The Co-operative Group

Key Findings

• Economic: Co-op’s documented Israeli nexus concerns agricultural sourcing. Its June 2025 announcement identified Israeli carrots among products affected by a phased sourcing withdrawal; its 2026 update reaffirmed the policy but did not establish complete supplier-level implementation.^{1, 2}
• Settlements: In April 2012, Co-op discontinued relationships with four produce exporters known to source from Israeli settlements. The historical investigation did not establish that the specific settlement-packaged products it described were stocked in Co-op stores.^{3, 4}
• Political: Members supported an advisory motion on ceasing trade with Israel in May 2025. The subsequent Board policy covered 17 countries, while separate commercial partnerships expanded access to Palestinian olive oil and supported peacebuilding initiatives.^{5, 1, 6, 7}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of Co-op contracts supplying Israeli military institutions, an Israeli-origin surveillance deployment, or Group-operated settlement premises in the reviewed evidence record.^{8, 9, 10, 11}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

The Co-operative Group is a UK member-owned consumer business whose documented Israel/Palestine nexus centres on agricultural procurement and sourcing policy. Historical evidence records commercial relationships with Israeli produce exporters. In April 2012, the Group discontinued procurement from Agrexco, Arava Export Growers, Adafresh and Mehadrin because they were known to source from Israeli settlements. A contemporaneous company statement reproduced by campaigners put the affected trade at approximately £350,000 and said approximately 20 other Israeli suppliers continued supplying Co-op; the subsequent duration of those remaining relationships is unknown.^{13, 3, 4}

The distinction between Israeli sourcing and settlement sourcing is essential. Co-op’s 2026 member-motion update dates its settlement-product prohibition to 2007; its published historical policy describes a formal Human Rights and Trade Policy from 2009 and the additional supplier-level restriction adopted in April 2012. Those disclosures establish successive policy measures. They do not establish that the specific settlement-packaged grapes and dates described in the historical investigation were sold by Co-op.^{2, 11, 3}

On 17 May 2025, members supported an advisory motion concerning ceasing trade with Israel by 72.80% to 27.20%. On 24 June, the Board announced a sourcing policy covering 17 countries, including Israel, with phased removal of clearly and solely originating products and ingredients beginning that month. Israeli carrots were expressly identified. The announcement qualified implementation with “wherever possible” and acknowledged supply-chain, contractual and seasonal constraints. The 2026 update reaffirmed the restriction but supplied no complete independently audited inventory or supplier reconciliation.^{5, 1, 2}

The record also documents Palestinian supplier relationships and peacebuilding activity. Zaytoun announced distribution of Palestinian Fairtrade organic olive oil through 250 Co-op stores from October 2024. Co-op subsequently publicised a Palestinian brewery collaboration and humanitarian fundraising. Conversely, no public evidence identified of Israeli military procurement, weapons manufacture, Israeli state technology provision, an Israeli-origin surveillance deployment, or Group-operated settlement premises. Its UK military-community and cybersecurity-education relationships do not establish Israeli military involvement.^{6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18}

The final human-vetted V6.6 outcome is BRS 0, Tier E (Minimal/No Complicity). This preserves the documented civilian economic nexus, the historical supplier exits and the unresolved completeness of the later sourcing withdrawal without converting those uncertainties into evidence of military, digital or political complicity.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Co-operative Group Limited is a UK registered society with member ownership and democratic governance. Its registered office is in Manchester. The examined subsidiary register, dated 11 October 2024, identifies entities including Co-operative Group Food Limited, Co-operative Brands Limited, Co-operative Group Holdings (2011) Limited, Co-operative Group Legal Services Limited and Nisa Retail Limited. It does not identify a named Israeli-incorporated operating subsidiary.^{12, 14, 21}

The documented operating perimeter comprises consumer retail, wholesale and services. Nisa Retail Limited was repositioned as Co-op Wholesale in 2025, while the Nisa brand remained available to participating independent retail partners. The 2026 wholesale proposition included approximately 2,400 Co-op own-brand products and retail-support services. These relationships do not establish ownership of every participating retailer or an Israel-specific product flow.^{13, 22}

The Southern Co-op transaction expanded the consumer-business perimeter. The CMA records completion on 26 July 2026 and subsequent consideration of remedies concerning 15 convenience stores and two funeral homes. Corporate reporting described separate operations pending regulatory approval. Neither the acquisition nor that regulatory process establishes an Israeli political, military or settlement relationship.^{20, 23}

No public evidence identified of a Group-operated Israeli retail estate, warehouse, office, production facility or settlement branch. Shared co-operative branding alone does not justify attributing another independently operated society’s technology or commercial relationships to this Group.^{21, 8, 24}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of contracts between Co-op and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defence Forces, Israel Prison Service or Israeli Border Police. The reviewed record establishes consumer retail, wholesale distribution and related services, rather than defence procurement or military manufacturing.^{8, 13}

The Israeli products expressly identified in the 2025 announcement were civilian agricultural goods, including carrots. No public evidence identified that these products were supplied to an Israeli military end-user or manufactured to military specifications. Likewise, Co-op’s disclosed retail-support and promotional systems were not identified as tactical or weapons-targeting technologies.^{1, 2, 22}

No public evidence identified of weapons-system components supplied to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems or Israel Military Industries; military-base catering or logistics; construction work at checkpoints or settlements; or company-specific Israeli military export licences and enforcement proceedings. General UK export-licensing statistics and aggregate arms-financing research do not establish Co-op participation.^{8, 25, 26}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the absence of a documented Israeli defence contract combined with the civilian character of the identified business activity. Historical produce procurement is an economic relationship; the reviewed evidence supplies no military end-user connection.^{1, 8}

Two UK relationships require careful attribution. Signing the Armed Forces Covenant concerned veterans, reservists and military families in the United Kingdom. A UK Ministry of Defence technology official’s participation in a school cybersecurity event was educational. Neither establishes an Israeli military partnership, defence procurement contract or military technology transfer.^{17, 18}

The military findings describe the reviewed public record, not unrestricted access to private contracts. No public evidence identified of the specified military activities; undisclosed relationships cannot be asserted merely because public disclosure is incomplete.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Co-op has substantial civilian technology relationships. A February 2024 announcement described expansion of its longstanding TCS engagement into a cloud-first infrastructure programme using TCS Enterprise Cloud. A separate historical supplier case study describes SAP on Microsoft Azure and Power BI for customer insight and stock allocation. That case study does not establish the production configuration in October 2026.^{19, 27}

Diebold Nixdorf supplies retail transaction equipment and managed services. February 2026 reporting described dual-screen flexi-checkouts, with rollout planned to 150 stores by April and software reportedly developed by Co-op’s own teams. These are documented continuing technology relationships, but no public evidence identified of an Israeli-origin component deployed specifically for Co-op.^{28, 29}

The surveillance record warrants precise treatment. Co-op disclosed a 14-store AI security trial in the first half of 2024, generating alerts to Mitie about theft-related activity and assaults. The software developer remained unidentified. A separate 2022 trial combined Diebold Nixdorf equipment with Yoti facial age estimation; the company described age estimation without identity recognition. Continued operation of that particular trial in October 2026 was not confirmed.^{9, 10, 30, 31}

No public evidence identified of Israeli hosting, Project Nimbus participation, an Israeli technology acquisition or R&D facility, or provision of digital systems to Israeli military, intelligence or settlement institutions. The reviewed privacy disclosures establish personal-data processing and possible international transfers, but do not identify Israel as a processing destination.^{19, 27, 32}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that documented cloud, checkout, analytics and security systems serve civilian business functions, with no verified Israeli supplier or end-user nexus. TCS, Microsoft, Mitie and Diebold Nixdorf relationships cannot support an Israeli attribution through unrelated activities of those vendors.^{19, 27, 9, 28}

The unidentified AI developer is an evidence gap. It is not evidence that an Israeli surveillance company supplied the trial. Reporting about Project Pegasus and police-assisted identification likewise did not identify an Israeli software provider or establish that Co-op directly operated an Israeli facial-recognition product.^{10, 33}

The 2025 cyberattack exposed membership information and disrupted operations, but the reviewed reporting did not attribute the incident to Israeli state actors. Co-op’s subsequent work with The Hacking Games concerned cybercrime prevention, research and education.^{24, 34, 35}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The strongest documented nexus is historical procurement from Israeli agricultural suppliers. The 2012 company statement reproduced by campaigners identifies four excluded exporters - Agrexco, Arava Export Growers, Adafresh and Mehadrin - and approximately £350,000 of affected trade. Independent contemporary reporting corroborates the four supplier names and the withdrawal decision. Approximately 20 other Israeli suppliers reportedly remained at that date, but their subsequent relationship duration and total procurement value were not established.^{3, 4}

The historical investigation described settlement-linked grapes and dates, including produce associated with Beqa’ot. It did not establish that the particular products described were stocked by Co-op. The evidenced corporate response was supplier exclusion, extending beyond a restriction limited to the direct origin of individual products.^{3, 4}

The June 2025 policy broadened restrictions from settlements to identifiable Israeli-origin products and ingredients. Israeli carrots provide a concrete product example. Implementation was phased and qualified by identification, replacement, contractual and seasonal constraints. The 2026 reaffirmation does not disclose remaining procurement values or independently prove removal of every affected input across retail and wholesale channels.^{1, 2}

A separate economic relationship connects Co-op with Palestinian producers. Zaytoun’s October 2024 announcement established a commercial olive-oil partnership covering 250 stores and described expanded access for West Bank farmers. Zaytoun states that it sources exclusively from Palestinian producers.^{6, 36}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence combines historical supplier exits, the later sourcing withdrawal and the absence of identified Israeli operating assets or settlement premises. The four exporters’ 2012 relationships must be treated as discontinued. Their historical names cannot establish continuing procurement, and the £350,000 figure cannot be presented as current annual Israeli expenditure.^{3, 4, 21, 1}

No public evidence identified of a named post-June-2025 intermediary continuing Israeli-origin deliveries, verified 2024–2026 Israeli procurement totals, Israeli sovereign-bond underwriting, direct lending to Israeli defence manufacturers, or current pension exposure to specified Israeli entities. The lack of a complete removal reconciliation limits confidence in implementation; it does not establish continuing purchases.

The Palestinian dates promotion also requires restraint. Indexed company terms described donating 100% of trading profits from specified Zaytoun dates until 1 April 2025. The original terms were not directly accessible during verification, and the actual donation amount, payment completion and resulting benefit remain unverified. The commercial Palestinian supplier relationship is better established than the completed donation claim.^{36, 37}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The political record concerns member governance, sourcing decisions and public peacebuilding activity. The May 2025 Israel motion was advisory: its 72.80% support expressed member preference but did not itself compel a Board decision. The June policy was a separate Board-approved framework covering 17 countries under stated human-rights and international-law criteria.^{5, 1, 2}

Co-op’s documented initiatives include Palestinian supplier promotion, the Brewgooder–Taybeh Brewery Sun & Stone Lager collaboration, and Wahat Al Salam Neve Shalom as a peacebuilding case study. The lager campaign stated a minimum £20,000 commitment to the Disasters Emergency Committee Middle East Appeal. This is a published commitment, rather than independently verified payment completion. The February 2026 Manchester event was documented, but complete panel proceedings and individual contributions were not independently verified.^{6, 7}

Political financing must be distinguished by period and purpose. The 2025 annual report disclosed £598,600 paid to the Co-operative Party during 2025, matching 2024. Separately, members authorised a maximum £750,000 of political expenditure for 2026. Neither the subscription nor the ceiling was attributed to Israel- or Palestine-specific activity.^{8, 38}

No public evidence identified of lobbying for settlement expansion, Israeli military assistance or anti-BDS restrictions; donations to Israeli military-welfare or settlement organisations; or executive endorsements of settlement expansion or Israeli military operations in Gaza.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The company’s strongest defence is its documented restriction of Israeli sourcing, Palestinian commercial partnerships and peacebuilding programme. These actions do not independently verify every supply-chain claim, but they are material evidence and must accompany the historical procurement record.^{1, 2, 6, 7}

No public evidence identified of Group-operated settlement premises, settlement sponsorship, or a target-specific settlement enforcement judgment. No verified finding of Co-op’s inclusion in the OHCHR settlement-business database was established. This is a bounded research finding, not a claim of exhaustive verification of every institutional database entry.

External opposition to the member motion is also distinct from corporate conduct. UK Lawyers for Israel criticised the proposed motion and sought its rejection; the motion nevertheless proceeded and passed. That opposition does not establish a corporate affiliation or financing relationship with the organisation.^{39, 5}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.6. Final human-vetted values.

• V_MAX: 0.00 Avg_OTHERS: 0.00
• BRS Score: 0 Tier: E (Minimal/No Complicity)

The economic record documents agricultural procurement, discontinued settlement-linked suppliers and a broader sourcing withdrawal whose complete implementation remains unreconciled; the fixed economic inputs retain I=3.50 and P=7.80 alongside M=0.00 and a domain result of 0.00. All four final domain results are zero, producing V_MAX=0.00 and BRS 0/Tier E under the scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted method. These values are reproduced without recalculation; neither historical trade values nor unresolved implementation gaps are substituted for a verified current scale.

Methodology Note

• This dossier compiles only the four supplied domain audits, with their research cutoff of 23 October 2026. Citations identify their underlying sources; this compilation adds no independent verification.
• V6.6 is scale-free: Impact concerns activity type, M concerns scale, and P concerns directness. Final human-vetted inputs and results are preserved exactly.
• Temporal attribution distinguishes historical, discontinued and current activity. Supplier exits mitigate the historical record; an announced withdrawal is not treated as independently verified completion.^{3, 1, 2}
• Entity attribution requires a documented relationship. Shared branding, supplier relationships, independent wholesale customers and unrelated vendor activities do not establish transitive involvement.^{22, 24}
• A verified settlement operation would count in both Economic and Political. No such Group-operated presence was established; historical supplier exposure and settlement-product policies are described separately.^{3, 11, 21}
• “No public evidence identified” reports a bounded negative finding. Unidentified vendors, incomplete reconciliations and unverified donation payments remain unresolved rather than becoming affirmative allegations.^{9, 2, 37}