INDEX / DIRECTORY / LOCKHEED MARTIN

Lockheed Martin

Defense & Aerospace 194 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-22 METHOD V6.5
BDS-1000 Score 868 /1000 A Tier A - Extreme
Military ↗ 9.50 Digital ↗ 0.00 Economic ↗ 6.50 Political ↗ 7.20
OWNERSHIP TREE 17 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Military: Lockheed Martin supplies and services Israel’s F-16 and F-35 fleets; Israel’s F-35 procurement proceeds principally through U.S. Foreign Military Sales, while an Israeli-funded F-35I software-upgrade contract is separately reported.1, 2
  • Economic: The industrial-cooperation agreement extended through 2029 requires reinvestment of 35% of new contract value in Israeli industry; reporting states more than $4 billion has been invested since 2005.3
  • Political: Lockheed Martin’s shareholder-proposal filings frame its products as critical to Israel’s self-defence, while CEO James Taiclet was reported to describe regional conflict demand as a commercial opportunity.4, 5
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin operations, dealerships, resellers, or direct commercial activity specifically located in West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights settlements.6

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameLockheed Martin Corporation
JurisdictionMaryland, United States
HeadquartersBethesda, Maryland, United States
SectorAerospace, defence, missiles, rotary-wing aircraft, mission systems, space, information technology and cybersecurity
OwnershipPublicly traded corporation. As of 2 March 2026, State Street was disclosed at 14.9%, Vanguard at 8.9%, and BlackRock at 7.4%.7
Key Executives / GovernanceJames D. Taiclet, Chairman, President and CEO; Frank A. St. John, COO; Evan T. Scott, CFO; Timothy S. Cahill, President of Missiles and Fire Control; Kevin J. O’Connor, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary.7
Israeli-Nexus SummaryA U.S. defence prime with an Israeli subsidiary, major F-35 and other military-platform relationships with Israel, industrial-cooperation commitments, and documented partnerships with Israeli defence firms.

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Lockheed Martin’s documented Israel/Palestine nexus is centred on the supply, sustainment, adaptation and industrial integration of military aircraft, missiles, air-defence systems and associated support. Israel’s acquisition of F-35 aircraft is principally a U.S. government-to-government Foreign Military Sales arrangement, rather than a conventional direct commercial procurement contract with Lockheed Martin. Israel signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance for a third F-35 squadron of 25 aircraft, reportedly valued at roughly $3 billion, and its government approved a fourth squadron in 2026.1, 10 Lockheed Martin also reportedly received an Israeli-funded $11.4 million contract to upgrade F-35I “Adir” software through 2030.2

The strongest documented vector is military. The audit record includes Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and F-35 supply and servicing role, its Hellfire missile manufacture, Sikorsky helicopter programmes, C-130J deliveries, and collaborations with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems.11, 12, 13 Amnesty International has characterized the F-16 and F-35 fleets as central to Israeli Air Force operations during the bombardment of Gaza; this is an advocacy and human-rights organization’s assessment, not a judicial finding against Lockheed Martin.11 The record also contains litigation concerning government export licensing for F-35 components, including UK and Dutch proceedings; these proceedings concerned government licensing decisions and do not establish that Lockheed Martin itself was found non-compliant.14, 15

Economic and institutional ties are also substantial. The Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement, extended through 2029, reportedly requires Lockheed Martin to reinvest 35% of new contract value in Israeli industry and is reported to involve more than $4 billion in investment since 2005, including more than $470 million under the current agreement.3 IAI supplies F-35 wing and structural components to Lockheed Martin, while Lockheed Martin has entered defence-technology collaborations with IAI and Rafael.12, 13 The audits also document Tel Aviv and Be’er Sheva-related corporate and research activity, although the current scope and continuity of particular offices, programmes and technology functions are not always established.9, 16

The digital audit supports a narrower conclusion than the military record. It documents historic enterprise-scale use of Cybereason endpoint-security technology after Lockheed Martin’s 2015 strategic investment, and a 2019 agreement under which Lockheed Martin Israel would operate and maintain an F-35 training centre at Nevatim and provide ALIS logistics-support expertise.17, 18 It does not establish current Cybereason deployment status, Israeli data residency, Israeli ODIN deployment, civilian surveillance, target generation, offensive cyber activity, or a Lockheed Martin role in Project Nimbus.17, 18, 19 No public evidence identified of a direct settlement operation, settlement reseller network, or settlement-based facility.

On the fixed human-vetted V6.5 assessment, the company receives a BRS of 868, placing it in Tier A (Extreme Complicity). This result reflects the documented scale and directness of its military supply and Israel-linked industrial integration, rather than an inference that every Israel-related corporate activity is a settlement operation, digital-surveillance programme, or direct contract with every Israeli security body.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
2005Lockheed Martin’s industrial-cooperation relationship with Israel began; subsequent reporting describes the framework as requiring reinvestment in Israeli industry.3
April 2014Lockheed Martin announced an office in Be’er Sheva connected to Israel’s “Move to the South” strategy and related technical projects.16
August 2014Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd. was registered in Israel.9
June 2016Lockheed Martin and Israel marked the rollout of Israel’s first F-35I “Adir.”20
June 2019Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a maintenance agreement with Lockheed Martin Israel for the F-35 training centre at Nevatim, including ALIS support services; the initial term was five years with a possible further five-year option.18
August 2020Lockheed Martin signed an Umbrella Industrial Cooperation Agreement with Israel, reportedly committing 35% reinvestment of new contract value into Israeli companies.21
July 2021Lockheed Martin and IAI announced an agreement to cooperate on integrated air- and missile-defence systems.12
December 2022Lockheed Martin and Rafael announced collaboration on a high-energy laser system associated with an Iron Beam variant for U.S. and other markets.13
June 2024Israel announced a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with the U.S. government for a third F-35 squadron, including support and maintenance services.1
March 2025Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced a Sikorsky agreement for integration of Israeli systems into 12 CH-53K helicopters.22
December 2025Reporting stated that the UICA had been extended through 2029.3
February–May 2026CEO Taiclet was reported to have described Israeli F-35 operational feedback as commercially valuable; Israel also approved a fourth F-35 squadron.5, 10

Corporate Overview

Lockheed Martin Corporation is a Maryland-incorporated U.S. public corporation headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. Its FY2025 filing identifies Aeronautics, Missiles and Fire Control, Rotary and Mission Systems, and Space as its principal business areas.8 The group includes Sikorsky, whose Israel-facing helicopter activity is relevant to the record.22

Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd. is the documented local corporate vehicle. Public information describes business development, programme management connected to Israeli defence contracts, and engagement with Israeli industry and startups. A third-party registry entry identifies the entity as active, but the supplied research did not obtain an official company extract establishing its exact contemporary ownership chain or control structure.9 Lockheed Martin’s public Israel page describes industrial participation and collaboration with Israeli industry and academia; because some of its operational assertions are undated, they do not independently establish that every listed activity remains active in 2026.23

The audit record supports a Tel Aviv presence and a historical Be’er Sheva technology/research presence. It also documents Lockheed Martin’s relationship with Israeli defence-industry partners: Elbit supplies F-35 composite structural assemblies; IAI has F-35 wing-production and missile-defence collaboration; and Rafael has partnered with Lockheed Martin on SPICE-250 and high-energy-laser work.12, 13, 24 These are defence-industrial relationships, not evidence that Lockheed Martin owns those Israeli companies.

No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin operating a consumer franchise, retail channel, dealership network, agricultural supply chain, or settlement-based commercial distribution network. No public evidence identified of the company operating, leasing, or colocating Israeli data-centre infrastructure for cloud-service delivery.6, 19

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s Israel relationship is most directly evidenced through military platforms and their support ecosystems. Israel’s F-35 programme is structured primarily as a U.S. Foreign Military Sales programme. Israel signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance through the U.S. government for a third squadron of 25 aircraft, and Israel subsequently approved a fourth squadron.1, 10 The company separately reportedly received an Israeli-funded contract to upgrade F-35I software through 2030.2

The F-35I “Adir” is an Israeli-customized F-35 configuration. Audit material describes Israeli electronic-warfare and national-customization elements layered onto the baseline aircraft. Israel’s Ministry of Defense also announced a 2019 Nevatim training-centre agreement involving simulation, maintenance, logistics support and ALIS expertise; the evidence establishes the agreement but not its post-option performance, continuation, staffing, data architecture or current status.18, 25

Other documented military links include Lockheed Martin manufacture of Hellfire missiles; historical transfers reported by AFSC; C-130J delivery; and Sikorsky UH-60/S-70 and CH-53K programmes.26, 27, 22 The audit records a reported 2023 transfer of approximately 2,000 Hellfire missiles, based on leaked-document reporting, and a report attributing a strike near al-Shifa Hospital to an R9X variant; the latter attribution was not independently corroborated and should not be treated as established fact.28, 29

Lockheed Martin’s industrial partnerships further connect it to Israeli defence production. Elbit supplies F-35 assemblies to Lockheed Martin. IAI and Lockheed Martin have an air- and missile-defence cooperation arrangement involving Arrow-related production. Rafael and Lockheed Martin have announced collaborations involving a high-energy laser system and the SPICE-250 precision-guided weapon system for the U.S. market.24, 12, 13

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest counter-argument is that core F-35 procurement is U.S. government-to-government Foreign Military Sales, with the U.S. government acting as implementing authority, rather than a direct commercial sale by Lockheed Martin to Israel’s Ministry of Defense.1 This distinction does not negate Lockheed Martin’s manufacturing and sustainment role, but it limits assertions about the contractual form and customer relationship.

No public evidence identified of a direct, non-FMS commercial contract between Lockheed Martin and the Israel Prison Service or Israel Border Police. No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin as prime contractor for small arms, artillery or naval vessels supplied to Israel. No public evidence identified of current active new-build PAC-3 sales specifically to Israel, distinct from broader production arrangements and sales to other customers.30

The UK and Dutch F-35 litigation in the record addressed export licensing and government decision-making. The UK court accepted that parts could be used in breach of international humanitarian law but ruled the challenge non-justiciable; Dutch litigation later required governmental reassessment. Neither proceeding is a finding that Lockheed Martin itself violated export-control law.14, 15

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The evidence supports historical, limited digital and logistics-related links, but not a verified Israeli population-surveillance, targeting, sovereign-cloud or offensive-cyber nexus. In 2015, Lockheed Martin made a $25 million Series B investment in Cybereason and was described as a customer deploying its detection-and-response platform across more than 120,000 endpoints and servers.17 Cybereason described its platform as collecting endpoint and server information for its detection engine. This establishes historical enterprise-scale endpoint-security use, not data processing in Israel, Israeli legal access, or a present deployment.17

The 2019 Nevatim agreement is the most direct Israel-specific digital-support record. Israel’s Ministry of Defense stated that Lockheed Martin Israel would operate and maintain the F-35 training centre and Full Mission Simulator and provide ALIS support services and experts. ALIS was described as an F-35 maintenance-and-logistics information-management system supporting aircraft readiness and availability.18 The public record does not describe civilian surveillance, target generation, intercepted-communications processing or population-data analytics.

ODIN is the F-35 programme’s successor to ALIS and is described by the U.S. Department of Defense as a U.S. government-owned cloud supporting performance monitoring, technical orders, parts and programme-performance information.33 The supplied research does not confirm an Israeli ODIN node, an Israeli transition date, Israeli data residency, or Lockheed Martin Israel ownership or operation of the ODIN cloud.19, 33

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin participating in Project Nimbus or another Israeli sovereign-cloud programme.19 No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin providing Israeli state bodies with standalone AI/ML platforms for automated target generation, computer-vision surveillance, facial recognition, predictive policing, offensive cyber tools or zero-day exploits.19

The current legal and economic status of Lockheed Martin’s Cybereason investment is unverified. A Lockheed Martin Ventures portfolio listing supports continued public presentation of Cybereason as a portfolio company, but does not establish retained shares, voting rights, percentage ownership or current deployment.34 Similarly, the XOS/MDCX collaboration with Israeli company XTEND concerns multi-drone command-and-control experimentation; the retrieved material does not identify an Israeli military customer, Israeli deployment, targeting function or lethal autonomy.35

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The principal economic vector is durable defence-industrial investment and industrial cooperation. Reporting on the UICA extension through 2029 states that Lockheed Martin has invested more than $4 billion in Israel since 2005, including more than $470 million since 2020, and commits to reinvest 35% of new contract value in Israeli industry.3 This is a documented outbound capital and industrial-participation relationship associated with Israel-directed defence contracts.

The record also documents Israeli supply-chain integration. IAI produces F-35 wings for Lockheed Martin, reportedly delivering its 350th wing in February 2026, while Elbit provides F-35 structural assemblies.32, 24 Lockheed Martin’s agreements with IAI and Rafael concern defence-industry cooperation rather than ordinary commercial sourcing.12, 13

The economic audit records historical research and innovation links, including the MIT–Lockheed Martin Seed Fund. MIT’s primary announcement describes early-stage collaboration between MIT researchers and Israeli universities or public research institutions, focused initially on advanced manufacturing. The public primary record does not identify surveillance, targeting, biometric, population-data or deployed weapons outcomes.36 The audit states that the fund was discontinued in 2024 following a divestment campaign, based on campaign reporting; this discontinuation was not independently confirmed by MIT in the supplied record.37

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin sourcing from Israeli agricultural exporters, settlement-origin produce suppliers, consumer-product distributors or retail supply chains. No public evidence identified of settlement-origin product-labelling issues or consumer country-of-origin labelling policies, categories that are not applicable to the company’s defence-aerospace product lines.6

No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin’s corporate treasury holding Israeli-domiciled equities, Israeli sovereign bonds or Israel-focused funds; of underwriting Israeli sovereign debt; of selling Israel Bonds; or of providing insurance underwriting or trade finance to Israeli defence firms. No Israel-market revenue percentage or Israel-specific workforce total was identified in the reviewed filings.8

A reported Lockheed Martin-Bynet “Project 5/9” joint venture to build an IDF communications centre is supported only by a single secondary aggregator in the audit and remains provisional. It should not be treated as independently verified.38

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Lockheed Martin’s documented public posture presents its products as material to Israel’s self-defence. In shareholder-proposal opposition statements, the company described the 7 October attacks in strongly conflict-specific terms and stated that its products are critical to Israel’s ability to defend itself. It characterized a proposed political-activity and human-rights alignment report as intended to embarrass the company and deter defence companies from doing business with Israel.4

The audit also records reported executive comments. In February 2026, Taiclet was reported to have told Israel’s ambassador that Israeli F-35 operational feedback was worth “many billions” to Lockheed Martin. In the April 2026 earnings context, he was reported to have described the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as a “golden opportunity.”5, 39 These reports evidence a commercial framing of regional demand; they do not establish a governmental policy role or a formal Israel-specific lobbying campaign.

Lockheed Martin’s UICA renewal was publicly framed in bilateral industrial-cooperation terms. The record also documents sponsorship of SkillZ, a national high-school cyber competition created with Israel’s Ministry of Education, IDF Cyber Command and the Rashi Foundation, and support for MadaKids science-kindergarten programmes.3, 40 On humanitarian giving after 7 October 2023, Lockheed Martin announced a $1 million donation to Project HOPE and matching for four named organizations, including two U.S.-based fundraising affiliates supporting Israeli emergency-response organizations; the announced list did not include a Gaza- or Palestinian-focused organization.41

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Lockheed Martin holding a leadership or board role in AIPAC, the Christians and Israel Foundation, FIDF, JNF/KKL, Regavim, Im Tirtzu or a settlement-advocacy organization. No public evidence identified of direct corporate or PAC donations to settlement organizations specifically.42

Lockheed Martin’s Q4 2025 federal lobbying disclosure covered U.S. defence appropriations, the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act and related appropriations; the reviewed disclosure did not identify an Israel-specific or Middle East-specific line item.43 Its broad federal lobbying and PAC activity therefore should not be represented as proof of Israel-specific lobbying without further evidence.

No public evidence identified of company HR action, termination or litigation specifically targeting pro-Palestinian employee speech or union activity. No public evidence identified of an Israel-specific corporate statement condemning or curtailing its own Israel defence supply chain in response to civil-society scrutiny.44

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military9.507.009.009.50
Digital0.000.000.000.00
Economic6.509.609.006.50
Political7.207.007.807.20

Military sets the V_MAX because the record documents major military-platform supply, sustainment, customization, weapons production and defence-industrial partnerships involving Israel. Economic and Political reflect continuing industrial-cooperation commitments and documented corporate communications and governance-related activity. Digital is scored 0.00 because the audit did not establish a qualifying verified digital-surveillance, sovereign-cloud, offensive-cyber or Israeli-targeting nexus.

The V6.5 approach is scale-free and evidence-only: it records documented activity type, scale and directness, using fixed human-vetted scores rather than extrapolating from unsupported allegations.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-inks-deal-to-buy-25-more-f-35-fighter-jets-for-3-billion/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  2. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/lockheed-martin-just-won-an-11-4-million-contract-to-upgrade-israels-f-35i-adir-funded-by-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-879041 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  4. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936468/000121465924007145/g418242px14a6g.htm ↩ ↩2

  5. https://caat.org.uk/news/lockheed-martin-ceo-confirms-data-from-israels-use-of-f-35-jets-worth-billions-to-the-company/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  6. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936468/000093646826000004/lmt-20260326.htm ↩ ↩2

  8. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936468/000162828026004195/lmt-20251231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. https://en.checkid.co.il/company/LOCKHEED%2BMARTIN%2BISRAEL%2BLTD-LOx8X6m-515125763 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  10. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/israel-approves-plan-buy-f-35-f-15i-aircraft-us-2026-05-03 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  11. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/09/global-political-economy-enabling-israels-genocide-occupation-apartheid/ ↩ ↩2

  12. https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/lockheed-iai-tie-up-on-missile-defense-is-bad-news-for-boeing/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  13. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2022-12-05-Lockheed-Martin-and-Rafael-Advanced-Defense-Systems-to-Collaborate-on-High-Energy-Laser-System ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  14. https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Al-Haq-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Business-and-Trade.pdf ↩ ↩2

  15. https://opiniojuris.org/2025/10/08/dutch-supreme-court-orders-executive-branch-to-reassess-export-of-f-35-parts-to-israel-in-light-of-international-obligations/ ↩ ↩2

  16. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2014-04-09-Lockheed-Martin-Opens-New-Office-In-Israel ↩ ↩2

  17. https://www.cybereason.com/press/cybereason-closes-25-million-series-b-funding-enters-lockheed-martin-partnership ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  18. https://www.mod.gov.il/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%96%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%91%D7%99%D7%98%D7%97%D7%95%D7%9F/%D7%A0%D7%97%D7%AA%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%A1%D7%9B%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%96-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%93%D7%99%D7%A8 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  19. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5923-economy-occupation-economy-genocide-report-special-rapporteur ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2016-06-22-Lockheed-Martin-and-Israel-Celebrate-Rollout-of-Israels-First-F-35-Adir ↩

  21. https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/lockheed-martin-signs-umbrella-offset-agreement-with-israel_11640 ↩

  22. https://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-mod-signs-hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars-deal-with-lockheed-martin-sikorsky-for-integration-of-israeli-systems-on-ch-53k-pere-helicopters ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  23. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-il/who-we-are.html ↩

  24. https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-awarded-contract-to-supply-additional-complex-composite-structural-assemblies-for-the-f-35-aircraft/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning_II_Israeli_procurement ↩

  26. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/lockheed-martin ↩

  27. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2014-04-09-First-C-130J-Super-Hercules-Shimshon-Arrives-In-Israel ↩ ↩2

  28. https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/leaked-list-of-weapons-the-us-secretly ↩

  29. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2023/11/12/714488/US-Hellfire-missiles-used-to-strike-main-Gaza-hospital - Reports ↩

  30. https://breakingdefense.com/2026/01/israel-saudi-weapon-sale-us-apache-jltv-fms-patriot/ ↩

  31. https://www.jsf.mil/aboutus ↩ ↩2

  32. https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-886139 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  33. https://www.acq.osd.mil/news/spotlight/looking-forward-into-2021.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  34. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/lockheed-martin-ventures/lm-ventures-portfolio-companies.html ↩

  35. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2025-12-18-Skunk-Works-R-and-XTEND-Expand-Joint-All-Domain-Command-and-Control-for-Advanced-Mission-Execution ↩ ↩2

  36. https://news.mit.edu/2019/lockheed-martin-mit-misti-seed-fund-0418 ↩ ↩2

  37. https://www.palestinechronicle.com/major-divestment-win-students-say-mit-has-cut-ties-with-lockheed-martin-fund/ ↩

  38. https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/lockheed-martin ↩

  39. https://www.thecanary.co/skwawkbox/2026/04/27/lockheed-martin-golden-opportunity/ ↩ ↩2

  40. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-il/stem.html ↩ ↩2

  41. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/statements-speeches/2023/charitable-giving-for-humanitarian-assistance.html ↩ ↩2

  42. https://www.cfr.org/bios/james-d-taiclet ↩

  43. https://www.quiverquant.com/news/Lobbying+Update:+$3,910,000+of+LOCKHEED+MARTIN+CORPORATION+lobbying+was+just+disclosed ↩

  44. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents/sustainability/Lockheed_Martin_Human_Rights_Report_2022.pdf ↩

  45. https://www.adl.org/resources/press-release/adl-and-jlens-urge-shareholders-reject-anti-israel-shareholder-proposals ↩

  46. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/lockheed-martin/totals?id=D000000104 ↩