Atlassian DIGITAL

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

• Atlassian’s 2021–22 SOC 2 system description identified CyberArk (then described as “CyberArk (formerly Idaptive)”) as the single-sign-on access-management system across listed cloud-platform components, including Jira Cloud, Confluence Cloud, Bitbucket Cloud, Forge, Opsgenie and Data Lake ¹.

• The same historical SOC 2 report identified Snyk and SourceClear as tools used to continuously scan the code base for vulnerable open-source libraries ¹.

• The SOC 2 report did not mention Check Point, Palo Alto Networks or SentinelOne, which is a document-scoped absence rather than evidence that no relationship existed elsewhere ¹.

• AWS was described in the SOC 2 report as providing physical and environmental safeguards, infrastructure support and management, and storage services for the platform ¹.

• Atlassian’s current subprocessor disclosure continues to list AWS as a hosting and infrastructure provider for major Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Loom, Rovo and Data Lake ².

• Atlassian’s official partner directory lists Matrix DevOps, located in Herzliya, as an Atlassian Platinum Solution Partner offering licensing, custom development, implementation, cloud migration, managed services and support ³.

• A 2024 Israeli IT-market study listed Jira, Confluence and Bitbucket and named Methoda, Matrix, PractiProject, HMS-Proceed and AgileSparks as Israeli integrators ⁴.

• The available study does not document deployments of Israeli-origin security products by those integrators ⁴.

• No verified current Israeli government tender, customer name, licence value, reseller contract or implementation record was identified in the supplied research materials ^{1, 2, 3, 4}.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

• No public evidence identified of Atlassian’s use of Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, behavioural or gait analytics, predictive-policing, sentiment-monitoring, social-media-monitoring or workforce-surveillance products ^{1, 2}.

• The reviewed materials were Atlassian’s historical SOC 2 disclosure, current subprocessor disclosure and focused public-web research, so this negative finding does not establish absence across all customers, integrations or internal systems ^{1, 2}.

• No sourced evidence in the memo connects Atlassian products or Israeli partners to retail-surveillance, policing or biometric deployments ^{1, 2, 3, 4}.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

• Atlassian’s data-residency documentation states that unpinned Cloud-app data is held in a “Global” location and can be dynamically assigned and moved among Atlassian AWS regions ⁵.

• Account-information data is outside the stated data-residency scope, and Israel is not listed as a selectable residency location on that documentation page ⁵.

• The documentation does not establish whether a particular unpinned tenant is processed in Israel ⁵.

• Atlassian Government Cloud is described as U.S.-resident, with AWS, CrowdStrike, Google, Okta and Tenable listed as subprocessors processing data in the United States ^{2, 5}.

• Atlassian’s June 2026 subsidiary exhibit lists wholly owned subsidiaries but no Israeli-incorporated entity ⁶.

• Atlassian’s current group-subprocessor list likewise does not list an Israeli Atlassian entity ².

• These disclosures do not rule out sales through partners, remote employees, customer self-hosting or other non-subsidiary operations ^{2, 6}.

• No public evidence identified of Atlassian participation in Project Nimbus or of an Atlassian-operated or leased data centre in Israel ^{2, 5, 6}.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

• Israel’s National Cyber Directorate issued a July 2022 advisory concerning critical vulnerabilities affecting Atlassian Server and Data Center products including Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket and Bamboo ⁷.

• The advisory recommended installation of relevant updates but did not identify an Israeli defence, intelligence, law-enforcement customer, contract, deployment or procurement award ⁷.

• No public evidence identified of a verified Atlassian contract or service agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, intelligence agencies or other Israeli security bodies ^{1, 2, 7}.

• No public evidence identified of offensive-cyber or digital-weapons development or provision by Atlassian in the reviewed materials ^{1, 2, 7}.

• The research memo did not locate evidence connecting Matrix, Methoda or other named Israeli integrators to a customer in an internationally recognised occupied territory, settlement municipality, Israeli military body or intelligence agency ^{3, 4}.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

• Matrix DevOps markets services involving Atlassian Intelligence and Rovo in Israel ³.

• A November 2024 Atlassian Community event at Matrix included an “Atlassian AI ROVOlution” presentation ³.

• These materials establish commercial ecosystem activity around Atlassian AI products, not provision to an Israeli state, military, intelligence or security body ³.

• No public evidence identified that Atlassian AI or machine-learning, computer-vision, autonomous, target-generation, tracking or surveillance systems were provided to Israeli state or security bodies ^{1, 2, 3}.

• No public evidence identified that such systems were trained on Israeli or occupied-territory civilian data or surveillance-derived data ^{1, 2, 3}.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

• Atlassian Corporation is a Delaware corporation listed on Nasdaq under ticker TEAM, and its FY2025 filing states principal executive offices at 350 Bush Street, Floor 13, San Francisco ⁸.

• Atlassian completed a redomestication on 30 September 2022, replacing the former English-and-Welsh public-company parent with Atlassian Corporation, a Delaware corporation ⁸.

• Atlassian’s official office page identifies Sydney as its Global HQ and San Francisco as its US HQ, and its published office list does not include Israel ⁹.

• As of 30 June 2026, Atlassian’s subsidiary exhibit describes the registrant as a holding company conducting substantially all business through wholly owned subsidiaries ⁶.

• The exhibit identifies subsidiaries across Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, without an Israeli-incorporated subsidiary ⁶.

• Named entities include Atlassian Pty. Ltd., Atlassian US, Inc., Atlassian Network Services, Inc., Atlassian Ventures LLC, Trello, Inc., Loom, Inc., OpsGenie, Inc., AgileCraft LLC and Cycle App, Inc. ⁶.

• No public evidence identified of an Atlassian-operated Israeli R&D centre, Israeli acquisition, strategic investment, venture-fund investment, patent-licensing arrangement or co-development relationship with an Israeli research institution ^{6, 8, 9}.

• Atlassian’s office and subsidiary disclosures do not rule out contractors, remote employees, resellers, minority investments, customer relationships or later corporate changes ^{6, 9}.

• Atlassian’s dual-class structure gives each Class B share ten votes and each Class A share one vote, and Class B holders collectively held approximately 85% of voting power as of 30 June 2025 ⁸.

• Entities affiliated with co-founders Michael Cannon-Brookes and Scott Farquhar held substantially all Class B shares as of that filing ⁸.

• Michael Cannon-Brookes was CEO and a director as of the FY2025 filing, while Scott Farquhar remained a director after stepping down as co-CEO effective 31 August 2024 ⁸.

• The 2025 proxy identifies Shona L. Brown as independent Board Chair and lists Anu Bharadwaj, Joseph Binz, Rajeev Rajan and Brian Duffy among executive officers ¹⁰.

• A February 2025 Schedule 13G/A identifies Michael Cannon-Brookes as the filing person in relation to Atlassian beneficial ownership ¹¹.

• No public evidence identified in the supplied research of a verified personal investment by Michael Cannon-Brookes or Scott Farquhar in an Israeli surveillance, cyber, AI, SIGINT, defence or settlement-linked technology company ^{8, 11}.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

• The supplied deterministic full-text pre-scan found no Atlassian mention in the specified local copies of OHCHR settlement-database updates, A/HRC/59/23 and listed NGO reports, which is document-scoped rather than evidence of database-wide or sector-wide absence ^{6, 8}.

• No public evidence identified of an organised boycott, divestment or sanctions campaign specifically grounded in Atlassian technology provision to Israel or occupied territories ^{1, 2, 6}.

• No public evidence identified of a related regulatory, export-control, sanctions or legal action in the supplied research ^{1, 2, 6}.

• The reviewed materials did not establish reservist-pay policies, Israeli charitable-match recipients or Israel/Palestine-related content-moderation practices for Atlassian ^{1, 2, 8}.