Etihad Airways MILITARY

Target: Etihad Airways PJSC and relevant group entities

Research date: 22 October 2026

Scope: Israeli defence procurement, military-related freight, dual-use supply, military infrastructure, defence-industry integration, regulatory history and civil-society scrutiny.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Corporate identity and ownership

On 18 October 2022, the Abu Dhabi Media Office announced the transfer of full ownership of Etihad Aviation Group to ADQ, an Abu Dhabi-based investment and holding company.¹

Etihad’s corporate disclosures identify Etihad Airways PJSC, Etihad Aviation Group PJSC, Etihad Guest LLC, Etihad Airways Center of Excellence LLC and Etihad Aviation Training LLC among its principal UAE VAT group entities.²

Etihad’s published leadership information identifies Mohamed Ali Mohamed Al Shorafa Al Hammadi as chairman, Mansour Mohamed Abdulqader Mohamed Al Mulla as vice chairman and Antonoaldo Neves as group chief executive.³

Israeli commercial aviation agreement

On 19 November 2020, Etihad Airways and EL AL Israel Airlines announced a memorandum of understanding covering potential codeshare operations, loyalty-programme cooperation, engineering, cargo services and aircraft maintenance, including opportunities involving Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv.⁴

On 1 July 2021, the airlines announced the launch of their commercial codeshare network and reciprocal frequent-flyer benefits, with flights available under the arrangement from 18 July 2021.⁵

Etihad’s July 2021 announcement stated that the earlier memorandum also covered exploration of maintenance, repair and overhaul, pilot and crew training, and cargo opportunities, which the parties were progressing.⁵

The agreements publicly describe commercial aviation cooperation, without identifying the Israel Ministry of Defense, IDF or another military organisation as a contracting party or named customer.^{4, 5}

Israeli aviation registration

The Israel Airports Authority lists Etihad Airways as an airline operating through Ben Gurion Airport, identifies its IATA code as EY and names Aero Handling Co. as its local ground-services provider.⁶

Israeli military procurement context

The Israel Ministry of Defense announced contracts with Elbit Systems worth approximately NIS 1 billion on 7 January 2025, including the supply of heavy aerial munitions and the establishment of domestic raw-material production capacity.⁷

A further Israeli Ministry of Defense announcement on 11 August 2025 identified an approximately $260 million agreement with Elbit Systems for domestically manufactured aerial munitions.⁸

Neither reviewed procurement announcement identifies Etihad Airways as a supplier, contractor or logistics provider.^{7, 8}

Direct Israeli defence contracts

No public evidence identified of an Etihad Airways contract, tender award, framework agreement or defence-specific memorandum with the Israel Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service or Israeli Border Police.

Defence trade directories

No public evidence identified of Etihad Airways being listed as an Israeli defence exporter or supplier in the SIBAT materials examined.

Principal-specific military-channel activity

No public evidence identified establishing a personal Israeli defence-industry investment, Israeli military procurement role, FIDF donation or comparable military-channel act by a named Etihad controlling principal.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Civilian aviation services

Etihad’s November 2020 memorandum with EL AL identified commercial aircraft engineering, cargo transportation and maintenance cooperation as potential areas of collaboration.⁴

Etihad’s 2021 annual operating-results announcement reported approximately 729,200 tonnes of cargo carried across its international network.⁹

These disclosures establish commercial aviation and freight capabilities but do not identify purpose-built weapons systems, military-targeting products or tactical aircraft variants supplied to Israeli forces.^{4, 9}

Military-related cargo investigation

A civil-society investigation published on 29 July 2025, “Exposing Canadian Military Exports to Israel”, identified Etihad Airways among airlines involved in transporting shipments the researchers classified as military-related Canadian exports to Israel.¹⁰

The investigation’s airline comparison attributed four involved flight legs to Etihad Airways, within a broader investigation of 47 shipments and more than 100 associated flights.¹⁰

The published flight count does not independently identify four separate Etihad weapons shipments, and the publicly examined material did not establish the precise commodities carried on those four Etihad flight legs.¹⁰

On 2 August 2025, Canadian foreign minister Anita Anand publicly disputed several findings in the investigation, including the classification of certain projectiles, allegations about mortar shipments and claims concerning explosive materials aboard passenger aircraft.¹¹

The Canadian government’s response stated that explosive materials such as bullets or other munitions are not transported on passenger aircraft, directly contesting part of the investigation’s description of the wider air-freight network.¹¹

The public documents examined therefore establish a specific published allegation involving Etihad flight legs, while leaving the cargo classification and any Etihad-operated carriage of weapons unresolved.^{10, 11}

Military-specified products

No public evidence identified of Etihad manufacturing or marketing militarised product variants specifically for Israeli forces.

Military targeting software

No public evidence identified of Etihad supplying autonomous targeting software, fire-control AI, kill-chain automation or weapons-integration software to Israeli military customers.

End-user certification

No public evidence identified of an Etihad-specific military end-user certificate or export-control approval for Israeli defence customers.

For the shipment departing Calgary on 18 June 2024, Table 5 identifies the physical goods as a “Gps Receiver” supplied by Novatel to WaldyTech. For the shipment departing on 11 June 2025, it identifies an “NXT Fixture” supplied by Inova Geophysical to Niron Systems. The accompanying discussion associates Inova’s products with seismic equipment and describes the shipment in the context of components for Niron Systems. The published descriptions establish the reported product categories, but neither entry supplies a technical datasheet, serial number, controlled-goods classification or demonstrated military configuration. The designation “Elbit parts” in the report’s accompanying discussion cannot independently establish the final application of the specific NXT fixture.¹⁰

The distinction between the two shipment descriptions matters when assessing whether the Etihad-attributed activity involved munitions. Neither of the two Abu Dhabi-routed entries is described as ammunition, explosives, cartridges or weapons. Both concern technical equipment or components. Their potential relevance to military systems derives from the documented recipient relationships and the investigators’ interpretation of the supply chain. The published records do not establish an explosive payload, combat-specific modification or actual use in hostilities for either consignment.¹⁰

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Corporate activity

Etihad’s published operations concern passenger aviation, freight transportation and related aviation services, while its corporate tax disclosure identifies the group entities relevant to those operations.^{2, 9}

Etihad’s current corporate disclosure specifically states that Etihad Airways Engineering LLC ceased being part of the Etihad Airways group in 2022, requiring any subsequent activities of that company to be assessed against its separate corporate position.²

Equipment in occupied territories

No public evidence identified of Etihad-owned construction machinery, vehicles or engineering equipment being used to build or maintain Israeli settlements, checkpoints, the separation barrier or military infrastructure in occupied territory.

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of Etihad holding contracts for settlement construction, military-base construction, detention facilities, demolition operations or infrastructure expansion.

Direct versus indirect supply

No public evidence identified establishing Etihad as a direct or indirect supplier of machinery used in settlement construction or demolition.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Israeli defence-industry procurement

The Israeli Ministry of Defense identified Elbit Systems as a contracting party for two major domestic defence programmes in January 2025, including aerial munitions and raw-material production capacity.⁷

In August 2025, the Ministry separately announced an approximately NIS 900 million agreement with Elbit Systems for aerial munitions manufactured in Israel.⁸

In November 2025, the Ministry announced a major procurement order involving Rafael Advanced Defense Systems for expansion of Iron Dome production.¹²

The November announcement identified Rafael as the prime contractor and described relevant collaboration involving ELTA Systems, part of Israel Aerospace Industries, and mPrest.¹²

None of these reviewed procurement announcements establishes Etihad as a component supplier, manufacturer, systems integrator or subcontractor.^{7, 8, 12}

Defence exhibition relationships

The Israeli Ministry of Defense identified Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, Elbit Systems, SCD and Ophir Optronics among the Israeli companies participating in ADEX 2025 in Seoul under SIBAT coordination.¹³

A separate February 2025 Israeli Ministry of Defense announcement identified Israel Aerospace Industries, Elbit Systems, Rafael, D-Fend, Orbit and Controp among companies exhibiting at Aero India 2025.¹⁴

Neither reviewed exhibition announcement identifies Etihad Airways as participating in the Israeli defence delegation or supplying its exhibitors.^{13, 14}

Component supply to Israeli defence manufacturers

No public evidence identified of Etihad providing components, raw materials, avionics, propulsion systems, targeting electronics or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael or other Israeli defence primes.

Joint development and co-production

No public evidence identified of Etihad participating in Israeli weapons development, licensed weapons manufacturing, military technology transfer or defence-system co-production.

The two Abu Dhabi-routed shipments have identifiable commercial counterparties. Table 5 records Inova Geophysical as exporter and Niron Systems as Israeli recipient for the June 2025 shipment. It identifies Novatel as exporter and WaldyTech as recipient for the June 2024 shipment. These named recipients distinguish the shipments from unidentified general commercial freight. The investigation describes Niron Systems as an Israeli defence contractor developing avionics and weapon-delivery systems, while describing WaldyTech as a local supplier serving Israeli defence companies, including Elbit Systems and Rafael. The latter relationships provide defence-industry supply-chain context but do not establish that the particular Novatel shipment was subsequently delivered to Elbit, Rafael or an Israeli military unit.¹⁰

The shipment descriptions provide evidence of specialised technical components entering Israeli companies associated with defence supply channels, but they do not identify an ultimate military purchasing authority, procurement contract, production batch or final installed system. The investigation’s assessment that the technologies support military guidance and targeting represents an inference from the products and recipient relationships. It is not equivalent to documentary confirmation that either consignment entered a particular weapon, military aircraft or operational deployment.¹⁰

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Documented commercial operations in Israel

Etihad announced the launch of scheduled Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv passenger services on 6 April 2021, following the normalisation of UAE–Israel diplomatic relations.¹⁵

The Israel Airports Authority identifies Etihad as an airline operating through Ben Gurion Airport, with Aero Handling Co. providing its ground services.⁶

An Israeli news report published on 10 April 2026 stated that Etihad planned to resume Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv operations from 15 April 2026, initially providing two daily flights.¹⁶

Commercial cargo volumes

The Israel Airports Authority’s October 2025 statistical report attributed 172 tonnes of passenger-aircraft cargo to Etihad Airways at Ben Gurion Airport, comprising 105 tonnes inbound and 67 tonnes outbound.¹⁷

The same report recorded 136 tonnes for the corresponding month in October 2024, showing that the published cargo statistics cover periods after both 19 July 2024 and November 2024.¹⁷

These statistics establish cargo movements involving Israel but do not identify individual cargo types, military consignees, weapons manufacturers or defence end users.¹⁷

Military-related shipping allegation

The July 2025 investigation of Canadian military exports identified Etihad among airlines appearing in reconstructed transportation routes for shipments classified by the investigators as military-related.¹⁰

The investigation reported that moving 47 identified shipments required more than 100 flights and that 64 involved commercial passenger aircraft.¹⁰

Its airline breakdown identified four Etihad flight legs, establishing a specific, publicly documented allegation concerning Etihad’s place in the investigated transport network.¹⁰

The investigation did not provide sufficient independently examined Etihad-specific shipment documentation in the material reviewed to determine the precise military classification of cargo on those four flight legs.¹⁰

The Canadian foreign minister’s August 2025 response contested aspects of the investigation, including the description of allegedly explosive or lethal cargo transported on passenger flights.¹¹

Israeli military airlift

On 26 August 2024, the Israeli Ministry of Defense announced that 500 aircraft had participated in a military supply airlift involving more than 50,000 tonnes of equipment, including ammunition, armoured vehicles and protective equipment.¹⁸

On 27 May 2025, the Ministry announced that the operation had reached 800 aircraft movements and more than 90,000 tonnes of transported military equipment.¹⁹

The Ministry identified its defence procurement and transport authorities, the Israeli Air Force and the IDF’s planning organisations as participants in the military airlift.^{18, 19}

Neither announcement identifies Etihad Airways as an aircraft operator or logistics contractor for that programme.^{18, 19}

Military installation support contracts

No public evidence identified of Etihad providing catering, fuel, maintenance, transportation or facilities services under contract to IDF bases, detention centres or military training installations.

Occupied-territory logistics

No public evidence identified of Etihad-operated military freight, transport services or base support specifically destined for installations in the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan Heights.

Shipping and freight contracts

No public evidence identified of a disclosed Etihad contract specifically requiring the transportation of weapons or military equipment to Israeli defence end users.

The investigation’s shipment tables provide a narrower basis for examining Etihad’s four attributed flight legs. Table 5, on page 11, identifies two shipments routed through Abu Dhabi (AUH): Novatel to WaldyTech, departing Calgary (YYC) on 18 June 2024 and arriving in Tel Aviv (TLV) on 20 June 2024; and Inova Geophysical to Niron Systems, departing Calgary on 11 June 2025 and arriving in Tel Aviv on 26 June 2025. Both routes are recorded as YYC > AUH > TLV. Figure 7, on page 12, independently reproduces this routing pattern as two shipments. Each itinerary contains two air legs, making four potential flight legs. This provides a plausible numerical reconciliation with Figure 17’s four Etihad-attributed flights, but the published tables do not explicitly associate those four individual legs with Etihad.¹⁰

Figure 17, on page 38, expressly identifies Etihad Airways (EY) and assigns it four involved flights. The figure provides an airline identifier and aggregate count, but no flight numbers, aircraft registrations, air waybill numbers, scheduled departure times or shipment-to-flight cross-reference. Tables 1–6 identify routes, departure dates, arrival dates, exporters, recipients and commodity descriptions without identifying the operating carrier for each sector. Consequently, the four-flight attribution is documented as an investigative finding, while independent confirmation of which individual sectors Etihad operated remains unavailable from the published evidence. Routing through Abu Dhabi alone cannot establish Etihad carriage.¹⁰

June 2024–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed investigation, its shipment tables, airline comparison and Canadian regulatory disclosures did not provide underlying air waybills, cargo manifests, flight numbers, aircraft registrations or carrier-issued delivery confirmations linking Etihad individually to either Calgary–Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv shipment. The reported departure and arrival dates establish shipment-level chronology in the investigation, but cannot establish the actual operating dates of the intervening flights or whether a different airline operated any sector.^{10, 11}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal systems manufacturing

Etihad’s published corporate identity and operating disclosures describe an aviation business encompassing passenger services, freight and related aviation operations.^{2, 9}

No public evidence identified of Etihad manufacturing small arms, military drones, armoured vehicles, artillery systems, missile systems or other lethal military platforms.

Munitions and precursor materials

The July 2025 investigation identified Etihad among the airlines associated with its reconstructed routes for military-related Canadian exports to Israel.¹⁰

The investigation attributed four involved flight legs to Etihad but did not, in the material examined, establish a verified Etihad-specific list of explosives, ammunition or warhead components.¹⁰

The Canadian foreign minister subsequently disputed the investigation’s claims concerning particular weapons categories and explosive cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft.¹¹

No independently verified Etihad-specific shipment record identifying munitions or explosive precursor materials was established from the available documentation.^{10, 11}

Strategic defence platforms

The Israeli Ministry of Defense’s November 2025 announcement identified Rafael as the Iron Dome prime contractor and named its collaborating defence-system companies.¹²

That announcement does not identify Etihad Airways as a manufacturer, systems integrator, maintenance contractor or supplier of Iron Dome components.¹²

No public evidence identified of Etihad manufacturing, integrating or servicing Israeli fighter aircraft, missile-defence systems, main battle tanks, warships or ballistic missile systems under a defence contract.

Critical sub-systems

No public evidence identified of Etihad supplying purpose-built guidance electronics, fire-control components, military radar equipment, propulsion systems, warhead casings or autonomous targeting technologies to Israeli armed forces.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Canadian export-control restrictions

Canada’s official 2024 strategic-goods report describes its January 2024 decision to stop issuing new permits for military items intended for Israel and its subsequent suspension of certain existing permits.²⁰

Canada’s 2025 strategic-goods report states that no new export permits had been approved since 8 January 2024 for arms that could be used in the Gaza conflict, and that the relevant suspended permits had expired.²¹

Government briefing material published for the 27 November 2025 parliamentary appearance stated that only two permits had been approved in the broad military-goods category during the relevant period, relating to parts for Israel’s Iron Dome system.²²

These Canadian government materials describe regulatory treatment of military exports to Israel but do not identify Etihad as the applicant or holder of a relevant export permit.^{20, 21, 22}

Disputed allegations concerning Canadian exports

On 2 August 2025, Canada’s foreign minister rejected several allegations made in the July 2025 civil-society investigation, including claims concerning the classification and movement of particular weapons-related items.¹¹

The government stated that exporters of controlled goods require valid permits and that violations could result in fines, seizures or criminal prosecution.¹¹

The minister’s published statement did not identify Etihad Airways as the subject of an export-control enforcement action.¹¹

Etihad-specific export licences

No public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending or revoking an Etihad-specific military export licence for Israeli defence end users.

Sanctions and embargo enforcement

No public evidence identified of an Etihad-specific sanctions citation, arms-embargo enforcement decision or export-control prosecution relating to military shipments to Israel.

Judicial proceedings

No public evidence identified of a judicial decision, court proceeding or government enforcement determination establishing that Etihad unlawfully transported weapons or supplied Israeli military forces.

The Canadian foreign minister’s response of 2 August 2025 specifically contested three claims from the wider investigation: that certain identified projectiles were conventional bullets rather than paintball-style projectiles accompanied by equipment intended to prevent normal firearm operation; that Canadian manufacturers had shipped mortars to Israel after the relevant permit suspensions; and that explosive materials such as ammunition were transported aboard passenger aircraft. The statement also asserted that no new permits had been approved since January 2024 for controlled goods usable in Gaza and that relevant existing permits remained suspended. It did not identify Etihad, Novatel, Inova Geophysical, WaldyTech, Niron Systems or the two Calgary–Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv shipments. Consequently, the government’s specific commodity rebuttals do not resolve the identity of the carrier or the technical-goods descriptions in those two entries.¹¹

The 2025 Canadian strategic-goods annual report supplies subsequent regulatory context. It states that the government continued its policy of withholding new arms-export permits for items that could be used in Gaza and that all permits suspended in 2024 had expired. Its statistical tables nevertheless record C$14,671,705.14 in military-goods exports to Israel during 2025, 50 permits utilised and two permits issued. The distinction between permits restricted because of potential use in Gaza and other controlled military-goods authorisations is therefore material. These aggregate figures do not identify the exporters, products, operating carriers or end users involved in the two Abu Dhabi-routed shipments.²¹

The November 2025 Canadian parliamentary briefing and the 2025 strategic-goods report demonstrate that the government continued to address export authorisations and restrictions after publication of the civil-society investigation. Neither document supplies an Etihad-specific shipment determination or establishes that the two identified consignments were cancelled, reversed, delivered under a particular permit or subsequently repeated. The 2025 annual report also records continuing litigation concerning Canadian military exports to Israel as of 31 December 2025, without identifying Etihad as a party to the proceedings.^{21, 22}

June 2025–October 2026 - no public evidence identified: the reviewed investigation, ministerial response, parliamentary briefing and annual strategic-goods disclosures do not establish a later Etihad-specific termination agreement, residual freight obligation, outstanding military-delivery commitment, enforcement finding or independent confirmation of continuing carriage under the two identified shipment arrangements. The investigation reports shipment arrival dates of 20 June 2024 and 26 June 2025, but underlying proof of delivery and Etihad-issued carriage documentation were unavailable in the reviewed public sources.^{10, 11, 21, 22}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

July 2025 military exports investigation

The civil-society report “Exposing Canadian Military Exports to Israel”, published on 29 July 2025, examined Israeli import information and commercially available shipment records to investigate Canadian military exports.¹⁰

The report identified 47 shipments and reconstructed a transport network involving more than 100 flight legs, including 64 attributed to commercial passenger flights.¹⁰

Etihad Airways was expressly named among airlines participating in the investigated shipping network, with its airline comparison attributing four involved flight legs to Etihad.¹⁰

The investigation’s general assertion that the identified transportation network moved military-related cargo cannot establish the exact commodity on each Etihad flight without access to the corresponding shipment documentation.¹⁰

Canadian government response

On 2 August 2025, Canadian foreign minister Anita Anand described several claims in the July investigation as misleading or factually incorrect.¹¹

The statement disputed the identification of certain projectiles as bullets, rejected claims concerning recent mortar shipments from Canadian manufacturers and denied that explosive materials such as ammunition were transported aboard passenger aircraft.¹¹

These objections directly affect interpretation of the investigation’s military-cargo categories, although they do not independently identify the commodities carried on the four Etihad flight legs.^{10, 11}

United Nations reporting and settlement-company scrutiny

A September 2026 UN Human Rights Council proceeding described the continuing maintenance of the OHCHR database of businesses involved in activities linked to Israeli settlements, including reassessment and removal of companies where warranted.²³

No public evidence identified establishing Etihad Airways’ inclusion in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-related material.

No public evidence identified establishing that the report A/HRC/59/23 specifically named Etihad Airways as a military supplier.

Boycott and divestment campaigns

The July 2025 civil-society investigation expressly named Etihad Airways in its analysis of military-related shipment routes to Israel.¹⁰

No public evidence identified of a named institutional divestment decision, pension-fund exclusion or organised Etihad-specific campaign based on a proven contract with the Israeli defence sector.

Corporate responses

Etihad’s published statements establish its commercial cooperation with EL AL, including the passenger codeshare and proposed aviation-services collaboration.^{4, 5}

No public evidence identified of an Etihad corporate statement specifically responding to the July 2025 Canadian military exports investigation.

No public evidence identified of an Etihad announcement terminating a confirmed Israeli defence contract or establishing a military-specific end-use monitoring commitment in response to civil-society pressure.

The July 2025 investigation relies on two different evidentiary sources: commercially available shipping records for 47 traced shipments and Israeli Tax Authority import information covering a substantially larger population of transactions. The individual shipment tables derive from the commercial-shipping investigation, whereas the tax authority material provides broader evidence of imports by commodity classification. Figure 17 aggregates airline involvement across the reconstructed transport network. These evidence sets cannot be treated as interchangeable: an Israeli import classification does not independently identify the operator of a particular flight, and the Etihad airline count does not establish which items from the wider import dataset it transported.¹⁰

The report’s Calgary entries permit a specific distinction between an identified shipment, a reconstructed route and an attributed airline. The exporter, recipient, commodity description and overall departure/arrival dates are published at shipment level. The airport sequence is published at route level. Etihad’s four-flight count is published at aggregate airline level. Matching the two Abu Dhabi itineraries to the four Etihad flights is arithmetically consistent, but the published material lacks the shipment-specific carrier identifiers required to establish that correspondence conclusively.¹⁰