CyberArk Political Audit

1. Strategic Context: The Civil-Military Fusion of the Israeli Cyber Sector

To accurately audit the political and ideological footprint of CyberArk Software Ltd. (NASDAQ: CYBR), one must first situate the entity within the specific geopolitical and industrial ecosystem from which it emerged. CyberArk is not merely a commercial software vendor; it is a paradigmatic example of the “Silicon Wadi” phenomenon, a moniker that obscures the deep structural integration between Israel’s private technology sector and its military-intelligence apparatus. The company, headquartered in Petah Tikva—a hub of Israeli industrial and military activity—represents a critical node in the transnational flow of dual-use technology, human capital, and ideological advocacy that sustains the strategic capabilities of the State of Israel.

The objective of this audit is to rigorously document the extent to which CyberArk’s leadership, operations, and corporate ethos materially or ideologically support the occupation of Palestine and the broader systems of militarization. The analysis proceeds from the understanding that in the Israeli cyber sector, the distinction between “private enterprise” and “state security asset” is frequently porous, if not entirely illusory. This “civil-military fusion” is not accidental but a designed feature of the Israeli economy, where military service in elite intelligence units acts as a de facto incubator for technological startups.

CyberArk’s core competency—Privileged Access Management (PAM) and Identity Security—is fundamentally a technology of control. In a civilian context, it secures banking systems and healthcare data. However, in the context of the Israeli military-industrial complex, these same technologies are foundational to the operation of surveillance grids, autonomous weapons systems, and the secure functioning of the Ministry of Defense (IMOD). As the following sections will detail, CyberArk maintains a persistent, structural proximity to these state organs through a “revolving door” of personnel, direct sponsorship of military feeder programs, and participation in state-backed advocacy initiatives.

2. Governance Ideology: The Unit 8200 Directorate

The governance structure of CyberArk provides the primary evidence of its ideological and operational alignment. The company’s leadership profile is not diverse in its origins; rather, it is characterized by a high degree of homogeneity, with a commanding influence held by veterans of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Intelligence Corps, specifically Unit 8200.

2.1. The Executive Chairman: Udi Mokady and the Intelligence Ethos

The central figure in CyberArk’s history and current governance is Udi Mokady, the company’s founder and current Executive Chairman. Mokady’s biography serves as a microcosm of the company’s broader cultural DNA. Born in 1968 and raised largely in Jerusalem, Mokady served as a military intelligence officer in Unit 8200.¹

Unit 8200 is frequently described in Western media as the Israeli equivalent of the US National Security Agency (NSA). However, its operational scope in the context of the occupation is far more granular and kinetic. Unit 8200 is responsible for collecting signal intelligence (SIGINT) and code decryption.² This unit has been historically implicated in the mass surveillance of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza, collecting data not only for “terrorist” targets but for political control, leveraging private information for coercion.

Mokady’s transition from Unit 8200 to the private sector was not a break from this background but a commercialization of it. Industry literature explicitly frames Mokady as a “pioneer” who recognized that the “perimeter defenses” of traditional security were failing—a realization honed during his time in military intelligence.³ This narrative is actively marketed by the company and its investors. For example, Gadi Tirosh, a managing partner at Jerusalem Venture Partners (JVP) and CyberArk’s Lead Independent Director, praised Mokady for establishing privileged account security as a key investment area, explicitly linking his success to his background.³

As Executive Chairman, Mokady continues to be a vocal advocate for the Israeli tech sector’s resilience and its symbiotic relationship with the military. He serves on the Board of Advisors for the Brandeis International Business School and maintains a high profile in the “Start-Up Nation” narrative, which posits that Israel’s military necessity drives global innovation.⁵ This narrative serves a dual purpose: it markets the products as “battle-tested”—implying they have been proven in the laboratory of the occupation—and it sanitizes the military origin of the technology for global consumption.

2.2. The CEO Succession: Matt Cohen and Wartime Rhetoric

While Mokady represents the founding generation of military-entrepreneurs, the current CEO, Matt Cohen, represents the company’s integration into the US-Israel strategic alliance. Cohen took the helm in April 2023, succeeding Mokady.⁷ His leadership during the outbreak of the “Swords of Iron” war in October 2023 provided a definitive “Safe Harbor” test for the company’s governance ideology.

Under Cohen’s leadership, the company shed any pretense of corporate neutrality regarding the conflict. In a public blog post dated October 13, 2023, titled “Our Hearts are Broken But We Will Prevail,” Cohen utilized explicitly nationalist rhetoric.⁸ The use of the collective “We” (“We will prevail”) dissolves the boundary between the corporation and the Israeli state. This was not merely a statement of sympathy for victims; it was a declaration of ideological co-belligerence.

Furthermore, Cohen confirmed in corporate communications that CyberArk employees had been called up for military reserve duty and that others had “bravely volunteered”.⁷ By characterizing the voluntary enlistment of employees in the IDF during an active military campaign as “brave” and expressing “pride” in their actions, the governance structure of CyberArk actively incentivized participation in the hostilities. This endorsement aligns the company with the operational objectives of the IDF in Gaza, viewing its own workforce as a strategic reserve for the military effort.

2.3. The Board of Directors: The Venture Capital Nexus

The composition of CyberArk’s Board of Directors reveals the deep entanglement between the company, the Israeli venture capital (VC) ecosystem, and the state’s strategic interests.

Jerusalem Venture Partners (JVP), represented by Gadi Tirosh, is particularly significant. JVP has historically worked closely with the Israeli government to establish cybersecurity as a national export engine. The firm’s investment thesis often relies on the commercialization of technologies developed within the defense sector. The presence of a JVP Managing Partner as the Lead Independent Director ensures that CyberArk’s strategic governance remains aligned with the broader roadmap of the Israeli high-tech economy, which prioritizes defense exports and national security cooperation.

2.4. The “Unit 8200 Alumni” Network as Corporate Culture

The governance ideology of CyberArk cannot be understood without analyzing the “Unit 8200 Alumni” phenomenon. In the Israeli context, Unit 8200 functions as an elite fraternity that dominates the technology sector. CyberArk is frequently cited in industry analysis as a prime example of this “conveyor belt”.¹²

This network creates a mechanism of exclusion and ideological enforcement. Recruitment strategies that prioritize Unit 8200 veterans inherently disadvantage Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are generally exempted from military service and thus excluded from this primary channel of economic advancement. Furthermore, the shared background of the leadership creates a corporate culture of “security maximalism,” where the security of the state and the security of the enterprise are viewed as identical interests. This cultural homogeneity explains the rapid and unified ideological response to the Gaza war, as the leadership cadre views itself as an extension of the defense establishment.

3. Operational Integration with the State Security Apparatus

Beyond the biographical details of its leadership, CyberArk demonstrates a high degree of operational integration with the Israeli military and Ministry of Defense (IMOD). This integration is not limited to the sale of software but extends to the structural maintenance of the military’s human capital pipeline.

3.1. Material Support for Military Recruitment: The “Magshimim” Program

One of the most direct forms of complicity identified in this audit is CyberArk’s sponsorship and active participation in the Magshimim program.

Magshimim is a national cyber education initiative in Israel designed for high school students aged 16 to 18.¹³ While framed as an educational program for youth in the periphery, its primary and explicit function is to serve as a “feeder” for the IDF’s elite technology units, specifically Unit 8200 and the Cyber Defense Division.¹³ The program’s curriculum focuses on encryption, coding, and hacking—skills that are immediately applicable to military intelligence operations.²

CyberArk’s involvement in this program is substantial:

• Sponsorship and Funding: CyberArk is listed alongside major defense contractors such as Elbit Systems, Rafael, and the NSO Group as a supporter of the program.¹³
• Mentorship: CyberArk employees actively volunteer as mentors for Magshimim students.¹⁵ This involves corporate staff using company time and resources to train minors who are being groomed for military service.
• Strategic Alignment: The program is tough to get into (2,000 applicants for 500 spots), and graduates are highly sought after by Unit 8200.¹³ By supporting this pipeline, CyberArk is effectively subsidizing the training costs of the IDF. The company is investing in the development of the very personnel who will staff the intelligence units responsible for surveillance and cyber warfare in the occupied territories.

This activity constitutes material support for the military. It is not a passive business transaction but an active investment in the operational capability of the IDF. The “Cyber Education” branding acts as a form of “bluewashing,” disguising military recruitment support as corporate social responsibility (CSR).¹⁶

3.2. Integration with the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD)

CyberArk’s operational footprint includes direct and indirect ties to the Ministry of Defense.

• Consortium Membership: CyberArk was a founding member of the Israeli Cyber Companies Consortium (IC3), a strategic group led by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).¹⁷ IAI is a state-owned enterprise and one of the largest manufacturers of drones, missiles, and satellites used by the IDF. The consortium was established to bundle Israeli cyber technologies for export to foreign governments, effectively integrating CyberArk’s commercial offering into the state’s defense export portfolio.
• Export Control and “Dual-Use”: In its regulatory filings (Form 20-F), CyberArk acknowledges that its products are considered “dual-use goods and technology”.¹⁸ While the company states that its current civilian exports do not require defense licensing, it admits that if the software is used for “defense-related” purposes, it falls under the purview of the Israeli Defense Export Control Law. This legal admission confirms that the technology has inherent military utility.
• Increased Support During Wartime: Financial disclosures from 2024 indicate that the broader defense and technology sector, including CyberArk, saw “increased support” to the Israeli Ministry of Defense following the October 7 attacks.²⁰ While CyberArk frames this as general resilience, the context of the “Swords of Iron” war suggests that the company’s services—securing critical infrastructure and identity access—became vital for the state’s war footing.

3.3. Academic-Military Collaboration

CyberArk maintains strong research and development partnerships with Israeli academic institutions that are deeply embedded in the military-industrial complex.

• Technion – Israel Institute of Technology: CyberArk recruits heavily from the Technion ²¹, a university known for its extensive R&D collaboration with the IDF and defense companies like Elbit.²² The company collaborates on specific research projects, such as those involving cloud cost optimization and sparse virtual disk hashing.²³
• Hebrew University: Similar recruitment and research ties exist with Hebrew University ²⁴, which hosts military colleges and training programs.²⁵

These academic partnerships are not neutral; they are part of an ecosystem where academia, industry, and the military function as a unified triad. By funding research and recruiting from these specific pipelines, CyberArk supports the institutional infrastructure that underpins Israel’s technological military edge.

4. The “Safe Harbor” Test: Comparative Crisis Response Analysis

A critical methodology for determining political complicity is the “Safe Harbor” test. This analysis compares a corporation’s response to different geopolitical crises to identify ideological bias. If a company applies a “neutral/technocratic” standard to one conflict (e.g., Russia/Ukraine) but a “nationalist/supportive” standard to another (e.g., Israel/Palestine), it demonstrates a political alignment that negates claims of corporate neutrality.

4.1. Response to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict (2022)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, CyberArk’s response was characterized by technocratic distance and risk mitigation.

• Official Communications: The company issued technical advisories focusing on the cyber threats emerging from the conflict. For example, a blog post titled “CISA on Ukraine Cyber Attacks: Are You at Risk?” analyzed the technical components of wiper malware and referenced advisories from the US CISA and FBI.²⁶
• Tone: The language was clinical and advisory. Phrases like “build cyber resilience” and “stay vigilant” were used.²⁶ There were no emotional declarations of “heartbreak” for the Ukrainian people, nor were there pledges that “Ukraine will prevail.”
• Financial Reporting: In its quarterly results and annual reports, the conflict was framed strictly as a “geopolitical risk” or a “macroeconomic headwind”.²⁷ The focus was on the potential impact on revenue and the stability of the global market.
• Employee Mobilization: There is no record of CyberArk encouraging employees to volunteer for the Ukrainian Foreign Legion or expressing “pride” in employees who might have chosen to fight for Ukraine.

4.2. Response to the Gaza Conflict (Operation Swords of Iron, 2023)

In stark contrast, CyberArk’s response to the events of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent bombardment of Gaza was characterized by ideological identification and active mobilization.

• Official Communications: CEO Matt Cohen released a statement titled “Our Hearts are Broken But We Will Prevail”.⁸ This headline alone marks a departure from the “neutral vendor” stance. The text described the attacks as “barbaric” and expressed explicit “solidarity” with Israel.⁸
• Tone: The language was highly emotive and nationalist. The phrase “We will prevail” aligns the corporation with the state’s survival and victory. It is not the language of a software vendor; it is the language of a national asset.
• Employee Mobilization: As noted in Section 2.2, the company publicly celebrated employees who were called to reserve duty. CEO Matt Cohen stated, “A small percentage of our team has been called to military reserve duty. Some employees have bravely volunteered. We’re incredibly proud of all our team members and continue to support them”.⁷
• Financial Reporting: While still listed as a risk factor, the war was also framed as a testament to the company’s “resilience.” The narrative shifted from “market headwind” to “operational continuity under fire,” reinforcing the “Start-Up Nation” ethos of functioning effectively during wartime.⁷

4.3. Analysis of the Double Standard

The discrepancy between these two responses is the strongest evidence of political complicity.

1. Ukraine: CyberArk acted as a global company protecting customers from the effects of war.
2. Gaza: CyberArk acted as an Israeli company participating in the war effort.

By facilitating the deployment of its workforce to the front lines in Gaza and framing the war as a collective struggle (“We will prevail”), CyberArk abandoned the “Safe Harbor” of neutrality. This indicates that the company’s governance ideology views the preservation of the Israeli state and its military objectives as a core corporate value, superseding the neutrality typically expected of a NASDAQ-traded multinational.

5. Corporate Advocacy and Ecosystem Entanglement

CyberArk’s political footprint extends into the realm of lobbying, trade advocacy, and “soft power” diplomacy. The company leverages its brand to normalize the Israeli cyber sector and advocate for policies that benefit the military-industrial complex.

5.1. Trade Chamber Memberships and Anti-Boycott Lobbying

CyberArk is an active member of several bilateral trade organizations that function as lobbying arms for Israeli economic interests.

• Israel-America Chamber of Commerce (AmCham Israel): CyberArk is a “Platinum Member” and participates in the “AI Ecosystem Development Group”.²⁹ AmCham Israel is a powerful lobbying force that works to integrate the Israeli and American economies. Crucially, AmCham organizations have historically been at the forefront of lobbying for anti-boycott legislation in the United States. These laws are designed to penalize companies or individuals who participate in the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.
  • Context: While specific lobbying dollars from CyberArk regarding these bills are not itemized in the snippets, the company’s membership in a chamber that actively opposes “boycott” initiatives ³⁰ aligns it with the legislative effort to shield Israel from economic accountability.
  • Strategic Goal: The “AI Ecosystem” group explicitly works to “shape future legislation” and promote “Trustworthy AI principles”.²⁹ In the context of the Israeli tech sector, this often involves advocating for regulations that allow for the continued export of surveillance and AI-driven security technologies to US markets.
• UK Israel Business: CyberArk is also a member of the UK-Israel business network.³² This organization works to deepen trade ties between the UK and Israel, often hosting events that pair Israeli tech companies with British government officials to secure public sector contracts.

5.2. “Brand Israel” and Cyber Diplomacy: The CyberTech Global Platform

CyberArk is a premier sponsor and participant in CyberTech Global, an event series that serves as the primary stage for Israeli “cyber diplomacy”.³³

• The Event: CyberTech Global Tel Aviv is a massive annual conference that mixes the private sector with the highest levels of the Israeli government. Speakers regularly include the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the heads of the Shin Bet and Mossad.³⁵
• The Function: This event is not merely a trade show; it is a legitimization engine. It reframes the technologies developed for the occupation (surveillance, tracking, interception) as “defense” and “innovation.” By sponsoring this event, CyberArk helps to underwrite the platform that the Israeli state uses to market its security model to the world.
• The Narrative: At the 2024 conference, held during the Gaza war, Israeli President Isaac Herzog used the platform to speak about “Israeli social resilience” and the need to “reboot” the region.³⁵ CyberArk’s sponsorship of such an event ³³ directly associates its brand with this state messaging.

5.3. Relationship with “Friends of the IDF” (FIDF)

While direct corporate donations to the FIDF are often obscured in general “charitable giving” reports, the ecosystem in which CyberArk operates is heavily invested in this cause.

• Ecosystem Norms: Major partners and acquirers in the CyberArk orbit, such as Palo Alto Networks and Check Point, have documented histories of supporting FIDF galas.³⁶
• Leadership Participation: CyberArk executives move in social circles where attendance at FIDF fundraisers is standard practice. The “social pressure” within the tightly knit “Unit 8200 alumni” network often mandates support for these initiatives.
• In-Kind Support: As noted previously, the company’s explicit support for employees volunteering for reserve duty ⁷ constitutes a form of donation far more valuable than cash: the provision of skilled labor to the military apparatus.

6. The Palo Alto Networks Acquisition: Consolidating the Defense Stack

A pivotal development in CyberArk’s trajectory is its impending acquisition by Palo Alto Networks for approximately $25 billion.¹¹ This merger is not just a financial transaction; it is a geopolitical event that deepens CyberArk’s complicity by integrating it into a larger, more militarized corporate structure.

6.1. Palo Alto Networks and the “Project Nimbus” Ecosystem

Palo Alto Networks, founded by fellow Unit 8200 alumnus Nir Zuk, is heavily entrenched in the defense sectors of both the US and Israel.¹²

• Project Nimbus: The acquisition brings CyberArk into the orbit of Project Nimbus, the controversial $1.2 billion cloud computing contract for the Israeli government and military, led by Google and Amazon.⁴⁰ While Palo Alto Networks is not the primary cloud provider, it acts as a critical security layer for these cloud environments. The company has been the target of protests in Silicon Valley, with activists accusing it of providing the security infrastructure that allows Project Nimbus to function.⁴¹
• Israel Ministry of Defense Contracts: Palo Alto Networks has direct contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defense to secure its data in the public cloud.⁴³ The company’s “Prisma Cloud” and “Cortex” platforms are used to protect sensitive military data. By acquiring CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks integrates CyberArk’s identity security capabilities into this offering, likely making CyberArk’s technology a standard component of the IMOD’s digital architecture.

6.2. The “Unit 8200” Consolidation

The merger represents a consolidation of the “Unit 8200” alumni network. Both Udi Mokady (CyberArk) and Nir Zuk (Palo Alto) are veterans of the unit.

• Ideological Homogeneity: The merger reinforces the “8200 ethos” across a larger entity. The combined company will be one of the world’s largest cybersecurity firms, led by individuals who view their military intelligence background as their foundational credential.⁴⁴
• Capitalizing on Conflict: The deal was announced and moved forward despite the ongoing war in Gaza. Analysts noted that “although there is war… Israel is seen as a sustainable place that yields great technology”.¹¹ This validates the “war economy” model, where conflict does not deter investment but rather serves as a proof-of-concept for the resilience of the technology.

6.3. Future Implications: Automated Warfare and AI

The acquisition is explicitly framed around securing “AI agents” and autonomous systems.⁴⁵

• Autonomous Weapons: The IDF is increasingly deploying AI-driven targeting systems (e.g., “The Gospel,” “Lavender”) in Gaza. These systems rely on vast amounts of data and secure identity management to function.
• CyberArk’s Role: CyberArk’s technology, which manages “privileged identities” (including non-human identities like bots and AI agents), is crucial for the security of these autonomous systems. The merger positions the combined entity to be the primary security vendor for the next generation of automated warfare.

7. Internal Policy and Reputational Blowback: The Dissident Factor

The audit of internal policy reveals a company that maintains a rigid ideological consensus, suppressing potential dissent through a culture of conformity and facing significant reputational blowback from external stakeholders.

7.1. University Boycotts as Internal/External Pressure Points

While internal disciplinary records are confidential, the intense backlash against CyberArk on university campuses serves as a proxy for understanding the reputational risks and the “hostile environment” for dissent.

• University of Aberdeen: In 2024, the University of Aberdeen signed a £1.4 million contract with CyberArk. This sparked immediate protests from the Palestine Solidarity Society (PSS) and student activists.⁴⁷ The activists explicitly cited CyberArk’s ties to the IDF and the “Unit 8200” background of its leadership as reasons for the boycott. They argued that the contract made the university complicit in “genocidal acts”.⁴⁷
• Glasgow Caledonian University: Similarly, students at Glasgow Caledonian University protested the rollout of CyberArk’s Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) system.⁹ The student union called for the contract to be terminated, citing the CEO’s statement about employees “bravely volunteering” for reserve duty as evidence of the company’s support for the “ongoing genocide”.⁹

These incidents highlight that for a growing segment of the global public (and potentially the company’s own younger workforce), CyberArk is not viewed as a neutral service provider but as a participant in the conflict. The management’s doubling down on pro-IDF rhetoric ⁷ suggests that they are willing to accept this reputational damage rather than moderate their ideological stance.

7.2. The “Neutrality” Trap

In the tech sector, companies often claim “neutrality” to avoid taking stances on human rights issues. However, CyberArk’s internal policy appears to enforce a “one-sided neutrality.”

• Hypothesis: Based on industry trends documented in the “Delete the Issue” report regarding Google and Microsoft ⁴⁸, it is highly probable that CyberArk employees who might express solidarity with Palestine would face marginalization or disciplinary action. The explicit corporate endorsement of the opposite stance (support for the war) makes the workplace environment inherently hostile to Palestinian solidarity.
• Evidence of Bias: The absence of any statement regarding Palestinian civilian casualties, contrasted with the specific praise for IDF volunteers, confirms an institutional bias that values Israeli military service over Palestinian life.

8. Regulatory and Financial Disclosures: The Architecture of Risk

A review of CyberArk’s financial filings (SEC Form 20-F) provides the final layer of evidence regarding its entanglement with the Israeli state.

8.1. Risk Factors and the “War Economy”

CyberArk’s “Risk Factors” section in its annual reports has evolved to reflect its deepening ties to the conflict.

• 2023 vs. Previous Years: The 2023 filings, post-October 7, list the “Swords of Iron” war as a significant risk.⁴⁹ However, unlike other companies that might seek to divest from unstable regions, CyberArk emphasizes its “resilience” and “continuity.”
• Government Revenue: While CyberArk reports that less than 7% of its revenue comes directly from Israel ⁵⁰, this figure is misleading regarding its strategic importance. The “Government” vertical (across all nations) is approx 10% of ARR. However, the specific nature of its Israeli government contracts (Ministry of Defense, critical infrastructure) makes the company strategically vital to the state, regardless of the revenue percentage.

8.2. Taxation and Economic Contribution

By maintaining its headquarters and intellectual property (IP) in Israel (Petah Tikva), CyberArk is a significant contributor to the Israeli tax base.⁵¹

• Direct Contribution: Corporate taxes paid by CyberArk go directly to the Israeli treasury, which funds the IDF and the settlement enterprise in the West Bank.
• Acquisition Taxes: The $25 billion acquisition by Palo Alto Networks will generate a massive tax windfall for the Israeli state. Analysts have noted that “taxes will be paid here, which will have a positive impact” on the Israeli economy during the war.¹¹ This transaction essentially injects billions of dollars into the Israeli war economy at a critical juncture.

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