TSMC MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of a publicly documented contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum between TSMC and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMI, or another identified Israeli security body.

TSMC is a dedicated semiconductor foundry whose disclosed principal activities include integrated-circuit manufacturing, sales, packaging, testing, computer-aided design, and mask manufacture ¹.

The reviewed SIBAT material describes an official directory of Israeli defence industries, while the reviewed 2023 Israeli delegation document for DSEI London does not name TSMC among its listed exhibitors ^{2, 3}.

The DSEI document is an exhibition list rather than a comprehensive procurement, supplier, or contracting database, so its omission of TSMC cannot establish the absence of commercial or indirect supply relationships ³.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Valens Semiconductor Ltd., an Israeli-incorporated fabless semiconductor company, stated in its FY2023 filing that all of its silicon wafers were designed to be manufactured at TSMC ⁴.

Valens described its products and target markets as audio-video, automotive connectivity, video conferencing, education, digital signage, medical, industrial, entertainment, and automotive ADAS/autonomous applications ⁴.

The Valens filing establishes a commercial foundry relationship with an Israeli semiconductor company as of FY2023, but it does not identify an Israeli military or security end-user, military product, defence contract, or kinetic-weapons application ⁴.

No public evidence identified of a TSMC purpose-built tactical, military-specific, or mil-spec product line for Israeli end-users in the reviewed corporate, UN, NGO, and official-directory materials ^{1, 4, 2, 3, 5, 6}.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

TSMC’s public corporate profile describes wafer-fab locations in Taiwan, China, the United States, Japan, and Germany, with customer-support, account-management, and engineering offices in North America, Europe, Japan, China, and South Korea ⁷.

Israel is not included in that particular office-location enumeration, although the disclosure does not establish that TSMC has no Israeli customers, representatives, shipments, distributors, or other commercial activity ⁷.

No public evidence identified of TSMC equipment, construction services, authorised distributors, or infrastructure activity connected to settlements, the separation barrier, checkpoints, military installations, or other occupied-territory sites in the focused source set.

The supplied document pre-scan recorded no TSMC mention in the reviewed OHCHR settlement-database materials, the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report, PAX’s June 2024 report, and the other named civil-society materials ^{8, 9, 5, 10, 6}.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of TSMC supplying identified components, foundry services, co-production, technology transfer, or joint development directly to Elbit, IAI, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another identified Israeli defence prime in the focused searches and reviewed sources ^{4, 2, 3}.

The reviewed 2023 SIBAT DSEI document lists Israeli exhibitors including IAI, Rafael, and Semiconductor Devices (SCD), but does not list TSMC ³.

The absence of TSMC from that exhibition document does not resolve whether unnamed customers, intermediaries, distributors, or downstream products may have incorporated chips fabricated by TSMC ³.

TSMC’s 2024 subsidiary chart identifies entities in North America, Europe, Japan, China, Arizona, and Japan’s majority-owned advanced-semiconductor venture, and does not identify an Israeli subsidiary ¹¹.

The 2025 SEC significant-subsidiary exhibit identifies TSMC Global Ltd. and TSMC Arizona Corporation while omitting subsidiaries that were not significant in aggregate, and it does not identify an Israeli significant subsidiary ¹².

These disclosure scopes cannot establish group-wide absence of an immaterial Israeli entity or commercial relationship ^{11, 12}.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of TSMC providing sustainment, freight, port, facilities, communications, or other base-support services to Israeli military or security installations in the reviewed material.

TSMC reported customer-support operations through Hsinchu and subsidiaries in the United States, Canada, Japan, China, Germany, the Netherlands, and South Korea, without listing Israel among those disclosed support-office and subsidiary locations ⁵.

That geographic disclosure does not establish the absence of Israeli customers, shipments, distributors, or indirect supply ⁵.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of TSMC manufacturing or integrating Israeli lethal platforms, munitions, missile-defence systems, strategic weapons systems, or weapon-specific subsystems in the reviewed material.

The consulted corpus did not identify a TSMC component specifically connected to Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, Israeli aircraft, armour, munitions, or drones ^{5, 6}.

The Valens disclosure does not identify military downstream deployment of wafers designed for manufacture at TSMC and therefore cannot support an inference of Israeli military end use ⁴.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of Israeli export-licence decisions, end-user certificates, export-control enforcement, sanctions investigations, or litigation concerning TSMC supply to Israeli military or security end-users in the focused sources reviewed.

TSMC’s FY2024 Form 20-F and annual-report disclosures reviewed for this audit identify its semiconductor business, facilities, subsidiaries, directors, and ownership disclosures, but do not disclose an Israeli military procurement or export-control relationship ^{1, 13, 11, 5}.

The evidence base does not include dedicated reviews of Israeli tender systems, export-licence databases, court dockets, DSCA/FMS notices, or Israeli corporate registries, so the negative finding is bounded to the sources reviewed ⁵.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied deterministic full-text pre-scan found no “TSMC” mention in the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report, the locally held 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-database updates, or PAX’s June 2024 report ^{8, 9, 5, 10, 6, 14}.

The OHCHR announced its 2025 update of the database of businesses involved in Israeli settlements, but the supplied pre-scan did not identify TSMC in the checked update materials ^{10, 14}.

TSMC’s FY2024 filing identifies Taiwan’s National Development Fund, Executive Yuan, as its only disclosed beneficial owner at or above 5%, holding 6.38% as of 28 February 2025, while directors and executive officers collectively held 0.27% excluding the Fund ⁵.

TSMC identifies C.C. Wei as chairman and CEO, while its current board page states that Mark Liu retired after the 4 June 2024 annual shareholders’ meeting ^{15, 5}.

TSMC director Moshe N. Gavrielov is disclosed as chairman of Foretellix Ltd., an Israeli private company, but the reviewed filing does not characterise Foretellix as a defence contractor or identify an IDF or IMOD relationship ⁵.

The reviewed corporate materials do not establish an Israeli defence-industry directorship, security-force position, settlement operation, or Israel-based group office held by TSMC, a disclosed subsidiary, or a named controlling principal ^{1, 13, 15}.