AstraZeneca MILITARY

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

• AstraZeneca PLC is the reporting parent, incorporated in England and Wales, and defines AstraZeneca or the Group as the company and its consolidated entities.¹
• AstraZeneca (Israel) Ltd was listed as a wholly owned subsidiary in the audited 2024 group-subsidiary schedule.²
• AstraZeneca’s FY2025 significant-subsidiary exhibit does not list AstraZeneca (Israel) Ltd, but the exhibit is expressly limited to subsidiaries deemed significant under Regulation S-X as at 31 December 2025; its omission does not establish disposal or a change of ownership.³
• Current AstraZeneca corporate records identify AstraZeneca (Israel) Ltd as a local operating entity. The Israel page describes an operation established in late 2008, based in Kfar Saba, employing more than 100 people, and undertaking sales, marketing, medical and regulatory affairs, clinical research, administration, and domestic research-and-development partnerships.⁴
• AstraZeneca’s Israeli privacy notice identifies AstraZeneca (Israel) Ltd as the local data controller and gives a Kfar Saba address, while its global privacy-contact page identifies the same entity but gives a Hod Hasharon address; the reviewed records do not explain the address discrepancy.^{5, 6}
• AstraZeneca’s Israel page records a May 2019 memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Innovation Authority supporting the healthcare ecosystem. The live page does not state whether the memorandum remains operative, identify project recipients, or describe a defence, security, prison, police, border, settlement, or occupation end user.⁴
• No public evidence identified of an AstraZeneca contract, tender award, framework agreement, memorandum, or other procurement relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Israel Police, Border Police, or another Israeli security body in the reviewed materials.^{4, 7, 8, 9}
• Israel’s Ministry of Defense describes procurement processes generally, but the reviewed official procurement material did not identify AstraZeneca as a supplier.⁷
• The Ministry of Defense vendor portal confirms RFP, purchase-order, vendor-certification, invoicing, and supplier-registration functions, but supplier accounts, RFP responses, and orders are login-gated; its public landing page neither exposes a searchable supplier list nor identifies AstraZeneca.¹⁰
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca appearing in reviewed SIBAT, defence-export, exhibition, or state-security procurement materials in connection with an Israeli defence contract.^{7, 8, 9}
• No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate, official-procurement, regulatory, UN/OHCHR, and targeted-search materials of material physical supply, services, investments, or procurement by AstraZeneca’s chief executive, chair, senior executives, directors, or a disclosed personal vehicle involving Israeli military, prison, police, border, settlement, or occupation end users.^{1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12}
• This principal-level finding is bounded: the reviewed work did not complete person-by-person searches of every executive or director, each associated foundation or personal vehicle, or all indirect investments.^{11, 12}

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

• AstraZeneca’s reviewed Israel materials describe pharmaceutical and healthcare functions rather than tactical, ruggedised, military-specification, or defence-grade products.⁴
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca manufacturing, marketing, or supplying tactical, ruggedised, military-specific, defence-grade, or weapons-effect product variants to Israeli security forces.^{4, 8, 9}
• No public evidence identified of an AstraZeneca-specific export licence, end-user certificate, export-control application, grant, refusal, suspension, or review concerning supply to an Israeli military or security end user.^{13, 14}
• UK licensing publications report aggregate Israel-related licensing decisions without identifying AstraZeneca as an exporter or licence holder.^{13, 14}
• As of 28 February 2026, UK aggregate data recorded 395 non-suspended licences involving Israel, including 203 classified as military, but did not name exporters or licence holders.¹⁴

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca equipment, vehicles, machinery, construction services, engineering work, or infrastructure work connected to settlements, the separation barrier, demolitions, checkpoints, detention facilities, military installations, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or other occupied-territory infrastructure.^{8, 15}
• AstraZeneca was not named in the supplied full-text scans of the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report or the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database update, which is a document-scoped finding rather than evidence of absence from all relevant records.^{8, 15}
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca construction, engineering, maintenance, or security-infrastructure contracts.^{8, 15}

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca supplying components, materials, specialist manufacturing services, technology, licensed production, or joint development to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another identified Israeli defence prime.^{8, 15}
• No public evidence identified of joint development, co-production, technology transfer, or licensed-manufacturing arrangements between AstraZeneca and an Israeli defence firm.^{8, 15}
• The available evidence supports the existence of an Israeli pharmaceutical operating entity but does not connect that entity to an Israeli defence-prime supply chain.^{2, 4, 5, 6}
• Israel’s Ministry of Defense identified Rafael, ELTA/IAI, mPrest Defense, and the United States Missile Defense Agency in the official Iron Dome-production announcement reviewed, without identifying AstraZeneca.¹⁶
• Israel’s Ministry of Defense identified Elbit as contractor for an August 2025 IDF aerial-munitions contract, without identifying AstraZeneca.¹⁷
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca PLC, AstraZeneca (Israel) Ltd, another identified group entity, an executive vehicle, or a board-controlled entity participating in an Israeli military or security procurement channel.^{2, 4, 5, 6, 10}
• The access-controlled Ministry of Defense vendor portal prevents its public front page from serving as a complete supplier-record check.¹⁰

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

• A 2021 Israel Ministry of Health-approved Soliris patient-safety card identifies Neopharm Israel Group as a contact for the Alexion/AstraZeneca Rare Disease medicine Soliris.¹⁸
• The patient-safety card documents a civilian pharmaceutical safety-contact and distribution context, not a military end user, defence-logistics role, or supply to Israeli security bodies.¹⁸
• Who Profits reported in 2012 that SLE provided logistics for Teva’s Israeli sales and distribution, including third-party products such as AstraZeneca products, but the reported channel was civilian and its continuation is unknown.¹⁹
• The Who Profits report does not document an AstraZeneca-specific sale, shipment, customer, facility, settlement, occupied-territory end user, or security end user; it cannot substantiate an AstraZeneca settlement or military-logistics relationship.¹⁹
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca providing catering, transport, fuel, facilities management, waste services, telecommunications, freight forwarding, port handling, or other sustainment services to IDF bases, detention sites, or Israeli security installations.^{8, 15, 19}
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca service activity at installations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Negev.^{8, 15}

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

• No public evidence identified that AstraZeneca is a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, integrator, or verified component supplier for Israeli lethal platforms, munitions, missile-defence systems, aircraft, armoured vehicles, naval systems, or ballistic-missile systems.^{8, 15}
• No public evidence identified of AstraZeneca supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, propellants, warhead components, munitions precursors, guidance systems, radar, fire-control systems, propulsion, targeting software, or other lethal-system sub-systems to Israeli defence end users.^{8, 15}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

• The United Kingdom suspended approximately 30 extant licences on 2 September 2024 for exports assessed as potentially usable in Israeli military operations in Gaza, but the notice does not identify AstraZeneca and cannot establish an AstraZeneca export relationship.¹³
• The subsequent UK release states that 29 licences were suspended in September 2024 and that six licences were later suspended or amended, without identifying exporters or establishing that AstraZeneca held a licence.¹⁴
• No public evidence identified of a public AstraZeneca-specific grant, refusal, suspension, revocation, investigation, enforcement action, sanctions investigation, judicial review, court proceeding, or arms-embargo matter concerning Israeli military supply.^{8, 13, 14}
• The reviewed settlement-business materials did not name AstraZeneca, and this conclusion remains limited to the supplied document scans.^{8, 15}

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

• The supplied report-level scans did not identify AstraZeneca in the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report or the 2023 OHCHR settlement-business database update.^{8, 15}
• The reviewed report-library searches also produced document-scoped no-hits for the listed PAX, Al-Haq, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, BankTrack, BDS, KLP, and Who Profits materials; these results do not establish absence from those organisations’ wider archives or databases.^{8, 15, 19}
• No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of an organised boycott, divestment, exclusion, or institutional-investment decision specifically grounded in AstraZeneca defence-sector activity involving Israel.^{8, 15}
• No public evidence identified of an AstraZeneca public response, contract termination, or end-use-monitoring commitment concerning a verified Israeli defence supply relationship.^{8, 15}
• AstraZeneca’s September 2025 General Meeting notice identified Michel Demaré as Non-Executive Chair, Pascal Soriot as Chief Executive Officer, Aradhana Sarin as Chief Financial Officer, and Marcus Wallenberg among the directors.¹¹
• AstraZeneca’s current leadership page states that Marcus Wallenberg has served as a Non-Executive Director since April 1999 and identifies his outside appointments, including chairmanships of Saab AB, SEB, Wallenberg Investments AB, and FAM AB, and vice-chairmanships of Investor AB and EQT AB.¹²
• AstraZeneca’s 2025 AGM notice listed Marcus Wallenberg among directors presented for re-election, alongside Chair Michel Demaré and Chief Executive Officer Pascal Soriot.²⁰
• Saab identifies Marcus Wallenberg as both an AstraZeneca board member and Saab chair, and Saab reported his re-election as chair at its 2026 AGM.^{21, 22}
• Saab’s 2026 AGM materials and remuneration-committee page also identify Wallenberg as Saab chair and as a remuneration-committee member after Saab’s 2025 AGM.^{23, 24}
• Saab identifies itself as a defence and security company, but the reviewed Saab, Ministry of Defense, corporate, and targeted-search materials did not identify a Saab Israel-linked physical-security act, Israeli defence or security procurement, delivery, or occupied-territory activity attributable to Wallenberg.^{21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26}
• No qualifying Israel-linked physical-security activity by an entity Wallenberg chairs was identified that can be attributed to AstraZeneca through his documented board role.^{20, 21, 22, 12}
• Wallenberg’s Saab role establishes a defence-industry board affiliation held by an AstraZeneca director, but it does not establish an AstraZeneca supply relationship with Israel or the Israeli armed forces.^{20, 21, 22}
• AstraZeneca’s FY2024 filing states that no director or senior executive beneficially owned, or held options over, one percent or more of issued share capital.²⁷
• BlackRock reported beneficial ownership of 117,761,076 AstraZeneca ordinary shares as of 31 March 2025, which records a financial interest rather than control or a military-sector connection.²⁸
• AstraZeneca’s corporate-governance material describes the board as responsible for Group strategy, policies, risk oversight, and governance, but the reviewed evidence does not establish that Saab is an AstraZeneca group entity or that Wallenberg’s external chairmanship constitutes an AstraZeneca-controlled act.^{12, 29}