VAST Data MILITARY

Request ID: adabb5b0-4ecc-471f-8323-abb7c396e1c7 Target: VAST Data Audit phase: Military Research date: 29 September 2026

Scope and evidence boundary

VAST Data markets a general-purpose AI/data infrastructure platform that combines storage, database, data-engine and compute functions; its current product materials do not describe the core platform as a weapon, munition, fire-control product or targeting system.^{1, 2} VAST nevertheless has a documented defence-market business through VAST Data Federal, which it launched in 2021 for government and defence organisations and now describes as working with defence and intelligence organisations from data centres to the tactical edge.³

VAST technology also has a verified purpose-built military rugged-storage integration through Mercury Systems. Mercury’s Rugged Data Storage (RDS) product is powered by VAST Data software, is designed to multiple MIL-STDs, and is marketed for applications including sensor processing, SIGINT and electronic warfare.⁴ Mercury’s tactical-edge materials state that the system was developed with VAST Data Federal for defence environments and discuss U.S. Army/U.S. Navy programmes and JADC2.^{5, 6} Mercury further states that RDS developed with VAST Data Federal would support U.S. Army Future Vertical Lift sensor-development work aboard helicopters.⁷ These sources establish military integration of VAST storage software, but they do not say VAST software itself makes targeting decisions, controls weapons or produces kinetic effects.

The strongest verified Israel-specific defence-industry link found is a 2026 IAI–ELTA storage-role listing stating that IAI’s Ashdod IT organisation operates central storage systems based on Dell EMC, NetApp and VAST.⁸ IAI describes itself as a defence/aerospace company and prime/subcontractor whose portfolio includes air and missile defence, UAS, precision-guided weapons and loitering munitions; IAI describes ELTA as its sensors-and-systems group producing radar, intelligence, electronic-warfare, communications and sensor systems.^{9, 10} The employment listing establishes VAST technology in an Israeli defence-prime enterprise storage environment. It does not identify a VAST contract, procurement route, classified programme, weapon-system component, targeting function, military end-user, contract value or operational mission.⁸

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Ministry of Defence, IDF and Israeli security-body contracts

No public evidence identified of a direct contract, tender award, framework agreement or memorandum of understanding between VAST Data/VAST Data Federal and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service or Israel Border Police.

A narrower relationship is documented at IAI–ELTA: the 2026 storage-and-backup role states that IAI’s Ashdod IT organisation manages central storage systems based on Dell EMC, NetApp and VAST.⁸ IAI’s own materials establish that IAI is a defence prime and ELTA a defence-electronics/sensors group.^{9, 10} The public material does not identify the seller, purchasing entity, contract terms, deployment architecture or military programme using that storage.⁸

Outside Israel, VAST announced in August 2021 that U.S. Department of Defense orders for Universal Storage exceeded $10 million and would support workloads including synthetic-aperture-radar data and AI-supported packet capture.¹¹ This 2021 evidence is more than five years old as of this audit but is post-2020; current U.S. defence continuity is separately evidenced by 2025 DoDIN APL certification and 2026 federal-market activity.^{12, 13} VAST’s December 2023 Series E announcement also listed the U.S. Air Force among its customers.¹⁴ In July 2025 VAST stated that one unnamed defence agency had reduced AI deployment time from months to days while using its platform.¹⁵

Defence trade directories and procurement registries

No public evidence identified of VAST Data appearing in a SIBAT Israeli defence-export directory or an Israeli procurement registry in connection with an IDF/IMOD award.

In the United States, Carahsoft lists VAST Federal procurement channels including GSA MAS, NASA SEWP V and ITES-SW2; ITES-SW2 runs through August 2030.¹⁶ This is U.S. procurement infrastructure and does not establish an Israeli defence award.

Official announcements and defence cooperation

VAST’s primary announcements establish U.S. defence cooperation, including VAST Federal’s 2021 launch, DoD orders in 2021, DoDIN APL certification in 2025 and a 2025 Leidos collaboration aimed at U.S. defence, intelligence and civilian agencies.^{3, 11, 12, 17}

Mercury’s current RDS material independently establishes a defence-oriented integration of VAST software: Mercury says RDS is powered by VAST Data software, designed to multiple military standards and intended for operational environments including ships, vehicles, mobile command centres, submarines and fixed-wing aircraft.⁴ Mercury also describes RDS as a joint Mercury/VAST Data Federal solution for tactical-edge defence storage.^{5, 6}

No public evidence identified of a VAST press release announcing a defence-cooperation agreement, joint venture or military programme with IMOD, IDF, IAI, ELTA, Rafael, Elbit Systems or IMI/Elbit Land.

VAST did announce a September 2025 partnership with Shonfeld Data Services to build sovereign AI infrastructure in Israel using the VAST AI Operating System.¹⁸ Contemporary reporting places the associated server farm at Bet Yehoshua and describes approximately 2,000 NVIDIA Blackwell B200 GPUs in its initial configuration.¹⁹ Neither cited source identifies an Israeli military or security end-user.^{18, 19}

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Militarised product lines

VAST’s standalone AI Operating System is general-purpose data infrastructure.^{1, 2} In contrast, Mercury’s RDS is a purpose-built rugged integration that incorporates VAST Data software. Mercury says the RDS is a SWaP-optimised, all-flash multi-petabyte storage system for operational environments, powered by VAST Universal Storage, and designed to meet MIL-STD-810, MIL-STD-461, MIL-STD-167 and MIL-STD-901.⁴ Mercury lists AI, sensor fusion/processing, SIGINT, electronic warfare, video/image capture and other applications, with platform contexts including ships, vehicles, mobile command centres, submarines and fixed-wing aircraft.⁴

Mercury’s tactical-edge white paper says Mercury Systems and VAST Data Federal developed the solution in response to defence sensor-data challenges and expressly covers JADC2 plus storage impacts on U.S. Army and U.S. Navy programmes/platforms.⁵ Carahsoft’s DoDIIS 2024 resource separately promoted VAST Federal use around ground and aerial sensors, tactical-edge data resilience and a global namespace for a common operating picture.²⁰ Mercury’s related blog says it partnered with VAST Federal and integrated VAST storage software to bring commercial data-centre innovation into aerospace and defence systems.⁶

Named military programme integration

Mercury’s October 2022 Future Vertical Lift article states that RDS, developed in collaboration with VAST Data Federal, would play a role in helping the U.S. Army create its next generation of helicopters.⁷ Mercury says RDS would be placed aboard helicopters to develop sensor requirements for FVL aircraft and collect flight/scenario data, including RF, IR and other electronic sensor data.⁷ This is a named U.S. military programme use of a rugged storage product incorporating VAST software.

The source describes storage, data collection and sensor-development support. It does not state that VAST software performs targeting, fire control, weapons guidance or autonomous engagement.⁷

No retrieved Mercury source connects RDS or Future Vertical Lift to Israel, the IDF, IMOD or an Israeli defence prime. Accordingly, no Israeli end-use is inferred from the Mercury integration.^{5, 6, 7}

Civilian-to-military distinction

VAST’s core platform is sold broadly for commercial AI and enterprise use as well as public-sector defence/intelligence workloads.^{3, 1, 2} VAST’s 2022 Ceres material likewise describes an enterprise/hyperscale NVMe storage platform powered by VAST software, reinforcing the civilian data-centre baseline.²¹ Mercury’s RDS is different in form: a ruggedised military/aerospace storage system built around VAST software and tested/designed against military environmental standards.^{4, 6}

For Israel, the ELTA evidence concerns central enterprise storage in an IT organisation.⁸ no public evidence identified that the IAI/ELTA VAST deployment is Mercury RDS, another tactical variant, contract-modified for a weapon system or purpose-built for kinetic effects.

End-user certification and export licensing

No public evidence identified of an export-licence application, Israeli end-user certificate, export-control review or military end-use authorisation specifically covering VAST products supplied to an Israeli defence/security body.

The DoDIN APL evidence concerns U.S. cybersecurity/interoperability approval for DoD infrastructure; it is not an Israeli export licence or end-user certificate.¹²

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Equipment in occupied territories

VAST’s documented products are data/software/storage infrastructure rather than bulldozers, vehicles, construction plant or demolition machinery.^{1, 2} Mercury’s RDS is rugged military/aerospace data-storage equipment, not construction machinery.⁴ no public evidence identified of VAST or VAST-powered Mercury equipment being used to construct, maintain or demolish property in Israeli settlements, at the separation barrier, checkpoints or military installations in the occupied Palestinian territory or occupied Syrian Golan.

The identified 2025 SDS/VAST server-farm project is reported at Bet Yehoshua.^{18, 19} The cited evidence does not identify a West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan deployment.^{18, 19}

Direct vs indirect supply

For the IAI/ELTA storage environment, the public evidence establishes VAST as one of the technologies used in central storage but does not identify whether supply was direct from VAST, through an authorised reseller/integrator or through another procurement channel.⁸ no public evidence identified of a VAST policy specifically addressing monitoring of Israeli military or settlement end-use.

Construction and engineering contracts

No public evidence identified of VAST contracting to construct, maintain or expand checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier or settlement infrastructure.

PAX describes Don’t Buy Into Occupation as examining companies linked to settlement construction, maintenance and expansion and associated investor relationships.²² The retrievable PAX material searched in this audit did not yield a VAST-specific settlement case.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Component or infrastructure supply to Israeli defence manufacturers

The IAI/ELTA storage-role listing is the clearest verified Israeli defence-prime integration found. It says IAI’s Ashdod IT organisation manages central storage based on Dell EMC, NetApp and VAST.⁸ IAI officially states that it acts as a prime contractor and subcontractor across aerospace, land, sea and cyber programmes and produces air/missile-defence systems, UAS, precision-guided weapons and loitering munitions.⁹ ELTA officially describes itself as IAI’s sensor-and-systems group producing radar, intelligence, electronic-warfare, communications and sensor systems, including a division with detection, tracking and fire-control systems.¹⁰

This evidence supports a bounded statement: VAST storage technology is present in an Israeli defence prime’s enterprise IT/storage environment.^{9, 10, 8} It does not establish that VAST supplies a weapon component, radar subassembly, guidance element, fire-control subsystem or data service for any named IAI/ELTA military programme.⁸

No public evidence identified of a verified VAST supply relationship with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Elbit Systems or IMI/Elbit Land.

Specific component categories

The Israel-defence-prime product category verified here is enterprise central storage.⁸ Separately, Mercury integrates VAST software into rugged military storage hardware used for sensor-data and tactical-edge applications.^{4, 5, 7} no public evidence identified of VAST supplying optical systems, propulsion parts, armour, guidance electronics, fire-control electronics, warhead components or other weapon-specific hardware to an Israeli defence manufacturer.

Joint development, co-production and technology transfer

Mercury and VAST Data Federal have a verified collaborative-development relationship around RDS, a rugged storage system for aerospace and defence applications.^{4, 6, 7} This is a U.S.-centred data-storage integration and not evidence of an Israeli joint weapons-development programme.

No public evidence identified of VAST participating in a joint weapons-development programme, co-production agreement, technology-transfer arrangement or licensed manufacturing agreement with an Israeli defence prime.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Service contracts to military installations

No public evidence identified of VAST providing catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, base telecommunications or comparable sustainment services to IDF bases, training facilities, detention centres or Israeli security installations.

VAST’s known defence activity is data infrastructure, including VAST Federal software for defence/intelligence missions and Mercury’s VAST-powered rugged storage integration.^{3, 4} These are technology-supply relationships rather than base-services contracts.

Geographic specificity

No public evidence identified of a VAST military-support service at an installation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, occupied Syrian Golan or Negev.

The Israel sovereign-AI infrastructure identified in 2025 is associated with SDS and a Bet Yehoshua server farm; the sources do not identify it as an IDF installation.^{18, 19}

Shipping, freight and port services

No public evidence identified of VAST providing shipping, freight forwarding or port handling for Israeli military cargo or arms shipments.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Lethal systems manufacturing

VAST’s own product descriptions concern AI/data infrastructure rather than small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, drones, warships or other lethal platforms.^{1, 2} Mercury’s RDS is a military/aerospace rugged data-storage system incorporating VAST software; Mercury describes applications such as SIGINT, EW and sensor processing, not weapons manufacture.⁴

No public evidence identified that VAST acts as a prime or licensed manufacturer of lethal systems supplied to Israeli forces.

Munitions and precursor materials

No public evidence identified of VAST supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, propellants, warhead components or munitions precursors to Israeli defence end-users.

Strategic and military platforms

Mercury’s FVL material is the strongest platform-specific military evidence found. It states that RDS developed with VAST Data Federal would be placed aboard helicopters to support sensor-requirements development for the U.S. Army Future Vertical Lift programme.⁷ That establishes a military-platform development use of VAST-powered rugged storage, but not a weapon-control or kinetic function.

IAI’s portfolio separately includes air and missile defence, UAS and precision-guided weapons, while ELTA produces radar and other mission-critical defence sensors.^{9, 10} The evidence that IAI/ELTA enterprise IT uses VAST storage does not identify VAST as a component of Arrow, Barak, a fighter-aircraft system, UAS weapon chain, tank, warship or ballistic-missile system.⁸

Sub-systems and critical components

Mercury RDS uses VAST software as a storage layer for military/aerospace edge data, and Mercury identifies sensor processing, SIGINT and EW among its applications.⁴ Mercury’s FVL example concerns onboard data collection for sensor development.⁷ Neither source says VAST provides guidance, fire control, weapon radar hardware, propulsion or another critical kinetic subsystem.

For Israeli systems specifically, no public evidence identified of VAST supplying a critical subsystem calibrated for a lethal or strategic platform.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export licence decisions

No public evidence identified of a government decision in any jurisdiction granting, denying, suspending or revoking an export licence for VAST products to an Israeli military/security end-user.

Arms embargo and sanctions compliance

No public evidence identified of an investigation, citation or enforcement action against VAST concerning arms-embargo, military-export-control or sanctions compliance involving Israel.

Legal challenges and judicial review

No public evidence identified of a court proceeding or judicial review against VAST, or against a government, concerning VAST defence supply to Israel.

Post-July/November 2024 continuity and constructive-notice chronology

VAST’s defence-market activity continued after 19 July 2024 and November 2024. The VAST Federal Data Platform obtained DoDIN APL certification in July 2025; VAST Federal announced a Leidos cybersecurity partnership for U.S. defence, intelligence and civilian agencies in October 2025; and Carahsoft reported continued VAST Federal public-sector growth in May 2026.^{12, 17, 13} Mercury’s current RDS page and tactical-edge materials continued to present VAST-powered rugged storage for defence applications during the same period.^{4, 5}

VAST’s Israel business also continued after those dates through the September 2025 SDS sovereign-AI partnership, while the 2026 IAI/ELTA storage-role listing evidences VAST technology in IAI’s enterprise storage environment.^{18, 8}

Those chronology points establish continuation of defence-market activity and Israel-based commercial activity. No public evidence identified that the post-July/November 2024 Israeli activity was an IDF/IMOD contract, settlement operation or purpose-built kinetic system. The Mercury military integration is U.S.-focused in the retrieved primary sources and is not treated as evidence of Israeli end-use.^{4, 5, 7}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO, UN and academic material

PAX’s June 2024 report addresses international arms producers selling weapons to Israel and the financial institutions backing them.²³ A text search of the retrievable PAX publication material did not identify a VAST-specific case during this audit. PAX also describes the Don’t Buy Into Occupation coalition as investigating companies involved in Israeli settlements and their investors.²² The retrievable PAX programme material searched here did not yield a VAST-specific settlement finding.

No public evidence was identified in the UN/OHCHR settlement-database, A/HRC/59/23 materials, or specialist NGO sources reviewed for VAST Data. UN/OHCHR URLs that failed direct retrieval were excluded from End Notes and the source manifest rather than used as document-verified absence evidence.

Boycott and divestment campaigns

No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment or institutional-exclusion campaign specifically targeting VAST for defence-sector activity with Israel.

Corporate response and policy statements

No public evidence identified of a VAST policy change, contract termination, military end-use commitment or public response to civil-society pressure concerning an Israeli defence supply chain.

Controlling principals and military-channel acts

A 2026 Mistral AI conference biography identifies VAST co-founder and CTO Alon Horev and states that he previously served in the Israel Defense Forces working on software and hardware development.²⁴ This is evidence of historical military service, not evidence by itself of a current VAST corporate military contract, defence-board role, donation, defence-prime equity holding or ongoing reserve activity.

VAST Federal appointed former CIA CTO Gus Hunt to its board in July 2021 to advise federal expansion.²⁵ That is a documented U.S. security-sector governance link within VAST’s federal subsidiary; it does not establish an Israeli military-channel act.

No public evidence identified in this audit of a current defence-industry directorship, FIDF/reservist-fund donation, equity stake in an Israeli defence prime or public co-belligerency act by a VAST founder, CEO, chair or other controlling principal that could be verified to the requested standard.