INDEX / DIRECTORY / SIEMENS

Siemens

Industrial & Conglomerates 113 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-22 METHOD V6.5
Complicity Index score 649 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 3.40 Digital ↗ 5.00 Economic ↗ 7.00 Political ↗ 3.50
OWNERSHIP TREE 30 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Economic: Siemens Mobility’s Israel Railways contract covers Desiro HC rolling stock and maintenance; the A1 route entered service in 2021 and crosses the Green Line at two points.1, 2
  • Military: Israeli Ministry of Defense licences for Siemens Teamcenter, Solid Edge and FLOEFD were reported at at least $1 million between November 2023 and June 2024, supplied through McKit Systems.3, 4
  • Settlements: Siemens reportedly contracted settlement-industrial-zone manufacturer Extal for aluminium rail components under reciprocal-procurement arrangements; the continuing status of that relationship was not independently confirmed.1, 5
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of Siemens supplying Israeli forces with weapons, munitions, missile-system components, offensive cyber capabilities, or physical defense subsystems.3, 4

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameSiemens AG
JurisdictionGermany; Siemens AG is a German Aktiengesellschaft with registered offices in Berlin and Munich.6
HeadquartersMunich, Germany.7
SectorIndustrial technology, infrastructure, mobility, software, automation, power technology, and medical technology.8
OwnershipPublicly listed company. BlackRock, Inc. held 7.11% of voting rights as of 3 March 2026; no Israeli controlling shareholder at or above 10% was identified in the reviewed materials.9
Key Executives / GovernanceRoland Busch, President and CEO; Jim Hagemann Snabe, Supervisory Board Chair.7
Israeli-Nexus SummarySiemens maintains Israeli subsidiaries, local operations, rail and industrial contracts, technology partnerships and defence-sector software distribution relationships; documented settlement-linked and security-sector issues are subject to the evidence limits stated below.1, 3, 6

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Siemens AG has a longstanding commercial presence in Israel through locally incorporated subsidiaries, industrial and digital operations, mobility contracts, research-and-development activity, and public-sector relationships.6, 8 Its most substantial documented economic nexus is the Israel Railways Desiro HC rolling-stock framework: Siemens announced a contract worth approximately €900 million for up to 60 trainsets, maintenance arrangements and a workshop, later reported as expanded to 834 coaches with options extending to 2046.2, 11

The central occupation-related concerns arise from the A1 Tel Aviv–Jerusalem rail route, which Who Profits reports crosses the Green Line in two places, and from a reported 2019 aluminium-parts arrangement with Extal in the Mishor Adumim settlement industrial zone.1, 5 Siemens has stated that it was a supplier rather than constructor of the A1 line and that a legal review found the transaction compatible with its human-rights due-diligence obligations.1

The strongest defence and security nexus is Siemens Digital Industries Software’s licensing of Teamcenter, Solid Edge and FLOEFD through McKit Systems, a Malam Team subsidiary whose listed clients include IMOD, IAI, Elbit Systems and Rafael.3, 4 Secondary-source reporting identifies IMOD purchases or renewals worth at least $1 million between November 2023 and June 2024. The audits identify the products as civilian-market engineering and product-lifecycle-management tools used in defence-sector production, not weapons or tactical hardware.3, 4

The record does not support claims that Siemens is an Israeli weapons manufacturer, a supplier of munitions or missile-defence components, a provider of offensive cyber tools, a Project Nimbus participant, or an operator of Israeli data-centre infrastructure.3, 4 Nor was Siemens confirmed on the OHCHR’s 2020 settlement-business database, and it is not named in the 2025 UN Special Rapporteur report reviewed by the audits.12, 13 On the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment, the resulting score is BRS 649 - Tier B (Severe Complicity).

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
2012–2017Siemens fire-detection and extinguishing systems were maintained for Israel Prison Service facilities through representative Orad Group.14
2017–2018Siemens and Israel Railways concluded the Desiro HC framework contract, initially covering up to 60 trainsets and associated maintenance.11
2019Reporting described a Siemens Mobility arrangement to purchase aluminium components from Extal in Mishor Adumim under reciprocal-procurement obligations; continuing performance after 2019 was not independently confirmed.5
December 2021Siemens train cars entered A1 service; Who Profits reports the route crosses the Green Line in two places.1
2021Siemens carved out its Intelligent Traffic Systems division, which thereafter operated as Yunex Traffic under separate ownership.1
October 22, 2023Siemens was among German companies signing the “Never again is now” advertisement condemning Hamas’s attack and expressing concern for civilian suffering in Israel and Gaza.15
November 2023–June 2024Secondary reporting identifies IMOD acquisition or renewal of Siemens software licences totalling at least $1 million.3
January/February 2024Israel Railways placed a further order for 81 Siemens Desiro HC units under the framework arrangement.16
February 2024Siemens stated that its A1 transaction had passed internal and external legal review and that prospective business would undergo further human-rights due diligence.1
February 13, 2024Siemens announced its acquisition of Israeli AI inspection company Inspekto.17
2025–2026The Great Sea Interconnector was reported frozen or paused amid financing and geopolitical disputes; its status was unresolved rather than confirmed cancelled.18

Corporate Overview

Siemens was founded in Berlin in 1847 and is a German industrial-technology corporation with registered offices in Berlin and Munich and group headquarters in Munich.6, 7 Its reviewed FY2025 corporate materials list Israel-domiciled subsidiaries across mobility, industrial software, health care, electronic design automation and other operations.6

Siemens’ local presence includes Siemens Ltd. and Siemens Mobility Ltd. in Rosh Ha’ayin, Siemens Healthineers in Rosh Ha’ayin, Smart Infrastructure in Gedera, and Siemens Industry Software Ltd. at Airport City.8 A prior company listing reported approximately 800 employees across Siemens entities in Israel; the audits did not identify a current consolidated employee figure.8

The company’s Israeli technology footprint includes a Siemens PLM development lineage connected to Tecnomatix, a Next47 office opened in Herzliya in 2020, Siemens Dynamo startup activity in Tel Aviv, a grant-supported collaboration with Cybord, and acquisitions including Corindus Vascular Robotics and Inspekto.17, 19 These are documented commercial and industrial relationships; no public evidence identified that the Cybord or Inspekto links involved state or security end use.17, 19

Siemens Energy AG and Siemens Healthineers are separately listed entities spun off from Siemens AG. Energy-sector claims concerning Siemens Energy - including the Great Sea Interconnector - must therefore not be transposed automatically onto Siemens AG absent a documented control or contracting relationship.6, 10

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

The documented military nexus is the distribution of Siemens PLM and engineering software - Teamcenter, Solid Edge and FLOEFD - through McKit Systems, a Malam Team subsidiary. McKit identifies itself as Siemens PLM Software’s Israeli representative and lists IMOD, the IDF, IAI, Elbit Systems and Rafael among its clients.3, 4 Secondary reporting identifies IMOD software licences or renewals of at least $1 million between November 2023 and June 2024.3

The audits characterize the identified products as civilian-market CAD, simulation and lifecycle-management software used by defence-sector customers to support design and production processes. They do not establish Siemens as a direct Israeli weapons exporter or a supplier of dedicated tactical hardware.3, 4 Siemens also operates a formal Xcelerator Academy training location at Rafael premises in Haifa, indicating an institutional training relationship.20

Via Israeli representative Orad, Siemens fire-detection, extinguishing and related security systems were supplied or maintained for Israel Prison Service facilities, including a documented contract sequence through the end of 2023.14 Orad separately describes range-radar, control-system and night-vision provision at Ktzi’ot Prison; the audits treat this as carceral-security infrastructure rather than a lethal weapon system, and do not independently establish the current status of those systems.14

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Siemens acting as prime contractor or licensed manufacturer for Israeli small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, drones, naval vessels, missile-defence systems, ammunition, explosives, radar, fire-control systems, propulsion, guidance systems or warhead components.3 No public evidence identified of physical component supply, co-production, joint development, or technology-transfer agreements with Elbit, IAI or Rafael beyond the identified software and training relationships.3, 20

The IMOD figure is based on secondary reporting and an unclassified, non-tender procurement database with limited coverage; the underlying award records were not retrieved in the economic audit. Accordingly, individual contract scope, licence values, exact end uses and post-June-2024 status remain unverified.3, 4

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
IMODReported purchaser/renewer of Siemens software licences, November 2023–June 2024.3Underlying procurement records were not retrieved.4
McKit Systems / Malam TeamSiemens PLM representative and channel partner; lists defence and state clients.4Client-list overlap does not establish every customer’s individual Siemens contract or use.4
IAI, Elbit Systems, RafaelListed McKit clients for Siemens PLM ecosystem products.4No public evidence identified of physical Siemens weapons subsystems or joint weapons development.3
Orad Group / IPSSiemens representative associated with fire-safety maintenance and related prison-security equipment.14Current status after the documented contract period is unconfirmed.14

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Siemens’ main digital-security nexus overlaps with the military record: PLM, CAD and simulation software are made available in Israel through McKit and reportedly reach IMOD and major defence manufacturers.3, 4 This creates a documented indirect software relationship to Israeli security and defence production rather than evidence of a dedicated military digital-weapons programme.

Siemens Healthineers has an active technology alliance with Claroty, an Israeli-founded operational-technology cybersecurity firm, to secure connected medical devices and clinical networks.21 In March 2026, Siemens announced an industrial-cybersecurity offering with Palo Alto Networks combining Siemens security-monitoring and private-5G systems with firewall technology.22 The audits describe these as commercial technology alliances, not Israeli state-security contracts.

Siemens acquired Israeli quality-inspection company Inspekto in 2024 and maintains documented industrial R&D and venture-capital activity in Israel.17, 19 No public evidence identified that these AI, machine-vision or R&D activities supplied Israeli military, intelligence or security agencies.17

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Siemens operating Israeli data centres, participating in Project Nimbus, providing sovereign-cloud services to Israeli state bodies, or using Israeli biometric or surveillance vendors such as BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trigo or Trax.4 No public evidence identified of Siemens developing, selling or licensing offensive cyber tools, zero-day exploits, autonomous target-generation systems, or digital weapons to Israeli state actors.4

The historical Stuxnet episode is not evidence of knowing Siemens participation: the audits describe Siemens Step 7/SCADA software as an exploited delivery vector, not a weapon supplied by Siemens to Israel.4

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
McKit SystemsIsraeli representative for Siemens PLM products.4Does not establish direct licence agreements with each listed end user.4
ClarotyTechnology partnership with Siemens Healthineers for medical-device and clinical-network security.21No identified Israeli state or military end use.4
Palo Alto NetworksJoint industrial-cybersecurity product offering announced in 2026.22No identified Israeli government procurement link.4
Inspekto / CybordIsraeli industrial AI and visual-inspection links.17, 19No public evidence identified of security-sector deployment.4

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Siemens maintains substantial Israeli operations through subsidiaries, offices, local suppliers and long-term infrastructure contracts.6, 8 The Israel Railways agreement is the clearest documented project: Siemens Mobility announced a framework contract of approximately €900 million for up to 60 Desiro HC trainsets, initially ordering 24, with maintenance and workshop arrangements.11 Siemens Mobility Israel later reported 141 trainsets and 834 coaches within its Israeli programme.23

Who Profits reports that Siemens train cars began serving the A1 route in December 2021 and that the line crosses the Green Line at two points.1 The audit does not attribute construction of the route to Siemens; Siemens describes itself as its supplier.1

A reported 2019 reciprocal-procurement arrangement involved aluminium-parts supplier Extal, located in Mishor Adumim Industrial Park. AFSC reports a $4 million Siemens contract, while a trade report described purchases worth “millions of shekels”; the audits therefore retain the amount and scope as attributed reporting rather than independently verified contract facts.5

Siemens also has documented historical and contemporary relationships with Israel’s electricity sector, including historical turbine contracts and 2016 industrial power-plant orders.24 The audit notes that Siemens’ statement that approximately 40% of Israeli generation capacity was based on Siemens technology does not mean Siemens itself generated 40% of Israeli electricity.24

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified that Siemens is Israeli tax-resident, Israeli-capital controlled, an Israeli sovereign-debt holder, an Israel Bonds underwriter, or a disclosed holder of Israeli public equities or Israel-focused funds.6, 9 No public evidence identified of procurement of settlement-origin consumer products or agricultural goods, consumer-goods origin-labeling violations, or retail labeling disputes.4, 6

The audits found no listed Siemens operating site in the West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan Heights, while cautioning that Siemens’ public location directory is not a complete property or operations register.8 Extal’s present deliveries, value and continuity after 2019 were not independently established.5 The current Israel Railways webpage is undated, and project-level contract figures do not establish Siemens’ total Israeli revenue, profit, tax payments or economic contribution.23

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
Israel RailwaysRolling-stock, maintenance and depot relationship.11, 23The rail contract itself does not establish Siemens built the A1 route.1
ExtalReported supplier of aluminium components; factory located in Mishor Adumim Industrial Park.5Value, deliveries and continuation remain only partially documented.5
Siemens Mobility IsraelReported €17 million local procurement from 160 suppliers in FY2023.23Suppliers and origin breakdown were not disclosed.23
Israel Electric CorporationHistorical turbine-contract relationship and bribery case.25Historical conduct does not itself establish current contracting.25

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Siemens was among 106 German corporations signing an October 2023 advertisement condemning Hamas’s attack, expressing horror at civilian suffering in Israel and Gaza, and opposing antisemitism.15 Siemens representatives have described the company as deeply rooted in Israel through approximately six decades of activity, while Siemens materials characterize the Israel relationship as a broad technology and innovation ecosystem.19

The audits identify a documented asymmetry between Siemens’ explicit May 2022 condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and wind-down of Russian industrial activities, and the absence of an identified equivalent condemnation, wind-down or Israel/Palestine-specific heightened-risk disclosure concerning its Israeli operations.26 This is a comparison of recorded corporate posture, not evidence of legal liability.

The political-risk nexus also includes settlement-linked infrastructure allegations: the A1 route, historical traffic-control observations on West Bank roads, the reported Extal arrangement, and advocacy claims concerning the Great Sea Interconnector.1, 18 Siemens’ former Intelligent Traffic Systems business was divested in 2021; the traffic-control allegations therefore should not be treated as present Siemens operations without further evidence.1

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Siemens has denied supplying, installing or maintaining traffic-control systems for use on roads in the occupied territories, while Who Profits reports field observations on Roads 5, 443 and 1. The sources do not resolve this discrepancy.1 Siemens also stated that its A1 transaction underwent internal and external legal review and that future business would receive human-rights due diligence, particularly concerning international humanitarian law.1

The Great Sea Interconnector is attributed in the audits principally to Siemens Energy, a separate company. The project was reportedly frozen or paused, no independently verified Siemens AG contract-holder was identified, and its future remains unresolved.10, 18 No court judgment, sanction or formal regulatory finding against Siemens specifically for occupied-territory operations was identified.12, 13

No public evidence identified of Siemens lobbying or PAC activity specifically tied to Israel policy, anti-boycott legislation or Middle East trade policy; of donations to Israeli military-welfare, settlement or pro-Israel advocacy organizations; or of employee discipline for pro-Palestinian speech.27

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipEvidence limit
Siemens AGSigned October 2023 German corporate advertisement.15The statement does not establish support for particular Israeli state policies.
Siemens Energy AGLinked in advocacy sources to the Great Sea Interconnector.10, 18Separate listed entity; specific converter-station contracting entity unverified.10
RS Industries / Yunex TrafficHistorical traffic-control distribution and subsequently divested business line.1Siemens denies the occupied-roads deployment; conflict unresolved.1
BDS Movement / Didsbury for PalestineCivil-society campaigns and inquiries concerning Siemens activity.18, 28Advocacy characterizations are not treated as independently proven facts.

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military5.505.505.503.40
Digital5.007.007.505.00
Economic7.007.009.007.00
Political3.507.409.003.50

Economic is the maximum domain because of the scale and durability of Siemens’ Israeli operational and infrastructure footprint, including rolling stock, local procurement and settlement-linked supply-chain evidence subject to stated limits. The other domains reflect documented software and security-sector relationships, digital ecosystem involvement, and public-positioning/occupation-risk issues, while preserving evidence of divestment, separate legal entities and unresolved claims.

The V6.5 result is scale-free and evidence-only: it records vetted activity type, scale and directness rather than inferring culpability from reputation, advocacy allegations or corporate association alone.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3958 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18

  2. https://press.siemens.com/global/en/feature/siemens-and-israel-railways-sign-contract-60-double-decker-regional-trains ↩ ↩2

  3. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/siemens ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16

  4. https://www.mckitprod.co.il/en/about-us-en-menu ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22

  5. https://whoprofits.org/companies/company/3862 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  6. https://assets.new.siemens.com/siemens/assets/api/uuid:428ea18a-e7ab-4f93-a160-33908f1c3540/Siemens-Annual-Report-2025.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12

  7. https://www.siemens.com/de-de/corporate-information/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://www.siemens.com/da-dk/content/hotline-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  9. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/eqs/siemens-ag-siemens-n-ord-shs - 0p6m/eqs-pvr-siemens-ag-release-according-to-art-/9463197 ↩ ↩2

  10. https://assets.siemens-energy.com/dam/32b27e9a-af91-4915-8b51-b3af012d0d98/A-Siemens_Energy_Annual_Report_2025-pdf_Original%20file.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  11. https://www.railwaygazette.com/traction-and-rolling-stock/israel-railways-signs-siemens-emu-contract/46085.article ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  12. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/ahrc4371-database-all-business-enterprises-involved-activities-detailed-paragraph ↩ ↩2

  13. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session59/advance-version/a-hrc-59-23-aev.pdf ↩ ↩2

  14. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/4007 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  15. https://www.timesofisrael.com/never-again-is-now-german-companies-condemn-hamas-terror-stand-with-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://www.railwaygazette.com/business/2024/02/08/israel-railways-places-rolling-stock-orders/ ↩

  17. https://www.activesilicon.com/news-media/news/siemens-acquires-inspekto/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  18. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Sea_Interconnector ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  19. https://www.isra-tech.net/25-years-siemens-israel-germany-synergy/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. https://training.plm.automation.siemens.com/ilt/locations.cfm?region=IL&locID=2381 ↩ ↩2

  21. https://claroty.com/partners/technology-alliances ↩ ↩2

  22. https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-delivers-verified-ai-driven-cybersecurity-solution-industrial-5g-palo-alto ↩ ↩2

  23. https://industry.org.il/files/marketing/college/2024/%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%A1%20%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%98%D7%99.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  24. https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-receives-order-two-turnkey-industrial-power-plants-israel ↩ ↩2

  25. https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/siemens-to-pay-israel-43-mln-to-settle-bribery-case-israel-idUSKCN0XT1CM ↩ ↩2

  26. https://press.siemens.com/global/en/pressrelease/siemens-wind-down-russian-business ↩

  27. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/siemens-ag/lobbying?id=D000042425 ↩

  28. https://www.thecanary.co/uk/2026/05/21/siemens-international-law/ ↩