INDEX / DIRECTORY / ADOBE / MILITARY

Adobe MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-22
Military Score 0.00 /10 D Adobe - BDS-1000 268
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Adobe Inc. is the SEC registrant for the Adobe corporate group, and its FY2025 subsidiary filing lists Adobe Systems Federal LLC as a Delaware subsidiary while providing no contract, customer, product, or Israeli nexus information for that entity 1, 2.

A 2022 Israeli National Digital Directorate notice solicited bids for Adobe software licences, but the issuing body was a civilian digital-government entity rather than the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD), IDF, Israel Police, Border Police, or Israel Prison Service 3.

The associated tender covered Acrobat, Creative Cloud, Photoshop, XD, Premiere Pro, updates, support, and legally licensed products acquired directly from Adobe, but it did not identify an awardee, a completed purchase, a defence end user, or a security use 4.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed IMOD vendor portal, SIBAT exhibition material, procurement sources, corporate announcements, and targeted searches did not yield a public Adobe contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding with IMOD, the IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or Israel Police 5, 6.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

The identified Israeli government tender concerned ordinary enterprise creative and document software rather than ruggedised, tactical, military-specified, weapon-integrated, or contract-modified products 4.

Adobe stated that Digital River, an Adobe-approved reseller, served Israel for sales and account support from January 2020, and that renewals through Digital River would cease from February 2025 7.

This reseller arrangement establishes a commercial sales channel but does not establish a military or security end user 7.

No public evidence identified of Adobe export-licence applications, end-user certificates, export-control decisions, or military-specific product variants for Israeli defence or security users.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Adobe’s FY2025 filings identify it as the registrant of a wholly owned subsidiary group, including Adobe Systems Israel Ltd., but the subsidiary filing does not describe Israeli operational activities, customers, addresses, or state-security relationships 1, 2.

No public evidence identified that Adobe equipment or services were used for settlement construction, demolitions, barrier works, checkpoints, military installations, or occupied-territory infrastructure.

The supplied document-scoped pre-scan reported no Adobe mention in the specified OHCHR, UN, PAX, Al-Haq, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Who Profits, BankTrack, and BDS materials, which does not establish database-wide absence 1.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Adobe supplying components, sub-systems, specialist manufacturing services, or licensed technology to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime.

No public evidence identified of Adobe–Israeli-defence-prime joint development, co-production, or technology-transfer programmes.

Adobe’s Partner Connection page establishes that Adobe operates a partner programme, but the reviewed material does not identify an Israeli reseller supplying IMOD, the IDF, Israeli police bodies, settlements, or occupied-territory sites 8.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of Adobe providing logistics, facilities, transport, catering, fuel, freight, port handling, telecommunications, or base-support services to Israeli military or security installations.

The IMOD vendor-site material and SIBAT catalogue were among the source classes reviewed for this category, without yielding a documented Adobe base-services relationship 5, 6.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified that Adobe is a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, or verified sub-system supplier for Israeli weapons, munitions, drones, missile-defence systems, aircraft, armoured vehicles, naval platforms, or targeting/fire-control systems.

No public evidence identified that an Adobe product was purpose-built to generate a kinetic targeting decision or weapons effect for Israeli forces.

The only identified Israeli public-sector procurement concerned general enterprise creative and document software 4.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of export-licence grants, denials, suspensions, revocations, sanctions investigations, embargo-related enforcement, or judicial proceedings concerning Adobe defence supply to Israeli military or security end users.

The conclusion is bounded by the reviewed Israeli procurement, IMOD, SIBAT, corporate, and targeted public-search material rather than a claim of universal absence 5, 6.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied pre-scan found no Adobe mention in the listed multi-company NGO and UN documents, including A/HRC/59/23, the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-database updates, PAX’s June 2024 report, and Al-Haq’s July 2024 report, and this finding is limited to those checked documents 1.

Adobe’s Israel careers and rewards page states that employee donations and volunteer time may be matched up to US$10,000 annually, but it does not name eligible organisations, identify an FIDF or settlement-related recipient, or establish a matching donation to one 9.

No public evidence identified of a boycott, divestment, exclusion, corporate-response, contract-termination, or end-use-monitoring campaign specifically grounded in Adobe’s Israel defence-sector activity.

Adobe’s 2026 proxy identifies Shantanu Narayen as chair and CEO and identifies The Vanguard Group as a reported 10.17% beneficial owner as of 17 February 2026, while not characterising Vanguard as exercising corporate control 10.

The focused controlling-principal review did not produce a supportable primary-source record of an Israeli defence-board role, ownership in an Israeli defence prime, FIDF or reservist-fund donation, or Israeli military co-belligerency statement by an Adobe controlling principal 10.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000003/adbe-20251128.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  2. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000003/adbeex211fy25.htm ↩ ↩2

  3. https://mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/he/p/4000548312 ↩

  4. https://mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/he/p/attachment/005056BF19AF1EDCB1ACC44EAB016149/%D7%97%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%AA%20%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%96 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://www.online.mod.gov.il/ENG/pages/General/Info/start.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Exhibitions/Eurosatory/Documents/ISRAEL_at_EUROSATORY_2024.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. https://helpx.adobe.com/x-productkb/policy-pricing/countries-served-by-digital-river.html ↩ ↩2

  8. https://partners.adobe.com/ ↩

  9. https://rewards.adobe.com/israel/ ↩

  10. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796343/000079634326000043/adbe-20260227.htm ↩ ↩2