INDEX / DIRECTORY / SODASTREAM / MILITARY

SodaStream MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-01
Military Score 0.00 /10 B SodaStream - BDS-1000 714
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

SodaStream became an indirect wholly owned PepsiCo subsidiary upon completion of PepsiCo’s acquisition of all outstanding shares on 5 December 2018 1. PepsiCo’s FY2025 subsidiary exhibit continues to list SodaStream International Ltd., SodaStream Industries Ltd., and SodaStream Israel Ltd. among its Israeli subsidiaries 2. PepsiCo reports SodaStream within its International Beverages Franchise segment, which manufactures and distributes sparkling-water makers and related products 3.

No public evidence identified.

The bounded review found no SodaStream or PepsiCo-SodaStream contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum, or supplier record with the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD), Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or another named Israeli security body. The accessible IMOD material confirms restrictions on access to SIBAT’s export site for registered exporters, but does not name SodaStream and cannot establish a database-wide absence finding 4. SIBAT is IMOD’s international defence-cooperation directorate and publishes a defence and homeland-security directory, although the located 2018–19 directory could not be fully text-retrieved in the research environment 5, 6.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Pre-acquisition SEC disclosures describe SodaStream’s product range as consumer sparkling-water makers, exchangeable carbon-dioxide cylinders, reusable bottles, flavours, refills, and related household carbonation products 7, 8. The disclosed production processes included metalworking, plastics and bottle blowing, machining, printing, assembly, cylinder manufacture, carbon-dioxide refill, and cylinder retesting 7, 8.

The reviewed filings do not describe military-specification, ruggedised, tactical, security-force, or other specialised defence variants of these products 7, 8. No public evidence identified. The targeted review also did not identify Israeli-security end-user certificates, export-licence applications, export-control decisions, or defence-sale documentation relating to SodaStream products 7, 8.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

SodaStream’s 2010 filing reported consumer-product manufacturing facilities in Mishor Adumim and Ashkelon, with Mishor Adumim performing metal, plastics, bottle-blowing, machining, assembly, cylinder-manufacture, refill, and retest operations 7. A 2014 restructuring plan described transition of the main manufacturing site from Mishor Adumim to a new southern-Israel plant, while the 2017 filing states that most manufacturing moved to Lehavim in 2015 9, 8.

Former chief executive Daniel Birnbaum wrote in 2018 that he inherited the Mishor Adumim premises in 2007 as a former Israeli bomb-making factory and that SodaStream operated its own facility there from 2007 to 2015 10. This account supports prior military-industrial use of the premises before SodaStream’s operation, but does not establish that SodaStream manufactured bombs, weapons, or military products at the site 10. No public evidence identified. The reviewed materials do not support claims that SodaStream equipment, vehicles, machinery, or services were used for settlement construction, demolitions, the separation barrier, checkpoints, or military installations 7, 9.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed SEC disclosures and targeted searches did not identify SodaStream supplying components, materials, manufacturing services, co-production, technology transfers, or joint development to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime 7, 8. The available production disclosures describe household-carbonation manufacturing and commercial distribution rather than defence-prime customers or military end uses 7, 8.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed disclosures describe commercial retail, distributor, and third-party refilling arrangements rather than military customers or military freight 7. No sourcing was located for SodaStream providing catering, transport, fuel, carbon-dioxide supply, waste management, telecommunications, facilities management, freight, port handling, or other sustainment services to IDF bases, detention facilities, or security installations 7, 8.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified.

SodaStream’s SEC-described output concerns household carbonation appliances, bottles, carbon-dioxide cylinders and refills, flavours, and related consumer products 7, 8. The reviewed record does not identify lethal systems, munitions, propellants, weapons components, missile-defence subsystems, or components for other strategic military platforms 7, 8. Birnbaum’s description of a pre-existing bomb-making factory at Mishor Adumim does not evidence SodaStream participation in munitions manufacture 10.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified.

The review did not identify export-licence grants, denials, suspensions, sanctions enforcement, arms-embargo investigations, judicial proceedings, or end-user documentation concerning SodaStream supply to Israeli military or security customers 7, 8, 5. The located SIBAT directory remains an unresolved lead because its full text could not be searched in the research environment, so the available record does not support a conclusive non-listing finding 6.

SodaStream’s 2017 Form 20-F refers substantively to regional-conflict business risk and reservist-service obligations affecting some employees, rather than an IDF, IMOD, or security-customer relationship 8. PepsiCo’s current leadership biography assigns oversight of the SodaStream business to Eugene Willemsen, Chief Executive Officer, International Beverages, but does not establish a SodaStream-specific directorship, ownership interest, or defence-sector role 11.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Al-Haq’s July 2024 report describes SodaStream as having previously operated in Mishor Adumim and states that the company announced closure amid international pressure 12. This is civil-society reporting on former settlement-linked operations, and the report pages cited do not document a military contract or defence-supply relationship 12. The underlying primary materials referenced for certain trade-labelling and related assertions were not independently retrieved in the bounded research record 12.

The BDS Movement’s 2024 guide lists SodaStream as a boycott target and attributes that listing to alleged displacement of Bedouin-Palestinian citizens in the Naqab and alleged discrimination against Palestinian workers 13. On the cited page, the guide does not allege that SodaStream made military donations or held Israeli military contracts 13. Birnbaum’s retrospective account describes boycott pressure and consolidation of production at a Negev facility, but it is a former executive’s account rather than independent evidence of the relocation’s motive 10.

The supplied full-text review reported no SodaStream mention in the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report A/HRC/59/23 or the OHCHR’s 2025 settlement-related business-enterprise database update 14, 15. These are document-scoped no-hit findings and do not establish database-wide, sector-wide, or future absence of relevant activity 14, 15.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.pepsico.com/newsroom/press-releases/2018/pepsico-completes-acquisition-of-sodastream-international-ltd ↩

  2. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747626000007/pepsico202510-kexhibit21.htm ↩

  3. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/77476/000007747626000007/pep-20251227.htm ↩

  4. https://www.online.mod.gov.il/Online2016/pages/general/News/SingleMessage.aspx?id=184&tType=3 ↩

  5. https://mod.gov.il/en/departments/sibat-international-defense-cooperation ↩ ↩2

  6. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Industries/directory/Documents/Sibatdir-dfs-en-2018-19.pdf ↩ ↩2

  7. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1502916/000114420411038499/v227150_jp-20f.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13

  8. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1502916/000114420417013585/v461340_20f.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12

  9. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1502916/000114420414063465/v392442_ex99-4.htm ↩ ↩2

  10. https://jcfa.org/defeating-denormalization/sodastream-model-economic-peace/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://www.pepsico.com/en/leadership/eugene-willemsen ↩

  12. https://www.alhaq.org/cached_uploads/download/2024/07/04/business-and-human-rights-booklet-1720077751.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. https://bdsmovement.net/sites/default/files/2024-12/Guide%20to%20BDS%20Boycott%20%26%20Pressure%20Corporate%20Priority%20Targeting-30%20Nov%202024-Submitted%20by%20BDS%20movement.pdf ↩ ↩2

  14. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2

  15. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩ ↩2