal.932 Following the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza, Siemens issued no publicly documented standalone corporate statement addressing the conflict, Israeli military operations, Palestinian civilian casualties, or the company’s operations in contested territories.15 CEO Roland Busch did not publish a dedicated op-ed or documented public communication on the Gaza conflict, despite a documented pattern of making public statements on the role of business in geopolitics during the Russia-Ukraine period.15 This asymmetry is not merely a communications choice: it coincides with Siemens’ commercial continuation of and active engagement with its Israeli contracts during the same period.
Active reaffirmation of JLR commitment (2021): In 2021, following the BDS National Committee’s public Palestinian civil society letter demanding Siemens withdraw from the Jerusalem Light Rail project, Electronic Intifada documented Siemens’ response as a reaffirmation of its commitment to the JLR project and to its Israeli business.33 This constitutes an active governance decision to continue rather than mere commercial inertia, and represents the clearest documented instance of Siemens explicitly choosing to maintain an occupation-linked contract in the face of a specific withdrawal demand.
Israel Innovation Authority cooperation agreement (September 2022): Siemens AG signed a formal cooperation agreement with the Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) — an Israeli government body — in September 2022, covering joint R&D and industrial digitalisation initiatives.11 This agreement represents a formal, non-commercial, government-tier partnership relationship with the Israeli state: Siemens is not merely supplying products to a state-owned enterprise but is co-committing to collaborative R&D with an Israeli government body. This is the most significant political-tier relationship identified in the V-POL audit and grounds the inclusion of an “institutional legitimation” element in the impact assessment, even at a single-instance scale.
Jerusalem Light Rail as active reference project: Siemens maintains the Jerusalem Light Rail as an active reference project on its corporate Mobility portal, publicly associating its brand with the system without any qualification regarding its routing through East Jerusalem or the internationally contested character of its territorial footprint.34 Annual reports for 2022 and 2023 frame Israel within the standard Europe/CIS/Africa/Middle East regional segment without territorial qualification.1 This active brand association — not passive omission — constitutes a form of normalisation of occupation-linked infrastructure.
2019 Israeli Embassy recognition: In 2019, Siemens was reported to have received recognition at the Israeli Embassy in Berlin.15 The precise nature of this honour is described only in general terms in available sources; whether it constitutes a formal state honour or a ceremonial acknowledgment cannot be confirmed from available records. This finding is treated conservatively in scoring and does not independently justify scoring at the Institutional Legitimation band.
Employee protests (2024) — no policy change: Public reports in 2024 documented employee protests and internal petitions at Siemens AG entities relating to the Gaza conflict, with workers calling for the company to publicly condemn Israeli military actions and/or exit contracts enabling Israeli state infrastructure.15 Siemens management acknowledged receipt of employee concerns but did not announce contract changes or a shift in public stance, and the company’s response emphasised Code of Conduct compliance without directly addressing the specific contractual questions raised.15 Siemens’ Code of Conduct prohibits employee public political statements that could be attributed to the company.35
Long-standing institutional relationship: Siemens AG’s documented commercial presence in Israel dates to the 1950s — one of the oldest continuous corporate-state partnership relationships in Siemens’ international portfolio.2 This multi-decade relationship is not scored as a distinct political act but provides context for the company’s institutional disposition toward Israeli state partnerships.
Confirmed political-domain absences: No evidence of Siemens AG making material corporate donations to Israeli settlement organisations, FIDF, or JNF has been identified across FIDF donor records, JNF annual reports, US IRS 990 filings, and NGO watchdog reports. No US lobbying line items explicitly addressing Israel-Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, or regional trade legislation have been identified in OpenSecrets summaries of Siemens Corporation’s Washington lobbying record, though a full line-item review of Senate LDA filings would be required to confirm the absence with certainty.3637 No evidence of formal “Brand Israel” public diplomacy sponsorship has been identified.
The most forceful counter-argument to the asymmetry finding is that the Russia exit and the continued Israeli operations are not structurally comparable. The Russia suspension responded to an internationally coordinated sanctions and divestment environment, significant reputational pressure from European governments, and the specific context of a war of aggression against a European state. The Israeli situation involves a contested legal characterisation of occupied territory and a decades-long commercial relationship without equivalent intergovernmental sanctions pressure on German companies. On this reading, Siemens’ silence on Gaza is a commercial and legal risk-management choice rather than a political act of favouritism, and its legal obligations under German and EU law do not require public condemnation of a commercial partner’s government.
A second counter-argument is that the IIA cooperation agreement, while a government-tier relationship, is a standard form of industrial policy engagement common among major technology companies in Israel. Numerous European industrial conglomerates maintain similar arrangements with the IIA; its existence does not uniquely distinguish Siemens’ political posture.
Material evidence gaps include: the incomplete Senate LDA line-item review for Siemens Corporation’s US lobbying; the unreviewed Siemens Stiftung grant-making record (which may include or exclude Israel-linked grants); and the unconfirmed character of the 2019 Israeli Embassy recognition. The I=4.00 score could be revised upward to 4.5–5.0 if the Embassy honour is confirmed as a formal state award, if shareholder resolution blocking evidence emerges, or if US lobbying records reveal Israel-adjacent line items.
The political scoring is also constrained by the inherent difficulty of distinguishing active political support from commercial risk management in the absence of explicit CEO-level statements. Siemens’ silence is documented and analytically significant, but the scoring correctly stops short of inferring intent from silence alone.
| Entity | Type | Role | Evidence status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roland Busch | CEO, Siemens AG (2021–present) | No documented statements on Gaza; Russia suspension documented | Confirmed (absence) 15 |
| Joe Kaeser | Former CEO, Siemens AG (2013–2021) | No documented personal donations to Israeli advocacy organisations | Confirmed (absence) |
| Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) | Israeli government body | Formal cooperation agreement with Siemens AG, September 2022 | Confirmed 11 |
| BDS National Committee (PACBI) | Palestinian civil society | Active targeted campaign; public letter demanding JLR withdrawal | Confirmed 38 |
| Electronic Intifada | Independent media | Documents Siemens’ 2021 reaffirmation of JLR commitment | Confirmed 33 |
| Siemens Corporation (US) | US subsidiary | Registered Washington lobbying operation; no Israel/anti-BDS line items confirmed | Confirmed (lobbying); Israel items unconfirmed 36 |
| Siemens Stiftung | Siemens Foundation | Philanthropic arm; Israeli grant-making not fully reviewed | Open question |
| Business & Human Rights Resource Centre | NGO database | Maintains Siemens company profile including civil society correspondence | Confirmed 39 |
| FIDF / JNF | Israeli military-welfare / land bodies | No Siemens donations identified | No public evidence |
| Press portal (siemens.com) | Siemens corporate communications | Russia suspension published prominently; no Gaza equivalent identified | Confirmed (asymmetry) 9 |
Across all four domains, the most structurally important caveat is that Siemens’ Israeli activities are civilian in character and legal under applicable German and EU law. No domain audit has identified a violation of export control law, a breach of sanctions, or a judicial finding of unlawful conduct. The BDS-1000 framework assesses corporate involvement with Israeli state and settlement infrastructure against a forensic rubric that is distinct from legal compliance analysis; the score reflects the nature and extent of that involvement, not a legal conclusion.
The principal cross-domain evidence gap is the absence of standalone Israel revenue disclosure. Israel is subsumed within a broad regional reporting segment across all Siemens group entities. The inability to confirm total annual Israeli revenue — from Siemens AG proper, Healthineers, and the Siemens Israel subsidiary combined — means that both the V-ECON and V-MIL magnitude scores are calibrated estimates from confirmed project-level anchors rather than verified financial data. A full revenue disclosure would likely increase the composite score, making the current 421 a floor rather than a midpoint estimate.
A second cross-domain limit is the Siemens Energy attribution boundary. Siemens Energy AG holds the Claroty OT security partnership (V-DIG) and Israeli grid infrastructure contracts (V-ECON/V-MIL) as a separately listed entity in which Siemens AG held a minority stake by 2023. The scoring conservatively treats these as indirectly attributable to Siemens AG. A consolidated group analysis — which a beneficial ownership framework might support — would push scores in multiple domains modestly higher.
Third, several civil society allegations — the pre-2020 prison CCTV supply, the uncertain character of the 2019 Israeli Embassy honour, the precise Siemens scope within JLR rolling stock versus Alstom/CAF — remain unresolved evidentiary questions that cannot be scored in either direction without primary source confirmation. These gaps are individually modest but collectively introduce uncertainty across V-MIL, V-ECON, and V-POL.
| Entity | Domain(s) | Type | Confirmed Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Siemens AG | All | German public company (DAX) | Parent entity under assessment |
| Siemens Israel Ltd | V-ECON, V-MIL, V-DIG | Wholly-owned subsidiary | Local delivery platform, Tel Aviv |
| Siemens Mobility GmbH | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Division of Siemens AG | JLR expansion; Israel Railways electrification |
| Siemens Smart Infrastructure | V-ECON | Division of Siemens AG | Building tech and energy management, Israel |
| Siemens Digital Industries | V-DIG, V-ECON | Division of Siemens AG | Industrial automation; Israeli EDA engineering office |
| Siemens Healthineers AG | V-ECON | ~75% owned subsidiary | Medical imaging, Israeli hospital supply |
| Siemens Energy AG | V-DIG, V-ECON | Separately listed (<25% stake) | Claroty OT partnership; Israeli grid infrastructure |
| Next47 | V-DIG, V-ECON | Siemens AG venture arm | Israeli start-up engagement; Tel Aviv hub (2019) |
| Roland Busch | V-POL | CEO, Siemens AG | No public statements on Gaza conflict |
| Israel Railways (Rakevet Israel) | V-MIL, V-ECON | Israeli state-owned enterprise | Electrification contract counterparty |
| CityPass / NTA | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Israeli government-owned rail consortium | JLR expansion contract counterparty |
| Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) | V-ECON, V-POL | Israeli state-owned utility | Multi-year grid modernisation partnership |
| Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) | V-POL | Israeli government body | R&D cooperation agreement (Sept 2022) |
| Claroty | V-DIG | Israeli-founded OT cybersecurity company | Siemens Energy OT security partnership |
| Who Profits Research Center | V-MIL, V-DIG, V-ECON | Israeli NGO | Primary civil society documentation source |
| BDS National Committee (PACBI) | V-MIL, V-POL | Palestinian civil society | Targeted boycott campaign; JLR withdrawal demand |
| Electronic Intifada | V-POL | Independent media | Documents Siemens 2021 JLR reaffirmation |
| AFSC Investigate | V-MIL | US NGO database | Lists Siemens; electrification contract primary concern |
| UN OHCHR | V-MIL, V-ECON | UN body | Settlement database: Siemens not listed |
| SIPRI | V-MIL | Research institute | Arms databases: Siemens not listed as arms producer |
| European Parliament | V-MIL | EU legislative body | Written question on JLR/occupied territory, 2022 |
| BAFA | V-MIL | German export control authority | No company-level Siemens/Israel decision in public records |
| Elbit Systems / IAI / Rafael | V-MIL | Israeli defence primes | No confirmed supply relationship identified |
| EU Regulation 2021/821 | V-MIL, V-DIG | Regulatory instrument | Dual-use export control classification regime |
| Microsoft | V-DIG | US technology company | Azure cloud strategic partnership (global scope) |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 4.50 | 6.50 | 8.00 | 4.18 |
| V-DIG | 3.50 | 3.50 | 5.50 | 1.37 |
| V-ECON | 5.50 | 6.50 | 8.00 | 5.11 |
| V-POL | 4.00 | 4.50 | 8.50 | 2.57 |
| Composite BRS | 421 |
V-ECON is the leading domain (V_MAX = 5.11). The composite is computed as:
BRS = ((V_MAX + Sum_OTHERS × 0.2) / 16) × 1000 = ((5.107 + 8.125 × 0.2) / 16) × 1000 = 421 (Tier C)
V-MIL (4.18): Impact reflects dual-use civilian infrastructure (rail electrification, JLR signalling) with confirmed routing through occupied territory and settlement connectivity concerns. Band ceiling is 4.0–5.0 because no military-channel procurement instrument, IDF/IMOD direct contract, or mil-spec product variant has been identified. Magnitude captures the national-scale JLR and Israel Railways contracts. Proximity is high (direct divisional contract; no intermediary).
V-DIG (1.37): Customer Cap applies throughout. The sole confirmed Israeli-origin vendor relationship is held by Siemens Energy, a separately listed minority-stake entity. Magnitude and proximity are accordingly low. The score is a floor that would increase materially if full enterprise vendor disclosures were available.
V-ECON (5.11): Wholly-owned subsidiary, direct divisional contracts with state-owned enterprises (Israel Railways, IEC, NTA/CityPass), and a multi-year physical operational footprint drive this to the dominant domain. Impact and proximity are both high-confidence findings; magnitude is a calibrated estimate from confirmed contract anchors.
V-POL (2.57): Business-as-usual normalisation with active reaffirmation of JLR, the IIA government cooperation agreement, and documented Russia-vs.-Gaza asymmetry ground the impact score. Magnitude is low-mid: the political engagement is noticeable but not sustained across lobbying, financial contributions, or repeated shareholder resolution blocks. Proximity is the highest of the four domains (8.50) because the political acts assessed are direct acts of Siemens AG itself.
High confidence findings:
– Siemens Israel Ltd is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens AG 16
– Siemens Mobility holds direct contracts with Israel Railways (electrification) and CityPass/NTA (JLR expansion) 45
– Siemens issued no public statement on the Gaza conflict comparable to its Russia suspension announcement 915
– Siemens is not listed in the UN OHCHR settlement database, SIPRI arms industry index, or SIBAT defence supplier listings 2518
– No direct contracts with IMOD, IDF, or Israeli intelligence agencies have been identified across multiple independent source classes
Moderate confidence findings:
– JLR contract value of €180–220M (trade-press sourced, unconfirmed by Siemens) 56
– Israel Electric Corporation partnership extended in 2023 14
– Siemens Energy–Claroty OT security partnership (confirmed for Siemens Energy; Siemens AG applicability partially uncertain) 8
– Impact score of I=4.50 in V-MIL: Siemens scope in JLR rolling stock versus Alstom/CAF introduces marginal uncertainty within the band
Open questions:
– Total standalone Israel revenue: Not disclosed in any Siemens AG public filing. Resolving this would likely increase V-ECON magnitude and the composite BRS
– Siemens Energy Israeli operations (post-2023): The scope of grid infrastructure contracts held by Siemens Energy in Israel — a separately listed entity — is only partially documented 3
– 2019 Israeli Embassy recognition: Nature of the honour (formal state award vs. ceremonial acknowledgment) cannot be confirmed from available records; confirmation could affect V-POL impact score
– Pre-2020 prison CCTV allegation: Who Profits’ 2018 allegation of Siemens CCTV supply to Israeli prison facilities has not been confirmed or rebutted in post-2020 sources 19
– Next47 Israeli portfolio companies: Individual portfolio company identities require primary source verification against Next47 deal records or Israeli Startup Authority databases 27
– Senate LDA line-item review: A full line-item review of Siemens Corporation’s US lobbying filings is needed to confirm the absence of any Israel- or anti-BDS-related lobbying entries 36
– Siemens Stiftung Israel-directed grant-making: Not fully reviewed; targeted analysis of foundation annual reports would be required 1
– European Commission response to EP written question (2022): Whether a formal published response to the European Parliament’s 2022 written question on JLR/occupied territory has been issued is unconfirmed 10
– Score floor vs. midpoint: The composite BRS of 421 is assessed as a conservative floor. Full revenue disclosure and confirmation of open questions could push the score to the 440–470 range; no evidence currently identified would push it into Tier B (600–799)
The following recommended actions are tied to the validated score, domain findings, and uncertainty levels identified above. They are calibrated to the forensic record — not to political or advocacy positions beyond what the evidence supports.
For researchers, journalists, and civil society organisations (Tier C, score 421):
– Pursue primary-source confirmation of total Siemens Israel revenue via German commercial register filings, Israeli company registry records for Siemens Israel Ltd, and SEC Form 20-F disclosures. This is the single most impactful evidence gap; resolution would either confirm the current score or raise it materially
– Request and review the European Commission’s formal response to the 2022 European Parliament written question on Siemens Mobility’s JLR contract and EU occupied-territory law. This represents the most advanced formal legislative-body inquiry identified and its outcome has not been confirmed 10
– Conduct a targeted review of the Siemens Stiftung’s published annual reports to assess Israel-directed grant-making, and a full line-item review of Senate LDA filings for Siemens Corporation to assess lobbying activity on Israel-adjacent issues 36
For institutional investors and ESG analysts (V-ECON dominant; V-MIL secondary):
– The V-ECON score (5.11) is the most robustly evidenced domain. Engagement on the occupied-territory routing of Siemens’ contracted rail infrastructure — specifically the JLR Green Line’s extension toward settlement areas — is grounded in confirmed contractual facts and does not require resolution of ambiguous evidence 519
– The magnitude score may be conservative: investors with access to Siemens’ internal segment reporting, or who can commission private research using Israeli commercial databases, would have a more accurate basis for financial materiality assessment
– The absence of a shareholder resolution specifically addressing Israeli settlement-linked infrastructure provides an engagement opportunity consistent with UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which Siemens cites as its own governance standard 40
For regulatory bodies and export control authorities (V-MIL; export licensing gaps):
– The structural inaccessibility of BAFA company-level export licence data prevents public confirmation or exclusion of dual-use licence activity for Siemens products to Israeli end-users. Regulatory bodies with access to BAFA records should assess whether any export licence conditions specifically address settlement-territory end-use restrictions for Siemens’ rail and industrial automation products 22
For Siemens AG (governance and disclosure):
– Voluntary disclosure of standalone Israel revenues and a country-level breakdown of contract counterparties would resolve the most significant evidence gap and allow more accurate external assessment of materiality and human rights exposure, consistent with the company’s own UNGPs commitment 40
– The documented asymmetry between the Russia suspension statement and the absence of any public position on Gaza operations represents a reputational coherence risk identified by multiple stakeholder groups; a published explanation of the criteria governing Siemens’ geopolitical communications would address this gap without requiring a change in commercial position
– Confirming whether the Israel Railways electrification scope and the JLR Green Line route include sections serving Israeli settlements — and if so, whether this has been assessed under Siemens’ Human Rights Due Diligence framework — would demonstrate compliance with the company’s own stated UN Guiding Principles standards 40
Siemens AG Annual Report — https://www.siemens.com/investor/en/siemens_annual_report.htm ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens AG Israel history and operations — https://www.siemens.com/global/en/home/stories/siemens-israel-history.html ↩↩↩↩
Siemens Energy investor relations and reports — https://www.siemens-energy.com/global/en/home/investors/reports-and-presentations.html ↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens Mobility Israel Railways electrification press release — https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-mobility-wins-contract-electrification-israels-railway-network ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Jerusalem Post, Siemens JLR expansion contract — https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/siemens-wins-contract-jerusalem-light-rail-expansion-670000 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Railway Gazette, Siemens Mobility JLR contract — https://www.railwaygazette.com/urban/siemens-wins-jerusalem-light-rail-expansion-contract/58053.article ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Microsoft and Siemens AG Azure partnership announcement — https://news.microsoft.com/2021/06/29/microsoft-and-siemens-ag-announce-partnership/ ↩↩↩
Claroty and Siemens Energy OT cybersecurity partnership — https://www.claroty.com/company/press-releases/claroty-and-siemens-energy-partner ↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens suspends new business in Russia — press release — https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-suspends-new-business-russia ↩↩↩↩
European Parliament written question E-9-2022-002345 on JLR — https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002345_EN.html ↩↩↩↩↩
NoCamels, Siemens Israel Innovation Authority agreement — https://nocamels.com/2022/09/siemens-israel-innovation-authority-agreement/ ↩↩↩
ECC Palestine, NGO open letter to Siemens on JLR — https://www.eccpalestine.org/open-letter-siemens-jerusalem-light-rail/ ↩↩↩
Middle East Eye, Palestinian trade unions and Siemens JLR — https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/siemens-jerusalem-light-rail-palestinian-trade-unions ↩↩↩
Globes, Siemens Israel Electric Corporation partnership — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-siemens-israel-electric-corporation-1001422000 ↩↩↩↩↩
DW, German companies and Israel business ties post-October 7 — https://www.dw.com/en/german-companies-israel-business-ties-october-7/a-67345210 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens Israel Ltd country page — https://www.siemens.com/il/en.html ↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens Healthineers Israel — https://www.siemens-healthineers.com/en-il ↩↩↩↩
SIPRI arms industry database — https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry ↩↩↩↩↩
Who Profits Research Center, Siemens company profile — https://whoprofits.org/company/siemens/ ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
Palestine Solidarity Campaign UK, Siemens campaign page — https://www.palestinecampaign.org/siemens/ ↩↩↩↩↩
Siemens export control compliance policy — https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/sustainability/compliance/export-control.html ↩
BAFA German Federal Export Office — https://www.bafa.de/EN/Foreign_Trade/Export_Control/export_control_node.html ↩↩↩↩↩
AFSC Investigate, Siemens company entry — https://investigate.afsc.org/company/siemens ↩↩
War on Want, corporate complicity and Israeli apartheid — https://waronwant.org/resources/corporate-complicity-israeli-apartheid ↩↩
UN OHCHR settlement database (HRC session 43) — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/database-hrc4320 ↩↩↩
Siemens Xcelerator digital transformation platform — https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/digital-transformation/xcelerator.html ↩↩↩
CyberArk customers page — https://www.cyberark.com/customers/ ↩
Siemens EDA acquires Solido Design Automation — https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-eda-acquires-solido-design-automation ↩
Siemens acquires Brightly Software — https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-acquires-brightly-software ↩
Siemens Smart Infrastructure Israel press release — https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-smart-infrastructure-israel ↩↩
Reuters, Siemens suspends Russia business — https://www.reuters.com/business/siemens-suspends-new-business-russia-2022-03-02/ ↩
Electronic Intifada, Siemens reaffirms JLR commitment — https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/adri-nieuwhof/siemens-reaffirms-commitment-apartheid-israel ↩↩
Siemens Mobility JLR reference project page — https://www.mobility.siemens.com/global/en/portfolio/rail/references/jerusalem-light-rail.html ↩
Siemens Code of Conduct / Business Conduct Guidelines — https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/sustainability/compliance/business-conduct-guidelines.html ↩
OpenSecrets, Siemens Corporation lobbying — https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/siemens-corp/lobbying?id=D000022163 ↩↩↩↩
Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act filings — https://lda.senate.gov/system/public/ ↩
BDS movement, Palestinian civil society letter on JLR — https://bdsmovement.net/news/palestinian-civil-society-letter-siemens-jerusalem-light-rail ↩
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Siemens profile — https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/companies/siemens/ ↩
Siemens Human Rights Statement — https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/sustainability/human-rights.html ↩↩↩
