INDEX / DIRECTORY / CLOUDFLARE / ECONOMIC

Cloudflare ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-08
Economic Score 5.70 /10 C Cloudflare - BDS-1000 526
Economic 5.70

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Supply Chain & Sourcing Relationships

Cloudflare provides internet-infrastructure and cybersecurity services rather than sourcing or distributing physical goods.1 no public evidence identified of a relationship between Cloudflare and agricultural aggregators or exporters including Mehadrin, Hadiklaim, Galilee Export, or Agrexco successors, or of Cloudflare acting as an importer of record for goods.1, 2 no public evidence identified of seasonal, third-party, reseller, franchise, or indirect sourcing arrangements connecting Cloudflare to Israeli or settlement-based supply chains.1, 2

Product Origin, Labeling & Regulatory Compliance

Cloudflare does not manufacture or sell physical goods; conventional country-of-origin labeling and customs or settlement-origin goods findings therefore do not apply.1 no public evidence identified of a Cloudflare policy on goods-origin or settlement-origin labeling.1

As of the September 2025 OHCHR database update, no public evidence identified of Cloudflare, its parent, subsidiaries, or named controlling principals appearing in the UN Human Rights Office database of businesses involved in Israeli settlements.3 Document-scoped searches of the reviewed OHCHR, UN Special Rapporteur, DBIO, PAX, Who Profits, HRW, Amnesty, Al-Haq, KLP, BDS, and insurance reports likewise produced no Cloudflare mention; this does not establish absence from every external database or report edition.3, 2

A service-level compliance-adjacent issue remains documented. DAWN reported in September 2024 that Cloudflare nameservers provided DNS service to four websites associated with Benzion Gopstein, Lehava, Jewish Power, or Meir Kahane-related material, including the Jewish Power site, Lehava site, and two Kahane-related sites.4 DAWN submitted its evidence to the U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments on 3 September 2024 and requested domain seizure under Executive Order 14115.4 Its report described the nexus as one concerning sanctions and DNS jurisdiction, rather than alleging that the sites themselves were settlement-located commercial infrastructure.4

The U.S. Treasury announced on 24 January 2025 that Executive Order 14115 had been revoked and all designations under that order removed; the 2024 sanctions status is therefore historical and does not itself establish a current U.S. prohibition.5 A DNS query recorded on 8 September 2026 returned Cloudflare nameservers for rabbikahane.co.il, while the other three domains used different nameservers.6 That result is evidence of DNS delegation only, not proof of current site ownership, CDN or proxy service, payment, endorsement, or a settlement-geographic operation.6 no public evidence identified of further Cloudflare reseller, franchisee, authorized-partner, settlement-service-contract, or settlement-infrastructure activity in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights.3, 2

Investment, Capital & Financial Exposure

Cloudflare brought a Tel Aviv point of presence online on 15 March 2018 as part of its edge network, then described as its 135th data center.7 Cloudflare’s current network materials listed Tel Aviv and Haifa among its Middle East locations on 8 September 2026, and its public status page listed Tel Aviv (TLV) as operational.8, 9 Cloudflare reported deployments in Tel Aviv and Haifa with one unnamed large Israeli ISP in January and March 2022, serving practically all requests from that ISP’s subscribers locally; this does not quantify all Israeli users or traffic.10 The record does not disclose the locations’ investment value, colocation provider, hardware ownership, staffing, facility addresses, dedicated-real-estate ownership, or capital expenditure.7, 8, 9, 10

Cloudflare acquired all outstanding shares of Zaraz Inc., a Delaware corporation, under a merger agreement dated 5 October 2021 that closed on 15 October 2021.11, 12 Its purchase-accounting disclosure records $7.2 million in total consideration: $5.6 million in cash net of $0.8 million acquired cash and $1.6 million in Cloudflare Class A common stock, including a $1.1 million cash payment to cancel and settle Zaraz equity-related arrangements.13 The FY2021 filing presents merger consideration as $6.4 million cash plus 47,940 Class A shares, with a substantial majority of the share consideration subject to post-closing service-based vesting.11 These are different securities-law and purchase-accounting presentations, rather than conflicting transaction values.11, 13 Cloudflare separately disclosed $6.5 million in acquisition-related stock-based and cash compensation arrangements, with remaining expense then scheduled through 2024.13

A secondary Israeli startup-registry profile listed Zaraz at 71 Mazeh Street, Tel Aviv-Yafo, with Israeli registrar number 516069085 and a 1–10 employee range.14 This is not an Israeli Corporations Authority extract and does not independently verify a headquarters, office lease, workforce composition, R&D expenditure, or operating status.14 Contemporaneous Geektime reporting similarly characterized Zaraz as an Israeli startup; this is secondary corroboration only, while Cloudflare’s filing establishes that the acquired parent was Delaware-incorporated.15, 11

Cloudflare, Inc. remains a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its principal executive office in San Francisco, and it consolidates its wholly owned subsidiaries.16, 17 no public evidence identified of Cloudflare underwriting Israeli sovereign debt, Israel Bonds, or appearing among the bank underwriters identified in BankTrack’s research on Israeli war-bond issuance.18 no public evidence identified of Israeli-domiciled securities, Israeli sovereign bonds, Israel-focused fund positions, Israeli investment amounts, Israel-specific capital expenditure, or Israeli revenue disclosed on Cloudflare’s balance sheet or in the reviewed filings.1, 17

The reported 2024 expansion concerned a Dubai Internet City office in the UAE, not an Israel R&D-center expansion; Cloudflare described it as building on a regional commitment dating to early 2015.19, 20 No authoritative source reviewed corroborates a claimed Matthew Prince–Benjamin Netanyahu meeting leading to an Israel-based R&D-center expansion.19, 20, 17

Operational Presence & Market Activity

The confirmed Israeli record consists of two distinct mechanisms: the 2021 acquisition of Delaware-incorporated Zaraz Inc., whose group included an Israeli subsidiary, and network locations in Tel Aviv and Haifa.11, 21, 8, 9, 10 A Cloudflare SEC application dated 3 March 2023 identifies Sweeps Ltd. as a private company organized under Israeli law and states that it was, and remained, a subsidiary of Zaraz Inc.21 The filing describes Sweeps Ltd. as holding de minimis assets and conducting no operations, within a group of acquisition-related holding entities with no ongoing operations.21

Cloudflare’s 8 December 2021 acquisition announcement stated that the Zaraz team would join Cloudflare’s Portugal office and continue leading Zaraz product development there.22 This establishes a Portugal-based integration plan at announcement, but not the location of every former Zaraz employee.22 It also materially qualifies any inference that acquiring Zaraz established an ongoing Israel-based R&D center.21, 22

Zaraz remains an active, integrated Cloudflare product. Its official changelog records releases through 11 February 2025 and an update on 16 April 2026; current official documentation, updated 14 August 2026, states that Zaraz is available on all plans.23, 24 Cloudflare’s public status page listed Zaraz as operational on 8 September 2026.8 These sources confirm continuing product availability, but do not identify the developers’ location or demonstrate ongoing Israeli development work.23, 8, 24 no public evidence identified of a Zaraz shutdown, divestment, dissolution, further relocation announcement beyond the December 2021 Portugal plan, continued Israel-based development team, or an announcement that former personnel were retained in Israel.21, 23, 24, 22

No public evidence identified in the reviewed corporate materials of a Cloudflare-branded Israel office, sales office, support center, warehouse, current Israel-based Zaraz workforce, Israeli R&D center, Israeli tax registration, Preferred Technology Enterprise status, Israeli IP operation, Israel-specific payroll, or Israel-specific headcount.1, 21, 17 no public evidence identified of Sweeps Ltd.’s dissolution, sale, formal divestment, present corporate-registration status, directors, shareholders, registered address, annual filings, or current activity beyond the 2023 disclosure that it conducted no operations.21

Cloudflare’s Form 10-K does not report Israel as a distinct market segment beyond general geopolitical-risk disclosures.1, 17 Its public commentary has framed service provision in security-neutral terms: Matthew Prince said in 2014 that providing security services to Israeli and Hamas-linked customers was not material support for either side, and Michelle Zatlyn stated in 2024 that Cloudflare would provide cybersecurity assistance to both Palestinian and Israeli sites that needed it.25, 26 Cloudflare has also published analyses of cyberattacks and traffic patterns during the Israel-Hamas war, including attacks affecting Israeli and Palestinian infrastructure, Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel, and Gaza connectivity disruption.27, 28, 29, 30

Corporate Structure & Foundational Ties

Cloudflare was founded in 2009 in San Francisco by Matthew Prince, Michelle Zatlyn, and Lee Holloway, and is not itself an acquired Israeli-origin entity.16, 17 Its current parent is Delaware-incorporated, with a San Francisco principal executive office.16, 17 The reviewed filings identify no Israeli controlling parent, Israeli beneficial owner, Israeli state ownership, Israeli principal place of management, government board appointee, golden share, founder-share provision, or charter provision tying governance to the Israeli state.16, 17, 31

As of 30 April 2026, Cloudflare’s board comprised Matthew Prince, Michelle Zatlyn, Stacey Cunningham, John Graham-Cumming, Mark Hawkins, Karim Lakhani, Carl Ledbetter, Scott Sandell, and Katrin Suder.31 The 2026 proxy reported Prince with 39.0% total voting power and Zatlyn with 13.4%, substantially through Class B holdings; it identified institutional holders including Capital World Investors, Baillie Gifford, Morgan Stanley, and BlackRock, without identifying Israeli beneficial control.31 The bounded review did not locate a named Prince- or Zatlyn-linked private foundation or attributable grant schedule; this leaves principal-linked personal investments, foundation grants, political contributions, and Israel/Palestine advocacy unresolved rather than establishing their absence.31

Cloudflare’s disclosed acquisitions include Area 1 Security, Vectrix Security, and Zaraz; the reviewed materials do not establish an additional acquisition of an Israeli-domiciled operating company beyond the Zaraz group’s Israeli subsidiary, Sweeps Ltd.32, 33, 11, 21 no public evidence identified of an Israeli state ownership stake, critical-national-infrastructure designation, or other Israeli acquisition, controlling investment, or operating-company ownership attributable to Cloudflare or its controlling principals.21, 17, 31

Documented customer relationships are distinct from equity or governance ties. A 2014 report stated that the Israel Defense Forces used Cloudflare services to protect government web assets during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 and that Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal website used Cloudflare protection at the time of reporting.25 no public evidence identified of a post-2024 continuation of those specific relationships, Israeli defense contracts arising from Zaraz, or settlement-specific Cloudflare contracts.25, 21, 17

Profit Repatriation & Economic Contribution

No public evidence identified of Cloudflare disclosing Israel-specific revenue, operating expenditure, tax contribution, profit flows, purchase consideration allocated to Israel, or Israeli workforce figures.1, 13, 17 The reviewed record does not quantify revenue or profits attributable to the Tel Aviv point of presence, which is documented as a network node rather than a disclosed separate revenue-generating subsidiary.7, 8, 9 no public evidence identified of Cloudflare being characterized in the reviewed Israeli industry or government materials as a key employer or sector anchor.1, 17

The available evidence supports a confirmed technology acquisition of a Delaware parent with an Israeli subsidiary, plus network locations in Tel Aviv and Haifa.11, 21, 8, 9, 10 It does not establish continuing Israeli R&D, a staffed Israeli office, active operations by Sweeps Ltd., a disclosed Israel-based workforce, or an Israeli R&D budget.21, 17, 22 Public disclosures do not quantify acquisition consideration allocated to Israel or current Israel-specific investment and R&D spending.11, 13, 21, 17

Separately, Cloudflare’s Project Galileo provides free security services to at-risk civil-society organizations. Cloudflare’s ten-year retrospective refers generally to organizations “based in the region,” including Israel/Palestine-linked emergency-response and Muslim-community crowdfunding platforms, without naming entities or disclosing financial value.34, 35

Footnotes

  1. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733324000013/cloud-20231231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  2. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org/reports/dont-buy-into-occupation-report-2024/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  4. https://dawnmena.org/u-s-seize-jewish-power-and-other-extremist-websites-promoting-violence-against-palestinians/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USTREAS/bulletins/3ce946f ↩

  6. https://dns.google/resolve?name=rabbikahane.co.il&type=NS ↩ ↩2

  7. https://blog.cloudflare.com/tel-aviv/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  8. https://cloudflare.statuspage.io/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  9. https://www.cloudflare.com/network/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  10. https://blog.cloudflare.com/mid-2022-new-cities/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://cloudflare.net/files/doc_financials/2021/q4/98f467d0-9cc2-452a-817d-17e94bdcb2b9.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  12. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733322000008/cloud-20211231.htm ↩

  13. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733324000013/cloud-20231231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  14. https://finder.startupnationcentral.org/company_page/sweeps?section=lifecycle ↩ ↩2

  15. https://www.geektime.co.il/cloudflare-acquires-israeli-startup-zarz/ ↩

  16. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733326000016/cloud-20251231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  17. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733326000026/cloud-20251231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  18. https://www.banktrack.org/news/seven_underwriters_of_war_bonds_instrumental_in_enabling_israel_s_assault_on_gaza_new_research_finds ↩

  19. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240308676044/en/Cloudflare-Doubles-Down-on-Middle-East-Expands-Presence-and-Team-to-Support-Growing-Customer-Demand ↩ ↩2

  20. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2024/cloudflare-expands-presence-and-team-in-middle-east/ ↩ ↩2

  21. https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001477333/af98834c-0096-428e-b7d8-0de71e9cd155.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13

  22. https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-acquires-zaraz-to-enable-cloud-loading-of-third-party-tools/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  23. https://developers.cloudflare.com/zaraz/changelog/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://developers.cloudflare.com/zaraz/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  25. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-firm-helps-hamas-netanyahu-keep-hackers-at-bay/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  26. https://www.inc.com/magazine/202404/christine-lagorio/for-michelle-zatlyn-this-past-year-and-a-war-in-gaza-pushed-her-as-a-leader.html ↩

  27. https://blog.cloudflare.com/cyber-attacks-in-the-israel-hamas-war/ ↩

  28. https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-traffic-analysis-iran-israel-april-attack/ ↩

  29. https://blog.cloudflare.com/tag/israel/ ↩

  30. https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/ ↩

  31. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000119312526263809/d160227ddef14a.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  32. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/cloudflare-acquires-area-1-security-competitors-proofpoint-titanhq-mimecast/ ↩

  33. https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-acquires-vectrix-to-expand-zero-trust-saas-security/ ↩

  34. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2024/cloudflares-project-galileo-turns-10-marks-one-decade-of-protecting-vulnerable-groups/ ↩

  35. https://blog.cloudflare.com/celebrating-10-years-of-project-galileo/ ↩