AFRY

Key Findings

• Economic: AFRY documented engineering and technical advisory engagements for Israeli civilian electricity infrastructure: the 156 MW Manara pumped-storage project and the original 55 MW Halutziot solar installation.^{1, 2, 3}
• Political: Manara connects AFRY’s consultancy work to Israel’s regulated electricity market through the project’s licensing and electricity-purchase arrangements. AFRY’s published assignment spans 2021–2026; continuing construction reported by the developer in August 2026 does not independently establish AFRY’s service-delivery dates.^{1, 2, 4}
• Digital: AFRY announced an industrial cybersecurity partnership with Israel-based OTORIO in April 2022. Its continuation after Armis acquired OTORIO in March 2025 remains unconfirmed; the audited record does not establish Israeli military or population-surveillance deployment.^{5, 6}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of direct AFRY supply to Israeli military or intelligence institutions, verified settlement infrastructure work, or Israeli kinetic-targeting technology. AFRY’s documented Nordic defence contracts and Elbit’s separate CV90 supplier relationships do not establish those connections.^{2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

AFRY’s strongest documented Israel-related nexus is commercial engineering and advisory work for civilian electricity infrastructure. In July 2021, Ellomay Pumped Storage appointed AFRY as owner’s engineer for the 156 MW Manara pumped-storage project in northern Israel. AFRY also identified Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM and Enlight Renewable Energy as clients for technical advisory work concerning the original 55 MW Halutziot photovoltaic installation, beginning in 2013 and continuing as of September 2021.^{1, 2, 3}

Manara links AFRY’s services to an Israeli project company, an Israeli construction contractor and the regulated electricity system. AFRY identified Ellomay Pumped Storage as its client, Electra Infrastructure as EPC contractor and Israel Electric Company as electricity purchaser and dispatching entity. These relationships establish engineering participation in civilian infrastructure; they do not establish AFRY ownership of the plant, a military end user or a settlement location.^{1, 2} The reviewed project descriptions did not establish that Manara or the identified Halutziot engagement was physically situated in the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem or Syrian Golan.^{2, 3, 18}

A separate commercial connection arose through AFRY’s April 2022 partnership announcement with Israel-based OTORIO. Its disclosed purpose was industrial cybersecurity, including automated risk assessments and monitoring. Although AFRY identified former IDF cyber-defence personnel among OTORIO’s management, the announcement does not establish an Israeli military deployment. Armis acquired OTORIO in March 2025; AFRY-specific commercial continuity after that acquisition remains unconfirmed.^{5, 6}

The audits found substantial AFRY defence activity in Sweden and Norway and engineering relationships with BAE Systems Hägglunds. They did not establish direct Israeli military procurement, Israeli surveillance deployment or AFRY participation in Elbit’s separately documented Iron Fist contracts for the CV90 platform.^{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19} The political audit also documented AFRY’s public condemnation of Russia’s invasion and completed Russian divestment, while identifying no corresponding publicly discoverable statement specifically addressing Palestinian civilian harm within its defined search period. That comparison does not establish deliberate suppression, support for Israeli operations or an adopted neutrality policy.^{20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 17}

The fixed, human-vetted V6.6 assessment is BRS 311, Tier D (Moderate Complicity), with Economic and Political each at 3.50, and Military and Digital each at 0.00. The dossier preserves those values while distinguishing verified commercial relationships, limited public-record findings and unresolved continuity.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

AFRY’s documented origins are Swedish: its corporate history begins with a steam-boiler inspection association established in Malmö in 1895. The modern group combines ÅF and Finnish consultancy Pöyry, which merged in 2019. Historical ÅF and Pöyry relationships therefore require attention to predecessor identity and contract dates rather than treatment as automatically current engagements.^{32, 26}

AFRY’s principal shareholder is ÅForsk Foundation. Its enhanced voting influence reflects the company’s dual-class structure. Other large shareholders identified in the 2025 report include Handelsbanken Funds, SEB Investment Management, Swedbank Robur Funds and the Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund. No public evidence identified in the reviewed ownership disclosures of Israeli control, an Israeli government golden share or an Israeli governmental controlling holding.^{12, 15}

The Israeli entity record contains an unresolved discrepancy. AFRY’s Austria office description refers to subsidiaries in Israel and Turkey, whereas the economic audit identified no Israeli-incorporated operating subsidiary in the inspected 2025 group-company schedule. Those materials do not resolve the identity, ownership or current status of the Israeli subsidiary reference; it cannot support a categorical finding either of a verified current Israeli operating subsidiary or of a fully reconciled absence.^{12, 33}

Advansia is expressly identified as an AFRY group company in the Norwegian defence announcements. Ellomay Pumped Storage, Electra Infrastructure, Bank Leumi and Enlight instead appear as project counterparties or clients, while OTORIO appears as a technology partner. The reviewed records do not establish that these Israeli counterparties are AFRY subsidiaries, franchisees or controlled investments.^{1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 19}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

AFRY has documented military-sector engineering activity. Its January 2024 Hägglunds announcement described substantial design and engineering work for an unnamed CV90 customer, with an estimated SEK 300 million order value and a Q2 2024–2027 contractual period. A June 2025 framework covered product development, procurement, quality and production engineering, with estimated annual orders of SEK 150–200 million through 2030. A September 2025 agreement added a six-year strategic partnership.^{7, 28, 29}

The Swedish Armed Forces/FMV IT framework and Advansia’s Norwegian agreements establish further defence business outside Israel. The Norwegian construction-management framework concerns infrastructure supporting the Mime programme; the separately announced December advisory framework concerns defence property, buildings and long-term estate planning.^{10, 11, 19, 34}

Elbit separately announced USD 109 million and approximately USD 130 million Iron Fist active-protection-system contracts with Hägglunds for European CV90 programmes. These establish a shared manufacturer and vehicle family, not a verified AFRY–Elbit transaction or common work package.^{7, 8, 9}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the absence of an established Israeli military customer or deliverable. No public evidence identified of direct AFRY supply to Israeli security authorities, military-base services, weapons exports, munitions provision or military construction in occupied territories. The verified Nordic contracts cannot be reassigned geographically to Israel.^{7, 10, 11, 19, 34}

Neither the examined AFRY nor Elbit announcements attributes Iron Fist design, procurement, integration, testing or maintenance to AFRY. AFRY’s unnamed CV90 customer remains unidentified. Likewise, Mime concerns military communications, but AFRY’s disclosed assignment is construction management; these records do not establish weapons-targeting software supplied by Advansia.^{7, 8, 9, 11, 34}

Manara’s civilian grid function and northern Israeli location do not establish a military nexus. The fixed Military score of 0.00 preserves these attribution limits.^{1, 2}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

AFRY announced its OTORIO partnership on 27 April 2022, effective from 8 April. The proposed offering combined AFRY’s industrial engineering and cybersecurity services with OTORIO’s operational-technology security and digital risk management. Intended applications included production systems, energy infrastructure and smart infrastructure.⁵

The announcement described automated risk assessment and continuous cybersecurity monitoring but disclosed neither contract value nor named customer deployments. AFRY’s identification of former IDF cyber-defence personnel among OTORIO’s management establishes their disclosed background, not a military purpose for AFRY’s services.⁵

Armis’s March 2025 acquisition announcement stated that OTORIO’s Titan platform would be integrated into Armis Centrix. It did not identify AFRY as an Armis partner, confirm continuing purchase orders or establish the status of the original agreement.⁶

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the partnership’s documented industrial security purpose and the absence of verified harmful deployment. No public evidence identified of its use for Israeli military or intelligence procurement, population surveillance, biometric identification or settlement digital infrastructure. The reviewed announcements do not establish that OTORIO technology formed part of AFRY’s separate Swedish military IT framework.^{5, 6, 10}

No public evidence identified of AFRY-specific Israeli data hosting, routine transfer of customer information to Israel or Israeli legal access through a specified processing agreement. The announcements leave customer deployments, expenditure, internal dependency and commercial continuity unresolved. The fixed Digital score of 0.00 does not erase the partnership; it distinguishes the verified relationship from unestablished deployment claims.^{5, 6}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Manara is the clearest documented commercial relationship. AFRY’s owner’s engineering scope included design review, construction support, coordination with Electra Infrastructure and commissioning support. Ellomay Pumped Storage was the client; Israel Electric Company was identified as purchaser of electricity and as the grid-dispatching entity.^{1, 2}

Halutziot provides a second documented engagement. AFRY’s September 2021 capability statement named Bank Leumi and Enlight as clients for technical due diligence, construction monitoring, certification and quarterly operational monitoring of the original 55 MW photovoltaic plant. It described the assignment as beginning in 2013 and continuing at publication.³

Enlight confirms that Halutziot 1 began operating in 2015 and that Halutziot 2 later added 32 MW of solar capacity and 66 MWh of storage. AFRY’s published case study does not independently establish its participation in that expansion or continuation of its advisory contract beyond September 2021.^{3, 18}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

These were civilian service engagements. No public evidence identified of AFRY controlling equity in either project, financing them as lender or guarantor, or owning their generating assets. Bank Leumi’s identification as an advisory client does not make AFRY a participant in every activity of the bank.^{1, 2, 3, 35}

The reviewed disclosures do not quantify AFRY’s Israeli contract fees, revenue, profits, taxes or capital contribution. The 156 MW and 55 MW figures describe project capacities, not AFRY’s financial exposure. No separately verified Israel revenue total was established in the reviewed financial reporting.^{12, 1, 3}

No public evidence identified of settlement-origin agricultural sourcing or infrastructure physically located in the occupied territories through these engagements. Manara’s published 2021–2026 schedule and Ellomay’s August 2026 construction update do not independently date AFRY’s post-July or post-November 2024 services.^{12, 2, 3, 18, 4}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The documented institutional nexus centres on Manara’s integration into Israel’s regulated civilian electricity market. AFRY’s announcement identified state licensing, electricity policy and the power-purchase arrangement. Ellomay’s financial disclosure independently records the project company and conditional construction licence. AFRY’s own role remained engineering consultancy, rather than licence holder, electricity purchaser or project owner.^{1, 2, 35}

The political audit also records a bounded comparison in corporate communications. AFRY publicly condemned Russia’s invasion in March 2022, announced humanitarian assistance, reiterated its position in April 2022 and completed its Russian divestment in April 2023. Its Ukraine reconstruction communications extended into 2024.^{20, 21, 36, 22}

Within publicly discoverable English- and Swedish-language records examined for 7 October 2023–26 October 2026, the audit identified no corporate or verified attributable leadership statement specifically addressing Palestinian civilian harm. That is a search finding, not evidence of a formal instruction to remain silent.^{2, 23, 24, 17}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that civilian electricity consultancy is not documented political advocacy. No public evidence identified of AFRY lobbying on Israeli settlement policy, Palestinian statehood, military assistance or anti-BDS legislation; donating to Israeli military-welfare or settlement organisations; or financing settlement expansion. The Manara disclosures establish commercial and regulatory relationships, not political donations.^{1, 2, 35, 4}

The communications comparison involves different periods and operational circumstances. The audit did not comprehensively examine deleted posts, private correspondence or non-indexed employee communications. No public evidence identified of deliberate suppression, a formal neutrality policy, employee discipline over support for Palestine or corporate endorsement of Israeli military operations.^{20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 17}

AFRY’s December 2025 Academic Officers’ Society agreement supports Swedish defence-sector education, networking and recruitment. It does not establish an Israel-specific political objective. No confirmed AFRY entry was established in the reviewed settlement-business material; that finding is not verified exclusion from every database version.^{30, 37}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.6 - final human-vetted values.

• V_MAX: 3.50 Avg_OTHERS: 1.17
• BRS Score: 311 Tier: D (Moderate Complicity)

The documented civilian energy-service relationships and Manara’s institutional electricity-market connections provide the factual context for the fixed economic and political values driving V_MAX 3.50; no separate reviewed rationale was supplied to derive the individual I, M and P assignments.^{1, 2, 3, 35} The resulting BRS 311 / Tier D is retained exactly, alongside zero military and digital scores that preserve the audits’ attribution and deployment limits. The method is scale-free, evidence-only and human-vetted; these figures are corpus assessments, not judicial findings.

Methodology Note

• This dossier compiles only the four supplied domain audits, researched through 26 October 2026. Citations identify their underlying source records; negative findings describe the audits’ reviewed evidence, not exhaustive proof of absence.
• Under the supplied scale-free framework, Impact (I) concerns activity type, Magnitude (M) concerns scale and Proximity (P) concerns directness. All final V6.6 numbers are fixed.
• Temporal attribution distinguishes scheduled contracts from dated performance. Completed exits are mitigated: AFRY’s Russian divestment is treated as completed, while Halutziot continuity after September 2021 and AFRY-specific later Manara delivery remain unconfirmed.^{3, 21, 4}
• Entity attribution requires a documented relationship and role. A shared manufacturer, platform, client or executive background does not create transitive guilt; the unresolved Israeli-subsidiary reference is retained as unresolved.^{7, 8, 9, 33}
• Verified settlement operations may count in both Economic and Political under the supplied framework. No public evidence identified of such an AFRY operation in the reviewed project records.^{2, 3, 18}
• “No public evidence identified” denotes an unsuccessful check within the audited scope. It does not establish universal absence, corporate intent or comprehensive clearance.