Saab AB MILITARY

Target: Saab AB (Sweden) Research date: 26 October 2026 Evidence period: Historical material through October 2026.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Direct contracts with Israeli military and security bodies

Saab’s first-quarter 2026 financial reporting stated that the company had “currently no direct defence-related sales exposure to Israel.” The disclosure also acknowledged a limited number of Israeli suppliers, indicating that Saab distinguished direct Israeli defence sales from its upstream supply-chain relationships.¹

The Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) reported in March 2026 that Sweden had not authorised sales of military equipment to the Israeli armed forces or other Israeli state actors since the 1950s. ISP stated that final follow-on deliveries to a private Israeli recipient occurred during 2025 under historical authorisations, but did not identify Saab as the exporter.²

No public evidence identified of a current, named Saab AB contract directly supplying the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, Israel Prison Service or Israeli Border Police.^{1, 2}

Historical and third-country procurement

[pre-2020] In March 2017, Defence News reported that the British Ministry of Defence had awarded Rafael Advanced Defense Systems a £78 million contract for a battlefield command-and-control system supporting Falkland Islands air defence. Saab and MBDA received associated contracts to integrate previously ordered air defence components into the Rafael-led architecture. The arrangement involved a British customer and does not itself demonstrate procurement by the Israeli military. Current continuation of these particular contracts is unconfirmed.³

Defence trade directories and exhibitions

A July 2019 report documented competition between Saab’s Gripen fighter and Israel Aerospace Industries’ Kfir aircraft in Colombian fighter procurement. This establishes participation in the same third-country market rather than a Saab–IAI supply agreement. [pre-2020]; whether the particular procurement relationship continued in that form is unknown.⁴

No public evidence identified of a SIBAT directory entry establishing an Israeli Ministry of Defence award to Saab.^{2, 4}

Corporate announcements

Saab’s 2026 disclosure acknowledges relationships with Israeli suppliers but does not identify their names, products, contract values or specific end users.¹

No public evidence identified of a Saab announcement establishing a current direct Israeli defence contract or Israeli military joint venture.¹

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Military-specific products

Saab Denmark was identified in a May 2024 investigation by Danwatch and Information as an active supplier to the multinational F-35 combat-aircraft programme. The company supplied components for the aircraft’s self-protection system, a military-specific application. The journalists reported that their investigation could verify four active Danish F-35 suppliers after checking an earlier, substantially longer company list.⁵

The Workers in Palestine defence supply-chain compilation separately identifies Saab Denmark as a Saab AB subsidiary supplying components for the F-35 self-protection system. Its listing corroborates the component category, but does not provide Saab-specific delivery records for aircraft operated by Israel.⁶

Civilian versus military supply

The documented Saab Denmark F-35 components form part of a combat-aircraft programme. The evidence therefore concerns purpose-built military subsystems rather than incidental purchases of standard civilian products.^{5, 6}

Israel’s participation in the F-35 programme does not, by itself, establish that a particular Saab Denmark component was incorporated into an Israeli-operated aircraft. No Saab-specific serial-number trace, Israeli end-user certificate or delivery record was identified in the reviewed sources.^{5, 6}

Targeting technology

On 3 April 2024, Sweden’s Defence Materiel Administration announced an order worth SEK 390 million to Saab Aeronautics for additional laser-designation pods and maintenance capability for Gripen C/D and Gripen E aircraft. The equipment supports precision weapon targeting through laser designation and target tracking.⁷

Independent reporting identified the procured system as LITENING 5, with deliveries and associated maintenance capabilities scheduled for 2026. The programme concerns Sweden’s armed forces and establishes Saab’s integration and support role for an Israeli-origin targeting system rather than supply to an Israeli end-user.⁸

The targeting equipment’s designed output directly supports precision weapons employment, placing this identified Saab integration activity within the Military domain.^{7, 8}

Export approvals and end-user controls

ISP’s March 2025 report stated that Swedish exports to private Israeli entities continued during 2024 under historical authorisations. These consisted of follow-on supplies of components that had not constituted military equipment when originally exported. The report does not establish that Saab supplied those particular components.⁹

No public evidence identified of a Saab-specific Israeli military end-user certificate, individually attributable Israeli export licence or published licence decision covering the identified F-35 components.^{5, 9}

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Occupied-territory equipment

The September 2026 reporting on the updated OHCHR settlement-business database describes corporate activities examined under the UN mandate, including infrastructure, transportation, energy and other settlement-related services. The available reporting does not identify Saab among the named enterprises.¹⁰

No public evidence identified of Saab-manufactured construction machinery, vehicles or engineering equipment being used to build, maintain or demolish infrastructure in Israeli settlements, East Jerusalem, the occupied West Bank or the occupied Golan Heights.¹⁰

Distribution and secondary-market pathways

No public evidence identified establishing a Saab-authorised dealer, distributor or secondary-market supply chain for construction equipment deployed in occupied Palestinian territory.¹⁰

Construction, demolition and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of Saab holding contracts for settlement construction, checkpoints, detention facilities, demolition works, the separation barrier or Israeli military-base construction in occupied territory.¹⁰

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems - Swedish targeting systems

In April 2024, Sweden’s FMV contracted Saab Aeronautics for SEK 390 million of precision-targeting equipment and domestic maintenance capacity. The programme concerns Gripen aircraft operated by Sweden and uses the LITENING targeting-system family developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.^{7, 8, 11}

This establishes a procurement and integration relationship involving Israeli-origin military technology and Saab’s Swedish fighter programme. It does not establish a corresponding sale by Saab to Rafael or to the Israeli armed forces.^{7, 8}

The 2024 procurement included additional targeting pods, maintenance capability and spare parts, with deliveries scheduled for 2026. Public evidence reviewed did not establish completion of every scheduled delivery by the research date.⁸

Rafael - British air defence integration

[pre-2020] The 2017 British Falkland Islands air defence programme placed Rafael in the principal battle-management integration role, with Saab supplying integration services for associated radar and air defence elements under related British contracts. The publicly reported arrangement identifies the shared programme and the participating contractors but does not specify a bilateral Saab-to-Rafael component purchase. Current contractual status is unknown.³

Israeli suppliers acknowledged by Saab

Saab’s first-quarter 2026 reporting confirms a limited number of suppliers in Israel and states that the company maintains risk monitoring and supplier communication concerning Middle Eastern conflicts. The disclosure does not name those suppliers.¹

The Israeli supplier relationships were therefore publicly acknowledged as current in 2026, while their specific products, contractual terms and involvement in Israeli military production remain unidentified.¹

Elbit Systems

An Israeli Ministry of Defence announcement dated 16 December 2024 reported approximately $130 million of communication-system procurement from Elbit Systems for the IDF, including software-defined radios, satellite communications, autonomous-platform data links and maintenance infrastructure. The announcement does not identify Saab as a contractor or subsystem supplier.¹²

No public evidence identified of a verified direct Saab-to-Elbit component-supply agreement, licensed-production contract or joint-development programme specifically serving Israeli military end-users.^{1, 12}

Israel Aerospace Industries

A June 2025 investigation by Investigate Europe documented the participation of IAI-controlled Intracom Defense in European Defence Fund projects, including projects awarded after October 2023. The investigation does not establish a specific Saab–IAI supply transaction.¹³

[pre-2020] Saab and IAI were documented as competing suppliers in Colombian combat-aircraft procurement during 2019. The report establishes commercial competition, rather than component supply or joint production. Current status of that particular competitive tender is unknown.⁴

No public evidence identified of a Saab–IAI joint venture or verified technology-transfer arrangement directly serving the Israeli armed forces.^{4, 13}

Joint development and co-production

No public evidence identified of a current Saab–Rafael, Saab–Elbit or Saab–IAI co-production contract specifically supporting an Israeli Ministry of Defence programme.^{1, 3, 12, 13}

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Military installation support

Saab’s first-quarter 2026 disclosure states that the company has no current direct defence-related sales exposure to Israel. The report does not identify contracts for facilities support, catering, transport, fuel, maintenance or telecommunications at Israeli military installations.¹

No public evidence identified of a Saab contract providing routine logistical or facilities services to IDF bases, Israeli detention facilities or Israeli military training establishments.¹

Geographic specificity

No public evidence identified of Saab providing logistical services at installations in occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights or the Negev specifically for Israeli military operations.^{1, 10}

Shipping, freight and port handling

The Swedish export-control regulator confirms historical follow-on shipments to private Israeli recipients, but does not identify Saab or any Saab-controlled freight provider as the exporter or carrier.^{2, 9}

No public evidence identified of a Saab shipping, freight-forwarding or port-handling contract specifically servicing Israeli military cargo.^{2, 9}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Combat aircraft and F-35 subsystem manufacturing

Danwatch’s May 2024 investigation identified Saab Denmark as a supplier of F-35 self-protection components. The F-35 is a purpose-built combat aircraft, and the documented Saab Denmark role concerns a military subsystem.⁵

Workers in Palestine’s supply-chain documentation identifies Saab Denmark alongside other Danish companies involved in the F-35 programme. Its information does not establish the final destination of Saab-manufactured parts within the multinational aircraft and sustainment network.⁶

The available Saab-specific evidence establishes participation in the global F-35 supply chain but does not demonstrate direct Saab shipments to the Israeli Air Force or installation of individually identified Saab components in Israeli F-35 aircraft.^{5, 6}

Precision targeting and fire-control support

In April 2024, Sweden ordered additional LITENING 5 targeting pods through Saab Aeronautics for Gripen combat aircraft. FMV confirmed that the systems support laser designation and target tracking, while the independent defence-industry reporting specified the LITENING 5 configuration and planned 2026 delivery.^{7, 8}

The arrangement establishes Saab’s role in maintaining and integrating Israeli-origin precision-targeting equipment for the Swedish military. No evidence in the identified contract establishes Israeli military end use of the equipment supplied under this order.^{7, 8}

Other Saab military platforms

Saab’s GlobalEye airborne early-warning system incorporates the Erieye radar architecture. July 2026 reporting described NATO’s selection of GlobalEye for future airborne surveillance capability, documenting Saab’s continuing manufacture of specialised military aircraft systems. The reported programme does not identify an Israeli customer.¹⁴

Israeli air defence programmes

An April 2024 SEC-hosted Elbit Systems announcement documented a contract worth approximately $50 million for Elbit’s Red Sky short-range air defence system for an unidentified international customer. The disclosed system included electronic warfare equipment, sensors and missile-launching capability. Saab is not identified as a participant.¹⁵

No public evidence identified of a Saab-specific supply contract for Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling or Arrow systems.^{1, 12, 15}

Munitions and explosive components

No public evidence identified of Saab directly supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, propellants, warheads or munitions precursor materials to Israeli military end-users.^{1, 2}

Armoured vehicles, warships and strategic platforms

No public evidence identified of Saab directly supplying Israeli military customers with armoured vehicles, naval combat systems, strategic missile components or other complete lethal platforms.^{1, 2}

Purpose-built military software

The documented Saab/FMV targeting programme directly supports kinetic weapons employment. By contrast, the reviewed evidence does not establish that Saab supplied autonomous target-generation software, AI-based kill-chain automation or a purpose-built kinetic targeting platform to the IDF.^{7, 8, 12}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Swedish export-control decisions

ISP’s March 2025 publication reported that Sweden’s 2024 exports to private Israeli recipients continued under previously issued permits and involved follow-on deliveries rather than newly authorised Israeli sales.⁹

ISP’s March 2026 publication stated that Sweden had granted no licences for sales of military equipment to the Israeli armed forces or other Israeli state actors since the 1950s and had issued no new sales permits to Israel after 10 October 2023.²

ISP further reported that final follow-on deliveries to a private Israeli recipient occurred during 2025 under older export permissions. The public report did not identify Saab as the company responsible for those shipments.²

Export values and continued deliveries

Svenska Freds reported Swedish military-equipment export values to Israel of SEK 4.7 million in 2022, SEK 17.6 million in 2023, SEK 21.4 million in 2024 and SEK 11.6 million in 2025. The organisation characterised the post-2023 exports as deliveries associated with earlier authorisations.¹⁶

Its separate analysis of 2024 Swedish military exports stated that the regulator had not revoked historical permissions, allowing certain shipments to continue despite the absence of new sales approvals.¹⁷

These country-level export values cannot be attributed to Saab without company-specific licences, shipment records or procurement documentation.^{2, 9, 16}

Export-control publication framework

ISP maintains annual Swedish military-export statistics and links historical annual publications. These national reports distinguish aggregate Swedish export activity from individual company-level contractual evidence.¹⁸

Constructive-notice chronology

The Swedish export activity described by ISP continued after 19 July 2024 and after November 2024, with follow-on deliveries documented during 2025. The regulator’s public reporting does not identify Saab as the exporter, so these deliveries cannot be attributed to Saab.^{2, 9}

Saab’s first-quarter 2026 statement confirms that it continued to have a limited number of Israeli suppliers while monitoring conflict-related risks. The disclosure establishes an ongoing upstream commercial relationship after those dates, without identifying the counterparties or their military end uses.¹

Sanctions and enforcement

Saab’s 2026 interim disclosure describes export-control and sanctions compliance as an operational requirement and refers to monitoring applicable restrictions and conflict-related supply-chain risks.¹

No public evidence identified of a Saab-specific enforcement action or sanctions penalty arising from defence exports to Israeli military or security end-users.^{1, 2}

Litigation and judicial review

No public evidence identified of a court judgment, judicial-review decision or administrative enforcement determination establishing unlawful Saab-specific defence supply to Israel.^{1, 2, 9}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Danish F-35 investigations

Danwatch and Information investigated the Danish F-35 supply chain in 2024 and identified Saab Denmark among the companies with confirmed ongoing participation at the time of their reporting. The investigation focused on Danish military-industrial participation in an aircraft programme that also serves Israel.⁵

Workers in Palestine included Saab Denmark in its directory of F-35-related suppliers, identifying the company’s contribution as components for aircraft self-protection systems.⁶

Swedish military procurement scrutiny

A 2025 Left Voice article discussing Swedish military trade with Israel highlighted Saab’s role in Sweden’s 2024 acquisition of LITENING targeting pods and the Israeli origin of the technology. Its discussion concerned Swedish military procurement of Israeli-origin equipment, rather than a verified Saab sale to Israel.¹⁹

FMV’s original April 2024 procurement notice independently confirms the Saab contract, its SEK 390 million value and the equipment’s precision-targeting function.⁷

Swedish peace movement investigations

Svenska Freds documented Swedish military-equipment exports to Israel and criticised the continuation of historical export permissions after October 2023. Its published statistics and policy criticism address Swedish export activity generally and do not establish that Saab was responsible for the reported shipments.^{16, 17}

UN investigations

The UN Special Rapporteur’s report A/HRC/59/23, published in July 2025, examines corporate involvement in the economy supporting Israel’s occupation and military operations. The accessible document record establishes the report’s existence and scope, but does not itself identify Saab as a named subject of its findings.²⁰

September 2026 reporting on the OHCHR settlement-business database described an updated list of 214 companies from 11 countries. The reviewed coverage does not identify Saab as a listed enterprise.¹⁰

No public evidence identified establishing Saab’s inclusion in the reviewed UN settlement-business reporting or a Saab-specific finding in the accessible A/HRC/59/23 document record.^{10, 20}

Corporate ownership and executive activity

Saab’s April 2026 annual general meeting documentation confirmed Marcus Wallenberg as chairman and Micael Johansson among the re-elected directors. These governance facts do not independently establish personal participation in Israeli military procurement or military-support activities.²¹

No public evidence identified of attributable donations by Saab’s controlling principals to Israeli military-support organisations, relevant directorships in Israeli defence primes, or personal investment vehicles demonstrably financing specified Israeli military contracts.²¹

Corporate responses

Saab’s Q1 2026 reporting expressly stated that it had no current direct Israeli defence sales exposure while acknowledging a limited number of suppliers in Israel and describing continued supplier-risk monitoring.¹

No public evidence identified of a Saab-specific announcement terminating an Israeli defence-prime contract, adopting an Israel-specific military procurement exclusion policy, or establishing a dedicated Israeli military end-use investigation.¹

Boycott and divestment actions

The reviewed civil-society material documents scrutiny of military trade involving Israel and multinational weapons programmes, including the Danish F-35 supply chain. No independently verified institutional divestment decision specifically targeting Saab because of a proven direct Israeli military contract was established in the reviewed sources.^{5, 6, 16, 17}