INDEX / DIRECTORY / SENTINELONE

SentinelOne

Cybersecurity & VPN 61 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-29 METHOD V6.5
BDS-1000 Score 651 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 0.00 Digital ↗ 0.00 Economic ↗ 7.50 Political ↗ 4.71
OWNERSHIP TREE 12 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Economic: SentinelOne maintains Israeli R&D and operating subsidiaries, reported $10.681 million in Israeli long-lived assets at 31 January 2026, and disclosed substantial Israeli Tax Authority-related expense and payment obligations.1, 2, 3
  • Political: SentinelOne’s FY2026 filing presents its Tel Aviv team’s access to Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence expertise as an operating advantage.1 Principal-linked foundation grants were also identified, but the reviewed record does not establish SentinelOne corporate expenditure or Weingarten’s direction of those grants.4, 5
  • Digital: SentinelOne has Israeli subsidiaries, Israeli R&D personnel, and disclosed Israeli-affiliate and Tel Aviv account-management subprocessors; customer-specific Israeli data exposure remains unresolved.1, 2, 6, 7
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of a SentinelOne contract with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israeli intelligence, police, settlement end users, or Project Nimbus.8, 9

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameSentinelOne, Inc.
JurisdictionDelaware, United States.1
HeadquartersMountain View, California, United States.1
SectorAI-powered enterprise cybersecurity software and services, including endpoint, cloud-workload and identity security.1, 10
OwnershipPublic reporting parent with a dual-class voting structure. As of 30 April 2026, Tomer Weingarten held 29.18% total voting power through beneficial ownership; the proxy reported 29.99% when shares subject to an irrevocable proxy were included.11
Key Executives / GovernanceTomer Weingarten, co-founder, President, Chief Executive Officer and Chair; Almog Cohen is identified in the proxy-related voting-proxy disclosure.11, 12
Israeli-Nexus SummaryU.S.-incorporated cybersecurity company with continuing Israeli R&D, wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries, Israeli tax/IP arrangements, acquisitions and venture investments, but no verified Israeli military, intelligence, settlement, or occupied-territory customer relationship.1, 2, 3, 8, 9

Executive Summary

SentinelOne is a U.S.-incorporated cybersecurity company whose consolidated group includes Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. and Prompt Security Ltd., both listed as wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries. Its FY2026 reporting identifies Tel Aviv as an operating location, states that R&D employees are primarily located in Israel, India, the Czech Republic and remotely, and reports that approximately 11% of personnel were in Israel at 31 January 2026.1, 2 Israeli business reporting describes SentinelOne as Israeli-founded by Tomer Weingarten and Almog Cohen, while SEC filings establish that the legal parent is incorporated in Delaware.1, 13

The strongest documented nexus is economic. SentinelOne reported $10.681 million in long-lived assets in Israel at 31 January 2026, maintained Israeli employment and R&D operations, acquired Israeli security businesses, and made Israeli startup investments through S Ventures.1, 14, 15 Its January 2026 Israeli Tax Authority agreement addressed transfer pricing, intercompany transactions and the valuation and taxation of Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. intellectual property; subsequent filings disclosed significant related tax expense, installment obligations and shekel exposure.3, 16

The scored political frame is SentinelOne’s own investor-facing description of its Israeli military/intelligence talent nexus. Its FY2026 filing says the Tel Aviv operation benefits from Israel’s concentration of cybersecurity expertise and draws from Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence experts, presenting that heritage as a corporate operating advantage.1 Separately, SentinelOne’s CEO and Chair, Tomer Weingarten, was connected to the Weingarten Foundation through board governance records. FY2024 grant data records grants of $15,000 to Friends of Bshvil Hamachar and $5,000 to the Israeli-American Council.4, 5 Those grants remain contextual rather than score-driving because the reviewed record does not establish that they were SentinelOne corporate expenditures, that Weingarten personally directed them, or that the Israeli-American Council grant was transferred to its separate advocacy affiliate, IAC for Action.4, 5, 17

The audits did not verify a direct SentinelOne supply relationship with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, Israeli police, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, a defense prime, a settlement end user, or Project Nimbus.8, 9 SentinelOne’s products are dual-use cybersecurity products, and it markets to U.S. defense and national-security customers, but the reviewed materials do not identify an Israeli military end user or a purpose-built targeting, fire-control, weapons-guidance, offensive-cyber or lethal-autonomy product.8, 18 No public evidence identified for a SentinelOne office or facility in the West Bank, East Jerusalem settlements, or occupied Golan Heights.9

Under the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment supplied for this dossier, SentinelOne receives a BRS of 651 and Tier B, “Severe Complicity.” The score is driven primarily by the documented depth and continuity of Israeli operating, tax, IP, acquisition and venture-investment ties, with an additional political score for SentinelOne’s direct investor-facing use of Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence heritage as an operating advantage. The principal-linked foundation grants were not used as a governing scored act because corporate or controlling-principal direction was not established. The military and digital domain scores remain zero because the audits did not verify the required Israeli state, military, intelligence, settlement or surveillance end-user nexus.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
January 2013SentinelOne, Inc. was incorporated in Delaware.1
21 September 2022SentinelOne launched S Ventures, a $100 million fund for security and data companies; public reporting identified Israeli startups Torq and Laminar among the initial portfolio.15, 19
7–24 October 2023CEO Tomer Weingarten told CRN that the Israeli team was preparing for war and that employees were being drafted; SentinelLabs then published cyber-threat research concerning the Israel-Hamas war.20, 21
1 February 2024SentinelOne acquired 100% of Stride Security Ltd., an Israeli security-automation company, for a stated $7.5 million purchase price.14
5 September 2025SentinelOne completed its acquisition of Prompt Security; later reporting listed Prompt Security Ltd. as a wholly owned Israeli subsidiary.2, 22
8 January 2026SentinelOne entered an agreement with the Israeli Tax Authority concerning transfer pricing, intercompany transactions, and Israeli-subsidiary IP for fiscal years 2021–2025.3
31 January 2026SentinelOne reported $10.681 million in Israeli long-lived assets and approximately 11% of worldwide personnel in Israel.1
31 July 2026SentinelOne reported $186.3 million of cumulative Israeli Tax Authority-related expense including interest, and a $30.7 million installment paid during the first half of fiscal 2027.16

Corporate Overview

SentinelOne, Inc. is the U.S. public reporting parent of a consolidated cybersecurity group. Its products are described as an AI-powered security platform spanning enterprise endpoints, cloud workloads, identities and related security data.1, 10 The group primarily earns subscription revenue and fulfills substantially all sales through distributors, resellers and managed-security-service providers.1

The current subsidiary exhibit identifies Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. and Prompt Security Ltd. as wholly owned Israeli group companies.2 Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. is the enduring Israeli operating entity; Prompt Security Ltd. entered the group following SentinelOne’s 2025 acquisition of Prompt Security.2, 22 Stride Security Ltd. was separately listed as an Israeli wholly owned subsidiary following its 2024 acquisition, but does not appear separately in the FY2026 subsidiary exhibit; the reviewed primary sources do not specify the reorganization by which it ceased being separately listed.2, 14

The Israeli presence is principally an R&D, technical-talent, IP and corporate-services nexus. SentinelOne reports a Tel Aviv office and states that the location draws from Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence expertise, product specialists and other technical talent.1 This establishes a workforce and talent-pipeline link, not a verified Israeli government customer, state ownership relationship, or military procurement contract.1, 8

No public evidence identified of a SentinelOne franchise arrangement, settlement distributor, settlement operating facility, or direct service contract with a settlement customer.9

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

SentinelOne markets cybersecurity capabilities to U.S. federal, defense and national-security customers, including on-premises, disconnected and air-gapped deployment models. It also publicly identifies U.S. government, military and intelligence-community customers and partners.18, 23 These sources establish a defense-sector business in the United States, not an Israeli military relationship.

The company’s Israeli operation has a documented military-cyber talent nexus. SentinelOne’s FY2026 filing says its Tel Aviv team draws from Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence expertise; a former R&D leader was described as having served in an elite IDF cyber-security unit.1, 24 These are employment and biography facts, not evidence of supply to the IDF or an Israeli defense prime.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources for a SentinelOne contract, tender award or memorandum with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, Mossad, Shin Bet, or an Israeli defense prime.8 No public evidence identified for a military-specific tactical variant, export licence, end-user certificate, weapons-system integration, military logistics service, or construction or maintenance work connected to bases, checkpoints, detention sites, settlements or the separation barrier.8

SentinelOne’s documented products are dual-use cybersecurity tools, not products described in the cited material as targeting, fire-control, weapons-guidance, munitions, radar, or other lethal systems.10, 18 Reviews of UN and civil-society settlement-business materials did not identify SentinelOne as an Israeli military supplier; those bounded checks do not establish universal absence from public or classified procurement records.25, 26

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipLimit
U.S. defense and national-security usersSentinelOne markets federal and DoD-oriented cybersecurity deployments.18, 23No Israeli military end user is identified.
Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd.Wholly owned Israeli subsidiary and Israeli R&D/talent nexus.1, 2Subsidiary status does not establish IDF supply.
David GinatFormer R&D leader with reported elite IDF cyber-unit background.24Personnel biography, not procurement evidence.
Israeli military/security bodiesNo public evidence identified for a direct contract in reviewed sources.8Negative finding is limited to the reviewed record.

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

SentinelOne has a documented Israeli digital and IP footprint. Its FY2026 reporting identifies Israeli R&D personnel and wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries, while the January 2026 Israeli Tax Authority agreement addresses intergroup use of Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. intellectual property.1, 2, 3 Its subprocessor disclosure lists Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. as an affiliate subprocessor and Monday.com Ltd. in Tel Aviv for account management, with Israel listed as the processing country for that service.6

The disclosures do not show that every SentinelOne customer, product, telemetry category or volume is processed in Israel. The categories and volumes handled by Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. are not disclosed; a customer-specific Israeli-jurisdiction data path therefore remains unresolved.6, 7 Product data handling also varies: one product says scanning occurs locally without data leaving the customer cloud environment, while another permits executable samples to be uploaded for forensic analysis.27, 28

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of a SentinelOne-operated Israeli sovereign-cloud region, Project Nimbus participation, a named Israeli-state cloud or resilience contract, or a direct Israeli military, intelligence, police or settlement deployment.9 No public evidence identified that SentinelOne provides facial recognition, biometric identification, predictive policing, social-media monitoring, offensive exploit tooling, zero-day weaponization, autonomous target generation, fire-control, or lethal decision-support systems to Israeli state actors.9

SentinelOne’s documented AI and Prompt Security functions concern enterprise cybersecurity, generative-AI governance, prompt inspection, policy enforcement and sensitive-data-loss prevention.10, 22 The cited sources do not describe those functions as purpose-built kinetic targeting systems.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipLimit
Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd.Wholly owned subsidiary, Israeli R&D entity and disclosed affiliate subprocessor.1, 2, 6Specific customer-data categories and volumes are unresolved.
Monday.com Ltd.Listed Tel Aviv account-management subprocessor with Israel as processing country.6Does not establish processing of all customer telemetry.
Prompt Security Ltd.Wholly owned Israeli subsidiary after 2025 acquisition; provides enterprise GenAI/agent-security capabilities.2, 22No verified Israeli-state or military user.
Emek Yezreel Academic CollegeTender for SentinelOne endpoint and server protection.29Civilian academic procurement, not security-state procurement.

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

SentinelOne’s documented Israeli operating investment is substantial and current. At 31 January 2026 it reported $10.681 million of long-lived assets in Israel, maintained a Tel Aviv office, and reported approximately 11% of global personnel in Israel.1 It also reported Israeli employee severance expense in fiscal years 2024–2026 and continuing operational measures during armed conflict.1

The company has acquired and integrated Israeli operating businesses. It acquired Stride Security Ltd. in 2024 and Prompt Security in 2025; Prompt Security Ltd. is now listed as a wholly owned Israeli subsidiary.2, 14, 22 Through S Ventures, SentinelOne also established direct venture-investment relationships with Israeli cybersecurity startups including Torq, Laminar and Guardz, although the reviewed record does not disclose ownership percentages or cash amounts for those individual investments.15, 19

The clearest documented economic flow is the Israeli tax and IP arrangement. SentinelOne’s January 2026 agreement with the Israeli Tax Authority covered transfer pricing, intercompany transactions and the valuation and taxation of Israeli-subsidiary IP for fiscal years 2021–2025.3 The company subsequently disclosed $186.3 million of cumulative related expense including interest, installment obligations through fiscal 2031, and foreign-exchange hedging connected to the shekel-denominated liability.16

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The company does not separately disclose Israel-only revenue or operating profit, and no single country other than the United States represented 10% or more of reported revenue during the cited fiscal periods.1 The disclosures therefore do not establish a simple Israeli profit-repatriation ratio or Israel-specific revenue total.

No public evidence identified for settlement-specific revenue, Israeli sovereign-debt underwriting, Israel Bonds, settlement-enterprise lending, insurance underwriting, agricultural sourcing, imported physical goods from Israel or occupied territory, or settlement-origin labeling issues.1, 25, 26 No public evidence identified for a SentinelOne office, subsidiary, warehouse or operating facility in a West Bank settlement, East Jerusalem settlement or the occupied Golan Heights.9

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipLimit
Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd.Wholly owned Israeli subsidiary; subject of intercompany tax/IP arrangement.2, 3No evidence of settlement operation or state ownership.
Prompt Security Ltd.Wholly owned Israeli subsidiary following acquisition.2, 22Acquisition does not establish Israeli-state use.
Stride Security Ltd.Israeli company acquired in 2024 for stated $7.5 million purchase price.14No longer separately listed in FY2026 exhibit; reorganization not explained in reviewed records.
Israeli Tax AuthorityAgreement on transfer pricing and IP valuation; related tax expense and installment obligations disclosed.3, 16Not an Israel/Palestine-policy, sanctions or human-rights enforcement action.
S Ventures portfolio companiesTorq, Laminar and Guardz identified as Israeli startup investments.15, 19No disclosed stake size; no evidence they acted for SentinelOne on behalf of Israeli state bodies.

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The governing political frame is SentinelOne’s own investor-facing description of its military/intelligence talent nexus. Its FY2026 filing says the Tel Aviv operation benefits from Israel’s concentration of cybersecurity expertise and draws from Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence experts, product specialists and other technical talent.1 Under the fixed V6.5 rubric this was treated as direct corporate use of Israeli military/intelligence heritage as an operating asset; the magnitude was discounted because the documented framing is confined to investor-facing disclosure rather than a broad advocacy or marketing campaign.

Principal-linked philanthropy was researched separately but was not used as the governing scored act. The Weingarten Foundation’s governance records tie Tomer Weingarten to the foundation as of 2023, and FY2024 grant data records a $15,000 grant to Friends of Bshvil Hamachar and a $5,000 grant to the Israeli-American Council.4, 5 Friends of Bshvil Hamachar states that it supports trauma, recovery and resilience programmes for Israeli army combat reservists and expanded services after 7 October 2023.30

SentinelOne itself has documented U.S. cybersecurity-policy advocacy. Its Q4 2023 federal lobbying filing reported $60,000 in lobbying income for cybersecurity, AI, federal civilian-agency endpoint detection and response, and Department of Homeland Security appropriations; the filing did not list Israel, Palestine, settlements, boycotts or Middle East policy.31 Company personnel also participated in U.S. cybersecurity-policy advocacy and congressional testimony.32, 33

Following 7 October 2023, Weingarten commented on employee mobilization and expected operational continuity, while SentinelLabs published cyber-threat research related to the Israel-Hamas war.20, 21 The reviewed materials frame this activity as cybersecurity analysis and business continuity.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The available record does not establish that the foundation grants were SentinelOne corporate expenditures, that Weingarten personally directed the FY2024 grants, or that either grant occurred before or after particular July or November 2024 reference dates.4, 5 The reviewed material does not state that the Friends of Bshvil Hamachar grant purchased weapons, combat equipment or operational military services.5, 30

The Israeli-American Council identifies itself as a community organisation focused on Israeli-American identity and U.S.-Israel relations. IAC for Action is a separate sister organisation that describes advocacy and legislative activity, but the reviewed grant record names the Israeli-American Council, not IAC for Action; no evidence identified traces the $5,000 grant to lobbying or the sister organisation.5, 17

No public evidence identified of an official SentinelOne statement endorsing settlement policy, opposing a ceasefire, opposing the ICJ or ICC, advocating territorial outcomes, sponsoring settlement events, participating in a “Brand Israel” campaign, disciplining employees for pro-Palestinian speech, or conducting Israel-specific lobbying.9, 31 No public evidence identified of Israeli state ownership, a government-appointed director, a golden share, or a state-governance mechanism.1, 11

Named Entities and Evidence Map

EntityDocumented relationshipLimit
SentinelOne, Inc.FY2026 investor disclosure presents access to Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence expertise as an advantage of the Tel Aviv operation.1No verified Israeli state or military customer relationship follows from that talent-pipeline statement.
Tomer WeingartenCo-founder, President, CEO and Chair; substantial voting influence.11, 12No evidence identified of a settlement-organisation board role or public endorsement of settlement expansion.
Weingarten FoundationGovernance connection to Weingarten; FY2024 grants recorded.4, 5Not established as a SentinelOne corporate vehicle or expenditure.
Friends of Bshvil HamacharRecipient of reported $15,000 foundation grant; supports Israeli combat reservist recovery/resilience programmes.5, 30No evidence grant funded weapons or operational services.
Israeli-American CouncilRecipient of reported $5,000 foundation grant.5No evidence grant reached IAC for Action or lobbying activity.
Hill East GroupReported Q4 2023 federal lobbying income for SentinelOne.31Reported issues were cybersecurity policy, not Israel/Palestine policy.

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military0.000.000.000.00
Digital0.000.000.000.00
Economic7.507.009.007.50
Political6.605.009.004.71

V_MAX is driven by the documented Israeli economic footprint: subsidiaries, R&D and employment, acquisitions, venture investments, intercompany IP use, and substantial Israeli Tax Authority-related expense and obligations.1, 2, 3, 16 The political score reflects SentinelOne’s direct investor-facing use of Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence heritage as an operating advantage.1 Principal-linked foundation grants were reviewed but excluded as a governing scored act because the record does not establish SentinelOne corporate expenditure or Weingarten’s direction of the FY2024 grants.4, 5 The V6.5 method is scale-free, evidence-only and human-vetted; zero military and digital scores reflect the absence of verified qualifying Israeli military, intelligence, settlement or surveillance end-user relationships in the audited record.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370826000020/s-20260131.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28 ↩29 ↩30

  2. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370826000020/exhibit211_fy2026.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  3. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370826000003/s-20260108.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000110465924012922/tm245421d1_sc13ga.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  5. https://www.grantcue.com/foundations/weingarten-foundation-881278920 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  6. https://www.sentinelone.com/legal/sentinelone-sub-processors/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  7. https://www.sentinelone.com/legal/data-protection-addendum/ ↩ ↩2

  8. https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/federal-government-dod/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=A%2FHRC%2F60%2F19&t=pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  10. https://www.sentinelone.com/company/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370826000031/s-20260513.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  12. https://investors.sentinelone.com/governance/board-of-directors/person-details/default.aspx?ItemId=d0f08ac5-3448-4579-a7f6-ae0340ab1991 ↩ ↩2

  13. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-3895928%2C00.html ↩

  14. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370824000016/s-20240131.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  15. https://www.sentinelone.com/press/sentinelone-launches-s-ventures-fund/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  16. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000158370826000055/s-20260731.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  17. https://iac360.org/about-the-iac/ ↩ ↩2

  18. https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/federal-government/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  19. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/rkknkhfwi ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  20. https://www.crn.com/news/security/sentinelone-ceo-disruption-to-israeli-operations-should-be-minimal ↩ ↩2

  21. https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/the-israel-hamas-war-cyber-domain-state-sponsored-activity-of-interest/ ↩ ↩2

  22. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1583708/000110465925088079/tm2525181d1_8k.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  23. https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/an-official-statement-in-response-to-the-april-9-2025-executive-order/ ↩ ↩2

  24. https://www.sentinelone.com/press/sentinelone-david-ginat-new-r-d-leader/ ↩ ↩2

  25. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/2024_DBIO-IV-report.pdf ↩ ↩2

  26. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=A%2FHRC%2F59%2F23&t=pdf ↩ ↩2

  27. https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/singularity-cloud-data-security/ ↩

  28. https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/singularity-binary-vault/ ↩

  29. https://www.yvc.ac.il/tender/sentinelone-%D7%90%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%98%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%96%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%A4%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%AA/ ↩

  30. https://www.bshvil.org/en/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  31. https://lda.senate.gov/filings/public/filing/7bcd990b-45e7-4eb7-91b8-a1486d503db1/print/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/dems/what-they-are-saying-technology-stakeholders-urge-passage-of-peters-rounds-bipartisan-bill-to-restore-critical-cybersecurity-protections/ ↩

  33. https://homeland.house.gov/2025/01/23/preparation-of-the-battlefield-cybersecurity-experts-testify-on-global-threats-to-the-homeland/ ↩