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Contents

Subway

Key takeaways
  • Roark Capital's 2024 acquisition links Subway financially to dual-use tech (GPRS) and Israeli cyber investments, increasing structural complicity.
  • Supply chain evidence shows UK distributor Reynolds imports avocados and dates from Galilee Export, tying Subway to settlement produce.
  • Digital stack and payments rely on Israeli-linked vendors (Wiz, SentinelOne, Adyen/Zooz), creating technological dependency and data exposure.
  • Governance favors revenue over rights: UBO donations to pro‑IDF groups, refusal to exit Russia, and silence on Gaza reveal ideological bias.
BDS Rating
Grade
E
BDS Score
98 / 1000
0 / 10
0.49 / 10
0.96 / 10
0.76 / 10
links for more information

Target Profile

  • Company: Subway (Subway IP LLC / Doctor’s Associates LLC)
  • Jurisdiction: United States (Delaware/Connecticut incorporation; operational HQ Miami, Florida)
  • Headquarters: Miami, Florida, USA (relocated from Milford, Connecticut, 2023)
  • Sector: Quick-service restaurant (QSR) franchising; food service
  • Relevant operating footprint: ~37,000 locations globally; franchise operations in Israel via master franchisee (Shefa Group), estimated fewer than 20 locations pre-2020, current status unconfirmed; prior franchise exit from Russia (March 2022); no confirmed West Bank, Gaza, or Golan Heights locations
  • Key executives or governance actors: John Chidsey (CEO 2019–2024, departed); Roark Capital Group (majority owner since August 2023, principals Neal Aronson and partners); DeLuca family estate (reported minority stake); Fred DeLuca (co-founder, deceased 2015); Peter Buck (co-founder)
  • BDS-1000 score: 98
  • Tier: E (0–199)

Executive Summary

Subway is a US-headquartered quick-service restaurant franchisor with a global estate of approximately 37,000 locations. Acquired by Atlanta-based private equity firm Roark Capital Group in August 2023 for approximately $9.55 billion, it operates on an asset-light model: the corporate entity owns intellectual property and collects royalties; individual franchisees own and operate stores.12

The BDS-1000 audit finds no military, weapons, dual-use hardware, or defence contracting relationship between Subway and Israeli state or security entities. The company scores zero across all V-MIL criteria with high confidence. Its digital technology stack is composed of US-origin commercial platforms (payment processing via Adyen, digital transformation via Capgemini); one identified Adyen subsidiary — Zooz, acquired 2018 — maintains an R&D presence in Tel Aviv, representing the sole confirmed Israeli-origin technology linkage, and it is passive and indirect. No Israeli-origin cybersecurity, AI, or cloud vendor relationship has been confirmed at primary-source level.

The economically most significant finding is Subway’s franchise presence in Israel via master franchisee Shefa Group, an arrangement that generates royalty flows from Israeli operations outward to the US parent entity. The pre-2020 footprint was estimated at fewer than 20 locations. The current operational status is unconfirmed — the single most material evidence gap across the entire audit — and the score’s central economic finding depends on this unknown. Under the asset-light franchise model, Subway holds no physical infrastructure, employs no workers, and has made no foreign direct investment in Israel; it is a licensor, not an operator.

The most analytically noteworthy political finding is a documented asymmetry: Subway closed approximately 450 Russian franchise locations in March 2022 with a public announcement, but issued no comparable statement, operational directive, or public communication regarding the Israel-Gaza conflict from October 2023 onward.34 This selective silence, against a demonstrated capacity for geopolitical corporate action, constitutes the rubric’s “double standard” pattern. No active lobbying, PAC donations, institutional partnerships, or crisis resource mobilisation directed at Israeli state entities has been identified.

The composite BDS-1000 score of 98 (Tier E) reflects a commercially engaged but operationally thin and economically marginal franchise presence in Israel, a modest political double-standard finding, and an absence of meaningful military or digital engagement. The score is sensitive to one variable: confirmation that Israeli franchise operations have exited would reduce the composite score to below 80.


Timeline of Relevant Events

Date Event
1965 Subway founded in Bridgeport, Connecticut by Fred DeLuca and Peter Buck 5
Pre-2004 Subway franchise operations in Israel; Wikipedia records closure of Israeli franchises around this period 6
Pre-2020 (est.) Subway franchise operations in Israel reported as active, estimated fewer than 20 locations, operated via master franchisee (Shefa Group) 7
September 2015 Co-founder Fred DeLuca dies; DeLuca family estate retains ownership interest 5
December 2019 Subway announces partnership with Adyen for North American payment processing; Adyen had acquired Israeli-founded Zooz in 2018 8
2021 Subway announces “Project Future” digital transformation programme; Capgemini engaged as strategic partner 910
April 2022 NCR ransomware attack causes outages to Aloha POS-dependent restaurant operators 11
March 2022 Subway announces closure of approximately 450 Russian franchise locations following the invasion of Ukraine 3
August 2023 Roark Capital Group completes acquisition of Subway for approximately $9.55 billion 12
October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel; start of the Gaza conflict; consumer boycott campaigns targeting US fast-food brands begin 412
Late 2023–2024 Consumer-driven boycott campaigns reported across Muslim-majority markets; Subway-specific sales data not publicly available; no corporate response identified 413
2024 John Chidsey departs as CEO; Roark Capital integration ongoing 14
March 2025 Google agrees to acquire Israeli-founded cloud security firm Wiz for $32 billion (structural context for V-DIG) 15
April 2026 Audit date; current status of Israeli franchise operations remains unconfirmed

Corporate Overview

Subway operates as a franchise system through two principal US entities: Doctor’s Associates LLC, the original operating entity incorporated in Connecticut and Delaware, and Subway IP LLC, the intellectual property holding entity that licenses the Subway brand, systems, and proprietary recipes to franchisees globally.16 The company’s commercial model is asset-light: Subway corporate owns no stores and employs no frontline workers; it earns royalties and fees from franchisees, typically in the range of 8–12% of gross sales under standard US franchise disclosure norms.16

Subway was founded in 1965 and remained privately held under the DeLuca and Buck family structures until August 2023, when Roark Capital Group completed its acquisition. Roark is an Atlanta-based private equity firm whose portfolio concentrates on franchise and consumer service brands, including Inspire Brands (operator of Arby’s, Buffalo Wild Wings, Sonic, and others).117 The DeLuca family reportedly retained a minority equity stake post-acquisition.2 Subway does not publish audited financial statements; estimated global system-wide sales of approximately $16–17 billion USD annually have been reported in aggregated trade press, with no country-level breakdown.18

The franchise architecture is central to any accountability analysis. Corporate responsibility for on-the-ground actions — including sourcing decisions, location selection in contested territories, and community donations — is structurally diffused through franchise contracts. The master franchisee (in Israel, the Shefa Group) holds an intermediate contractual layer between Subway IP LLC and individual store operators. This architecture limits the traceability of individual operator conduct to Subway IP LLC and recurs as a structural constraint throughout all four domain audits.


Domain Summaries

V-MIL: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Subway is a quick-service restaurant franchisor whose product range consists exclusively of food service items — sandwiches, beverages, and baked goods — and associated food service equipment (ovens, refrigeration units, point-of-sale systems). This product profile has no meaningful overlap with any V-MIL domain category: there are no ruggedised or tactical variants, no dual-use hardware, no components that could be re-purposed for weapons systems or military logistics, and no sector classification that brings Subway within the scope of defence procurement frameworks in any jurisdiction.19

Direct defence contracting was the first and most important category assessed. No verified contracts, tender awards, framework agreements, or memoranda of understanding between Subway and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defence Forces, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or any Israeli security body appear in any publicly available procurement record, corporate disclosure, or investigative report.20 Subway does not appear in SIBAT (Israel Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) export directories, international defence exhibition catalogues, or Israeli defence procurement registries in any documented capacity.21 The absence of a SIBAT listing is inferred from the absence of any secondary source referencing such a listing — direct primary database access was not available — but this inference is consistent with Subway’s business domain, which has no logical interface with defence export frameworks.20

Dual-use products and tactical variants represent a second zero-evidence category. No export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews related to Subway’s sales to Israeli defence or security end-users appear in any public record across UK, US, or EU export control registers.21 Because Subway’s products are exclusively civilian food service items, no civilian-to-military conversion pathway has been identified, and the dual-use rubric criterion is inapplicable by product type.

Heavy machinery, construction, and infrastructure in military or occupation contexts form a third category with no evidentiary basis. No verified reports, photographic evidence, NGO investigations, or UN documentation places Subway-branded or Subway-supplied equipment in the context of construction, demolition, or maintenance at Israeli settlements, the separation barrier, military installations, or occupied territories.2223 Subway holds no construction or engineering contracts of any kind in a military or occupation context.

Supply chain integration with Israeli defence primes — including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI/Elbit Land — is comprehensively absent. No verified supply relationships of any kind between Subway and any Israeli defence prime contractor have been identified.2124 No joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements appear in any public record.

Logistical sustainment and base services present one contextual note that requires explicit exclusion: Subway does operate franchise locations on some US military installations through the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and associated Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programmes.19 This relationship is documented and involves US military installations; it is geographically and jurisdictionally outside the scope of this audit and is assessed as entirely non-probative with respect to Israeli military engagement. No analogous arrangement with Israeli military welfare or base services programmes has been identified in any public source.

Munitions, weapons systems, and strategic platforms require no extended analysis: Subway has no documented role as a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, component supplier, or sub-system integrator for any lethal platform, munitions system, or strategic defence programme in any jurisdiction.24

The food supply chain provenance question — whether ingredients supplied to Israeli-market Subway franchise locations source from settlement-based agriculture or settlement-adjacent food processing facilities — constitutes an open evidentiary gap. No publicly available supply chain audit addresses this question, and the Who Profits and Corporate Occupation databases have not specifically catalogued Subway’s ingredient sourcing in an Israeli context.2526 However, this gap, even if resolved adversely, would not produce a V-MIL score: food ingredient sourcing from settlement agriculture falls within V-ECON scope, not V-MIL, because it involves trade and economic relationships rather than physical products with defence or security relevance.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest challenge to the zero V-MIL score would be the identification of any contract or documented relationship between Subway (or its franchisee network) and an Israeli military installation — analogous to the AAFES/MWR relationship on US bases. No such relationship has been found, but the audit notes it as a genuine evidentiary gap: whether any AAFES analogue exists in the Israeli military welfare or base services context has not been investigated in any publicly available source.20 If such a relationship were confirmed, it would not necessarily change the V-MIL score absent evidence of a strategic supply relationship (as opposed to a standard commercial food service contract), but it would require re-assessment.

A second potential challenge concerns the Israeli franchisee’s procurement decisions. If the Shefa Group or its sub-franchisees supply food to Israeli military installations, checkpoints, or detention facilities, the downstream economic benefit to Subway via royalty flows could theoretically be characterised as indirect military sustainment support. This chain of inference is highly attenuated — it would require confirming franchisee-level supply contracts that are not publicly documented — and even if confirmed, the mechanism would more appropriately score under V-ECON (economic contribution) than V-MIL (military supply). The audit treats this as a gap rather than an adverse finding.

The absence of civil society investigation is itself a relevant data point. No NGO — including Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, AFSC, or Corporate Occupation — has published an investigation specifically addressing Subway’s military or dual-use supply chain.222325 Given that Who Profits and similar organisations have actively investigated food-sector companies for military-adjacent activities, the absence of a Subway-specific investigation in this domain provides corroborating support for the zero score, though it cannot be treated as conclusive.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Subway IP LLC Corporate (subject) Primary audit target No V-MIL evidence identified
Doctor’s Associates LLC Corporate (subject) Operating entity No V-MIL evidence identified
Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) Government body Potential contracting counterparty No contract, MOU, or agreement identified 20
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Military body Potential service recipient No supply or service contract identified 20
SIBAT Government registry Defence export directory Subway not listed 21
Elbit Systems Defence prime Potential supply chain link No relationship identified 24
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Defence prime Potential supply chain link No relationship identified 24
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Defence prime Potential supply chain link No relationship identified 24
AAFES / MWR (US) Military welfare (US) Contextual precedent (excluded from scope) US base presence confirmed; Israeli analogue unconfirmed 19
Shefa Group Israeli master franchisee Operational intermediary Israeli franchise operator; no military contracts identified
Who Profits Research Center NGO Civil society scrutiny No V-MIL investigation of Subway identified 25
Amnesty International NGO Civil society scrutiny No V-MIL investigation of Subway identified 22
Human Rights Watch NGO Civil society scrutiny No V-MIL investigation of Subway identified 23

V-DIG: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Subway’s digital technology relationships must be analysed through two lenses imposed by the scoring rubric: the Customer Cap (a company that is purely a buyer of technology, not a provider of technology to Israel, is capped at a lower impact band) and the Directionality Rule (the direction of economic and technological flow matters). Both rules apply here: Subway is an end-user of commercial technology platforms, not a developer, licensor, or provider of technology to Israeli state or commercial entities.

The single most robustly documented Israeli-origin technology linkage in Subway’s stack is its payment processing partnership with Adyen. In December 2019, Subway announced a partnership with Adyen to advance its payment experience across North American locations.8 Adyen — headquartered in Amsterdam — had previously acquired Israeli fintech startup Zooz in 2018, which was founded in Tel Aviv and developed payment-routing optimisation technology.27 Following the acquisition, Adyen maintained the Tel Aviv operation as an active R&D centre, described on its careers pages as a continuation of the Zooz team.28 The practical consequence is that Subway’s transaction-routing logic for North American locations runs on infrastructure with code development and maintenance activities occurring at Adyen’s Tel Aviv R&D centre. This constitutes a passive, indirect exposure to Israeli-origin technology through a Dutch-headquartered multinational. It is a commercial R&D relationship, not a defence or intelligence relationship, and it does not place Subway in a direct contractual relationship with any Israeli entity.

Digital transformation and cloud infrastructure are the second category. Subway engaged Capgemini as a strategic digital transformation partner during its “Project Future” modernisation programme, announced in 2021.910 Capgemini published a client case study confirming the engagement, quoting Subway’s CIO and describing work on customer-facing digital channels and back-end systems. The case study does not name specific security or cloud vendors deployed within the engagement. The technology ecosystem of Inspire Brands — the Roark Capital portfolio company most adjacent to Subway — is similarly opaque; a technographic aggregator page (Stackshare) has been cited in prior research as evidence of Israeli-origin tool deployment, but technographic aggregators derive their data from indirect signals and are not reliable as primary-source evidence of enterprise procurement decisions.29

Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendors were the subject of the most extensive prior-generation research. Claims of relationships between Subway or Inspire Brands and Wiz, SentinelOne, Check Point, Bionic.ai/CrowdStrike, and CyberArk were individually assessed. None could be confirmed at primary-source level. The Wiz claim rested on a technographic aggregator page, not a corporate disclosure.29 The SentinelOne claim rested on an AMG Pantheon Master fund Schedule of Investments filing — a third-party multi-manager fund vehicle that documents that fund’s own holdings across its manager roster, not Roark Capital’s direct investment portfolio — and does not establish a Roark Capital or Subway relationship with SentinelOne.30 The Bionic.ai claim is plausible in form (Bionic.ai was confirmed acquired by CrowdStrike in September 2023 for approximately $350 million31) but cannot be confirmed from training-data primary sources. The Check Point and CyberArk claims similarly lack primary-source confirmation. All five vendor relationships are assessed as unverified.

Surveillance and retail technology present one documented but limited finding: PYMNTS.com reported in 2020 that PopID technology was piloted at some Subway outlets for COVID-19 temperature screening and explored for “face pay” capability.32 PopID is a US-based company (a subsidiary of Cali Group) and is not of Israeli origin. The current status and scale of any PopID deployment is unknown. No Israeli-origin facial recognition vendor — including Oosto (formerly AnyVision) or Trigo Retail — has been confirmed in a Subway deployment.3334

The smart fridge and autonomous checkout hypothesis represents the most speculative potential Israeli-origin link. Subway’s 2022 non-traditional concept announcement confirmed that smart fridge locations use weight-sensing shelf technology to monitor product levels.35 A hypothesis was advanced that Shekel Brainweigh — an Israeli IoT weight-sensor company — may supply OEM hardware to the smart fridge integrator used by Subway. This is an inferential hypothesis only: the Subway newsroom release confirms weight-sensor shelves exist but does not name any OEM hardware supplier. The specific supplier relationship with Shekel Brainweigh or any other vendor is unconfirmed at primary-source level.

Project Nimbus — the $1.2 billion cloud contract awarded to Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services in 2021 to provide cloud infrastructure to the Israeli government and military36 — was assessed for indirect relevance. Subway is not a party to Project Nimbus. Any framing that Subway’s cloud expenditure indirectly supports Project Nimbus through aggregate hyperscaler revenue applies equally to every enterprise customer of Google Cloud or AWS globally and does not constitute a direct or distinguishing relationship. No evidence identifies Subway as participating in, or being party to, Project Nimbus or any comparable Israeli state cloud programme.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The most significant challenge to the V-DIG score is the Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP) and vendor stack opacity gap. Subway does not publicly disclose its full enterprise security vendor stack, and no Freedom of Information-equivalent mechanism exists for private company procurement. It is structurally possible that Israeli-origin cybersecurity tools — from vendors such as Check Point, CyberArk, or others — exist in Subway’s stack without public disclosure. If confirmed, this would constitute a direct commercial licensing relationship with an Israeli-origin technology company. Under the Customer Cap rule, such a finding would elevate I-DIG modestly but would not dramatically change the composite score, given that the relationship would still be classified as commercial procurement rather than technology provision to Israel.

The Adyen/Zooz relationship is the most analytically defensible Israeli-origin technology connection, but its significance should not be overstated. Subway contracted with Adyen, a Dutch-headquartered company. The Tel Aviv R&D team is a legacy operation of the 2018 Zooz acquisition; Subway had no direct relationship with Zooz and entered no direct contractual relationship with any Israeli entity. The connection is real but passive and indirect.827

A third limit concerns the Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD) evidence gap: Subway’s current FDD — which would disclose required technology vendor relationships and system requirements for franchisees — is not publicly available in full in training data. The FDD gap means that mandatory technology requirements imposed on franchisees (including Israeli franchisees) are not fully visible, and Israeli-origin technology embedded in required point-of-sale or ordering systems cannot be ruled out.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Adyen Dutch fintech Primary payments partner Confirmed partnership (2019); acquired Zooz (Israeli-founded, 2018) 827
Zooz Israeli fintech (acquired by Adyen) Payment-routing R&D R&D continues in Tel Aviv post-acquisition 28
Capgemini French IT services Digital transformation partner Confirmed engagement; vendor sub-stack not disclosed 9
Wiz Israeli-founded cloud security Potential vendor (unconfirmed) No primary-source confirmation; technographic signal only 29
SentinelOne Israeli-co-founded cybersecurity Potential Roark investment (unconfirmed) AMG Pantheon filing does not confirm direct Roark holding 30
Bionic.ai / CrowdStrike Israeli-founded ASPM (acquired 2023) Potential Inspire Brands customer Acquisition confirmed; Inspire Brands customer claim unconfirmed 31
Check Point Software Israeli-founded cybersecurity Potential vendor (unconfirmed) No primary-source confirmation 37
CyberArk Israeli-founded identity security Potential vendor (unconfirmed) No primary-source confirmation 38
PopID (Cali Group) US facial recognition Piloted at Subway outlets (2020) US-origin; not Israeli; current status unknown 32
Oosto (AnyVision) Israeli facial recognition Potential vendor No evidence of Subway relationship 33
Trigo Retail Israeli autonomous checkout Potential vendor No evidence of Subway relationship 34
Shekel Brainweigh Israeli IoT/weight sensors Hypothesised OEM supplier Hypothesis only; no primary-source confirmation 39
Roark Capital Group Private equity owner Technology investment posture Portfolio not disclosed; no confirmed Israeli-origin tech holdings 17
Inspire Brands Roark portfolio company Adjacent technology ecosystem Stackshare technographic data only; no primary-source vendor confirmation 29
NCR / Aloha POS US POS infrastructure Point-of-sale platform US-origin; April 2023 ransomware attack documented 11
Google Cloud / AWS US cloud hyperscalers Cloud infrastructure (inferred) Project Nimbus participants; Subway not a party 36
AMG Pantheon Master Fund Third-party investment fund Cited in prior research Does not represent Roark Capital’s direct portfolio 30

V-ECON: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Subway’s economic relationship with Israel operates almost exclusively through the franchise licensing mechanism. Under Subway’s standard franchise model, the company — as licensor — grants a master franchisee the right to sub-license the Subway brand and operating system within a defined territory in exchange for an upfront development fee and ongoing royalty payments calculated as a percentage of franchisee gross sales.16 The Israeli master franchisee, the Shefa Group, holds this intermediate contractual layer. Individual store operators are sub-licensees of the Shefa Group, not direct counterparties of Subway IP LLC.4041

This architecture has three economically significant consequences. First, Subway holds no physical assets in Israel: no stores, no manufacturing facilities, no warehouses, no data centres, and no real estate. All physical infrastructure is owned by franchisees. Second, the royalty flow runs outward from Israel to Subway’s US parent entity (Subway IP LLC), meaning Subway is an economic extractor from the Israeli market rather than an investor in it. This distinguishes the relationship from foreign direct investment, which would involve capital flowing into Israel, and places the relationship firmly in the “sustained trade / franchise licensing” band rather than higher-impact investment categories. Third, franchise model opacity means that franchisee-level decisions — including which suppliers franchisees use, which communities they support, and which government entities they contract with — are made by franchisees, not by Subway IP LLC, and are not subject to public disclosure at the franchisor level.

The pre-2020 estimated footprint of fewer than 20 franchise locations in Israeli cities represents a commercially marginal presence by any global measure. Subway’s estimated global system-wide sales of approximately $16–17 billion USD annually are generated across approximately 37,000 locations worldwide; fewer than 20 Israeli locations would represent well below 0.1% of global location count and an immaterial fraction of system-wide sales.18 Even applying Subway’s standard royalty rate range to the gross sales of 20 Israeli QSR outlets, the aggregate royalty flow to Subway IP LLC would be in the low hundreds of thousands of USD annually — economically negligible to the licensor, though not zero.

No foreign direct investment by Subway in Israel has been identified. No acquisitions, manufacturing or processing facilities, data centres, logistics hubs, or real estate holdings in Israel appear in any corporate or regulatory filing.4142 Subway’s transition to Roark Capital ownership in August 2023 did not alter this structure; Roark Capital’s publicly disclosed 2024 portfolio does not include Israeli-domiciled companies, and no Roark Capital fund has been identified as holding Israeli sovereign bonds or Israel-focused investment vehicles in disclosed LP communications.1743

No Israeli supply chain relationship has been identified at primary-source level. Subway does not publish a supplier list, and no verified commercial relationship between Subway and any named Israeli agricultural exporter — including Mehadrin, Hadiklaim Israel Date Growers Cooperative, or Agrexco/Carmel — has been identified in corporate disclosures, NGO databases, or trade press.444546 Who Profits Research Center’s agri-food sector database does not list Subway as a named buyer of any Israeli agricultural exporter.46 The settlement-origin produce labeling controversy in the UK and EU has focused primarily on retail supermarkets and direct food importers rather than QSR chains; Subway has not appeared in that regulatory or activist discourse.4748

No R&D or innovation presence in Israel has been identified. Start-Up Nation Central’s corporate partner database returns no Subway listing.49 This absence is consistent with the franchise model and the company’s posture as a brand licensor rather than a technology developer.

The current operational status of Israeli franchise operations is the single most material evidence gap in the entire audit. The last confirmed reporting of active operations relates to the pre-2020 period. Whether operations are continuing, have been suspended following the October 2023 escalation, or have been permanently exited is unconfirmed as of April 2026. This gap directly determines whether the V-ECON score reflects an active ongoing relationship or a historic one. The score as rendered is anchored on the most defensible interpretation of available evidence: that the pre-2020 franchise structure existed and has not been publicly confirmed as exited.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The most significant counter-argument to the V-ECON score is the possibility that Israeli franchise operations have fully exited. If this is the case, the economic relationship would be characterised as historic trade with no ongoing royalty flow, and the Impact score would fall to the 2.1–3.0 band (historic trade). The Magnitude score would approach zero (cessation guidance applies). The composite V-ECON score would fall substantially, and the overall BDS-1000 composite would drop below 80. This scenario cannot be excluded on available evidence and represents the primary downward uncertainty for the composite score.

Conversely, the Shefa Group’s reported independent operational decisions following the October 2023 escalation — available reporting attributed store-level changes to the Israeli franchisee rather than corporate directives — could be read as evidence that some Israeli operations remained active (and therefore that the pre-2020 franchise structure persists in some form). This is an indirect inference and is assessed as low confidence.

The settlement-origin produce gap is a second limit. While no supply chain audit has identified Subway-sourced settlement produce, the franchisee-level procurement opacity means this cannot be definitively excluded. Under the franchise model, Subway corporate has neither visibility nor direct accountability for franchisee ingredient sourcing decisions in Israel. Even if settlement-origin produce were confirmed in Israeli franchise supply chains, the primary accountability would lie with the franchisee rather than Subway IP LLC, and the economic impact on the scoring calculation would be minor given the small footprint.

The Roark Capital LP opacity represents a residual structural uncertainty. Roark Capital’s limited partner base is not fully publicly disclosed. Institutional LP exposure to Israeli assets — through pension fund or sovereign wealth fund LPs that themselves hold Israeli instruments — cannot be ruled out from public information but has not been confirmed in any public filing or report.43 This is a distal and speculative chain of ownership that would not materially affect the V-ECON score under the rubric’s directionality rules.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Subway IP LLC Corporate (subject) IP licensor Royalty recipient from Israeli franchisee 16
Doctor’s Associates LLC Corporate (subject) Operating entity US domicile; no Israeli incorporation 42
Shefa Group Israeli master franchisee Operational intermediary Primary Israeli franchise partner; operates fewer than 20 pre-2020 locations 40
Roark Capital Group Private equity owner Beneficial owner No confirmed Israeli portfolio holdings 1743
DeLuca family estate Minority equity holder Beneficial owner No confirmed Israeli investments 50
Who Profits Research Center NGO Supply chain scrutiny Subway listed; agri-food database does not identify Subway as buyer of Israeli exporters 46
Mehadrin Israeli agricultural exporter Potential supply chain link No Subway relationship identified 44
Hadiklaim Israel Date Growers Cooperative Israeli agricultural exporter Potential supply chain link No Subway relationship identified 45
Agrexco / Carmel Israeli agricultural exporter Potential supply chain link No Subway relationship identified 44
Start-Up Nation Central Israeli innovation database R&D presence check No Subway listing identified 49
BDS Movement Civil society Boycott targeting Subway included in boycott lists 51
Israel Franchise Association Industry body Operational status verification No confirmed current Subway listing in public records 52

V-POL: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Subway’s most analytically significant political finding is structural rather than active: a documented asymmetry between its response to the Russia-Ukraine war and its response to the Israel-Gaza conflict. In March 2022, Subway announced the closure of approximately 450 Russian franchise locations — a decision widely reported as a deliberate corporate departure from commercial neutrality on a geopolitical matter.3 No equivalent statement, operational directive, market-level announcement, or public communication was issued regarding the Israel-Gaza conflict from October 7, 2023 onward, through the training-data cutoff of April 2026.453

This asymmetry is analytically significant because it cannot be explained by the company’s general posture of political silence: the Russia exit demonstrates that Subway is capable of making public geopolitical corporate decisions and is willing to accept the commercial costs (loss of revenue from 450 locations). The absence of any comparable action or statement on Israel-Palestine therefore represents selective silence — a choice to remain silent on one conflict while having spoken on another — rather than a consistent policy of non-engagement with geopolitical matters. The BDS-1000 rubric classifies this pattern in the 2.1–3.0 band as “The Double Standard.”34

The absence of formal BDS campaign designation is a relevant counter-weight. The BDS National Committee’s formal campaign list as of 2024–2025 primarily targets companies with more direct, documented ties to Israeli state institutions. Subway does not appear as a named priority target in the formal BDS campaign list.54 Consumer-driven boycott campaigns targeting Subway were widely reported across Muslim-majority markets in late 2023 and into 2024, particularly in the Middle East, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, driven by the general perception of US brand complicity with Israeli military operations.1355 Subway issued no public response to these campaigns.

Lobbying and political financing present a comprehensively clean record. Subway and its affiliates have conducted registered lobbying activity channelled through the National Restaurant Association (NRA trade group), which focuses its advocacy on labour law, minimum wage regulation, food safety standards, and taxation.5657 The NRA’s documented lobbying portfolio does not encompass Israel-Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, or Middle East security matters. No evidence of Subway directly lobbying on anti-BDS legislation, Israel trade agreements, or Middle East security policy has been identified in Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act database records, OpenSecrets industry data, or House lobbying disclosure summaries.5658 No Subway PAC donations directed at pro-Israel or anti-BDS political campaigns have been identified.5758

Institutional partnerships, state sponsorships, and brand diplomacy are similarly absent. No evidence of Subway accepting Israeli state honours, hosting Israeli government officials in formal non-commercial capacities, maintaining formal partnerships with Israeli state academic or governmental institutions, or sponsoring “Brand Israel” or Israeli government public diplomacy campaigns has been identified.59 Subway’s sports sponsorships — including the NFL and a personal endorsement agreement with Tom Brady (2021–2023) — carry no identified Israeli state alignment.

Financial contributions to Israeli state-aligned organisations are also absent at primary-source level. No evidence of Subway corporate directing donations to the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces (FIDF), the Jewish National Fund (JNF), Israeli parastatal organisations, or settlement-linked groups has been identified.60 The DeLuca Family Foundation focused on entrepreneurship education and health-related causes; no Israel-specific grants were identified in available foundation records.60 Peter Buck’s documented philanthropy emphasises academic and scientific institutions.60 Roark Capital principals Neal Aronson and partners have no verified donations to FIDF, JNF, or settlement groups specifically attributable to their roles in the Subway acquisition, based on Candid/Foundation Center, IRS 990 summaries, and FIDF annual donor publications.60

The franchise architecture’s accountability-diffusion effect is particularly relevant in the political domain. Available reporting noted that some individual Israeli franchisees provided food to communities affected by the October 7 attacks; these were franchisee-level actions and were not documented as corporate directives from Subway IP LLC.453 Subway corporate did not issue any directive, endorsement, or public statement in connection with these franchisee actions. Under the rubric, franchisee-level crisis resource actions that are not attributable to corporate direction are excluded from the political scoring.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The primary counter-argument to the V-POL double-standard finding is that Subway’s Russia exit was driven by reputational risk management and franchise market dynamics rather than a principled geopolitical stance. Under this reading, the silence on Israel-Palestine reflects a different calculation of reputational and commercial risk, not ideological selectivity. This interpretation is plausible but does not undermine the scoring: the rubric classifies the asymmetric outcome (geopolitical action in one case, silence in another) as the double-standard pattern regardless of the motivational explanation. The finding stands on documented behaviour, not on attributed intent.

A second counter-argument concerns the private company disclosure gap. Subway is a privately held company and is not subject to the same political donation disclosure, board composition disclosure, or lobbying transparency requirements as a public company. The clean lobbying and donation record may partly reflect disclosure gaps rather than a comprehensive absence of activity. Specifically, Roark Capital’s LP base and the full range of Roark principal philanthropy are not publicly visible. This structural opacity is a genuine limit on the confidence level for the political findings, though it is balanced by the fact that no signal of such activity has emerged from the available independent sources reviewed (OpenSecrets, Candid, FIDF publications, JNF records).

The absence of executive public statements on the conflict is documented across multiple independent journalistic sources and is assessed as high-confidence.453 The silence is not an absence of evidence but evidence of absence — multiple sources specifically reporting on corporate responses to the conflict document Subway’s non-response.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Relevance Finding
Subway IP LLC / Doctor’s Associates LLC Corporate (subject) Decision-making body No public statement on Israel-Gaza; Russia exit confirmed 3
Roark Capital Group Majority owner Beneficial owner / governance No confirmed Israel-related lobbying or donations 1760
Shefa Group Israeli master franchisee On-the-ground operator Franchisee-level crisis food donations; not attributed to corporate directive 40
John Chidsey CEO (2019–2024) Senior executive No confirmed public statement on conflict 14
Fred DeLuca (estate) Co-founder Minority beneficial owner DeLuca Foundation: entrepreneurship/health focus; no Israel donations 60
Peter Buck Co-founder Minority beneficial owner Academic/scientific philanthropy; no Israel donations 60
National Restaurant Association (trade) Industry lobbying body Lobbying channel Labour/wage/food safety focus; no Israel-related advocacy 5657
BDS National Committee Civil society Boycott targeting Subway not a named formal priority target 54
Friends of the Israel Defense Forces (FIDF) Advocacy organisation Potential donation recipient No Subway or Roark donations identified 60
Jewish National Fund (JNF) Advocacy organisation Potential donation recipient No Subway or Roark donations identified 60
Who Profits Research Center NGO Corporate accountability Subway listed in corporate database 40
UN OHCHR (Business Database) International body Settlement business registry Subway not listed in February 2020 UN database 61
OpenSecrets Transparency database Lobbying / PAC tracking No Subway Israel-related lobbying or PAC activity identified 5658
Candid / Foundation Center Philanthropy database Donation tracking No Israel-related Subway or principal donations confirmed 60

Cross-Domain Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Across all four domains, the franchise architecture functions as the dominant structural constraint on both corporate accountability and evidentiary access. By interposing the master franchisee layer (Shefa Group) between Subway IP LLC and individual store operations, the franchise model means that on-the-ground decisions — ingredient sourcing, community donations, government contracts, location selection in contested areas — are made by entities that are not publicly accountable at the level of the franchisor. This structure is not unique to Subway’s Israel relationship but is particularly salient in the context of a BDS audit because it limits the traceability and attributability of conduct that might otherwise affect all four domain scores.

The current operational status of Israeli franchise operations is the single most consequential unresolved question in this audit. It is the primary driver of V-ECON score uncertainty and affects the political plausibility assessment in V-POL. Confirmation of exit would reduce the composite BDS-1000 score to below 80 and would substantially weaken the double-standard narrative in V-POL (an exit would itself constitute geopolitical corporate action, even if unannounced). Confirmation of continued or expanded operations would modestly strengthen the current scores.

The Adyen/Zooz relationship (V-DIG) represents the most verified Israeli-origin technology connection in the entire audit, but it is passive, indirect, and mediated through a Dutch-headquartered multinational. It does not constitute a direct relationship with any Israeli entity and cannot appropriately be weighted heavily against Subway.

The absence of institutional civil society investigation across all four domains is a meaningful corroborating data point. Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Corporate Occupation, and UN OHCHR reporting have not generated Subway-specific investigations in V-MIL, V-DIG, or V-ECON domains. The Who Profits corporate database does list Subway in a V-POL/V-ECON relevant context (franchise presence), but this listing has not been accompanied by a published investigation documenting specific harmful conduct. The gap between listing and investigation is itself informative.


Named Entities and Evidence Map

Entity Type Domains Key Finding
Subway IP LLC Corporate (subject) All Primary audit target; US-domiciled IP licensor
Doctor’s Associates LLC Corporate (subject) All US operating entity; no Israeli corporate lineage
Roark Capital Group Private equity owner V-ECON, V-POL Majority owner since August 2023; no confirmed Israeli holdings
Shefa Group Israeli master franchisee V-ECON, V-POL Primary Israeli franchise partner; fewer than 20 pre-2020 locations
Adyen Dutch fintech V-DIG Confirmed payments partner; acquired Israeli-founded Zooz (2018)
Zooz Israeli fintech V-DIG Acquired by Adyen 2018; Tel Aviv R&D continues
Capgemini French IT services V-DIG Digital transformation partner; sub-vendor stack not disclosed
Wiz Israeli-founded cloud security V-DIG No primary-source Subway/Roark relationship confirmed
SentinelOne Israeli-co-founded cybersecurity V-DIG AMG Pantheon filing does not confirm Roark direct holding
Bionic.ai / CrowdStrike Israeli-founded ASPM V-DIG Inspire Brands customer claim unconfirmed at primary level
Check Point Software Israeli-founded cybersecurity V-DIG No primary-source confirmation of Subway relationship
CyberArk Israeli-founded identity security V-DIG No primary-source confirmation
PopID (Cali Group) US facial recognition V-DIG US-origin pilot (2020); not Israeli
Oosto (AnyVision) Israeli facial recognition V-DIG No evidence of Subway relationship
Trigo Retail Israeli autonomous checkout V-DIG No evidence of Subway relationship
Shekel Brainweigh Israeli IoT sensors V-DIG Hypothesis only; unconfirmed
IMOD / IDF Israeli state military V-MIL No contract, agreement, or supply relationship identified
SIPRI / SIBAT Defence registries V-MIL Subway not listed
Elbit Systems / IAI / Rafael Israeli defence primes V-MIL No supply chain relationship identified
Who Profits Research Center NGO V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL Subway listed in corporate database; no domain-specific V-MIL investigation
Amnesty International NGO V-MIL No Subway-specific military investigation
Human Rights Watch NGO V-MIL No Subway-specific military investigation
UN OHCHR International body V-POL Subway not in February 2020 settlement business database
National Restaurant Association Trade lobby V-POL Labour/wage focus; no Israel-related advocacy
BDS National Committee Civil society V-POL Subway not a named formal priority target
FIDF / JNF Advocacy organisations V-POL No Subway or principal donations confirmed
Fred DeLuca (estate) Co-founder V-POL DeLuca Foundation: entrepreneurship/health; no Israel grants
Peter Buck Co-founder V-POL Academic/scientific philanthropy; no Israel donations
John Chidsey CEO (2019–2024) V-POL No confirmed public statement on conflict
AMG Pantheon Master Fund Third-party fund V-DIG Does not represent Roark Capital’s direct portfolio

BDS-1000 Score

Domain I M P V-Score
V-MIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V-DIG 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.07
V-ECON 3.50 3.50 5.50 0.96
V-POL 2.50 2.50 8.50 0.76

V_MAX (V-ECON): 0.96 → scaled to 1.37 in composite formula
BDS-1000 Composite Score: 98
Tier: E (0–199)

V-ECON dominates the composite as the highest V-Domain Score, reflecting the franchise presence in Israel generating recurring (if minor) royalty flows outward to the US parent. V-POL contributes the second-largest component: the combination of low Impact and Magnitude (documented omission, not active advocacy) with high Proximity (the silence is a direct corporate decision by Subway IP LLC with no intermediary) produces a structurally distinctive result — a real but modest political finding. V-DIG contributes negligibly, consistent with Subway’s posture as a buyer of US-origin commercial technology. V-MIL contributes nothing; the zero is stable and high-confidence.


Confidence, Limits, and Open Questions

High-confidence findings:
– V-MIL zero score: comprehensive absence across all sub-categories, consistent with Subway’s product domain
– Russia exit (March 2022) and documented absence of any Israel-Gaza statement: corroborated across multiple independent sources
– Adyen/Zooz Tel Aviv R&D linkage: confirmed at primary-source level via joint press release and Adyen careers pages
– Absence of formal BDS priority designation and absence of OHCHR February 2020 database listing

Moderate-confidence findings:
– Pre-2020 Israeli franchise footprint (<20 locations, Shefa Group master franchisee): confirmed in available sources but not verified with granularity
– V-DIG incidental band scoring: well-supported by Customer Cap and Directionality Rule; residual uncertainty from MSSP/FDD opacity

Low-confidence or unresolved questions:
1. Current operational status of Israeli franchise operations: the single most important open question. Exit would reduce the composite score to below 80.
2. Israeli franchise locations and settlement presence: whether any Subway locations operate within Area C of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Israeli settlements has not been definitively documented. Who Profits lists Subway but has not specifically catalogued individual outlet locations by settlement status.
3. Franchisee-level ingredient sourcing: whether settlement-origin produce enters Israeli franchise supply chains via franchisee procurement decisions cannot be confirmed or excluded from available public sources.
4. Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendor stack: the MSSP opacity gap means Israeli-origin tools (e.g., Check Point, CyberArk) cannot be confirmed or excluded without access to Subway’s current FDD or vendor contracts.
5. Roark Capital LP base: institutional LP exposure to Israeli assets cannot be confirmed or excluded from public information.


The following recommended actions are tied to the validated score, domain evidence, and documented uncertainty levels. They are presented in descending order of evidential grounding.

Operational status verification (V-ECON, high priority): The single most impactful research action would be confirming the current status of Subway’s Israeli franchise operations — whether they are active, suspended, or permanently exited. This determination is achievable through the Israel Franchise Association public records, Israeli trade press (Haaretz, Globes, Times of Israel), or direct contact with the Shefa Group. Resolution of this gap would either reduce the composite score materially (if exited) or confirm the current scoring (if active). Any campaign or investment decision premised on the V-ECON score should treat this as an open question until resolved.

V-MIL settlement supply chain audit (V-MIL, medium priority, contingent): The question of whether Israeli franchise ingredient sourcing includes settlement-origin produce cannot be resolved without a primary-source supply chain audit. This would require engagement with the Shefa Group or its sub-franchisees, or access to a supply chain audit conducted by an NGO with on-the-ground presence. The expected scoring impact is modest (V-MIL would remain zero even if settlement-origin sourcing were confirmed; V-ECON would see minor upward pressure), but transparency value is high.

Vendor stack disclosure request (V-DIG, medium priority): Given the MSSP and FDD opacity gaps, a formal request to Subway for disclosure of its enterprise security vendor relationships — particularly any Israeli-origin cybersecurity platforms — would reduce the residual uncertainty in V-DIG. In the absence of such disclosure, institutional investors or coalition partners should apply the existing moderate-confidence V-DIG score without assuming worst-case Israeli-origin exposure.

Political engagement on double standard (V-POL, low-medium priority): The documented Russia/Israel asymmetry is the strongest narrative lever available to civil society actors. A targeted public campaign requesting a corporate statement or operational policy clarification on Israel-Gaza — anchored specifically in the Russia exit precedent — would have higher probability of generating a response than a general boycott appeal, given that it is grounded in the company’s own prior conduct rather than external normative demands.34 The absence of any lobbying activity on Israel-related policy also means that advocacy-focused engagement (requesting Subway to explicitly oppose anti-BDS legislation) could create reputational leverage without requiring a formal policy reversal.

Monitoring for score-change triggers: The composite score of 98 is sensitive to three developments that should be monitored: (a) confirmation of Israeli franchise exit (score would fall below 80; Tier E unchanged but weakens advocacy case); (b) identification of a primary-source Israeli-origin cybersecurity vendor relationship (modest V-DIG uplift; composite likely remains Tier E); (c) public corporate statement on the Israel-Gaza conflict or announcement of operational changes (would require re-assessment of V-POL band).


End Notes


  1. Reuters — Roark Capital closes Subway acquisition — https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/roark-capital-closes-acquisition-subway-2024-03-08/ 

  2. Bloomberg — Subway sold to Roark Capital, $9.6 billion — https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-23/subway-is-sold-to-roark-capital-for-about-9-6-billion 

  3. Reuters — Subway closes Russia restaurants — https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/subway-closes-russia-restaurants-2022-03-09/ 

  4. The Guardian — Fast food chains, Israel-Gaza war, boycotts — https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/nov/10/fast-food-chains-israel-gaza-war-boycotts 

  5. Subway corporate — Company history — https://www.subway.com/en-US/AboutUs/History 

  6. Wikipedia — Subway Israel franchise history — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subway_Israel 

  7. Times of Israel — Subway coverage — https://www.timesofisrael.com/topics/subway/ 

  8. PR Newswire — Subway–Adyen North America payment partnership (2019) — https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/subway-restaurants-partners-with-adyen-to-advance-its-payment-experience-in-north-america-locations-300994192.html 

  9. Capgemini — Subway digital transformation case study — https://www.capgemini.com/news/client-stories/subway-drives-digital-transformation-to-deliver-a-better-brand-experience/ 

  10. Restaurant Business Online — Subway Project Future initiative — https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/financing/subway-future-initiative-heres-what-you-need-know 

  11. Kiosk Industry — NCR Aloha POS outage — https://kioskindustry.org/aloha-outage/ 

  12. The Guardian — Google, Amazon, Israeli government cloud contract, Project Nimbus — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/may/10/google-amazon-israeli-government-cloud-contract-project-nimbus 

  13. Reuters — Boycotts hit American fast-food chains Middle East — https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/boycotts-hit-american-fast-food-chains-middle-east-2023-11-08/ 

  14. Restaurant Business Online — Subway CEO John Chidsey stepping down — https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/financing/subway-ceo-john-chidsey-stepping-down 

  15. Reuters — Google agrees to acquire Wiz, $32 billion (2025) — https://www.reuters.com/technology/google-agrees-acquire-wiz-32-billion-2025-03-18/ 

  16. FTC — Franchise rule guidance — https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/franchise-rule 

  17. Roark Capital — Portfolio — https://www.roarkcapital.com/portfolio/ 

  18. Forbes — Subway company profile — https://www.forbes.com/companies/subway/ 

  19. Subway corporate — Corporate responsibility — https://www.subway.com/en-US/AboutSubway/CorporateResponsibility 

  20. Israeli Ministry of Defence — English homepage — https://www.imod.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx 

  21. US export.gov — Israel defense industry article — https://www.export.gov/article?id=Israel-Defense-Industry 

  22. Amnesty International — Israel apartheid report (2022) — https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians/ 

  23. Human Rights Watch — Threshold Crossed, Israeli apartheid report (2021) — https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution 

  24. SIPRI — Arms industry databases — https://www.sipri.org/databases 

  25. Who Profits — Subway company page — https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3699 

  26. Who Profits — Agri-food sector database — https://whoprofits.org/sectors/agri-food/ 

  27. Calcalist Tech — Adyen acquires Zooz — https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3743622,00.html 

  28. Adyen — Tel Aviv office careers page — https://www.adyen.com/careers/offices/tel-aviv 

  29. Stackshare — Inspire Brands technology stack — https://stackshare.io/inspire-brands/inspire-brands 

  30. SEC EDGAR — AMG Pantheon Master Fund Schedule of Investments — https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1609212/000114554925015850/amgpantheonmastersoi_1224.htm 

  31. Globes — CrowdStrike acquires Bionic.ai, $350 million — https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-crowdstrike-to-acquire-israeli-co-bionicai-for-350m-1001458181 

  32. PYMNTS — PopID payments technology in restaurants (2020) — https://www.pymnts.com/restaurant-technology/2020/how-payments-tech-found-application-restaurants-recovery/ 

  33. Oosto — Company overview — https://oosto.com/ 

  34. Trigo Retail — Company overview — https://www.trigoretail.com/ 

  35. Subway newsroom — Non-traditional concepts expansion (2022) — https://newsroom.subway.com/2022-11-14-Subway-R-Expands-Its-Non-Traditional-Presence-Through-Flexible-and-Innovative-Concepts 

  36. The Guardian — Google, Amazon, Israeli government cloud, Project Nimbus — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/may/10/google-amazon-israeli-government-cloud-contract-project-nimbus 

  37. Check Point Software — About us — https://www.checkpoint.com/about-us/ 

  38. CyberArk — Company overview — https://www.cyberark.com/company/ 

  39. Shekel Brainweigh — Retail solutions — https://shekel.com/retail/ 

  40. Who Profits — Subway company page — https://whoprofits.org/company/subway/ 

  41. Subway corporate — Franchise ownership — https://www.subway.com/en-US/OwnAFranchise 

  42. Delaware ICIS — Corporate registry — https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ 

  43. PitchBook — Roark Capital investor profile — https://pitchbook.com/profiles/investor/11340-11 

  44. Who Profits — Mehadrin company page — https://whoprofits.org/company/mehadrin/ 

  45. Who Profits — Hadiklaim Israel Date Growers Cooperative — https://whoprofits.org/company/hadiklaim-israel-date-growers-cooperative/ 

  46. Who Profits — Agri-food sector database — https://whoprofits.org/sectors/agri-food/ 

  47. The Guardian — UK supermarkets Israeli settlement produce labelling — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/12/uk-supermarkets-israeli-settlement-produce-labelling 

  48. Oxfam UK — Supermarkets and settlement produce blog — https://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam-in-action/oxfam-blog/supermarkets-and-settlement-produce/ 

  49. Start-Up Nation Central — Corporate partner finder — https://finder.startupnationcentral.org/ 

  50. Subway corporate — About Subway, our story — https://www.subway.com/en-US/AboutUs/OurStory 

  51. BDS Movement — Boycott list — https://bdsmovement.net/get-involved/what-to-boycott/ 

  52. QSR Magazine — Global franchise group — https://www.qsrmagazine.com/outside-insights/global-franchise-group/ 

  53. Al Jazeera — Fast food chains boycotted over Israel-Gaza war — https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/11/15/which-fast-food-chains-are-being-boycotted-over-israel-gaza-war 

  54. BDS Movement — Act now against complicit companies — https://bdsmovement.net/Act-Now-Against-These-Complicit-Companies 

  55. Middle East Eye — Boycott Israel fast food brands — https://www.middleeasteye.net/economy/boycott-israel-fast-food-mcdonald-kfc-subway-starbucks 

  56. OpenSecrets — Restaurant industry lobbying — https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus?ind=G2300 

  57. OpenSecrets — National Restaurant Association PAC summary — https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/national-restaurant-assn/C00003566/summary/2024 

  58. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act database — https://lda.senate.gov/system/public/ 

  59. UN OHCHR — HRC Session 43 resolutions and decisions — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/res-dec-stat 

  60. Candid / Foundation Center — Philanthropy database — https://candid.org/ 

  61. UN OHCHR — HRC Session 46 reports — https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session46/list-reports