INDEX / DIRECTORY / BAE SYSTEMS

BAE Systems

Defense & Aerospace 99 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-23 METHOD V6.5
BDS-1000 Score 740 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 8.54 Digital ↗ 0.00 Economic ↗ 2.32 Political ↗ 2.75
OWNERSHIP TREE 38 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Military: BAE Systems manufactures the rear fuselage and electronic-warfare/interceptor systems for the global F-35 programme; BAE-made components continue to reach Israel through the global spares pool, including after the UK’s 2024 partial licence suspension exempted F-35 components.1, 2
  • Military: BAE Systems, Inc. was named principal contractor for a US-notified approximately $992.4 million sale of APKWS-II guided rockets to Israel in May 2026.3, 4
  • Economic: BAE formerly owned Jerusalem-based Rokar International, an Israeli defence supplier which developed the Silver Bullet artillery-guidance kit; Rokar was sold to Elbit Systems in April 2021 and is no longer a BAE subsidiary.5, 6
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of current BAE offices, employees, data centres, Project Nimbus participation, Israeli AI/data contracts, settlement-construction equipment, or direct contracts with the Israel Prison Service or Border Police.7, 8

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameBAE Systems plc
JurisdictionUnited Kingdom
HeadquartersFarnborough, Hampshire, United Kingdom.9
SectorDefence and aerospace manufacturing.
OwnershipPublic company; the UK Government retains a special £1 “golden” share intended to protect national-security interests and restrict specified major corporate actions.10, 11
Key Executives / GovernanceChair Cressida Hogg; Group CEO Dr Charles Woodburn; CFO Brad Greve; BAE Systems, Inc. President/CEO Tom Arseneault; Senior Independent Director Nicole Piasecki; and the directors listed on BAE’s corporate board page.12
Israeli-Nexus SummaryDocumented nexus principally concerns global F-35 supply-chain participation, the 2026 APKWS-II FMS sale, and the former Rokar subsidiary; Rokar was divested in 2021.1, 3, 5

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

BAE Systems is a UK-based defence and aerospace manufacturer whose documented Israel/Palestine nexus is primarily military-industrial rather than consumer, digital-platform, or settlement-retail based. The strongest current evidence concerns BAE’s position in the multinational F-35 programme: it manufactures the rear fuselage and certain electronic-warfare/interceptor systems for every F-35, while BAE-made components can reach Israeli F-35 aircraft through the global supply pool.1, 2 Israel operates F-35I aircraft, and the audit record identifies those aircraft as part of Israel’s air fleet used in Gaza operations.13

A separate, more direct current route is a US Foreign Military Sales notification around May 2026 naming BAE Systems, Inc. as principal contractor for an approximately $992.4 million APKWS-II guided-rocket sale to Israel covering 10,000 All-Up Rounds.3, 4 The audits found no public evidence of a direct BAE–Israeli Ministry of Defense or IDF prime contract outside these documented routes, and no public evidence of BAE contracts with the Israel Prison Service or Border Police.7

BAE’s historical Israel footprint included Rokar International Ltd., a Jerusalem-based subsidiary acquired by BAE in 2007. Rokar supplied electronic countermeasure systems and GPS-guidance technology for Israeli military platforms and developed the Silver Bullet precision-guidance kit, which was tested in Israel and supplied for artillery integration.5, 14, 15 However, this relationship ended when Elbit Systems acquired Rokar in April 2021. The dossier therefore treats the Rokar operation as historical and mitigated by divestment, not as a current BAE Israeli subsidiary.5, 6

The audits found no public evidence that BAE currently operates data-centre infrastructure in Israel, participates in Project Nimbus, supplies Israeli state bodies with AI, analytics, autonomous target-generation, or civilian-data systems, or has a documented role in settlement construction, barrier construction, checkpoints, or demolition activity.7, 8 Claims concerning BAE-linked M109 use with white-phosphorus munitions, CTAI-made white-phosphorus shells reaching Israel, and a Rafael Protector naval-drone connection were not independently verified in the benchmark and remain unresolved secondary reporting rather than established findings.16, 17

Under the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment, BAE Systems receives a BRS of 740, placing it in Tier B (Severe Complicity). This result is driven chiefly by the documented F-35 supply-chain role and the current APKWS-II FMS sale, while the digital score remains zero because the reviewed evidence did not establish a current Israeli digital-services nexus.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
1982Rokar International was established in Jerusalem; BAE later acquired the company in 2007.5, 18
February 2014Silver Bullet precision-guidance fuze underwent live-fire trials in Israel.15
2015Further Silver Bullet testing and demonstration in Israel were reported; the kit was supplied to IMI Systems for M401 155mm artillery integration.14, 15
1–4 April 2021Elbit Systems announced and completed acquisition of BAE Systems Rokar for approximately $31 million net of cash.5, 6
9 October 2023Amnesty International photographic-verification reporting documented Israeli M109 self-propelled howitzers near Sderot reportedly firing M825/M825A1 white-phosphorus munitions; the audit treats the broader BAE-specific attribution with care.19
11 July 2024BAE responded to UN experts’ urgent appeal by stating that it complies with applicable defence export controls and had no operations or employees in Israel or Gaza.20
2 September 2024The UK suspended roughly 30 arms-export licences to Israel while exempting F-35 components entering the global spares pool.2, 21
30 June 2025The High Court dismissed the challenge to the UK’s F-35 exemption; subsequent permission to appeal was refused.22, 23
May 2026US reporting identified BAE Systems, Inc. as principal contractor for an approximately $992.4 million APKWS-II sale to Israel.3, 4

Corporate Overview

BAE Systems plc is a UK defence and aerospace manufacturer headquartered in Farnborough, Hampshire.9 Its corporate structure has a distinctive UK state-security feature: the UK Government retains a special “golden” share intended to protect national-security interests and limit specified foreign ownership or major corporate actions.10, 11

The only identified BAE physical operating footprint in Israel was Rokar International Ltd. in Jerusalem. While BAE owned it, Rokar reportedly employed approximately 100–120 staff, generated roughly $16 million in annual sales, and supplied electronic countermeasure and guidance products for Israeli military platforms.5, 18 Elbit Systems acquired Rokar in April 2021. No public evidence identified of a current BAE office, sales operation, support centre, warehouse, R&D facility, or innovation programme in Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories after that divestment.5, 8

BAE has documented relationships with Israeli defence companies, but their scope requires distinction. Rokar became an Elbit subsidiary after 2021; BAE also has a partnership with Elbit Systems of America on US Army combat-vehicle technologies, which is not documented as an Israeli end-use arrangement.24 BAE has collaborated with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems on the Mk 38/Typhoon naval gun system, but the asserted connection between that mount and Israel’s Protector unmanned surface vehicle was not independently verified in the benchmark.17

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

BAE’s clearest ongoing military nexus is the global F-35 programme. The company manufactures the rear fuselage for every F-35 and provides active interceptor/electronic-warfare systems; its UK F-35 contracts have been reported at approximately $6.6–6.7 billion.1, 13 Israeli F-35s receive BAE-origin components through the global supply pool rather than through a documented direct bilateral BAE–IMOD supply contract.1, 7

The UK’s September 2024 partial suspension of arms-export licences to Israel explicitly excluded F-35 components destined for the global pool. This carve-out remained in effect following the 2025 High Court decision and the refusal of permission to appeal.2, 21, 22, 23 BAE is the principal UK manufacturer implicated by this continuing F-35 component route.1

BAE Systems, Inc. was also identified as principal contractor in the May 2026 US-notified APKWS-II sale to Israel, valued at approximately $992.4 million for 10,000 guided-rocket All-Up Rounds.3, 4 This is the most current clearly documented Israel-directed transfer in the audits.

Historically, BAE-owned Rokar developed the Silver Bullet GPS precision-guidance kit, designed to convert standard 155mm artillery shells into precision munitions. The system was tested in Israel and supplied to IMI Systems for integration into M401 artillery.14, 15 Rokar, however, was divested to Elbit in 2021.5, 6

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

BAE’s strongest defence is that it does not have operations or employees in Israel or Gaza and operates under defence-export controls subject to ongoing assessment.20 The audits found no public evidence of a direct BAE–IMOD or BAE–IDF prime contract, no direct BAE contracts with the Israel Prison Service or Border Police, and no BAE construction-equipment role in settlements, barrier works, checkpoints, detention facilities, or military-base construction.7

The record also does not establish that BAE directly decides the final allocation of components once they enter the multinational F-35 supply pool. The licence exemption and litigation concerned UK Government policy, not a proceeding against BAE itself.22, 23

Several allegations require explicit qualification. Reporting that BAE M109 systems were used with white-phosphorus shells, that CTAI-produced white-phosphorus shells reached Israel, and that BAE supplied 155mm ammunition to Israel via FMS was not independently verified in this benchmark. These remain unresolved secondary leads and are not treated as established BAE-to-Israel transfers.16

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a current BAE Israeli digital-services nexus. BAE is an AWS Premier Tier Partner and has a Microsoft Azure collaboration for defence-sector wargaming and data modernisation, but no evidence identified that either relationship involves Israeli-jurisdiction infrastructure or Israeli government programmes.25, 26

BAE formerly had an Israeli technology and manufacturing presence through Rokar, which produced electronic countermeasure, flare/chaff dispensing, GPS receiver, and guidance systems. That relationship ended with the April 2021 sale to Elbit.5, 18

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified that BAE operates, leases, or co-locates data centres in Israel; participates in Project Nimbus; provides Israeli state or military bodies with cloud, analytics, data-sovereignty, AI, machine-learning, autonomous target-generation, or civilian-data systems; or uses Israeli-origin surveillance or biometric vendors in its own enterprise estate.7, 8

BAE Digital Intelligence’s historical Evident surveillance product was reportedly sold to several Middle East and North African states, but the reviewed sources did not identify Israel as a customer, and post-2017 programme status could not be confirmed.27

The claimed Rafael Protector connection is unresolved because no underlying Rafael, Israeli-government, or other primary source was independently verified for the installation.17

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

BAE’s material economic nexus was its former ownership of Rokar International, a Jerusalem-based operating subsidiary. Rokar was wholly owned by BAE until 2021, reportedly employed approximately 120 people and generated roughly $16 million in annual sales, before sale to Elbit for approximately $31 million.5, 6, 18

BAE’s continuing UK-based F-35 manufacturing also has an economic relationship to Israeli military procurement through the global F-35 programme. Campaign reporting estimated UK-supplied component value directed toward Israel’s F-35 fleet at more than £500 million by 2025, though this is an estimate rather than BAE-reported Israel revenue.28

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The Rokar operation is discontinued. No public evidence identified of a current BAE office, warehouse, support centre, R&D facility, or innovation programme in Israel or the occupied territories.8 No public evidence identified of Israeli-domiciled BAE equity holdings, Israeli sovereign-bond holdings, Israel-focused fund positions, disclosed Israel-specific revenue, or a current BAE role as a broad Israeli economic anchor.8

BAE is not a consumer retailer or agricultural sourcing company. No public evidence identified of settlement-origin consumer-goods sourcing, labelling, import structures, or comparable retail supply-chain arrangements.8

A reported Aviva investment figure in BAE was not independently verified through primary investment disclosures and remains report-attributed secondary context only.29 KLP’s exclusion of BAE relates to controversial-weapons concerns associated with the MBDA joint venture’s French nuclear-capable ASMP-A missile and is not an Israel/OPT finding.30

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

BAE’s documented political posture has been compliance-focused. In its July 2024 response to UN experts’ call to halt arms transfers to Israel, BAE stated that it operates under tight regulation and complies with applicable defence-export controls. The company’s response did not announce a contract termination, embargo, or Israel-specific enhanced end-use-monitoring commitment.20

The company’s state relationship is structurally significant: the UK Government retains BAE’s golden share, and BAE is a major UK defence contractor.10, 11 The UK Government’s decision to exempt global-pool F-35 components from the September 2024 suspension created the policy environment in which BAE’s F-35 component production continued.2, 21

BAE Systems North America maintains a federal PAC. The audits document its general US political spending but found no public evidence tying specified PAC disbursements to Israel-policy legislation, anti-BDS measures, AIPAC-aligned candidates, or similar Israel-specific advocacy.31, 32

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of BAE executive leadership roles in CFI, AIPAC, FIDF, JNF/KKL, USISTF, or comparable advocacy bodies; contributions to FIDF, settlement organisations, Regavim, Im Tirtzu, or Israeli reservist funds; or free logistics, cloud credits, or infrastructure directed to Israeli state or military activity during the current conflict.8

No public evidence identified of BAE sponsoring “Brand Israel” cultural or public-relations campaigns. No public evidence identified of BAE independently sponsoring or hosting Israeli official delegations at DSEI; the 2025 exclusion of official Israeli delegations was a UK Government policy, while Israeli firms could attend independently.33

Claims concerning BAE-related UK political access, parliamentarian shareholdings, or plans for BAE staff to enter the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office were not independently verified in this benchmark and remain unresolved secondary context.34

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military9.207.006.508.54
Digital0.000.000.000.00
Economic2.507.006.502.32
Political3.505.509.002.75

Military drives the V_MAX because of BAE’s global F-35 role, the continued global-pool route to Israeli F-35 aircraft, and the documented 2026 APKWS-II FMS sale.1, 3 The remaining-domain average reflects historical economic presence through divested Rokar and a documented political/regulatory nexus, while Digital remains zero because no current Israeli digital-services, cloud, AI, or data-infrastructure nexus was established.5, 7

This is a scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted assessment. It reflects documented activities and their assessed scale and directness, not allegations that were unverified, wrongly attributed, or mitigated by divestment.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bae-systems-uk-s-largest-arms-company-under-fire-for-israel-ties/3194243 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  2. https://caat.org.uk/publications/the-uk-governments-partial-suspension-of-arms-export-licences-to-israel-and-the-f-35-exemption/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  3. https://thedefensepost.com/2026/05/04/apkws-israel-qatar-uae/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2026/05/mil-260501-state05.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  5. https://www.elbitsystems.com/news/elbit-systems-acquires-bae-systems-rokar ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18

  6. https://www.prnewswire.com/il/news-releases/elbit-systems-acquires-bae-systems-rokar-301260652.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  7. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/bae-systems ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  8. https://www.army-technology.com/news/elbit-buys-bae-systems-subsidiary-bae-systems-rokar/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  9. https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/bae-systems/ ↩ ↩2

  10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_share ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2007-07-16/debates/07071658000023/GovernmentShareholding ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. https://www.baesystems.com/en/leadership/board-of-directors ↩ ↩2

  13. https://aoav.org.uk/2025/uks-6-7-billion-role-in-israeli-f-35-programme-raises-human-rights-questions-and-arms-control-concerns/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  14. https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/bae-live-fire-tests-rokar-silver-bullet-guidance-k/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  15. https://www.milrecon.com/2015/05/12/silver-bullet-precision-guidance-kit-tested-in-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  16. https://corporatewatch.org/whos-arming-israel-how-bae-fuels-genocide-in-gaza/ ↩ ↩2

  17. https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/bae-systems-developing-next-generation-mk-38-gun-mount/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  18. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/49142 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  19. https://citizenevidence.org/2023/10/13/israel-opt-identifying-the-israeli-armys-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-gaza/ ↩

  20. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/bae-systems-response-to-urgent-call-by-un-experts-to-cease-arms-transfer-amid-israels-war-in-gaza/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  21. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2024-09-02/hcws64 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  22. https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2025/07/04/challenge-to-export-of-military-parts-that-might-be-used-by-israel-fails-in-the-high-court/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  23. https://caat.org.uk/news/caat-statement-court-of-appeal-refuses-al-haq-permission-to-appeal-regarding-arms-licences-to-israel/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/bae-systems-elbit-systems-of-america-team-to-shape-the-future-of-army-combat-vehicles ↩ ↩2

  25. https://www.baesystems.com/en/our-company/bae-systems-inc/products-and-services/awspartnerusa ↩ ↩2

  26. https://www.computerweekly.com/news/365535046/BAE-Systems-partners-with-Microsoft-Azure-to-revamp-data-use-across-defence-sector ↩ ↩2

  27. https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40281963 ↩

  28. https://caat.org.uk/app/uploads/2025/09/CAAT-Israel-update-August-2025-v4.pdf ↩ ↩2

  29. https://boycottbloodyinsurance.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Ensuring-Genocide-Report.pdf ↩

  30. https://www.klp.no/en/corporate-responsibility-and-responsible-investments/exclusion-and-dialogue/Decision%20to%20exclude%20companies%20that%20produce%20controversial%20weapons.pdf ↩ ↩2

  31. https://www.opensecrets.org/political-action-committees-pacs/bae-systems/C00281212/candidate-recipients/2020 ↩ ↩2

  32. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/bae-systems/summary?id=D000000583 ↩ ↩2

  33. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/uk-bans-israel-officials-dsei-defense-trade-london-over-gaza-war ↩

  34. https://www.declassifieduk.org/flagship-british-firms-set-to-profit-amid-israels-war-on-gaza/ ↩

  35. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/06/states-and-companies-must-end-arms-transfers-israel-immediately-or-risk ↩