Squarespace MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

• Squarespace’s 2023 Form 10-K describes a general-purpose digital-services business offering website creation, domains, e-commerce, marketing, scheduling, hospitality, and social-media-presence tools, without identifying Israeli military products, customers, contracts, or operations ¹.

• The filing reports customers in more than 200 countries and territories but does not provide customer-level disclosure for Israel, government agencies, or military users ¹.

• Squarespace was not identified in the 2022 SIBAT Israel Defense, Homeland and Cyber Defense Directory, whose listed firms held Israeli Ministry of Defense marketing and export licences at publication, although the directory states that participation was voluntary and not exhaustive ².

• No public evidence identified.

• The publicly accessible IMOD tender interface and targeted searches produced no Squarespace contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum involving IMOD, the IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police ³.

• Squarespace’s reviewed corporate filings and acquisition announcement do not announce defence cooperation, an Israeli security-sector joint venture, or an Israeli state-security partnership ^{1, 4}.

• RONET International Certification Services presents itself as an Israel-based certification body approved by entities including the Israeli Ministry of Defense and displays a “Made with Squarespace” footer, which establishes use of Squarespace’s standard website platform rather than an IMOD procurement, defence-specific modification, or military end use ⁵.

• Squarespace confirms that websites may be purchased through approved third-party resellers, but the reviewed reseller material and focused searches did not identify an Israeli defence reseller, IMOD integrator, or settlement-based approved reseller ⁶.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

• Squarespace’s disclosed products are general-purpose website, hosting, domain-registration, e-commerce, scheduling, marketing, payments, and content-generation services, with no disclosed ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, defence-grade, or military-configured product line ^{1, 7}.

• Squarespace’s AI functionality generates or edits website text, code, scripts, images, and related content ⁷.

• Squarespace’s AI Terms prohibit use of AI output to condone, enable, promote, or commit violence or acts that could cause death or injury ⁷.

• No designed Squarespace output involving target generation, fire control, weapons guidance, or another kinetic effect was identified ⁷.

• Squarespace’s Terms require users to comply with applicable export controls and sanctions, while its 2023 Form 10-K addresses export-control and sanctions compliance as a general regulatory risk ^{1, 8}.

• These general platform conditions do not identify an export licence, military end-user certification, or Israeli defence transaction ^{1, 8}.

• No sale of a militarised or contract-modified Squarespace product to Israeli security forces was identified ^{1, 2, 3}.

• No export-licence application, end-user certificate, or government export-control review concerning Squarespace supply to an Israeli defence or security end user was identified ^{1, 3, 8}.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

• Squarespace’s disclosed portfolio does not include machinery, vehicles, construction equipment, engineering services, demolition equipment, or similar physical infrastructure products ¹.

• Squarespace was not listed in the reviewed 2023 or 2025 OHCHR databases of business enterprises involved in specified settlement-related activities ^{9, 10}.

• No verified report or photographic record was identified showing Squarespace equipment used for settlement construction, the separation barrier, demolitions, checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, or other occupied-territory infrastructure ^{9, 10, 11, 12}.

• No direct, dealer-mediated, or secondary-market machinery-supply pathway appears in Squarespace’s reviewed product disclosures ¹.

• No construction, engineering, maintenance, or servicing contract involving checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure was identified ^{3, 9, 10}.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

• Searches pairing Squarespace with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, IMI/Elbit Land, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow produced no verified supplier, integrator, subcontractor, or co-development record ^{1, 2, 3}.

• Squarespace does not disclose a component, subsystem, raw-material, or specialist-manufacturing product category ¹.

• No joint-development, co-production, technology-transfer, or licensed-manufacturing agreement between Squarespace and an Israeli defence firm was identified ^{1, 2}.

• Permira completed its acquisition of Squarespace on 17 October 2024, while Anthony Casalena rolled over a substantial majority of his equity, remained one of the largest shareholders, and continued as CEO and board chair ⁴.

• Squarespace stated that Accel and General Atlantic remained meaningful investors after the transaction ⁴.

• Permira maintains an Israel presence headed by Ran Maidan, and its public portfolio is organised across technology, consumer, healthcare, and services ^{13, 14}.

• No operational integration between Squarespace and an Israeli defence portfolio company was identified ^{13, 14}.

• In 2017, separate Permira credit funds acted as sole lenders for Dunlop Aircraft Tyres’ acquisition, which Permira described as serving regional and military aviation ¹⁵.

• The 2017 Dunlop Aircraft Tyres announcement identifies no Israeli customer or Israeli defence nexus and does not establish operational integration with Squarespace, which Permira acquired in 2024 ^{4, 15}.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

• Squarespace does not disclose catering, fuel, waste-management, facilities-maintenance, transport, freight-forwarding, port-handling, or military-telecommunications operations ¹.

• No service contract for an IDF base, training installation, detention centre, or security installation was identified, including in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Negev ^{3, 9, 10}.

• No shipping, freight-forwarding, or port-services agreement supporting Israeli military cargo or arms shipments was identified ^{1, 3, 16}.

• The March 2025 Ensuring Genocide report’s page-31 “Squarespace” references are citations to Maersk-shipment research files hosted at static1.squarespace.com, while the underlying allegation concerns Maersk rather than Squarespace ¹⁶.

• Those references do not identify Squarespace as a shipper, researcher, arms supplier, or contracting party ¹⁶.

• Hosting third-party material through Squarespace infrastructure does not independently establish Squarespace’s knowledge of, endorsement of, or operational involvement in the material’s underlying claims ^{8, 17}.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

• No role was identified for Squarespace as a prime contractor, manufacturer, or licensee of small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, drones, naval vessels, missiles, or other lethal systems ^{1, 2, 18}.

• No supply of ammunition, explosives, propellants, warhead components, or precursor materials to Israeli defence end users was identified ^{1, 2, 18}.

• No role in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, Merkava tanks, warships, ballistic missiles, or another strategic platform was identified ^{1, 2, 19, 18}.

• No targeting AI, fire-control software, kill-chain automation, precision-guidance software, radar component, guidance electronics, propulsion unit, or other weapons-calibrated subsystem was identified ^{1, 7}.

• Squarespace’s disclosed AI products concern website content and design, and its current AI Terms prohibit violence-enabling uses ^{1, 7}.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

• No publicly identified decision granting, refusing, suspending, or revoking an export licence for Squarespace products to an Israeli military or security end user was found ^{1, 3, 8}.

• No arms-embargo, sanctions, or export-control investigation or enforcement action involving Squarespace’s relationship with Israel was identified ^{1, 8}.

• No court proceeding, judicial review, or OECD National Contact Point complaint concerning a Squarespace defence-supply relationship with Israel was identified ^{9, 10, 18, 20}.

• Squarespace’s contractual export-control and sanctions requirement does not identify an Israeli defence transaction, licence, or end-user review ⁸.

• The accessible IMOD tender portal and SIBAT directory cannot establish universal absence because Israeli defence procurement can include non-public tenders and exempt procurements, but they produced no public Squarespace-specific record ^{2, 3}.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

• Squarespace is not listed in the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business update or the 2025 A/HRC/60/19 update based on the reviewed full-text checks ^{9, 10}.

• Squarespace is not named as a subject company in A/HRC/59/23, and the reported page-9 and page-19 occurrences appear in footnoted static1.squarespace.com URLs directing readers to third-party research documents rather than in the report’s corporate findings ¹⁹.

• Human Rights Watch’s 2018 Bed and Breakfast on Stolen Land includes a page-61 static1.squarespace.com URL for a Booking.com/Booking Cares infographic, which does not identify Squarespace as a settlement operator or implicated enterprise ¹¹.

• The March 2025 Ensuring Genocide report similarly uses Squarespace-hosted URLs for third-party Maersk research files and does not present a finding against Squarespace ¹⁶.

• Reviewed full-text checks found no Squarespace mention in PAX’s June 2024 arms-company report, Al-Haq’s July 2024 Business and Human Rights, the November 2024 DBIO report, or the BDS corporate-priority guide ^{18, 20, 12, 21}.

• No organised boycott, divestment, or institutional-exclusion campaign specifically grounded in Squarespace defence-sector activity was identified ^{18, 12, 21}.

• No Squarespace response, contract termination, or military end-use-monitoring commitment prompted by Israel-related defence-supply scrutiny was identified ^{4, 8, 22}.

• Squarespace states that it matches employee donations to nonprofit and social-impact organisations chosen by employees, up to $/€600 per employee annually ²².

• The public donation-matching policy does not name FIDF, reservist-support organisations, or specific eligible charities, and no verified FIDF-directed matching was identified ²².

• Squarespace’s last pre-acquisition proxy identified Anthony Casalena as chair and CEO, with Andrew Braccia, Michael Fleisher, Jonathan Klein, Liza Landsman, Anton Levy, and Neela Montgomery as directors ²³.

• Targeted searches found no verified defence-board role, Israeli defence-prime directorship, FIDF or reservist-fund donation, disclosed personal defence-prime holding, or military-channel statement attributable to those identified Squarespace principals ²³.

• Casalena beneficially owned 35.9% of the relevant share class as of 31 December 2023 through his revocable and family trusts, while post-acquisition public disclosure stated only that he remained one of Squarespace’s largest shareholders ^{4, 24}.

• No military-channel act by either identified trust was located ^{4, 24}.

• Squarespace is a self-service platform that does not publicly identify most customers, so an ordinary subscription by a defence-sector entity cannot by itself establish defence contracting, purpose-built supply, or corporate knowledge ^{8, 6, 5}.

• No customer-level revenue, Israeli-government account list, Israeli reseller roster, end-user certificate, or military-specific service-level agreement was located in the reviewed materials ^{1, 6}.