ASUS

Key Findings

• Economic: ASUS maintains a current 100%-owned Israeli subsidiary, ASUS Israel (Technology) Ltd. (ACIL), whose disclosed function is supporting ASUS 3C products in Israel; ASUS also maintains local sales, support and partner channels and in 2026 launched a product using an Israeli Hailo AI processor.^{1, 2, 3, 4}
• Political: Two contemporaneous reports attributed to ASUS Israel a November 2023 social-media post displaying the Israeli flag and expressing support for Israeli security forces and IDF soldiers. The original post was not independently retrievable in the audit, and no later global ASUS statement formally adopting that wording was identified.^{5, 6}
• Not found: No public evidence identified of a direct ASUS-group Israeli military contract, verified ASUS equipment in a named IDF or Israeli defence programme, an Israeli government cloud contract, an occupied-territory surveillance deployment, or a settlement-specific ASUS operation. Defence-capable products and defence-sector intermediaries were documented, but the audits did not establish the necessary end-user or programme link.^{7, 8, 9, 10, 11}

Target Profile

Key Facts:

• ASUS Israel (Technology) Ltd. is listed in ASUS’s 2026 consolidated accounts as 100% owned and engaged in supporting 3C products in Israel.¹
• Registry-derived material reviewed by the economic audit identifies ACIL as an active Israeli private company established in 2012.²
• ASUS retains a 16.72% non-controlling investment in Pegatron, while ASUS itself describes the companies as operationally separate following the earlier ODM/OEM reorganisation.^{1, 14, 15}
• Controlled-group entities relevant to the audits include AAEON, ASMedia, Onyx, Askey, ASUS Cloud and Taiwan AI Cloud; AAEON generated the strongest additional Israeli technology relationships identified in the digital review.^{1, 16}

Executive Summary

ASUS’s strongest documented Israel nexus is economic. Its June 2026 consolidated financial report identifies ASUS Israel (Technology) Ltd. as a current 100%-owned subsidiary supporting 3C products in Israel. ASUS also maintains Israel-localized sales and support contacts and an authorized partner network. The economic audit therefore treated ASUS as having sustained operational presence in Israel rather than merely exporting products at arm’s length.^{1, 3, 7} That presence drove the highest domain score: Economic 4.64.

The technology relationships add to that economic record but did not produce a qualifying Digital score. ASUS launched the UGen300 USB AI Accelerator in April 2026 using the Hailo-10H processor from Israeli semiconductor company Hailo. Controlled subsidiary AAEON has a longer Hailo integration history and a separate relationship with Israeli robotics company Cogniteam, whose cloud robotics platform can run on AAEON-based systems.^{4, 17, 18, 19} The digital audit nevertheless found no verified Project Nimbus participation, Israeli government cloud contract, military/intelligence deployment, occupied-territory surveillance deployment, or evidence that ordinary ASUS customer data is routinely stored on Israeli-controlled infrastructure. The Cogniteam pathway also lacks an identified customer deployment or demonstrated sensitive/highly exploitable human dataset at material scale. This evidentiary gap, rather than a requirement that every data-exposure finding have a state contract or physical Israeli hosting, supports the retained Digital zero.^{19, 20}

The principal political finding is a single November 2023 episode. Marketing-Interactive and Malay Mail reported that ASUS Israel published a social-media message displaying the Israeli flag and expressing support for Israeli security forces and IDF soldiers. The original post was not independently retrievable during the audit, so the finding remains attributed to those contemporaneous reports. The same reporting documented ASUS Malaysia distancing itself from the message and seeking its removal through Taiwan headquarters. No later global ASUS statement formally adopting the ASUS Israel wording, and no documented recurrence after the 2024 ICJ and ICC milestones used by the audits, was identified.^{5, 6} That episode nevertheless met the reviewed Political criteria because it was attributed to an official local corporate channel and directly aligned with Israeli security forces.

The military record is substantially exculpatory. ASUS has Israeli partners that separately serve defence customers, and controlled subsidiary AAEON sells some products marketed for defence or law-enforcement applications. A Ministry of Defense-registered Israeli reseller has also publicly quoted an ASUS laptop. However, the audits found no completed Israeli MoD or IDF purchase, named ASUS component in a military system, ASUS defence contract, weapons integration, military cloud deployment, or evidence that defence-capable ASUS-group products were actually supplied to an Israeli military or security end-user.^{7, 8, 9, 21, 22} Military therefore remains 0.00.

The final vetted Complicity Index result is 404, Tier C (Substantial Complicity). The score is driven primarily by ASUS’s direct and sustained Israeli economic presence and secondarily by the documented 2023 ASUS Israel political statement. Military and digital domains remain at zero because the reviewed record did not establish a qualifying physical military supply, state/security digital result, or vendor-controlled sensitive-data exposure at demonstrated material scale.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

ASUSTeK Computer Inc. is a Taiwanese technology group headquartered in Taipei. Its disclosed business centres on the design, research and development, and sale of computer and communications products.¹² Current governance materials identify Jonney Shih as chairman, Ted Hsu as vice chairman, and S.Y. Hsu and Samson Hu as co-CEOs.¹³

The current group boundary matters because the audits did not limit attribution to ASUS-branded consumer products. ASUS’s 2026 consolidated report includes ASUS Israel, Askey, ASUS Cloud, Taiwan AI Cloud and other subsidiaries, while AAEON, ASMedia and Onyx also appear within the consolidated structure. Jetway appears within the AAEON subgroup and Techpoint within ASMedia.^{1, 16} Accordingly, controlled-group conduct was examined where the corporate records supported attribution.

Pegatron was treated differently. ASUS states that the ODM/OEM businesses were separated in 2008 and describes ASUS and Pegatron as separate entities. The June 2026 accounts nevertheless disclose ASUS holding 448,506,484 Pegatron shares, or 16.72%, as a non-controlling financial investment.^{1, 14, 15} The audits therefore disclosed the economic link while declining to attribute Pegatron operations automatically to ASUS. Current ASRock conduct was likewise not attributed to ASUS absent evidence of current ASUS control.

The most direct Israeli corporate entity is ACIL. ASUS’s financial report lists it as wholly owned and describes its business as supporting 3C products in Israel.¹ ASUS also operates Israel-facing business contact and support channels and lists Israeli solution partners including CRG, Eastronics, EIM, Hiper Global, NISKO Technology and Visual.^{3, 7} These facts establish a continuing local commercial presence.

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No mechanically eligible military frame was established. The audit identified defence-adjacent pathways but did not identify a direct ASUS or controlled-group military supply outcome.

AAEON markets the EPIC-TGH7 single-board computer for applications including defence, while other AAEON systems are marketed for law-enforcement or armoured-vehicle contexts.^{25, 26} Separately, ASUS-authorized Israeli partners Eastronics, EIM and Hiper Global have capabilities or customer bases that include defence.^{7, 21, 22, 27} These are relevant channels because they make defence-sector procurement technically possible.

The evidence did not close the end-user chain. No retrieved source identified an ASUS or AAEON product supplied to the IDF, Israeli Ministry of Defense, Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael or another named Israeli military programme. Hiper Global’s separately reported Israeli tactical-computing order did not identify ASUS equipment.²⁸ Eastronics’s defence-sector customer profile likewise did not identify an ASUS SKU in a military contract.^{7, 21, 22}

A 2026 public Plonter quotation also showed an ASUS TUF Gaming F16 offered by a reseller identified as an Israeli Ministry of Defense supplier. The audit treated this as evidence of sales capacity, not procurement: it did not establish an MoD order, delivery, quantity, contract value or military use.⁸

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the absence of a verified military transaction. ASUS’s own guidance says MIL-STD-810 testing is used to assess product quality and does not indicate particular fitness for military use.⁹ The audits therefore rejected MIL-STD branding as military evidence.

No public evidence identified of an ASUS-group Israeli military contract, military export licence, end-user certificate, named weapon-system integration, military cloud pathway, military base-support contract, arms or munitions supply, or defence-sector joint development with an Israeli defence prime. Defence-capable products and defence-capable intermediaries were insufficient without a documented Israeli military end-user.

This distinction governs the final Military score of 0.00.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

The digital audit documented substantive Israeli technology relationships but no qualifying Israeli state-security deployment.

ASUS’s UGen300 product integrates the Hailo-10H processor. Hailo identifies itself in Tel Aviv and describes Hailo-10H as an on-device AI accelerator.^{4, 17} ASUS states that UGen300 inference can run locally, so the presence of an Israeli-designed processor does not itself establish that user data is transmitted to Israel.⁴

AAEON has a broader Hailo relationship dating from 2022, with Hailo modules supported across named edge-AI platforms.¹⁸ AAEON also partners with Israeli robotics company Cogniteam. Cogniteam states that AAEON-based systems can run its cloud robotics platform for deployment, remote management and fleet operation.¹⁹ This establishes an Israeli cloud-service pathway for deployments that actually use Cogniteam.

Those relationships did not establish a state-security effect. No public evidence identified of Project Nimbus participation, an ASUS Israeli government cloud contract, IDF or intelligence use of the cited AI products, an occupied-territory surveillance deployment, or an ASUS-controlled Israeli data centre.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The main defence is that the documented Israeli-origin technologies are general-purpose commercial technologies. Hailo’s pathway is substantially local/on-device in the UGen300 context.^{4, 17} Cogniteam’s privacy policy documents possible processing of user and robot-sensor information, and its platform provides cloud deployment and fleet management.^{19, 20, 29} The audited programme does not establish a specific deployed customer or a sensitive/highly exploitable human dataset at material scale. Those are material gaps in the data-exposure pathway; a generic vendor policy alone does not demonstrate that such data are actually processed in this programme. Physical hosting region, state access and occupied-territory use also remain unresolved, but a named state contract or physical Israeli hosting is not required when a qualifying vendor-controlled sensitive-data arrangement is otherwise proved.

Likewise, ASUS’s current Israeli infrastructure sales activity includes public-sector targeting, but sales capacity is not a contract award. The audit found no verified contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF or intelligence services and no evidence of ASUS supplying offensive-cyber tooling, targeting AI, lethal decision support or population-surveillance technology.

The final Digital score is therefore 0.00 despite the documented Israeli technology ecosystem links.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Economic contains the strongest qualifying nexus. ASUS’s current financial report identifies ACIL as a 100%-owned Israeli subsidiary whose activity is supporting 3C products in Israel.¹ Registry-derived evidence reviewed in the audit identifies the company as an active Israeli private company established in 2012.²

ASUS also maintains dedicated Israel sales and support contacts, including volume-purchase routes, and an authorized local solution-partner network.^{3, 7} The combination of wholly owned subsidiary, localized sales/support infrastructure and partner channels establishes sustained operational presence.

Current technology inputs reinforce the economic relationship. ASUS’s 2026 UGen300 uses Hailo’s Israeli-developed Hailo-10H processor.^{4, 17} At controlled-group level, AAEON maintains Israeli technology relationships with Hailo and Cogniteam.^{18, 19} An earlier 2022 ASUS-Airovation MOU concerned Israeli-origin air-purification technology, although the audit did not establish its commercial volume or continuation in 2026.^{23, 24}

The economic audit did not identify settlement-origin production, an ASUS-owned settlement facility, an Israeli manufacturing plant, an Israel-specific ASUS data centre, or separately disclosed Israel-market revenue. It also found no evidence of Israeli beneficial control of the Taiwanese parent.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the limited disclosed scale. ASUS’s accounts establish ACIL’s ownership and accounting value but do not disclose Israeli revenue, market share, employee count, payroll, tax contribution or volume of sales. The approved Magnitude of 5.8 reflects established regular commercial scale, while these disclosure gaps prevent a supported finding of significant volume.¹ ACIL’s disclosed original investment of NT$414 thousand, carrying amount of NT$46.599 million and NT$6.001 million investee accounting profit are not sales revenue, acquisition price, payroll, tax or proof of repatriated cash.^{1, 14}

The subsidiary’s disclosed role is support of 3C products, not military production, weapons manufacture or settlement infrastructure.¹ Its registry address was treated only as registry metadata, not proof that ASUS owns the premises.²

The audit also drew a strict control boundary around Pegatron. ASUS’s 16.72% holding is a material economic exposure, but the reviewed corporate materials establish that Pegatron is separately managed and not an ASUS-controlled operating subsidiary.^{1, 14, 15} Pegatron conduct was therefore not transitively attributed to ASUS.

These facts produced I=5.6, M=5.8 and P=9.0, yielding Economic 4.64.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing political evidence is the November 2023 ASUS Israel social-media episode. Marketing-Interactive reported that ASUS Israel displayed the Israeli flag and said it stood by Israeli security forces and IDF soldiers. Malay Mail independently reported that ASUS Israel had pledged support to the IDF.^{5, 6}

The original post was not independently retrievable during the audit. The dossier therefore attributes the wording and existence of the message to those contemporaneous reports rather than presenting it as a presently accessible ASUS primary source.

The reports also documented internal disagreement. ASUS Malaysia reportedly told a Malaysian artist that it agreed the ASUS Israel post should be removed and said it was contacting or working with Taiwan headquarters.^{5, 6} No public evidence identified of a later ASUS global statement formally adopting the ASUS Israel wording, and the audit found no documented recurrence or escalation after the 2024 legal-notice dates used in the scoring framework.

The examiner nevertheless treated an official local corporate channel expressly supporting Israeli security forces and IDF soldiers as a high-impact political alignment, while keeping magnitude low because the evidence established a single public local episode.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

ASUS’s strongest defence is the limited scope and duration of the episode. The evidence packet did not establish a recurring corporate campaign, global headquarters endorsement, sustained political lobbying, anti-BDS activity, military-welfare donations or an ASUS-funded political organization.

The current BDS Movement corporate priority guide reviewed by the audit does not list ASUS among its enumerated targets.³⁰ Ethical Consumer’s August 2026 Palestine-boycott guidance went further, identifying TCO-certified ASUS laptops and ASUS tablets among alternatives and stating that the alternative brands it listed were not being targeted by Palestinian human-rights campaigners.³¹ Those findings do not disprove the reported 2023 ASUS Israel message, but they materially limit any claim that ASUS was a current priority target of major Palestinian boycott campaigning.

No public evidence identified of ASUS sponsoring settlement organizations, donating to the IDF or FIDF, financing JNF/KKL, engaging in anti-BDS lobbying, or adopting a settlement-specific political programme.

The proximity finding follows integrated-group attribution of a wholly owned, consolidated, same-brand subsidiary without demonstrated operational or capital independence; it does not assert that Taipei headquarters authored or adopted the local post.^{1, 5, 6} The resulting political score is therefore high on directness and activity type but low on magnitude: I=7.2, M=3.0 and P=9.0, producing Political 3.09.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Counter-Arguments

The evidence supports several substantial counter-arguments that constrain the dossier’s interpretation.

First, the economic relationship is direct but primarily civilian in the available record. ACIL is disclosed as supporting 3C products, and ASUS’s visible Israeli channels concern ordinary technology sales, support, distribution and integration.^{1, 3, 7} The audits did not identify an ASUS-owned Israeli factory, military production line, settlement facility or military-service subsidiary.

Second, defence adjacency was repeatedly separated from military supply. Some AAEON products are marketed for defence applications, and ASUS partners such as Hiper Global and Eastronics have defence-sector businesses, but no source connected ASUS hardware to a named Israeli weapons programme or completed military procurement.^{21, 22} Even the Plonter document establishes only that a Ministry of Defense supplier offered an ASUS laptop, not that the Ministry bought it.⁸

Third, the digital relationships are commercial and dual-use. Hailo provides edge-AI processors, while Cogniteam provides robotics software and cloud functionality. No reviewed source tied those technologies to the IDF, Israeli intelligence agencies, police surveillance of Palestinians, Project Nimbus or a settlement deployment.^{4, 17, 19}

Fourth, the political evidence is concentrated in one local corporate communication episode from November 2023. The source post itself was unavailable for direct inspection, ASUS Malaysia reportedly sought its removal, and no later global ASUS adoption or repetition was identified.^{5, 6} The audits also found no corporate or principal-level military-welfare donation, anti-BDS lobbying campaign or settlement sponsorship.

Finally, current civil-society evidence does not show ASUS as a major priority boycott target. The BDS Movement’s reviewed corporate guide did not enumerate ASUS, and Ethical Consumer listed ASUS among alternative brands in its 2026 Palestine-related buying guidance.^{30, 31}

These countervailing findings do not erase the direct economic presence or the reported ASUS Israel statement. They define the limits of what the evidence establishes and explain why Military and Digital remain zero and why Political magnitude is comparatively low.

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.5.

• V_MAX: 4.64 Avg_OTHERS: 1.03
• BRS Score: 404 Tier: C (Substantial Complicity)

V_MAX is driven by the economic domain: a current wholly owned Israeli subsidiary, sustained local sales/support infrastructure and associated commercial channels produce a direct operational-presence finding, while the absence of disclosed revenue, headcount or market scale limits Magnitude. ECON and POL use the same integrated-group proximity treatment for ASUS Israel; an absence of proof of parent day-to-day management cannot itself establish subsidiary independence.¹ The political domain adds a lower overall contribution because the reported 2023 pro-IDF message was direct but represented one documented local corporate episode.

The V6.5 method is scale-free and evidence-only: Impact reflects the type of documented activity, Magnitude its demonstrated scale or recurrence, and Proximity the directness of the target’s relationship. The supplied scores are final, examiner-adjudicated and fixed following human vetting.

Methodology Note

• Evidence is restricted to the findings established in the four supplied Military, Digital, Economic and Political audits. Allegations not verified there are excluded or retained with the audits’ own caveats.
• The V6.5 system is scale-free: Impact (I) measures the type and consequence of the documented activity, Magnitude (M) its demonstrated scale or persistence, and Proximity (P) how directly the activity is attributable to the target.
• Temporal treatment matters. Historical or divested relationships are discounted, and continuing activity is distinguished from pre-2020 or otherwise historical facts. ASUS’s continuing 16.72% Pegatron stake is disclosed, but Pegatron’s operations are not treated as ASUS operations because current control was not established.^{1, 15}
• Entity attribution does not use transitive guilt. Defence activity by an ASUS distributor, technology partner or minority-held company is not attributed to ASUS without evidence tying the relevant product, contract or conduct to ASUS.
• A verified settlement operation may qualify in both economic and political analysis where the rubric permits dual counting. For ASUS, however, no public evidence identified of an ASUS-owned settlement facility, settlement-specific contract or verified settlement digital deployment in the audited record.^{10, 11}
• The audits use “No public evidence identified” where targeted checks did not establish the relevant fact. This is a bounded research finding, not proof that the activity has never occurred.