INDEX / DIRECTORY / CLOUDFLARE

Cloudflare

Cybersecurity & VPN 83 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-07-30
BDS-1000 Score 246 /1000 D Tier D - Moderate
Military ↗ 0.00 Digital ↗ 0.31 Economic ↗ 3.75 Political ↗ 0.61

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This is a direct document-drafting task with an exact, fully specified structure and content source (the four audits) already provided by the user - no creative/feature-building ambiguity requiring brainstorming, no code, no debugging. I’ll proceed directly to writing the dossier per the given spec.No file-write tool is available in this session, so I’ll deliver the complete dossier content directly below as the markdown that should populate 06-main-dossier.md.

BDS-1000 Dossier: Cloudflare, Inc.

Key Findings

  • Economic: Cloudflare has operated a Tel Aviv network point of presence (“135th data center”) since 2018 and disclosed no Israel-specific revenue, with its confirmed 2024 Middle East expansion (Dubai) explicitly excluding Israel.12
  • Digital: Cloudflare’s DNS/CDN services were documented by DAWN as still active for four websites tied to U.S.-sanctioned Kahanist figure Benzion Gopstein (Otzma Yehudit, Lehava, Kahane-linked sites) as of February 2025, alongside a 2019 voluntary OFAC self-disclosure over sanctioned-entity service use that remained under review through Cloudflare’s FY2024 10-K.345
  • Political: Cloudflare’s public posture is one of declared service-neutrality - simultaneously protecting Netanyahu’s website and Hamas-affiliated sites in 2014 - a stance that drew formal pressure from Israeli legal group Shurat HaDin in 2017 and criticism from the ADL in 2026 for inconsistent enforcement against extremist content.678
  • Not found: No public evidence of any Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, or Israeli-security-body contract; no SIBAT directory listing; no appearance in the OHCHR settlement-business database, Who Profits, or AFSC Investigate; and no evidence of ruggedized/military-spec products, weapons-systems involvement, or defence-prime supply relationships.91011

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameCloudflare, Inc.
JurisdictionUnited States (Delaware-domiciled, headquartered California); no evidence of Israeli incorporation or tax residency identified1
HeadquartersSan Francisco, California, USA1
SectorInternet infrastructure, content delivery network (CDN), DDoS mitigation, and cybersecurity (Zero Trust) services
OwnershipPublicly traded, NYSE: NET; independent company with no controlling parent or private-equity sponsor identified1
Key Executives / GovernanceMatthew Prince (Co-founder, CEO, Co-Chair); Michelle Zatlyn (Co-founder, President, Co-Chair); board members Scott Sandell, Stacey Cunningham, John Graham-Cumming, Dr. Karim Lakhani (2025 appointees); Maria Eitel departed board 2025. No public evidence identified connecting any named individual to Israeli defense/surveillance-firm equity or pro-Israel/anti-BDS advocacy organizations121314
Israeli-Nexus SummaryA commercial internet-infrastructure provider with a Tel Aviv network node and one Israeli-origin acquisition (Zaraz), whose neutral service-provision model has resulted in documented use by both Israeli government-linked sites and U.S.-sanctioned Israeli-extremist and Palestinian-militant-linked domains, with no identified defense-sector contracting

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

Cloudflare is a U.S.-domiciled, NYSE-listed internet-infrastructure company providing CDN, DDoS-mitigation, and Zero Trust security services on a largely self-service, neutral basis to any paying or Project Galileo-qualifying customer. Its documented Israel/Palestine nexus is almost entirely a function of this neutral, dual-use service model rather than of targeted commercial or political alignment: Cloudflare operates one Tel Aviv network point of presence (since 2018), holds one Israeli-founded acquisition (Zaraz, 2021), and maintains ordinary channel-partner relationships with Israeli integrators CYBERcom and Nanosek - none of which the four domain audits found connected to Israeli military, settlement, or defence-sector activity.1151920

The strongest documented vectors sit in the digital and political domains and concern content-neutrality outcomes rather than deliberate alignment. Cloudflare has, at different times, provided protective services to Israeli government-linked sites (the IDF’s website during 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense; Netanyahu’s personal website as of 2014) and to Hamas-, PFLP-, and al-Shabab-affiliated sites, prompting a 2017 public campaign by the Israeli legal-advocacy group Shurat HaDin and continued scrutiny into 2018–2019 before those specific militant-linked domains reportedly moved off Cloudflare.672122 A more recent and apparently still-live finding, reported by DAWN in September 2024 and updated February 2025, is that Cloudflare continued providing DNS service to four websites tied to Benzion Gopstein - a U.S.-Treasury-sanctioned Israeli settler-extremist figure and leader of the banned Lehava organization - after his July 2024 sanctions designation, with no confirmed termination as of the most recent reporting located.3 Separately, Cloudflare’s 2019 voluntary self-disclosure to OFAC concerning sanctioned-entity service use is documented as remaining under agency review as of the company’s FY2024 10-K, though no penalty or enforcement action has been identified.45

What is not supported by the evidence is any defence-sector, military-hardware, or settlement-operations nexus. No public evidence was identified of any contract or tender with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police; Cloudflare does not appear on the SIBAT defence-industry directory, the UN OHCHR settlement-business database, Who Profits, or AFSC Investigate; and it has no identified construction, machinery, or physical presence in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights.910112324 No public evidence was identified of weapons-systems involvement, defence-prime supply-chain integration, or Israeli state ownership of the company.

Cloudflare’s stated corporate posture - articulated by CEO Matthew Prince since 2014 as strict service-neutrality (“Both sides have an absolute right to tell their story… We’re not providing material support for anybody”)6 - is materially consistent with the audits’ findings: it protected Israeli-linked and Palestinian-militant-linked sites simultaneously, and its Project Galileo program is documented as having protected both Israeli and Palestinian civil-society organizations after October 7, 2023, including a UK-based Palestinian human-rights organization.2526 A documented asymmetry exists in Cloudflare’s public communications register: on Russia-Ukraine, CEO Prince published a named, first-person policy blog post in 2022 explaining a decision not to cut off Russian sites; no equivalent named policy statement was identified for Israel-Palestine, where coverage remains confined to technical traffic-analysis blogging.2728

Taken together, the evidence record supports a BRS of 246 (Tier D, Moderate), driven principally by the Economic domain’s proximity and magnitude scores (Impact 7.5, Magnitude 3.5, Proximity 8.0) reflecting Cloudflare’s sustained direct commercial infrastructure presence inside Israel, moderated by the near-zero Military score (0.00) reflecting the complete absence of any defence-sector nexus.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
2009Cloudflare founded in San Francisco by Matthew Prince, Michelle Zatlyn, and Lee Holloway.1
2012During Operation Pillar of Defense, the IDF reportedly moved its website onto Cloudflare’s service to withstand cyberattacks.6
2014Then-PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal website (netanyahu.org.il) is reported using Cloudflare’s reverse-proxy service; the same reporting finds Cloudflare simultaneously protecting Hamas-affiliated and Al-Quds Brigades (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) sites.621
March 15, 2018Cloudflare’s Tel Aviv data center (“135th data center”) goes live.1
2017–2019Israeli legal-advocacy group Shurat HaDin publicly pressures Cloudflare (from August 2017) to stop protecting Hamas-linked sites; by February 2019, Hamas, PFLP, and a Taliban-affiliated site reportedly no longer use Cloudflare, with no public explanation given.722
September 2019Cloudflare’s IPO S-1 discloses a voluntary self-report to OFAC regarding service use by SDN-listed entities, and a separate voluntary disclosure to the U.S. Census Bureau over export-filing errors.429
July 2020OFAC’s review of the 2019 disclosure is reported as continuing.4
January–April 2022Cloudflare acquires Vectrix Security (Amsterdam) and Area 1 Security (California); CEO Prince publicly declines a Ukrainian government request to cut off Russian sites.303127
October 15, 2021Cloudflare completes acquisition of Zaraz, a Tel Aviv-founded tag-loading startup, for $7.2 million.1516
October 7, 2023 – ongoingCloudflare documents DDoS attacks against both Israeli and Palestinian sites and internet-disruption patterns in Gaza; Project Galileo extends protection to civil-society organizations on both sides.323325
April 19, 2024Benzion Gopstein first sanctioned by U.S. State Department (further designation July 11, 2024) over West Bank settler violence.34
September 3, 2024DAWN submits evidence to U.S. Treasury/Justice that four Gopstein/Kahanist-linked websites (Otzma Yehudit, Lehava, two Kahane sites) remain on Cloudflare’s DNS despite sanctions; update issued February 3, 2025 confirms continued activity.3
November 2024Cloudflare named as a defendant in a U.S. Antiterrorism Act civil suit tied to the 2014 Har Nof synagogue attack, alleging aid to a PFLP-linked website.1718
April 14, 2026Cloudflare and Wiz (Israeli-founded, Google-acquired for $32 billion) announce an AI-security integration partnership.3536
May 2026ADL’s “Keeping the Lights On” report criticizes Cloudflare for sustaining extremist and terrorism-linked sites, including one referencing the Gaza war, and for inconsistent policy enforcement.8

Corporate Overview

Cloudflare, Inc. is an independent, NYSE-listed (NET) U.S. company headquartered in San Francisco, with no controlling parent, sovereign shareholder, or private-equity sponsor identified.1 Its physical footprint in Israel is limited to a single network point of presence in Tel Aviv, live since 2018 and functioning as an edge-network node within its global CDN rather than a separate revenue-generating subsidiary; no Israel-specific headcount, sales office, or tax/regulatory registration was identified.12 Cloudflare’s confirmed 2024 Middle East commercial expansion - a new Dubai Internet City office announced March 8, 2024, covering 17 regional network locations - explicitly does not name Israel.237

Cloudflare’s only confirmed Israeli-origin acquisition is Zaraz, a Tel Aviv-headquartered startup founded in 2019, acquired for $7.2 million in October 2021; whether it persists as a distinct Tel Aviv R&D site at any confirmed current scale could not be verified from primary sourcing.1516 Its other disclosed acquisitions (Area 1 Security, California; Vectrix Security, Amsterdam) are non-Israeli.3031 In Israel specifically, Cloudflare maintains ordinary channel-partner relationships with CYBERcom (an Israeli IT/cybersecurity integrator) and Nanosek (described as an “elite technology partner” for deployment support); no evidence surfaced tying either integrator to settlement-linked business activity.1920 A claim that Cloudflare was expanding an Israeli R&D center following a meeting between CEO Prince and PM Netanyahu could not be corroborated by any primary source and is excluded from this dossier as unverified.

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of any contract, tender, or MOU between Cloudflare and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police; Cloudflare does not appear on the SIBAT Defense and HLS Directory.910 Cloudflare’s own “Defense and Intelligence” page describes engagement with the U.S. Department of Defense (including the SHIELD IDIQ contract) with no reference to Israeli defense contracting.11 The sole documented instances of Cloudflare service reaching Israeli state actors are ad hoc, non-contractual: the IDF’s website reportedly moved onto Cloudflare during 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense, and then-PM Netanyahu’s personal website used the service as of 2014 - both instances of a standard commercial product being used, not a procurement relationship, with current status unconfirmed.6

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Cloudflare manufactures no ruggedized, tactical, or mil-spec hardware; its CDN, Zero Trust, and DDoS-mitigation products are general-purpose civilian internet infrastructure, which the audit treats as falling outside the Military domain boundary absent evidence of purpose-built kinetic or targeting functionality. No public evidence identified of supply-chain integration with Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land; no involvement in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, or any strategic platform; no export-licence or end-user-certificate history specific to Israeli defence or security end-users; and no appearance in the OHCHR settlement-business database, Who Profits, or AFSC Investigate.23241038 Cloudflare’s standing public position - articulated by Prince as strict neutrality - is corroborated by the same sources documenting the company’s Hamas- and Netanyahu-site service.6

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Cloudflare’s Israel-linked digital nexus centers on (a) DNS/CDN service continuity to sanctioned or militant-linked domains under its neutrality policy, and (b) technology partnerships with Israeli-founded firms. DAWN documented that as of February 2025, four websites tied to U.S.-sanctioned Kahanist figure Benzion Gopstein - including the Otzma Yehudit party site led by Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, the banned Lehava organization’s site, and two Meir Kahane-linked sites (one with e-commerce functionality) - remained on Cloudflare’s DNS despite his July 2024 sanctions designation.3 Separately, 2018–2019 reporting documented Cloudflare providing DDoS protection to State Department-designated terrorist organizations including Hamas, al-Shabab, and the PFLP, prompting the 2017 Shurat HaDin campaign; those specific domains reportedly left Cloudflare by February 2019 without public explanation.21227 On the partnership side, Cloudflare’s April 2026 integration with Wiz - founded by Unit 8200 alumni, acquired by Google Cloud for $32 billion - and its ongoing SentinelOne SASE/Zero Trust integration are structured as joint solution/technology-partner arrangements rather than embedding of Israeli-origin code into Cloudflare’s core network.35364041 Cloudflare’s sole Israeli-origin acquisition, Zaraz (2021), supplies server-side tag-loading technology on Cloudflare Workers.15

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of a direct Cloudflare relationship with Check Point, CyberArk, NSO Group, Verint, or Claroty; no evidence of biometric, facial-recognition, or predictive-policing technology use; no evidence linking Cloudflare to Project Nimbus (the “Nimbus” naming overlap in Cloudflare’s own product line is coincidental); and no evidence that Cloudflare’s AI/ML systems have been trained on or granted access to surveillance-derived data from Israel or the OPT. No public evidence identified of any regulatory penalty actually imposed over either the 2019 OFAC self-disclosure or the Gopstein-domain matter - both remain, per available sources, at the disclosure or advocacy stage rather than confirmed enforcement.453 Cloudflare’s Radar traffic-analysis publications on the October 2023 escalation and the April 2024 Iran-Israel attack are technical/observational, and its data has been independently cited by Access Now’s tracking of Gaza connectivity disruption - an exculpatory, humanitarian-monitoring use of the same infrastructure.323342

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Cloudflare’s Tel Aviv data center, live since March 2018 and described as its “135th data center,” is its principal disclosed physical/economic footprint in Israel, alongside its Zaraz acquisition.115 No public evidence identified of Israel-specific revenue disclosure, profit repatriation, sovereign-debt underwriting, or Israel Bonds/war-bond involvement; Cloudflare’s 10-K does not treat Israel as a distinct market segment beyond general geopolitical risk-factor language referencing the Hamas-Israel conflict.21 Cloudflare’s confirmed 2024 Middle East investment activity is a Dubai Internet City office, explicitly not an Israel-based expansion.237 Executive public commentary - Prince’s 2014 neutrality statement and Zatlyn’s April 2024 remarks that Cloudflare offered cybersecurity help “whether sites were run by Palestinians or Israelis”643 - frames the company’s economic posture as service-neutral rather than market-aligned.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of Cloudflare, its founders, or named board members holding Israeli securities, sovereign bonds, settlement-enterprise investments, or Israeli defense-firm equity. No public evidence identified of Cloudflare appearing in the UN OHCHR settlement-business database, and direct searches of Who Profits and the Don’t Buy Into Occupation 2024 report annex returned no indexed Cloudflare entries (though the DBIO annex could not be fully retrieved to confirm absence).2344 Cloudflare’s disclosed acquisitions outside Zaraz (Area 1 Security, Vectrix Security) are non-Israeli, and the company holds no Israeli state ownership stake, government board appointee, or critical-infrastructure designation.3031 A claim of an Israel-based R&D-center expansion tied to a Prince-Netanyahu meeting could not be corroborated and is excluded as unverified.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

Cloudflare’s documented political posture is one of declared neutrality: CEO Prince stated in 2014, regarding simultaneous service to Netanyahu’s site and Hamas-affiliated sites, “We’re not providing material support for anybody… We’re not sending money, or helping people arm themselves.”6 This drew the 2017 Shurat HaDin campaign, to which Cloudflare responded that it was “aware of obligations under U.S. law and is in compliance.”745 Cloudflare’s October 2023 blog coverage of the Israel-Hamas war remains technical/observational (DDoS attacks against Israeli and Palestinian outlets, Gaza connectivity outages), with no explicit named statement of political position - a documented asymmetry against Cloudflare’s 2022 Russia-Ukraine posture, where Prince published a named policy blog stating “Russia needs more internet access, not less.”32332728 The ADL’s May 2026 “Keeping the Lights On” report separately alleges Cloudflare sustains extremist propaganda outlets, including one referencing the Gaza war as “a religious war against all Jews everywhere,” and states Cloudflare “did not substantively respond to three ADL reports” while inconsistently enforcing its own policy.8 DAWN’s September 2024 submission alleges continued DNS service to Gopstein/Kahanist-linked sites post-sanctions.3

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of any organized, named BDS-movement or NGO-led boycott/divestment campaign against Cloudflare specifically on Israel-Palestine grounds, distinct from the extremism-hosting criticism raised by ADL and DAWN. No public evidence identified of HR actions, disciplinary measures, or terminations against Cloudflare employees over pro-Palestinian speech or activism, in contrast to documented 2024 actions at comparator companies Google and Microsoft.46 No public evidence identified of Cloudflare corporate PAC or lobbying activity itemized as Israel-Palestine policy, anti-boycott legislation, or donations to FIDF, JNF/KKL, Regavim, or Im Tirtzu; OpenSecrets records only a general $40,000 year-to-date federal lobbying spend with no Israel-specific itemization.4748 No public evidence identified connecting Prince, Zatlyn, or any 2025 board appointee to AIPAC, CFI, USISTF, or Israeli defense/surveillance-firm equity. Project Galileo is documented as having protected a UK-based Palestinian human-rights organization following DDoS attacks tied to an October 2023 pro-Palestine demonstration - an exculpatory, non-exclusive application of the same program.2526 Cloudflare’s Tel Aviv data center sits within Israel’s internationally recognized 1949 borders, not the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and no Cloudflare presence was identified in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights.1

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score (V4)

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military0.700.400.500.00
Digital3.002.002.500.31
Economic7.503.508.003.75
Political3.002.504.000.61

The Economic domain drives the aggregate score, reflecting Cloudflare’s sustained direct commercial infrastructure presence inside Israel (the Tel Aviv node) and its high proximity/magnitude coefficients (P=8.0, M=3.5), against a near-zero Military score (0.00) reflecting the complete absence of any defence-contracting or weapons-supply-chain nexus. The Digital and Political scores (0.31 and 0.61) capture the documented but comparatively low-magnitude findings around sanctioned-domain DNS service and neutrality-policy controversy. Scores were computed using the scale-free Impact × Magnitude/Proximity methodology, drawn exclusively from evidence in the four domain audits and subject to human vetting.

Methodology Note

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloudflare ; https://medium.com/cloudflare-blog/tel-aviv-israel-cloudflares-135th-data-center-now-live-24de7fcaac49 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  2. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240308676044/en/Cloudflare-Doubles-Down-on-Middle-East-Expands-Presence-and-Team-to-Support-Growing-Customer-Demand ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  3. https://dawnmena.org/u-s-seize-jewish-power-and-other-extremist-websites-promoting-violence-against-palestinians/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. https://cyberscoop.com/cloudflare-ipo-terrorism-narcotics/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  5. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1477333/000147733325000043/cloud-20241231.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  6. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-firm-helps-hamas-netanyahu-keep-hackers-at-bay/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  7. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2017-08-31/ty-article/.premium/cloudflare-now-being-pressed-to-stop-working-with-hamas/0000017f-dbaf-d3ff-a7ff-fbaf5c960000 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  8. https://www.adl.org/resources/report/keeping-lights-how-cloudflare-sustains-violent-extremism-graphic-violence-and ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  9. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Industries/directory/Pages/default.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/3794 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. https://www.cloudflare.com/defense/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2025/cloudflare-appoints-three-new-board-members/ ↩ ↩2

  13. https://securitymea.com/2025/04/02/cloudflare-appoints-three-new-board-members/ ↩ ↩2

  14. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2019/cloudflare-raises-usd150m-and-adds-to-board-of-directors/ ↩ ↩2

  15. https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-acquires-zaraz-to-enable-cloud-loading-of-third-party-tools/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  16. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/yoavmoshe_why-cloudflare-bought-zaraz-activity-6874466571813744641-p8FD ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  17. https://www.motleyrice.com/anti-terrorism/hamas-terrorist-attack-lawsuit ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  18. https://www.lawandisrael.org/library/topical/terrorism/pflp-and-affiliates/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cybercom-il_doingmore-cybercom-cloudflare-activity-7371438471774756865-V2NI ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  20. https://elioplus.com/europe/israel/channel-partners/cloudflare ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  21. https://worldisraelnews.com/israel-law-center-cloudflare-stop-supporting-terror-linked-sites/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  22. https://gizmodo.com/cloudflare-under-fire-for-allegedly-providing-ddos-prot-1831107649 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  23. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  24. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_companies_operating_in_West_Bank_settlements ↩ ↩2

  25. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2024/cloudflares-project-galileo-turns-10-marks-one-decade-of-protecting-vulnerable-groups/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  26. https://blog.cloudflare.com/galileo10anniversaryradardashboard/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  27. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/07/cloudflare-rejects-ukraines-call-to-stop-protecting-russians-from-cyberattacks/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  28. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/cloudflare-rebuffs-ukraine-requests-stop-123215699.html ↩ ↩2

  29. https://exportcompliancedaily.com/article/2019/09/13/cloudflare-discloses-possible-sanctions-violations-in-sec-filing-1909120065 ↩ ↩2

  30. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/cloudflare-acquires-area-1-security-competitors-proofpoint-titanhq-mimecast/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  31. https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-acquires-vectrix-to-expand-zero-trust-saas-security/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-traffic-patterns-in-israel-and-palestine-following-the-october-2023-attacks/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  33. https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-traffic-analysis-iran-israel-april-attack/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  34. https://2021-2025.state.gov/designation-of-individuals-and-entities-contributing-to-violence-and-instability-in-the-west-bank/ ; https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/far-right-activist-benzi-gopstein-a-ben-gvir-ally-targeted-by-us-in-third-round-of-settler-sanctions/ ↩

  35. https://futurumgroup.com/insights/can-cloudflare-and-wiz-close-the-ai-security-visibility-gap/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  36. https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-biggest-exit-in-israeli-history-google-completes-32-billion-deal-to-buy-wiz/ ↩ ↩2

  37. https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2024/cloudflare-expands-presence-and-team-in-middle-east/ ↩ ↩2

  38. https://investigate.afsc.org/ ↩

  39. https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/cloudflare-admits-potential-sanctions-violations ↩

  40. https://www.sentinelone.com/press/sentinelone-and-cloudflare-expand-partnership-to-deliver-real-time-threat-detection-and-automated-response-for-enterprises/ ↩ ↩2

  41. https://developers.cloudflare.com/reference-architecture/architectures/cloudflare-sase-with-sentinelone/ ↩ ↩2

  42. https://www.accessnow.org/publication/palestine-unplugged/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  43. https://www.inc.com/magazine/202404/christine-lagorio/for-michelle-zatlyn-this-past-year-and-a-war-in-gaza-pushed-her-as-a-leader.html ↩

  44. https://dontbuyintooccupation.org/reports/dont-buy-into-occupation-report-2024/ ↩

  45. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/30/cloudflare-pressued-to-cut-ties-with-hamas-linked-/ ↩ ↩2

  46. https://time.com/6968385/google-fires-workers-protesting-israeli-contract-project-nimbus/ ↩

  47. https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/cloudflare-inc/totals?id=D000071785 ↩

  48. https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/summary?id=D000071785 ↩