SentinelOne MILITARY

Target: SentinelOne, Inc. and operationally integrated subsidiaries where relevant. Research date: 29 September 2026. Scope note: This audit distinguishes documented cybersecurity work for U.S. defense/national-security customers and Israeli military-cyber personnel backgrounds from the narrower question of supply to Israeli military, security, prison, border-police, defense-prime or settlement-security end users. Personnel biographies and Israeli R&D presence are not treated as customer evidence.

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

• SentinelOne openly markets its Singularity platform to the U.S. Department of Defense and defense industrial base, including on-premise, disconnected and air-gapped environments; its broader federal page separately addresses defense and national-security agencies.^{1, 2} SentinelOne also states that it works with U.S. government, military and intelligence-community customers and partners.³ These sources establish a defense-sector business, but they do not identify an Israeli military end user.^{1, 2, 3}
• SentinelOne’s July 2024 CISA announcement documents a U.S. federal cybersecurity role under CISA’s Persistent Access Capability initiative.⁴ FedRAMP High authorizations announced in 2024 and 2025 and a 2026 GovRAMP High authorization further establish current public-sector cybersecurity capability.^{5, 6, 7} None of those records concerns the Israeli Ministry of Defense or IDF.^{4, 5, 6, 7}
• In Israel, a public Yezreel Valley College tender concerned supply, implementation and maintenance of SentinelOne protection solutions for a civilian academic institution.⁸ no public evidence identified in the reviewed sources for a SentinelOne contract, tender award or memorandum with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service or Israel Border Police.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

• SentinelOne describes its core business as AI-powered cybersecurity across endpoints, cloud, identities and data.^{9, 10} Its DoD marketing describes endpoint defense, threat detection, response, monitoring and investigation in military environments, including air-gapped deployment.² These are dual-use cybersecurity functions; the reviewed product descriptions do not describe a purpose-built targeting, fire-control, weapons-guidance or kill-chain system.^{10, 2}
• SentinelOne’s March 2026 on-premise announcement says its security products can process data entirely within a customer’s own environment and operate with zero cloud dependency.¹¹ This may make the technology suitable for sensitive or sovereign environments, but the source does not identify an Israeli military customer.¹¹
• Prompt Security, acquired in 2025 and now a wholly owned Israeli subsidiary, is described as securing enterprise use of generative and agentic AI rather than generating kinetic targeting or weapons effects.^{12, 13, 14} no public evidence identified for a military-specific SentinelOne tactical variant supplied to Israeli forces.
• No public evidence identified for an export licence, end-user certificate or export-control decision specifically concerning SentinelOne supply to an Israeli military/security end user.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

• SentinelOne’s current filings and company materials describe a cybersecurity software business and list Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. and Prompt Security Ltd. as Israeli subsidiaries.^{9, 12, 10} The reviewed records do not describe SentinelOne as a manufacturer of heavy machinery, vehicles or construction equipment.^{9, 10}
• No public evidence identified for SentinelOne equipment or services used to construct, maintain or demolish settlements, checkpoints, the separation barrier, detention facilities or Israeli military bases.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources for SentinelOne supplying components, subsystems or purpose-built military services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems or another Israeli defense prime.
• SentinelOne’s Israel operation does have a documented military-cyber talent nexus. Its FY2026 10-K says the Tel Aviv team draws from a deep pool of Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence experts.⁹ A 2019 report described SentinelOne recruiting near Unit 8200 facilities and an objection from the unit’s commander; that episode concerned recruitment of soldiers/talent, not a procurement contract.¹⁵
• SentinelOne’s former R&D leader David Ginat was described by the company as having served six years in an elite IDF cyber-security unit.¹⁶ This is a personnel biography and does not establish defense-prime or IDF supply.¹⁶

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

• No public evidence identified for SentinelOne providing catering, transport, fuel, facilities maintenance, freight, port handling or other physical sustainment services to Israeli military installations.
• The company’s documented offerings are cybersecurity software and associated security services.^{10, 1, 2} The reviewed sources did not identify a SentinelOne logistical-support contract for an Israeli base, detention site, checkpoint or settlement-security installation.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

• No public evidence identified for SentinelOne manufacturing or supplying munitions, weapons, warhead components, propulsion, guidance, radar, fire-control or other lethal/strategic subsystems for Israeli forces.
• SentinelOne’s acquired businesses in the reviewed record are cybersecurity or security-data businesses: Scalyr was acquired for data analytics/XDR, Attivo for identity security, PingSafe for cloud-native application protection, Observo AI for AI-native data/security operations, and Prompt Security for GenAI/agent security.^{13, 17, 18, 19, 20} None of these acquisition descriptions identifies a purpose-built kinetic targeting or weapons-integration function.^{13, 17, 18, 19, 20}

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources for a government decision to grant, deny, suspend or revoke an arms/export licence for SentinelOne products to Israeli military/security end users.
• No public evidence identified for an arms-embargo, sanctions-enforcement or judicial proceeding concerning SentinelOne military supply to Israel.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

• UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/59/23 was reviewed as a current authoritative source on corporate involvement connected to the occupation and Gaza war; SentinelOne was not identified in the reviewed report as an Israeli military supplier.²¹ The related A/HRC/60/19 report was also checked for current settlement-business context.²²
• The 2024 Don’t Buy Into Occupation report was reviewed as a civil-society reference set for business links to settlements; no SentinelOne military-supply finding was identified in the reviewed report.²³ These are bounded source checks and do not prove universal absence from all public or classified procurement records.
• No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources for an organized boycott/divestment campaign specifically alleging that SentinelOne physically supplies Israeli weapons systems, military logistics or settlement-security infrastructure.

Israeli Subsidiaries, Principals & Constructive-Notice Context

• SentinelOne’s FY2026 10-K identifies a Tel Aviv office and states that the team draws from Israeli military cybersecurity and intelligence expertise; its subsidiary exhibit lists Sentinel Labs Israel Ltd. and Prompt Security Ltd. as wholly owned Israeli subsidiaries.^{9, 12} This establishes a substantial Israeli cyber/R&D nexus, not an Israeli military customer.^{9, 12}
• SentinelOne’s Israeli footprint continued after 19 July 2024 and November 2024: the FY2026 filing and 2025 Prompt Security acquisition show ongoing Israeli operations and expansion.^{9, 12, 13, 14} Because no qualifying Israeli military-supply relationship was verified, this continuity is not treated as constructive notice of a military-supply act.
• No public evidence identified for SentinelOne military-adjacent activity in West Bank, East Jerusalem or Golan settlements, or for a settlement-linked distributor, base, checkpoint or detention-facility contract.