- Tiffany & Co. holds a BDS-1000 score of 82.6 (Tier E), driven solely by a Tel Aviv retail presence and corporate silence on the Israel–Palestine conflict, with zero scores in military and digital involvement domains. - The company has no identified links to Israeli defence, settlement infrastructure, or dual-use technology, and is absent from all major divestment and occupation databases. - Since its US$15.8 billion acquisition by LVMH in January 2021, Tiffany operates as a private subsidiary, significantly limiting the availability of granular public disclosures on IT vendors, legal entity structures, and sub-tier supply chains. - Tiffany has taken documented public stances on LGBTQ+ inclusion, racial justice, and Ukraine humanitarian relief, yet has issued no public statement on the Israel–Hamas conflict since October 2023. - Identified evidence gaps — including the Tel Aviv boutique's legal entity structure and polished-diamond supply chain intermediaries — carry upward score revision risk only, insufficient to alter the Tier E classification.
Table of Contents
Tiffany & Co. is a luxury jeweler with no identified operational, technological, or financial link to Israeli defence, security, or settlement infrastructure. Across two of the four BDS-1000 domains — V-MIL (Military) and V-DIG (Digital) — the audit returns zero scores, reflecting structural inapplicability of Tiffany’s product portfolio to defence contracting, dual-use technology supply, and Israeli state technology relationships. The company is absent from the UN OHCHR settlement-business database, the Who Profits corporate occupation database, AFSC Investigate’s divestment lists, and the BDS Movement’s official consumer boycott target list.123
The composite BDS-1000 score of 82.6 (Tier E) is driven entirely by two low-intensity findings. In V-ECON, a historically documented retail boutique in Tel Aviv constitutes a minor direct sales channel in a market that is neither strategically named nor revenue-segmented in LVMH’s public disclosures.45 In V-POL, the company’s consistent public silence on the Israel–Palestine conflict — contrasted with documented corporate-voice deployment on LGBTQ+ inclusion, racial justice, and the Ukraine war — places it in the “Business-as-Usual” normalisation band without rising to active advocacy or geopolitical alignment.67
Both findings carry moderate confidence. Key evidence gaps — the precise legal entity structure of the Tel Aviv boutique, the polished-diamond supply chain’s intermediaries, and post-October 2023 internal communications — would need to be resolved before any material revision to the score could be justified. No evidence gap identified in any audit presents downward risk to the score; any gap resolution would carry upward potential only, and even generous upward re-scoring on V-DIG would not change the Tier E classification.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1837 | Tiffany & Co. founded in New York City by Charles Lewis Tiffany and John B. Young as “Tiffany, Young and Ellis” 8 |
| 1862–present | Tiffany & Co. awarded U.S. federal contract to manufacture the Medal of Honor; relationship ongoing 6 |
| 1919–1942 | Tiffany & Co. produced the “Tiffany Cross” variant of the Medal of Honor; commemorative and decorative in nature 6 |
| 2018 | Tiffany & Co. launches LGBTQ+-inclusive advertising campaigns 6 |
| 2019 | Diamond Source Initiative introduced; discloses rough-diamond country of origin under Responsible Jewellery Council certification 9 |
| 2020 | Tiffany & Co. issues public statement on racial justice following killing of George Floyd 6 |
| 2020–2021 | Salesforce clienteling and unified-commerce deployment at Tiffany publicly documented 10 |
| November 2020 | LVMH and Tiffany resolve merger litigation in Delaware; revised acquisition terms agreed 11 |
| 7 January 2021 | LVMH completes acquisition of Tiffany & Co. for approximately US$15.8 billion; Tiffany becomes wholly-owned LVMH subsidiary 11 |
| January 2021 | Anthony Ledru appointed CEO of Tiffany & Co. 12 |
| 16 June 2021 | LVMH announces strategic AI and cloud partnership with Google Cloud covering group maisons 13 |
| 2022 | LVMH group donates €5 million to Red Cross for Ukraine humanitarian relief, communicated as covering portfolio brands including Tiffany 7 |
| 2023 | LVMH-Microsoft Azure generative-AI programme publicly documented, covering group maisons 14 |
| 2023 | Tiffany Landmark flagship at 727 Fifth Avenue, New York, reopened following renovation 6 |
| 2023 | Tiffany & Co. 2023 Sustainability Report published; maintains Kimberley Process compliance, Diamond Source Initiative, RJC certification 9 |
| October 2023–present | Israel–Hamas war; no Tiffany-specific public statement on the conflict identified in company newsroom or LVMH disclosures 67 |
| 2024 | LVMH Universal Registration Document 2024 published; no Tiffany-specific Israel IT vendor or settlement supply chain disclosure 15 |
| 2025 | Cyberattacks affecting LVMH maisons (including Dior, Louis Vuitton) reported; no Tiffany-specific Israeli-vendor link identified 16 |
| 2026-05-01 | BDS-1000 audit cutoff date |
Tiffany & Co. is among the world’s most recognised luxury jewelry brands, founded in New York City in 1837. Its core business spans fine jewelry, watches, sterling silver, leather goods, fragrances, and home accessories, with manufacturing facilities concentrated in the United States, Belgium, and several manufacturing-cost jurisdictions.817 The brand is positioned at the apex of the global luxury jewelry market, with annual revenues in the US$4–5 billion range as part of LVMH’s Watches & Jewelry division.
Since the acquisition closed on 7 January 2021, Tiffany has operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of LVMH SE, the French conglomerate controlled by the Arnault family via Financière Agache and Christian Dior SE.11 As a private subsidiary, Tiffany no longer files independently with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; its public disclosure is now channelled through LVMH’s annual Universal Registration Document.15 This governance structure creates material opacity for forensic auditing: enterprise IT vendor stacks, subsidiary-level legal entity structures in individual markets, and sub-tier supply chain relationships are not publicly disclosed at the maison level.
Tiffany’s publicly stated sourcing framework centres on conflict-free diamond sourcing under the Diamond Source Initiative (introduced 2019), Responsible Jewellery Council membership, and Kimberley Process compliance.9 Its manufacturing and polishing operations are vertically integrated at facilities in Antwerp (Belgium), Mauritius, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Dominican Republic; Israel is not listed as a Tiffany-operated cutting or polishing site in any public disclosure reviewed.17
The V-MIL audit applies the framework across six sub-categories: direct defence contracting, dual-use products and tactical variants, heavy machinery and construction, supply chain integration with defence primes, logistical sustainment and base services, and munitions and weapons systems. Across all six, the audit returns the same conclusion: no public evidence of involvement, and in several cases, structural inapplicability of Tiffany’s product portfolio to the category in question.
Direct Defence Contracting. No contract, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Tiffany & Co. and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police has been identified in any reviewed source. Searches of the Israeli Ministry of Defense International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT) exporter directory, Israeli MoD tender publications, LVMH Universal Registration Documents, and U.S. Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) records under “Tiffany and Company” return no relevant procurement records.1819 Tiffany is not listed as a registered Israeli defence exporter or foreign vendor in SIBAT materials, nor does it appear in exhibitor catalogues for major defence trade events such as Eurosatory, ISDEF, or AUSA. The U.S. State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) ITAR-registered manufacturer list contains no Tiffany entry.20
Dual-Use Products. Tiffany’s product portfolio — fine jewelry, watches, sterling silver, leather goods, fragrances, home accessories — contains no ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variant of any product. The company does hold a long-standing historical association with U.S. military commemorative items, most notably the “Tiffany Cross” variant of the Medal of Honor (produced 1919–1942) and ongoing production of the Medal of Honor under a U.S. federal contract dating to 1862.6 These items are commemorative and decorative in nature. No analogous Israeli-state commemorative production relationship is documented in any reviewed source. Standard consumer retail sale of Tiffany goods at Israeli department stores, duty-free outlets, or to individual servicemembers acting as private consumers does not constitute dual-use defence supply and is not documented as state procurement.
Heavy Machinery, Construction, and Infrastructure. This sub-category is structurally inapplicable: Tiffany does not manufacture heavy machinery, construction equipment, vehicles, or infrastructure plant. It therefore has no capacity to supply settlement construction, separation barrier projects, military installations, checkpoints, or detention facilities. No NGO report, UN OHCHR database entry, Who Profits dossier, AFSC Investigate profile, Stop the Wall archive, or Corporate Occupation record places Tiffany-branded equipment in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Golan Heights, or East Jerusalem.12
Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes. No public record documents Tiffany & Co. supplying components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, IMI/Elbit Land, or any other Israeli defence prime contractor. Tiffany’s supply chain disclosures are scoped to responsibly sourced rough diamonds, gold, silver, and platinum for jewelry production.9 No joint development programmes, co-production arrangements, technology-transfer agreements, or licensed manufacturing arrangements between Tiffany or LVMH and Israeli defence firms are documented in USPTO patent assignments, SIBAT listings, Who Profits, AFSC Investigate, or LVMH Universal Registration Documents.12
Logistical Sustainment and Base Services. This sub-category is structurally inapplicable: Tiffany is a luxury retailer and does not provide catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, or telecommunications services. SAM.gov and FPDS records show no Tiffany service contracts to U.S. forces in Israel or elsewhere. No source reviewed places Tiffany in any service-contract, freight-forwarding, or port-handling capacity in connection with Israeli defence logistics or arms shipments.19
Munitions, Weapons Systems, and Strategic Platforms. Tiffany is not a manufacturer or licensed producer of small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, or naval vessels. No evidence documents the supply of ammunition, ordnance, propellants, warhead components, or precursor materials by Tiffany to any party. No Tiffany role in Israeli strategic systems — including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, or F-35 programme participation — is documented in any reviewed source. USPTO patent assignment searches for “Tiffany and Company” return design and jewelry-method patents only; no filings exist in guidance, fire-control, radar, propulsion, or warhead-related technology classes.21
The rubric-grounded outcome for V-MIL is unambiguous: I = 0.0 (None: No Measurable Kinetic Impact), M = 0.0 (None/Negligible), P = 0.0 (None: No connection). The V-MIL domain score is 0.000.
The strongest challenge to the zero V-MIL score would arise if future disclosure revealed that Tiffany’s sub-tier precious-metals supply chain — specifically gold, silver, or platinum refiners and bullion suppliers — included Israeli entities with documented ties to Israeli defence procurement. The audit acknowledges that Tiffany’s Diamond Source Initiative discloses rough-diamond country of origin but that the full tier-2/tier-3 metals supply chain is not publicly granular.9 However, this is an acknowledged gap, not positive evidence; and even if an Israeli refiner were identified in Tiffany’s supply chain, the connection to Israeli defence activity would require a further independent evidentiary step that no reviewed source currently supports.
A second potential challenge arises from Israel’s historically significant diamond-cutting and trading sector. Whether any portion of Tiffany’s polished-diamond intake passes through Israeli commercial intermediaries is not specifically addressed in public sourcing disclosures.9 This is a civilian commercial question with no established defence dimension, and no source reviewed draws a connection between commercial diamond polishing activity and V-MIL criteria.
A third consideration is the LVMH-group context. As a wholly-owned subsidiary since January 2021, Tiffany inherits group-level disclosures, and a comprehensive cross-check of every LVMH brand portfolio against defence-adjacency criteria was not exhaustively performed.15 However, LVMH itself is not a defence company, and no LVMH-group defence contract with Israeli entities is documented in reviewed sources. The structural arguments for the zero V-MIL score are robust: no evidence scenario identified in any audit gap realistically places Tiffany’s luxury jewelry product portfolio within the scope of military supply.
| Entity | Type | V-MIL Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tiffany & Co. | Target entity | Direct subject of audit | No defence contracts, no dual-use products, no munitions |
| LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE | Parent company | Group-level disclosure | Not a defence company; no Israeli defence contracts identified |
| Israeli MoD / SIBAT | Regulatory / procurement body | Exporter directory and tender search | No Tiffany entry identified 18 |
| Israel Defense Forces (IDF) | State military | Procurement counterparty search | No relationship identified |
| Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land | Israeli defence primes | Supply chain integration check | No relationship with Tiffany identified 12 |
| U.S. DDTC / ITAR registry | Regulatory body | Export control check | Tiffany not listed 20 |
| U.S. FPDS / SAM.gov | Procurement database | Contract-award search | No Tiffany defence contracts identified 19 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | Corporate occupation scrutiny | No Tiffany entry 1 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | Divestment list check | No Tiffany entry 2 |
| UN OHCHR A/HRC/43/71 | UN database | Settlement-business list | Tiffany not listed 22 |
| Norwegian GPFG Council on Ethics | Investment exclusion list | Defence-related exclusion check | Tiffany/LVMH not listed for Israeli defence reasons |
| Tiffany “Tiffany Cross” Medal of Honor | Historical product | Dual-use product check | Commemorative/decorative; U.S. state only; no Israeli equivalent 6 |
| Diamond Source Initiative | Sourcing framework | Sub-tier supply chain | Rough-diamond origin disclosed; metals tier-2/3 not granular 9 |
| Responsible Jewellery Council | Certification body | Supply chain standards | Member; oriented to conflict-free sourcing 9 |
The V-DIG audit assesses Tiffany & Co. across five domains: enterprise technology stack and vendor relationships; surveillance, biometrics, and retail technology; cloud infrastructure and sovereign-cloud participation; defence, intelligence, and security sector technology relationships; and AI, algorithmic, and autonomous systems.
Enterprise Technology Stack. Tiffany’s publicly documented enterprise technology relationships centre on two major U.S.-headquartered platforms: Salesforce, deployed for clienteling and unified commerce from approximately 2020, and Adobe Experience Cloud, deployed for digital experience management from approximately 2019.1023 Neither is Israeli-origin. At the LVMH group level, two publicly disclosed hyperscaler partnerships are relevant: a strategic AI partnership with Google Cloud announced in June 2021, and a generative-AI programme with Microsoft Azure publicly documented from 2023.1314 Both involve U.S. hyperscalers; no Israeli sovereign-cloud or Israeli government-facing component of either partnership is publicly disclosed. LVMH does not publish a maison-by-maison IT vendor inventory, creating structural opacity at the Tiffany-specific level.
Israeli-Origin Enterprise Software. Vendors of Israeli origin active in enterprise security, endpoint detection and response, privileged access management, and cloud security include Check Point Software, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks (Israeli-founded), NICE Systems, Verint Systems, and Claroty. No public evidence was identified of a direct named licensing, subscription, or integration relationship between Tiffany & Co. and any of these vendors.12 Sources consulted include the LVMH URD 2024, Tiffany’s privacy and sustainability disclosures, vendor customer-story pages, AFSC Investigate, and the Who Profits database.
Surveillance, Biometrics, and Retail Technology. Israeli-origin or Israeli-linked vendors active in retail surveillance and biometrics include Trigo, BriefCam (acquired by Canon; Israeli-founded), AnyVision/Oosto, Trax Retail, and Corsight AI. No public evidence was identified that Tiffany & Co. has deployed any of these systems in its retail estate. Tiffany’s Privacy Notice acknowledges the use of closed-circuit television in stores but does not identify any biometric vendor or facial recognition system.24 Who Profits and AFSC Investigate do not list Tiffany in connection with Israeli-origin surveillance technology.12
Cloud Infrastructure and Project Nimbus. Project Nimbus is the Israeli government’s national cloud programme, with Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services named as primary awarded contractors in 2021.25 Tiffany & Co. is not among the awarded vendors. No public evidence identifies Tiffany operating, leasing, or co-locating data centre infrastructure within Israel, nor providing sovereign infrastructure services to Israeli state institutions. The LVMH group’s disclosed cloud partnerships with Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure do not specify Israeli cloud-region or sovereign-cloud components.1314
Defence, Intelligence, and Security Sector Technology. Tiffany operates exclusively in the consumer luxury sector and has no documented defence-sector commercial line. No commercial relationship between Tiffany & Co. and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, Israel Defence Forces, or Israeli intelligence agencies is identified in any reviewed source.12 Tiffany’s product portfolio — jewelry, watches, and luxury accessories — does not fall within dual-use technology classifications. No evidence exists of offensive cyber, zero-day, or digital weapons provision to any actor.
AI, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Systems. Tiffany is a consumer of AI services through LVMH’s group-level partnerships with Google Cloud and Microsoft, not an AI developer or vendor. There is therefore no pathway identified by which Tiffany would be providing AI or machine-learning capabilities to Israeli state or security institutions.1314 No public evidence was identified of AI training data sourced from civilian populations in occupied territories, or of autonomous targeting, tracking, or weapons system involvement.
R&D and Israeli Technology Investment. No public evidence was identified of Tiffany operating R&D, design, or engineering facilities in Israel; acquiring an Israeli-origin technology company; or making strategic investments in Israeli technology startups or Israeli-focused venture capital funds. At the LVMH group level, Israeli startups have participated in the LVMH Innovation Award via the Viva Technology ecosystem, but no public document attributes a specific Israeli-startup investment or partnership to the Tiffany maison specifically.26 USPTO assignee searches for “Tiffany and Company” return design and jewelry-method patents only; no co-assignment or joint filing with Israeli institutions was identified.21
The rubric-grounded outcome for V-DIG is: I = 0.0 (None: No Digital Interaction), M = 0.0 (None/Negligible), P = 0.0 (None: No connection). The V-DIG domain score is 0.000.
The scoring file acknowledges moderate confidence for the V-DIG zero score, specifically identifying structural opacity of LVMH’s maison-level IT stack as the principal uncertainty. LVMH does not publish a brand-by-brand IT vendor list; Tiffany-specific cybersecurity, EDR, SIEM, and cloud vendor identities — any of which could include Israeli-origin products — are not publicly disclosed.15 This means the zero score reflects the complete absence of positive evidence rather than confirmed absence.
A materially important secondary gap is the store-level surveillance stack: Tiffany’s Privacy Notice acknowledges in-store CCTV and analytics but names no technology vendors.24 No investigative reporting on the loss-prevention or surveillance vendor stack of Tiffany flagship stores, including the Landmark in New York, was identified. Israeli-origin retail analytics or biometric systems could theoretically be present without public disclosure.
A third limitation concerns indirect Israeli-origin technology exposure. Major U.S. technology stacks in use across LVMH — Microsoft, Google Cloud, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks — incorporate components or previously acquired Israeli-origin technology. The scoring file explicitly excludes such transitive exposure under the “No Transitive Guilt” rule: without positive evidence of a direct, named relationship, indirect component exposure does not generate a score.12 However, this is a principled exclusion, not a factual confirmation of absence.
The scoring file notes that even if a future disclosure confirmed deployment of an Israeli-origin cybersecurity product such as CyberArk or SentinelOne at Tiffany, the rubric-correct response would be to assign I-DIG to Band 3 (Soft Dual-Use Procurement, maximum 3.9) per the Customer Cap. Given the low likely M scores for a passive procurement relationship of this kind, the practical effect on the composite BRS would be modest and would not change the Tier E classification.
| Entity | Type | V-DIG Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tiffany & Co. | Target entity | Direct subject of audit | No Israeli-origin digital relationship identified |
| LVMH SE | Parent company | Group IT governance | Sets technology strategy; no maison-level vendor disclosure 15 |
| Salesforce | Enterprise platform | Documented Tiffany deployment | U.S.-origin; not Israeli; deployed from ~2020 10 |
| Adobe Experience Cloud | Marketing technology | Documented Tiffany deployment | U.S.-origin; not Israeli; deployed from ~2019 23 |
| Google Cloud | Hyperscaler | LVMH group partnership | U.S.-origin; no Israeli sovereign-cloud component disclosed 13 |
| Microsoft Azure | Hyperscaler | LVMH group partnership | U.S.-origin; no Israeli sovereign-cloud component disclosed 14 |
| Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, Palo Alto Networks, NICE, Verint, Claroty | Israeli-origin vendors | Vendor screening | No named Tiffany relationship identified 12 |
| Trigo, BriefCam, AnyVision/Oosto, Trax, Corsight AI | Israeli retail/surveillance vendors | Retail biometric screening | No deployment at Tiffany identified 12 |
| Project Nimbus | Israeli state cloud programme | Cloud/sovereignty check | Tiffany not a vendor; awarded to Google Cloud and AWS 25 |
| LVMH Innovation Award / Viva Technology | Innovation programme | Israeli startup exposure | Group-level; no named Tiffany-specific engagement documented 26 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | Digital complicity screening | No Tiffany entry 1 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | Digital complicity screening | No Tiffany entry 2 |
| USPTO | Patent registry | R&D co-development check | No Israeli co-assignments for Tiffany 21 |
| California AG data breach portal | Regulatory database | Cybersecurity incident check | No Tiffany-Israeli-vendor incident listed 27 |
The V-ECON audit assesses Tiffany & Co. across six economic sub-categories: supply chain and sourcing relationships; product origin, labelling, and regulatory compliance; investment, capital, and financial exposure; operational presence and market activity; corporate structure and foundational ties; and profit repatriation and economic contribution.
Supply Chain and Sourcing — Diamond Nexus. Israel’s Ramat Gan Israel Diamond Exchange is a globally significant hub for diamond cutting and polishing, and luxury jewelers broadly have historically sourced polished diamonds through it.28 However, Tiffany’s Diamond Source Initiative and LVMH’s Universal Registration Documents identify specific countries of origin for rough diamonds — Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Canada, and (pre-2022) Russia — and disclose a vertically integrated cutting workshop in Antwerp, Belgium, plus finishing facilities in Cambodia, Mauritius, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic.917 Israel is not listed as a Tiffany-operated cutting or polishing site. Whether ad-hoc Israeli-polished stones enter Tiffany’s supply chain via secondary market transactions in 2024–2025 remains unknown; no named Israeli polisher appears in any publicly disclosed Tiffany supplier record. This is a documented evidence gap, not a finding of absence.
Supply Chain and Sourcing — Settlement and Agricultural Goods. Categories including agricultural aggregators, Medjool date sourcing, and seasonal produce procurement are structurally inapplicable to Tiffany’s product portfolio. Tiffany does not appear on the UN OHCHR settlement-business database (2020 list, 2023 update), the Who Profits database, or AFSC Investigate as a company sourcing or retailing goods originating from West Bank, Jordan Valley, or Golan Heights settlements.2212 No regulatory enforcement actions — DEFRA citations, EU customs advisories, or U.S. CBP enforcement actions — have been identified against Tiffany relating to country-of-origin labelling for settlement-produced goods.
Physical Operational Presence — Tel Aviv. Tiffany & Co. has historically operated a branded retail boutique in Tel Aviv, referenced in Israeli business press via Globes archives.29 Current operational status as of 2025 has been flagged as requiring direct re-verification via the Tiffany.com store locator; the memo treats this as an unverified live status. The legal entity acting as importer of record or local distribution partner is not publicly disclosed in LVMH Universal Registration Documents; the corporate structure — whether a wholly-owned subsidiary, franchise, or third-party concession — cannot be confirmed from public filings alone.415 LVMH’s revenue segmentation does not break out Israel as a distinct geography; Israel is subsumed within “Other” or “Europe” aggregate figures and is not characterised as a strategic market for Tiffany or the Watches & Jewelry division in any investor disclosure reviewed.5
Investment, Capital, and Financial Exposure. No public evidence identifies Tiffany-owned factories, data centres, logistics hubs, or real estate holdings (beyond any leased retail boutique space) within Israel or the occupied territories. Tiffany’s disclosed operational real estate and manufacturing footprint is concentrated in the United States, Dominican Republic, Mauritius, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Belgium.179 No Tiffany-level R&D centre or innovation laboratory in Israel is documented in any source reviewed. Neither Tiffany nor LVMH SE holds disclosed positions in Israeli sovereign bonds or Israel-focused investment funds per the 2023 and 2024 Universal Registration Documents.45
Parent-Level LVMH Exposure. At the LVMH parent level, Israeli-market exposure beyond Tiffany includes: a Louis Vuitton boutique in Tel Aviv, Sephora operations via local partnership, and Israeli startup participations through LVMH Luxury Ventures and the LVMH Innovation Award programme in beauty-tech and retail-tech verticals between 2018 and 2024.30 These parent-level exposures are attributable to LVMH SE as the group entity, not to Tiffany & Co. as the scored target entity. The scoring file explicitly excludes this from Tiffany’s domain score per the rubric’s entity-level analysis framework; they are noted here as contextual background for beneficial-ownership analysis only.
Profit Repatriation. To the extent any Tiffany retail activity generates profit in Israel, those profits flow outward from Israel to the U.S.-domiciled Tiffany & Co. entity and ultimately to the France-domiciled LVMH SE parent. No Israeli-domiciled entity is disclosed in the ownership chain. No public evidence identifies Tiffany as a key employer, sector anchor, critical infrastructure provider, or economically strategic entity within the Israeli domestic economy.12
Corporate Structure and State Linkages. Tiffany & Co. was founded in New York City in 1837 with no Israeli founding or origin ties.8 Its headquarters are in New York; legal parent is LVMH SE, Paris. No Israeli state ownership stake, government-appointed board members, government procurement contracts, golden shares, or critical national infrastructure designations have been identified in any reviewed source.12
The rubric-grounded scoring for V-ECON reflects the confirmed direct sales channel — a Tel Aviv boutique in a market that is minor and not strategically characterised — at I = 2.5 (Low-Mid: Direct Sales, minor export market, no significant capital investment); M = 2.5 (Very Low Upper End: Occasional/Non-Strategic, small-scale single-market presence); P = 7.5 (Moderate Upper End: Direct Operator/Active Parent, brand owner directly generating the sales revenue). The V-ECON domain score is 1.339.
The most material challenge to the V-ECON score concerns the Israeli diamond polishing supply chain. Tiffany’s Diamond Source Initiative tracks rough-diamond country of origin but provides limited public detail on named cutting and polishing intermediaries outside its own workshops.928 If a future supply chain disclosure confirmed that Israeli polishers in Ramat Gan supply Tiffany via secondary trade at material volumes, this could warrant reassessing the sourcing relationship component of I-ECON and M-ECON upward. However, no named Israeli polisher appears in any publicly disclosed Tiffany supplier record, and the connection to occupation-related economic harm would require further evidentiary steps.
A second challenge concerns the Tel Aviv boutique’s legal entity structure. The scoring file assigns P = 7.5 on the basis that Tiffany is the brand owner directly generating the sales revenue in Israel, whether directly or via an LVMH-controlled entity.2915 If the boutique operates through an independent third-party franchisee or distributor rather than a wholly-owned or jointly controlled entity, the correct proximity score might be lower — the “Minority Shareholder / Licence or Franchise Grantor” band would apply at 5.0–6.5 rather than 7.5. Resolving this would require an Israeli Registrar of Companies lookup not available from public sources reviewed.
A third consideration is the LVMH parent-level Israel exposure. The scoring file correctly excludes this from Tiffany’s score under the entity-level analysis rule. However, analysts assessing beneficial-ownership exposure across the LVMH group — rather than Tiffany specifically — would need to examine the full LVMH Luxury Ventures Israeli portfolio, the exhaustive composition of which is not publicly disclosed in LVMH Universal Registration Documents.30
| Entity | Type | V-ECON Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tiffany & Co. | Target entity | Direct subject of audit | Tel Aviv boutique; minor direct sales channel |
| LVMH SE | Parent company | Ownership and capital flows | Controls Tiffany; France-domiciled; no Israeli state nexus 11 |
| Israel Diamond Exchange, Ramat Gan | Industry institution | Diamond supply chain | Globally significant polishing hub; no named Tiffany-specific polisher identified 28 |
| Diamond Source Initiative | Sourcing framework | Supply chain transparency | Discloses rough origin; polishing intermediaries not named 9 |
| Responsible Jewellery Council | Certification body | Sourcing standards | Tiffany member; conflict-free orientation 9 |
| Louis Vuitton (LVMH maison) | Sibling maison | LVMH group Israel footprint | Tel Aviv boutique; attributable to LVMH, not Tiffany 30 |
| Sephora (LVMH maison) | Sibling maison | LVMH group Israel footprint | Israeli operations via local partnership; attributable to LVMH 30 |
| LVMH Luxury Ventures / Innovation Award | Investment programme | Israeli startup exposure | Israeli startup participation 2018–2024; attributable to LVMH 30 |
| Arnault family / Financière Agache | Controlling shareholder | Ownership architecture | Controls LVMH; no Israeli state nexus disclosed 11 |
| UN OHCHR A/HRC/43/71 | UN database | Settlement-business list | Tiffany not listed 22 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | Corporate occupation screening | No Tiffany entry 1 |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO database | Corporate occupation screening | No Tiffany entry 2 |
| Globes (Israeli business press) | Media source | Tel Aviv boutique confirmation | Historical presence referenced 29 |
| LVMH URD 2024 | Corporate disclosure | Revenue segmentation | Israel not broken out; subsumed in “Other” aggregate 15 |
| LVMH 2024 Full-Year Results | Investor disclosure | Strategic market characterisation | Israel not named as strategic market for Tiffany 5 |
The V-POL audit assesses Tiffany & Co. across five domains: corporate communications and public stance; operations in occupied or contested territories; internal governance and content and retail policies; brand heritage and state partnerships; and lobbying, advocacy, financing, and logistics.
Communications Record and Comparative Silence. The most analytically significant V-POL finding is a pattern of selective corporate silence. Tiffany & Co. has a documented record of deploying corporate voice on social and geopolitical matters: explicit LGBTQ+-inclusive advertising campaigns in 2018, a public statement on racial justice following the killing of George Floyd in 2020, and participation in LVMH’s €5 million donation to the Red Cross for Ukraine humanitarian relief in March 2022.76 This establishes a clear precedent for corporate-voice use on matters of political sensitivity. Against this baseline, no public corporate statement specifically addressing the Israel–Hamas war (post-October 2023) or the broader Israel–Palestine conflict has been identified in the company’s official newsroom or parent-company LVMH’s public disclosures.67 The silence is consistent across the full post-October 2023 period through the audit cutoff.
Under the BDS-1000 rubric, the combination of (a) established precedent for public positioning on comparable social and geopolitical matters and (b) complete silence on Israel–Palestine places Tiffany in the “Business-as-Usual” band of the I-POL scale, scored at 3.2 (lower end of Low-Mid: 3.1–4.0). The normalisation is passive — no active promotion of Israeli state policy, no “Brand Israel” sponsorship, no anti-BDS lobbying — which suppresses the score to the lower end of the band rather than the upper end that would apply to active normalisation.
Operations in Occupied or Contested Territories. Tiffany maintains a retail and wholesale presence in Israel through authorised distribution channels, historically including placement in Tel Aviv luxury shopping centres via Israeli luxury retail partners.294 The brand’s store locator confirms Israeli-market presence, though the precise ownership structure remains an evidence gap. No publicly documented Tiffany retail location, dealership, service contract, or authorised point of sale within Israeli settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem beyond the Green Line, or the Golan Heights has been identified. Source classes reviewed include the Tiffany store locator, Who Profits Research Center, and the OHCHR settlement-business database (A/HRC/43/71, most recent update February 2023); Tiffany and LVMH are absent from all three.122
BDS Targeting and NGO Scrutiny. Tiffany & Co. does not appear on the BDS Movement’s official consumer boycott target list as of the audit cutoff.31 No organised BDS-led campaign specifically naming Tiffany & Co. as a primary target has been identified. No regulatory action, sanction, or formal NGO complaint specifically targeting Tiffany operations in occupied territories has been identified in any reviewed database or news archive.221
Lobbying, PAC Activity, and Organisational Financing. Tiffany & Co. has a documented U.S. federal lobbying history oriented toward jewelry-sector regulatory issues: conflict diamonds and Kimberley Process implementation, Dodd-Frank Section 1502 (conflict minerals), tariff classifications for luxury goods, and luxury-import duty schedules.32 No lobbying disclosures specifically addressing Israel–Palestine policy, anti-BDS legislation, or regional trade policy have been identified in Senate LDA or House filings.32 No Tiffany corporate PAC disbursing funds to AIPAC-affiliated candidates, anti-BDS legislative campaigns, or analogous political committees exists on the public record.33 No corporate donations from Tiffany & Co. to organisations such as the Jewish National Fund, Friends of the Israel Defense Forces, settlement-affiliated charities, or comparable organisations have been identified in public IRS Form 990 filings, corporate sustainability reports, or NGO donor trackers.97
Brand Heritage and State Partnerships. Tiffany’s historical U.S. state relationships — Medal of Honor production since 1862, revisions to the Great Seal of the United States, U.S. military presentation swords — are well-documented but pertain exclusively to U.S. state relationships.6 No record has been identified of Tiffany receiving Israeli state honours, hosting Israeli government officials in non-commercial capacities, partnering with Israeli academic or governmental institutions, or sponsoring “Brand Israel” public-diplomacy campaigns.76 Tiffany’s major commercial sponsorships — NFL Vince Lombardi Trophy, MLB Commissioner’s Trophy, NBA Larry O’Brien Championship Trophy, U.S. Open tennis trophies — carry no identified geopolitical dimension.6
Executive and Leadership Footprint. As of the audit cutoff, Tiffany’s senior leadership comprises Anthony Ledru (CEO), Alexandre Arnault (EVP, Product & Communications), and Nathalie Verdeille (Chief Artistic Officer of Jewelry).34 No verifiable personal donations from Ledru or Alexandre Arnault to FIDF, JNF, or comparable Israeli military-welfare or settlement-affiliated organisations have been identified in FEC records or public donor lists.33 No public statements, op-eds, signed open letters, or media commentary by Tiffany executives regarding the Israel–Palestine conflict have been identified.6 Bernard Arnault, as controlling shareholder of parent LVMH, has historically maintained public political neutrality on Middle East matters; no identified personal board role, advisory position, or financial affiliation with Israeli or Palestinian advocacy organisations has been found.35
The rubric-grounded scoring for V-POL: I = 3.2 (Business-as-Usual: treats Israel as a standard Western market, silent on occupation context despite established precedent for public positioning); M = 2.5 (Very Low Upper End: silence and standard commercial presence, no active advocacy, donations, or lobbying); P = 9.0 (Very High Lower End: Direct Operator, the normalisation act is Tiffany’s own corporate communications posture and retail operations with no intermediary). The V-POL domain score is 1.029.
The strongest challenge to the I-POL 3.2 “Business-as-Usual” score would be the argument that corporate silence is morally neutral and should not constitute a scoreable act. The rubric, however, specifically assigns a distinct band to the scenario where a company treats Israel as a standard Western market while ignoring occupation context, and Tiffany’s documented history of selective public positioning on comparable issues is the evidential basis for placing it in this band rather than in a lower one. A company with no record of public political positioning on any issue would be analytically distinguishable from Tiffany’s case.
Three evidence gaps carry genuine potential to move the V-POL score upward if resolved with positive findings. First, post-October 2023 internal communications (employee-facing memos, store-level guidance, social media content addressing the Gaza war) are not visible in public filings; if these revealed active pro-Israel messaging or employee discipline over Palestine-related speech, the I-POL score would be revised upward.6 Second, Alexandre Arnault’s personal social media activity is not captured in formal corporate disclosures and requires live review; any posts constituting active advocacy would be relevant to both I-POL and P-POL scoring.34 Third, 2024–2026 quarterly LDA lobbying filings beyond the training cutoff could reveal anti-BDS or regional trade legislation disclosures not currently visible.32
None of these gaps creates downward risk to the current score. The magnitude score of 2.5 is the most judgement-sensitive element, capturing the low intensity of a passive normalisation posture. If any of the three gaps above resolved into positive evidence of active advocacy or donations, the correct analytical response would be to reassign M-POL upward (toward the 4.0–6.0 range) and potentially I-POL as well.
| Entity | Type | V-POL Relevance | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tiffany & Co. | Target entity | Direct subject of audit | Business-as-Usual normalisation posture; no active advocacy |
| Anthony Ledru | CEO, Tiffany | Executive communications | No public Israel–Palestine statements identified 6 |
| Alexandre Arnault | EVP, Tiffany; son of Bernard Arnault | Executive communications | No public statements in formal disclosures; social media gap 34 |
| Nathalie Verdeille | Chief Artistic Officer, Tiffany | Governance actor | No Israel–Palestine statements identified 6 |
| Bernard Arnault | Controlling shareholder, LVMH | Parent-level political footprint | Historically politically neutral on Middle East; no advocacy ties 35 |
| LVMH SE | Parent company | Group communications | Ukraine donation documented; no Israel–Palestine equivalent confirmed 7 |
| BDS Movement | Advocacy organisation | BDS targeting check | Tiffany not on consumer boycott target list 31 |
| OHCHR A/HRC/43/71 | UN database | Settlement-business list | Tiffany not listed 22 |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO database | Occupation complicity screening | No Tiffany entry 1 |
| FIDF (Friends of the IDF) | Military-welfare organisation | Donation screening | No Tiffany donations identified 9 |
| JNF (Jewish National Fund) | Parastatal organisation | Donation screening | No Tiffany donations identified 9 |
| AIPAC | Lobby organisation | PAC affiliation check | No Tiffany PAC activity identified 33 |
| OpenSecrets / Senate LDA | Lobbying databases | Lobbying disclosure | Jewelry-sector only; no Israel-related lobbying identified 32 |
| FEC | Campaign finance database | PAC and individual donor records | No relevant Tiffany or executive donations identified 33 |
| Kimberley Process | Industry framework | Sourcing policy | Tiffany compliant; no settlement-origin inputs 9 |
Several structural limitations affect the reliability of findings across all four domains simultaneously.
LVMH Subsidiary Opacity. The most pervasive limitation is that Tiffany has been a private LVMH subsidiary since January 2021, with no independent SEC filing obligation beyond its historical pre-delisting filings under CIK 0000098246.36 LVMH’s Universal Registration Document does not break out maison-by-maison IT vendor inventories, supply chain intermediaries, or Israel-specific revenue or employment figures.15 This opacity means that a material portion of potentially relevant information — enterprise software procurement, boutique legal entity structure, sub-tier precious metals supply chain — simply cannot be confirmed or excluded from public sources alone. The zero scores in V-MIL and V-DIG, and the conservative low scores in V-ECON and V-POL, reflect the absence of positive evidence rather than confirmed absence in all cases.
Diamond Supply Chain Gap. Across V-MIL, V-ECON, and V-POL, the audits identify a consistent evidence gap in the precious-stones supply chain: Tiffany’s Diamond Source Initiative discloses rough-diamond country of origin but does not publicly name cutting and polishing intermediaries outside its own workshops.928 Whether Israeli polishers in Ramat Gan supply Tiffany via secondary market transactions is genuinely unknown. This gap has no established defence or occupation dimension in any reviewed source, but it is the single most plausible pathway by which a materially higher V-ECON score could emerge from future disclosure.
Tel Aviv Boutique Entity Structure. The V-ECON and V-POL scores both depend in part on the confirmed existence of a Tiffany retail presence in Israel, referenced in Israeli business press.29 The current operational status of this boutique (open/closed as of 2025), its precise legal entity structure (direct subsidiary vs. franchisee or distributor), and its geographic location relative to Israel’s Green Line cannot be confirmed from public sources reviewed. These gaps affect both the V-ECON proximity score (P = 7.5 vs. potentially 5.0–6.5 if franchise-operated) and the V-POL normalisation finding.
Post-October 2023 Conduct. Multiple audit sections flag the absence of verified information about Tiffany’s and LVMH’s internal and public conduct since October 2023. Internal employee-facing communications, social media content, and any group-level humanitarian response specific to the Gaza conflict are not visible in formal public disclosures. The audit cutoff is 2026-05-01; the post-October 2023 period represents over two years of conduct that is assessed only by confirmed absence of public statements, not by confirmed internal conduct.67
| Entity | Category | Domains | Key Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tiffany & Co. | Target entity | All | Luxury jeweler; LVMH subsidiary since January 2021 |
| LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE | Parent company | All | Controlling parent; France-domiciled; Watches & Jewelry division |
| Arnault family / Financière Agache / Christian Dior SE | Ownership structure | V-ECON, V-POL | Controls LVMH; no Israeli state nexus |
| Bernard Arnault | Individual | V-POL | Controlling shareholder LVMH; historically politically neutral on Middle East |
| Anthony Ledru | Individual | V-POL | CEO Tiffany since January 2021 |
| Alexandre Arnault | Individual | V-POL | EVP Product & Communications; social media evidence gap |
| Nathalie Verdeille | Individual | V-POL | Chief Artistic Officer of Jewelry |
| Salesforce | Technology vendor | V-DIG | U.S.-origin; documented Tiffany deployment |
| Adobe Experience Cloud | Technology vendor | V-DIG | U.S.-origin; documented Tiffany deployment |
| Google Cloud | Hyperscaler | V-DIG | LVMH group-level partnership; no Israeli sovereign-cloud component |
| Microsoft Azure | Hyperscaler | V-DIG | LVMH group generative-AI programme; no Israeli sovereign-cloud component |
| SIBAT (Israeli MoD Export Directorate) | Regulatory body | V-MIL | No Tiffany listing |
| Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) | Military | V-MIL | No relationship with Tiffany identified |
| Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael, IMI | Israeli defence primes | V-MIL | No supply relationship with Tiffany identified |
| Israel Diamond Exchange, Ramat Gan | Industry institution | V-MIL, V-ECON | Diamond polishing hub; no named Tiffany-specific polisher |
| Diamond Source Initiative | Sourcing framework | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Rough-origin disclosure; polishing intermediaries not named |
| Responsible Jewellery Council | Certification body | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Tiffany member; conflict-free sourcing standard |
| Project Nimbus | Israeli state cloud | V-DIG | Google Cloud and AWS awarded; Tiffany not a vendor |
| UN OHCHR A/HRC/43/71 | UN database | V-MIL, V-ECON, V-POL | Settlement-business list; Tiffany not listed |
| Who Profits Research Center | NGO | All | Corporate occupation database; no Tiffany entry |
| AFSC Investigate | NGO | All | Divestment database; no Tiffany entry |
| BDS Movement | Advocacy organisation | V-POL | Consumer boycott list; Tiffany not listed |
| FIDF / JNF | Parastatal / charity | V-POL | Donation screening; no Tiffany contributions identified |
| Louis Vuitton / Sephora (LVMH maisons) | Sibling entities | V-ECON | Israeli market presence; attributable to LVMH, not Tiffany |
| LVMH Luxury Ventures / Innovation Award | Investment programme | V-DIG, V-ECON | Israeli startup exposure at group level; not Tiffany-specific |
| Globes (Israeli business press) | Media source | V-ECON, V-POL | Tel Aviv boutique confirmation |
| LVMH URD 2024 | Corporate disclosure | All | Primary group-level disclosure source |
| Domain | I | M | P | V-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-MIL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 |
| V-DIG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.000 |
| V-ECON | 2.5 | 2.5 | 7.5 | 1.339 |
| V-POL | 3.2 | 2.5 | 9.0 | 1.029 |
BRS: 82.6 — Tier E (0–199)
V-POL is the V_MAX domain (1.143 when computed via the BRS formula). The composite score is driven by V-POL and V-ECON; V-MIL and V-DIG contribute zero. The low magnitude scores in both contributing domains (M = 2.5 in each) are the principal suppressors keeping the score in Tier E despite non-zero impact and high-proximity scores. The V-ECON score of 2.5/2.5/7.5 reflects a confirmed direct sales channel in a market that is not strategically characterised in LVMH investor disclosures and carries no documented capital investment or defence dimension. The V-POL score of 3.2/2.5/9.0 reflects a passive normalisation posture — business-as-usual commercial presence without occupation acknowledgement — at very low magnitude because no active advocacy, donations, or lobbying on this issue is evidenced.
High Confidence: V-MIL = 0.000. The structural incompatibility of Tiffany’s luxury jewelry portfolio with every defence supply sub-category is unambiguous. No evidence scenario involving the known product and service lines of this entity would generate a non-zero V-MIL score.
Moderate Confidence: V-DIG = 0.000. The zero score reflects complete absence of positive evidence. The principal risk is LVMH’s undisclosed maison-level IT vendor stack and the unnamed surveillance vendor stack at Tiffany flagship stores. Even if an Israeli-origin cybersecurity product were subsequently confirmed, the Customer Cap would limit the correct I-DIG assignment to a maximum of 3.9 (Band 3: Soft Dual-Use Procurement), and the practical effect on the composite BRS within Tier E would be modest.
Moderate Confidence: V-ECON = 1.339. Tel Aviv boutique existence confirmed in Israeli business press but current operational status, legal entity structure, and scale require live verification. The polished-diamond supply chain remains an unresolved gap. Conservative scoring at 2.5/2.5/7.5 is rubric-grounded; boutique entity structure resolution could move proximity downward to 5.0–6.5 if franchise-operated.
Moderate-High Confidence: V-POL = 1.029. The Business-as-Usual classification at I-POL 3.2 is well-supported by the documented selective public-positioning record. The magnitude score of 2.5 is the most judgement-sensitive element. Three open questions carry upward-only risk: post-October 2023 internal communications; Alexandre Arnault personal social media; and 2024–2026 quarterly LDA filings.
Open Questions:
1. Is the Tel Aviv Tiffany boutique currently operating, and what legal entity operates it?
2. Does Tiffany’s polished-diamond supply chain pass through named Israeli intermediaries in Ramat Gan?
3. Did Tiffany or LVMH issue employee-facing or public communications on the Gaza conflict after October 2023?
4. Do Alexandre Arnault’s personal social media accounts contain material relevant to V-POL scoring?
5. Do 2024–2026 quarterly LDA filings disclose any lobbying on anti-BDS or Israel-related trade legislation?
6. Did LVMH make a group-level Gaza/Israel humanitarian contribution analogous to its 2022 Ukraine donation?
7. Are Tiffany products reaching settlement retail through third-party gray-market channels not captured by Who Profits or OHCHR databases?
For investors and institutional asset managers applying ESG or BDS-aligned screens:
The Tier E score of 82.6 reflects minimal identified involvement. At this score level, a blanket divestment or exclusion recommendation is not supported by the validated evidence base. The principal residual risk — the unnamed polished-diamond supply chain — is a civilian commercial question without an established defence or settlement dimension in any reviewed source. Investors applying a strict BDS screen should note that Tiffany is absent from all major BDS, UN OHCHR, Who Profits, and AFSC divestment lists as of the audit cutoff.122231
For analysts seeking to elevate confidence in the current score:
Three targeted verification steps would materially reduce uncertainty. First, a live query of the Tiffany.com store locator combined with an Israeli Registrar of Companies (Rasham HaHavarot) lookup would resolve the Tel Aviv boutique’s operational status and legal entity structure, directly affecting the V-ECON proximity score. Second, a review of Tiffany’s and LVMH’s social media accounts and internal communication channels for the October 2023–2026 period would resolve the largest open V-POL gap. Third, a direct inquiry to Tiffany & Co. under Responsible Jewellery Council certification provisions regarding polishing intermediaries would address the diamond supply chain gap without requiring regulatory action.
For campaigning organisations evaluating targeting priority:
Given the Tier E score, the absence of settlement supply chain evidence, and the absence of active defence, technology, or political advocacy relationships, Tiffany & Co. does not meet the evidentiary threshold for a primary campaign target under BDS-aligned frameworks based on currently available public evidence. Targeting priority should be governed by the three unresolved open questions above; if any resolves into positive evidence of active involvement, a reassessment of I-POL or I-ECON would be warranted.
For Tiffany & Co. and LVMH SE in a stakeholder-engagement context:
The V-POL finding at I-POL 3.2 is driven entirely by the documented gap between Tiffany’s history of public positioning on comparable social and geopolitical matters and its silence on the Israel–Palestine conflict. A formal position — whether a statement of concern regarding civilian harm, a commitment to supply chain transparency that includes polishing intermediary disclosure, or a clearly articulated human-rights due diligence framework covering occupied territories — would directly address the normalisation scoring criterion and the diamond supply chain evidence gap simultaneously.915
