INDEX / DIRECTORY / ATLASSIAN / MILITARY

Atlassian MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-22
Military Score 0.00 /10 E Atlassian - BDS-1000 174
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Atlassian Corporation is a Delaware-incorporated, publicly traded software company whose FY2025 filing describes team-collaboration offerings built on the Atlassian Cloud Platform, rather than a defence-manufacturing or military-contracting business 1.

No public evidence identified of an Atlassian contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or another Israeli security body in the reviewed public procurement material.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense operates a supplier and RFP portal, but its public landing page does not provide a searchable Atlassian award 2.

The September 2022 SIBAT defence directory identifies listed companies as holding Ministry of Defense marketing or export licences at that time, but it is expressly non-exhaustive and does not list Atlassian in the reviewed material 3.

An Israeli National Insurance Institute tender concerned Jira/Atlassian user licences, maintenance, and implementation services, constituting civilian public-sector procurement rather than evidence of a defence or security end user 4.

A separate National Insurance Institute archive entry similarly concerns licences, maintenance, and implementation services for Atlassian products, but does not establish bidder identity, award status, supplier identity, value, term, military end use, or a defence-supply relationship 5.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Atlassian’s FY2025 disclosures describe software for software, service, and business teams, and do not describe tactical, ruggedised, mil-spec, weapons-integration, or kinetic-targeting product lines 1.

No public evidence identified of Atlassian marketing Israeli-security-specific, tactical, ruggedised, or military variants of Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Trello, or other products.

No public evidence identified of Israeli military end-user certificates, export-licence applications, or export-control decisions concerning Atlassian products.

The identified Israeli procurement evidence concerns ordinary enterprise-software licensing and implementation, which does not itself establish a Military relationship 4, 5.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Atlassian’s disclosed business is software and cloud-platform services rather than heavy machinery, construction, engineering, or infrastructure development 1.

No public evidence identified that Atlassian products or equipment were used in settlement construction, the separation barrier, demolitions, checkpoints, detention facilities, military installations, or related infrastructure in the occupied Palestinian territory or Golan Heights.

No public evidence identified of direct or intermediary construction, engineering, maintenance, or end-use-monitoring arrangements relevant to those activities.

Atlassian’s FY2025 filing records an “Atlassian” trademark registration in Israel, but that intellectual-property fact does not establish an Israeli subsidiary, physical office, defence contract, settlement activity, or occupied-territory operation 1.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Atlassian supplying components, specialist manufacturing services, sub-systems, or purpose-built software to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another identified Israeli defence prime.

No public evidence identified of Atlassian–Israeli-defence-prime co-development, technology transfer, co-production, or licensed-manufacturing arrangements.

The reviewed corporate record does not enumerate Atlassian’s subsidiaries in the FY2025 filing, while the FY2026 second-quarter filing states that consolidated financial statements include Atlassian and its wholly owned subsidiaries without listing them in the reviewed text 1, 6.

No authoritative corporate source identified in the reviewed material enumerates Atlassian’s Israeli legal entities, if any, or identifies Israeli resellers, distributors, or implementation partners serving its customers.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of Atlassian providing base services, transport, fuel, catering, facilities management, telecommunications, freight forwarding, or port services to Israeli military or security installations.

No public evidence identified of Atlassian geographic activity involving military installations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or Negev.

The reviewed Ministry of Defense portal is primarily an authenticated supplier interface, limiting the completeness of public procurement visibility 2.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified that Atlassian manufactures, integrates, maintains, or supplies components for Israeli lethal systems, munitions, missile defence, aircraft, armoured vehicles, naval systems, targeting systems, fire-control systems, or other strategic weapons platforms.

No public evidence identified that an Atlassian product was designed to produce targeting decisions or weapons effects.

The available public-sector tender evidence concerns user licences, maintenance, and implementation services for Atlassian enterprise software rather than weapons-related production or deployment 4, 5.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of a government decision granting, denying, suspending, or revoking an export licence for an Atlassian sale to an Israeli military or security end user.

No public evidence identified of arms-embargo, sanctions, export-control enforcement, litigation, judicial review, OECD National Contact Point proceedings, or ICC/ICJ filings concerning an Atlassian defence-supply relationship with Israel.

The SIBAT directory can identify companies listed as licensed defence exporters, but its express non-exhaustiveness means it cannot prove non-involvement by an unlisted company 3.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied document-scoped review found no Atlassian mention in the UN Human Rights Council’s 2023 and 2025 updates of the settlement-business database or in the Council’s 2025 report A/HRC/59/23, but those results do not establish absence beyond the reviewed documents 7, 8, 9.

AFSC’s “Occupations” index returned no textual match for “Atlassian” or “Atlassian Corporation” in the review, while AFSC characterises its database as selective rather than comprehensive 10.

Who Profits’ accessible general company listing did not provide an Atlassian profile or a completed query result, so no database-wide absence conclusion can be drawn 11.

No public evidence identified of a boycott, divestment, exclusion, or NGO campaign specifically grounded in Atlassian defence-sector activity in Israel.

Atlassian Foundation states that its founders committed 1% of equity, profit, tools, and employee time to the Foundation, whose accessible description identifies education and social-impact work but does not provide a complete grant register or identify Israel-, Palestine-, IDF-, or settlement-related grants 12.

Atlassian Foundation states that permanent employees may receive up to US$1,000 annually in donation matching and use Goodstack to locate opportunities, but the reviewed page does not identify Israeli recipients or evidence funding of an IDF-, reservist-, settlement-, or defence-affiliated organisation 13.

Scott Farquhar is identified by Skip Foundation as a founder, and an IRS-derived filing index identifies him as treasurer and board officer of the God Only Knows Foundation, but the reviewed index did not permit recipient-level findings because the underlying Form 990-PF filing materials were unavailable in the research environment 14, 15.

Atlassian’s 2025 proxy identifies Michael Cannon-Brookes as CEO and co-founder and Scott Farquhar as co-founder and former co-CEO, with each holding 42.59% of total voting power as of 30 September 2025 16.

No supportable evidence was identified in the bounded review of defence-board roles, Israeli-defence-prime equity holdings, FIDF or reservist-fund donations, or public co-belligerency statements by Cannon-Brookes or Farquhar.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000165037225000036/team-20250630.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  2. https://www.online.mod.gov.il/ENG/pages/General/Info/start.aspx ↩ ↩2

  3. https://mod.gov.il/media/otaeo2yv/%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%90_250811_080922-1-_compressed.pdf ↩ ↩2

  4. https://www.btl.gov.il/About/tenders/Pages/ArchiveFolder/2023/MicrazT%284%292021.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://www.btl.gov.il/About/tenders/Pages/ArchiveFolder/2021/MicrazT%288%292019.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000165037226000011/team-20251231.htm ↩

  7. https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/53/24 ↩

  8. https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/60/19 ↩

  9. https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/59/23 ↩

  10. https://investigate.afsc.org/occupations ↩

  11. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/all ↩

  12. https://www.atlassian.com/foundation/about ↩

  13. https://www.atlassian.com/foundation/how-we-work/volunteering-and-donating ↩

  14. https://www.skipfoundation.org/ ↩

  15. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/271537927 ↩

  16. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650372/000165037225000058/team-20251014.htm ↩