Ahava MILITARY

Request ID: 9b1f1e4a-5dbd-409e-94b6-67529eeba248 Target: Ahava–Dead Sea Laboratories Ltd. / AHAVA Research cut-off: 30 September 2026

This audit records identified evidence and bounded search results. “no public evidence identified” means that this review did not establish the specified relationship; it is not a finding that no such relationship exists. Historical evidence is marked [pre-2020]. Online availability does not establish continuation of the activity described.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Ministry of Defence and IDF relationships

October–November 2023 - named military recipients. Ahava’s Hebrew corporate statement, published on 8 November 2023, says that it reached combat areas and supplied essential products to Givati’s Shaked Battalion, Division 99 and an unnamed paratrooper battalion. In translated wording, it states: “we also reached combat zones.” The statement also describes civilian and medical donations. It does not disclose product quantities, values, purchasing terms, delivery receipts or precise military delivery locations.¹

ICE reported the same three military recipients on 25 October 2023. Its report refers to skincare donations and uses company-provided imagery. This corroborates the contemporaneous published account, but does not independently establish receipt by the units.²

Undated; publicly available at the research cut-off - Ministry of Defence gift-pack testimonial. Ahava’s business-to-business page offers gift packs for conferences, employees, overseas visitors and official visits. A customer testimonial thanks the company for received boxes and is labelled, in Hebrew, “Ministry of Defence.” This is company-published evidence of a claimed gift-pack customer relationship. No date, purchaser identity, procurement instrument, value or recurring supply term is provided.³

Contracts and procurement awards: no public evidence identified of a named tender award, framework agreement, memorandum of understanding or otherwise identifiable paid procurement contract with IMOD or the IDF. The testimonial and 2023 supply account do not establish those instruments.^{1, 3}

Other security bodies: no public evidence identified of contracts or deliveries to the Israel Prison Service, Border Police or another named Israeli state security body in the reviewed records.^{1, 3}

Defence directories, exhibitions and official announcements

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of an Ahava entry in a SIBAT defence-export directory, a defence exhibition catalogue or a defence procurement registry. A complete authenticated registry search was not available.

The identified corporate military announcement is the 2023 product-support statement. No public evidence identified of a defence joint venture, weapons-development partnership or government announcement identifying a separate Ahava military cooperation agreement.^{1, 3}

Ownership, principals and group scope

2016 [pre-2020]; acquisition subsequently documented. Fosun announced an agreement to acquire a “100% equity interest” in Ahava for NIS290 million. The named sellers included Gaon Holdings, the Livnat family, Shamrock Israel Growth Fund Advisors, Kibbutz Mitzpe Shalem and Kibbutz Kaliaan. Fosun’s 2018 annual report subsequently documented 100% equity ownership.^{4, 5}

2019 [pre-2020]; historical operational engagement, present continuation unknown. Fosun’s 2019 ESG report identified Ahava as one of four pilot companies implementing operational-excellence programmes. This is evidence of historical group operational engagement, separate from legal ownership.⁶

2022–2024. Fosun’s 2022 annual report places Ahava among Yuyuan’s brands. Yuyuan’s 2024 environmental, social and governance reporting also retains Ahava in the group’s consumer-business context. These disclosures establish group and environmental-management context, not a defence supply chain.^{7, 8}

2024 ownership snapshot, published 2025. Fosun’s annual report identifies Guo Guangchang as chairman and founder, Wang Qunbin as co-chairman and founder, and Chen Qiyu and Xu Xiaoliang as co-CEOs. Fosun International Holdings was owned 85.29% by Guo and 14.71% by Wang; the associated controlling-shareholder chain held approximately 72.76% of listed Fosun’s shares at year-end 2024. These are dated ownership disclosures, not an assertion of an unchanged September 2026 percentage.⁹

Public management page reviewed September 2026. Fosun continues to identify Guo, Wang, Chen and Xu in its leadership structure; its biographies describe Xu’s Yuyuan directorship.¹⁰

Principal military-channel acts: no public evidence identified in the reviewed material of a verified Ahava/Fosun principal act involving an Israeli defence-prime directorship, FIDF donation, reservist-fund donation, identifiable defence-prime equity holding or personally attributable military supply programme. A complete current Ahava governance roster and exhaustive investigation of every Fosun director’s personal vehicles remain unavailable.^{9, 10}

Group-attribution limit. Fosun’s historical operational-programme disclosure does not establish that all Fosun siblings share Ahava’s military deliveries.⁶

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Product purpose and military-specific modification

2023. The military-recipient statement concerns essential products within a broader skincare-donation account. It does not identify tactical variants, military specifications, ruggedisation, contract modifications or purpose-built military formulations.^{1, 2}

Undated; reviewed September 2026. The business-gifting page markets standard skincare gift packs and custom pack assembly. Custom packaging is not evidence of a militarised product formulation.³

2008–2012 [pre-2020]; project closed. The European Commission’s CORDIS record identifies Ahava as coordinator of SKIN TREAT, grant 213202, concerning personalised skin treatments. The project ended on 31 August 2012. Its dermatological and nanotechnology work does not establish targeting, weapons guidance or another kinetic military purpose.¹¹

Militarised products: no public evidence identified of a ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec or defence-grade Ahava product line sold to Israeli security forces.^{1, 3, 11}

Civilian-to-military distinction

The verified 2023 company account identifies military recipients. That supports a product-support channel to military formations, while leaving itemisation and delivery terms unresolved. It does not establish that a product was designed for military use or procured under a defence contract.^{1, 2}

End-user certification and export licensing

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of Ahava-specific military end-user certificates, defence export-licence applications or export-control reviews relating to Israeli military or security recipients. The identified domestic product-support statement does not supply an export-licensing record.¹

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Historical settlement operations

2011 [pre-2020]; historical observation. B’Tselem’s Dispossession and Exploitation report describes Ahava’s cosmetics enterprise at Mitzpe Shalem and its use of Dead Sea mud. This records civilian production and resource exploitation, not manufacture or supply of demolition machinery.¹²

20 November 2018 [pre-2020]; historical operations confirmed by a primary institutional source. The European Commission stated: “AHAVA does have operations in the settlement Mitzpeh Shalem.” Its answer also identified operations at Ein Gedi. It required Ahava’s Horizon 2020 project activities to remain outside territories occupied since June 1967 and described monitoring of PEPTICAPS. This establishes historical locations and research-funding conditions, not a checkpoint or military-construction contract.¹³

UN database status

26 September 2025. OHCHR’s A/HRC/60/19 lists Ahava–Dead Sea Laboratories Ltd. and Fosun International Ltd. under category (g), concerning the use of natural resources for business purposes. The listed category does not establish arms supply, security equipment or a military construction contract.¹⁴

Current operation claims and contrary evidence

2026 - disputed settlement activity. AFSC describes continued activity at Mitzpe Shalem in its 5 June 2026 company profile. That settlement-operation evidence is analytically separate from the documented military product-support channel and does not establish a defence procurement contract.¹⁵

Ahava’s live store directory advertises the Ein Gedi factory/visitor centre and lists the Mitzpe Shalem factory/visitor-centre entry as temporarily closed. A visitor-centre closure does not independently resolve the current operational status of the Mitzpe Shalem site.¹⁶

Requested military-infrastructure subcategories

Equipment, vehicles and machinery: no public evidence identified of Ahava equipment used for settlement construction, demolition, barrier works or military-installation construction. The historical cosmetics operations do not establish those uses.^{12, 13}

Direct versus indirect equipment supply: no public evidence identified of an Ahava machinery sale, authorised-dealer supply or secondary-market resale into those activities.

End-use monitoring: no public evidence identified of an Ahava military-equipment end-use monitoring policy.

Construction and engineering contracts: no public evidence identified of contracts to construct, service or expand checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier or settlement infrastructure.^{14, 12, 13}

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Review through September 2026 - components and manufacturing services: no public evidence identified of Ahava supplying components, subsystems, specialist manufacturing services or raw materials to Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael or IMI/Elbit Land.

Specific categories: no public evidence identified of optical, electronic, propulsion, structural, guidance, communications or armour components supplied by Ahava to those firms.

Joint development, co-production and licensing: no public evidence identified of a defence-firm joint-development programme, co-production agreement, technology-transfer arrangement or licensed military manufacturing relationship.

The identified gift-pack channel concerns a Ministry of Defence-labelled testimonial. It does not identify a defence-prime customer or production input. The identified research project concerns skin treatments.^{3, 11}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Product support to military personnel

2023; later continuation unknown. Ahava’s statement establishes a company-reported distribution of products to three military formations. It does not identify a base-services agreement or disclose whether deliveries were made to permanent bases, field positions or another distribution point.¹

Geography: The statement refers to combat areas without supplying exact military delivery locations. No public evidence identified tying those deliveries to a West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights or Negev installation.¹

Service contracts

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of Ahava contracts for military catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications or detention-centre support.

The Ministry of Defence gift-pack testimonial is recorded as a limited customer indication, not a facilities or logistical-services contract.³

Shipping, freight and ports

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of Ahava shipping, freight-forwarding or port-handling contracts specifically servicing military cargo, arms shipments or Israeli defence logistics. Ordinary cosmetics distribution is not sufficient to establish such a relationship.^{3, 5}

Reservists and charitable matching

November 2023. Ahava says some employees were called up to reserve service and that employees helped distribute products. The statement does not disclose reservist salary supplements, an employer subsidy policy, eligible matched-donation charities or a FIDF contribution.¹

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of those specific employer-payment or matching arrangements.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal platforms: no public evidence identified of Ahava manufacturing or licensing small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels or another lethal platform for Israeli forces.

Munitions and precursors: no public evidence identified of ammunition, explosives, chemical propellants, warhead components or munitions precursor supply to Israeli defence end-users.

Strategic systems: no public evidence identified of Ahava manufacture, integration, maintenance or component supply for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, tanks, warships or ballistic missiles.

Critical subsystems: no public evidence identified of guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar, propulsion or warhead casings calibrated for lethal or strategic systems.

The identified civilian skin-treatment research and donated products do not establish those roles.^{1, 11}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Military export licensing and enforcement

Review through September 2026: no public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending or revoking an Ahava export licence for Israeli military/security end-users.

Arms embargoes and sanctions: no public evidence identified of an Ahava-specific investigation, enforcement citation or judicial review concerning arms-embargo compliance or military export controls.

OHCHR’s 2025 database inclusion is a settlement-activity finding within that database’s mandate; it is not an arms-export sanction or procurement judgment.¹⁴

Settlement-related scrutiny distinguished from defence licensing

2013 [pre-2020]; historical scrutiny. Human Rights Watch discussed EU research grants to Ahava and the application of settlement-related funding eligibility rules. That publication concerned research funding and settlement location, not an arms export licence.¹⁷

2018 [pre-2020]. The Commission’s answer recorded settlement operations, territorial conditions on project activities and planned reinforced monitoring. It did not report a defence export enforcement action.¹³

2016 [pre-2020]; current procedural status unverified. AFSC records Ahava as a defendant in the Al-Tamimi settlement-related civil litigation. Its account is evidence that litigation was reported, not proof of the allegations or a judgment establishing Ahava military supply.¹⁵

Continuation after the specified 2024 notice thresholds

Military product support: no public evidence identified sufficient to establish continuation of the documented 2023 donations after 19 July 2024 or after November 2024. Continued online availability of the 2023 statement is not evidence of another delivery.¹

Settlement activity: The 2025 UN listing and AFSC’s 2026 observations concern periods after both thresholds. They document subsequent scrutiny and disputed activity; they do not demonstrate an ongoing military contract, military delivery or the company’s receipt of a particular warning.^{14, 15}

Target-specific notices: no public evidence identified of a shareholder resolution, employee letter or sanctions notice specifically demanding termination of the named 2023 military product-support channel.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO and UN findings

2011 [pre-2020]. B’Tselem documents the Ahava cosmetics operation within its examination of Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea resource exploitation. This is settlement/resource evidence, not a finding of weapons manufacture.¹²

2025. OHCHR lists Ahava and Fosun for category (g) activity. The original report is cited through a retrievable mirror.¹⁴

2025 report reviewed. A/HRC/59/23 was inspected, including its discussion of military and associated corporate activity. No public evidence identified in that report establishing an Ahava-specific military supply relationship. This is a bounded report-review result, not an assertion that every underlying citation excludes Ahava.¹⁸

2026. AFSC’s investigation concerns alleged continued settlement operations. That evidence is recorded in section 3 and is not treated as proof of a defence contract.¹⁵

Other requested organisations: no public evidence identified in the targeted discovery searches of PAX, SOMO, BankTrack, Don’t Buy Into Occupation or Amnesty that establishes a target-specific military supply finding. Complete inspection of every requested report was not achieved; no absence from those organisations’ entire output is asserted.

Boycott, divestment and exclusion

Historical campaigns [pre-2020]; present institutional status not established here. AFSC records organised boycott and exclusion activity directed at Ahava because of settlement production and resource exploitation. These stated grounds must not be relabelled as a demonstrated defence-contract campaign.¹⁵

Military-specific campaigns: no public evidence identified of an institutional divestment or exclusion decision specifically based on the three named 2023 military recipients.

Corporate response

Defence-channel response: no public evidence identified of an Ahava statement terminating the documented military product-support channel, cancelling a verified military contract or adopting a military end-use monitoring commitment.^{1, 3}