INDEX / DIRECTORY / EXPRESSVPN

ExpressVPN

Cybersecurity & VPN 49 CITED SOURCES UPDATED 2026-09-07 METHOD V6.5
BDS-1000 Score 758 /1000 B Tier B - Severe
Military ↗ 0.00 Digital ↗ 6.10 Economic ↗ 8.30 Political ↗ 5.83
OWNERSHIP TREE 0 brands and group businesses View all

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Key Findings

  • Economic: ExpressVPN joined Kape in December 2021; Kape’s acquisition financing included Bank Leumi, and group disclosures establish Israeli operations, Tel Aviv R&D activity, and an identified commercial link between ExpressVPN and Israeli subsidiary Webselenese.1, 2, 3
  • Digital: ExpressVPN advertises a Tel Aviv server location; its virtual-location policy supports the limited conclusion that the location is physically in Israel, while the reviewed sources do not disclose the hosting facility, supplier, customers, or use cases.4, 5
  • Political: Kape is controlled through Unikmind, which states that it holds 98.63% of Kape shares and is wholly owned by Teddy Sagi; reporting documents Sagi’s personal, rather than ExpressVPN or Kape corporate, philanthropy connected to Israeli civilian and military-welfare initiatives.6, 7, 8
  • Not found: No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN or Kape contracts, deployments, procurement awards, or other verified provision to the IDF, Israeli Ministry of Defense, intelligence agencies, settlement entities, or Project Nimbus.9, 10, 11

Target Profile

FieldDetail
Company NameExpressVPN
JurisdictionBritish Virgin Islands: Express Technologies Ltd. is identified as operating under BVI law, with its headquarters and registered place of business in the British Virgin Islands.12
HeadquartersBritish Virgin Islands.12
SectorConsumer digital privacy and security services; VPN service provider.13
OwnershipExpressVPN is a Kape group brand. Unikmind states that it holds 432,860,855 Kape shares, representing 98.63% of issued share capital, and is wholly owned by Teddy Sagi.1, 6
Key Executives / GovernanceExpressVPN co-founders Peter Burchhardt and Dan Pomerantz; Kape CEO Charles Butler and CFO Or Ifrah. Kape’s active directors listed in reviewed Companies House materials are Charles Butler, Elizabeth Chambers, Marios Hadjiyiannakis, Pierre-Etienne Lallia, and Nikhil Singhvi.14, 15, 16
Israeli-Nexus SummaryDocumented nexus consists of Kape-group ownership by Teddy Sagi through Unikmind, Israeli group operations and Tel Aviv recruitment/R&D indicators, an ExpressVPN-linked commercial relationship with Webselenese, and an advertised Israeli server location; no verified Israeli state or military contract was identified.3, 4, 6, 9

Key Facts:

Executive Summary

ExpressVPN is a consumer VPN and privacy-service brand operated through Express Technologies Ltd., which its privacy policy identifies as a British Virgin Islands company. The brand joined Kape Technologies in December 2021. Kape’s 2021 accounts record the acquisition of the ExpressVPN business - including assets, liabilities, and service entities - from Access Global and subsidiaries for final consideration of US$925.8 million.12, 14, 2

The principal documented Israel nexus is economic and corporate rather than military. Kape’s acquisition financing included Bank Leumi.18 Its group disclosures identify Israeli subsidiaries and Tel Aviv R&D activity, while contemporary reporting described ExpressVPN as the largest customer of Webselenese, an Israeli Kape subsidiary, and described integration as a group objective. ExpressVPN’s public jobs materials also listed Tel Aviv-based technical, product, data, and social-media roles. The evidence establishes Israeli group operations and a commercial connection to Webselenese; it does not establish that all ExpressVPN engineering, infrastructure, or customer data are located in Israel.2, 3, 19

ExpressVPN also advertises a Tel Aviv server location. Its policy says locations not listed as virtual are physically located in the specified country, supporting a limited finding of ordinary consumer VPN infrastructure in Israel. The reviewed sources do not identify the facility, hosting supplier, customer base, legal entity, state access, or military use. Its privacy policy states that ExpressVPN controls and stores user personal data rather than Kape or other related entities, although it permits limited processing by related entities for listed purposes.4, 5, 12

The audits did not identify a verified ExpressVPN or Kape contract, tender, partnership, deployment, or procurement arrangement involving Israeli military, intelligence, police, settlement, or government-security bodies. They likewise found no public evidence of Project Nimbus participation, settlement operations, offensive cyber supply, weapons integration, or Israeli state data-residency services. Allegations reflected in a Business & Human Rights Resource Centre entry were not treated as verified because the Centre disclaims responsibility for the accuracy of linked third-party material.9, 10, 11, 20

Under the fixed, human-vetted V6.5 assessment, ExpressVPN receives a BRS score of 758, placing it in Tier B (Severe Complicity). This result reflects documented economic, operational, ownership, and political-proximity indicators - not an evidenced finding of direct military contracting or digital deployment for Israeli state security bodies.

Timeline of Relevant Events

DateEvent
2009ExpressVPN states that Peter Burchhardt and Dan Pomerantz founded ExpressVPN.13
5 March 2021Kape acquired holding companies owning Webselenese, including Gclid assets; Kape reported the group’s principal R&D locations included Tel Aviv.2
September 2021Kape announced that a wholly owned subsidiary would acquire the ExpressVPN business for approximately US$936 million; the acquisition financing included a lender group that included Bank Leumi.21, 18
15–16 December 2021Kape acquired ExpressVPN, and ExpressVPN announced it had joined Kape.2, 14
September 2022Kape reported that Dan Pomerantz had been nominated as a non-executive director and employed as General Manager of its Digital Privacy Division.22
April–May 2023Unikmind’s offer became unconditional; Kape’s AIM trading was cancelled effective 31 May 2023.17, 23
November 2023Globes reported Teddy Sagi’s personal NIS 1 million gift to help families evacuated from the Gaza border; the broader project also supported evacuees and soldiers on leave, without establishing allocation of Sagi’s gift to those purposes.8
7 September 2026Unikmind’s website stated that it held 98.63% of Kape’s issued share capital and was wholly owned by Teddy Sagi.6

Corporate Overview

ExpressVPN is a VPN-service business. Its Terms of Service identify Express Technologies Ltd. as the service provider, and its privacy policy identifies that entity as operating under British Virgin Islands law. The same policy identifies Kape Technologies PLC as ultimate holding company while stating that ExpressVPN controls and stores customer personal data rather than Kape or other related entities.24, 12

Kape acquired the ExpressVPN business from Access Global and related entities in 2021. The transaction included assets, liabilities, and service entities. Burchhardt and Pomerantz received 47,782,800 Kape shares, approximately 13.6% of enlarged share capital at issuance; acquisition terms also granted Burchhardt a conditional right to appoint a Kape non-executive director while specified founder interests retained at least 5% of Kape ordinary shares.2, 22

The available disclosures establish Israeli Kape-group entities and activity, but not an Israeli incorporation or headquarters for ExpressVPN. Kape’s 2021 accounts identify Webselenese Ltd. as an indirectly held, wholly owned Israeli operating subsidiary, alongside Israeli holding companies Ani Ariel Ltd. and Uma Capital Ltd. Kape’s earlier 2018 disclosure listed BestAd Hi Tech Media Limited, Crossrider Advanced Technologies Limited, and Crossrider (Israel) Limited; that pre-acquisition evidence does not establish that ExpressVPN received services from those entities.3, 25

No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN offices, employees, servers, sales entities, resellers, or other physical operations in settlements, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Golan Heights. No public evidence identified that its advertised Israeli server is located in any occupied territory.26, 27

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of direct ExpressVPN or Kape defence contracting, procurement, tender awards, framework agreements, memoranda, or deployments involving the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, SIBAT, intelligence agencies, or other Israeli security bodies.9, 28

ExpressVPN markets a “military VPN” to individual service members for personal communications, internet access, and streaming while deployed. The material directs an individual subscriber to choose a server location; it does not identify a state customer, procurement vehicle, defence specification, contract-modified product, or Israeli security use.29

No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN supplying weapons, tactical systems, intelligence-specific tools, export-controlled products, logistics, construction services, or components to Israeli defence primes. The supplied document-scoped review also found no ExpressVPN mention in the cited UN Special Rapporteur report’s relevant sections.28, 11

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that ExpressVPN is a civilian consumer VPN provider and that its military-oriented marketing is directed to individual deployed users, not state procurement. The reviewed materials describe standard VPN routing rather than ruggedised, tactical, weapons-integrated, intelligence-specific, or Israeli-security-customised technology.29

Document-scoped non-mentions in UN and OHCHR materials are limited findings, not proof of absence across every historical database, court record, tender archive, or civil-society source. Nevertheless, the focused audit did not retrieve a primary procurement, licence, contract, end-user certificate, or defence-prime record naming ExpressVPN or Kape.27, 28

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

ExpressVPN markets a Tel Aviv server location that provides Israeli IP addresses. Israel does not appear on its virtual-location list, whose policy states that omitted locations are physically situated in the specified country. This supports ordinary consumer VPN infrastructure in Israel, not a finding about the facility, host, customers, state access, or security deployment.4, 5

The group’s Israeli footprint is also documented through Tel Aviv-based ExpressVPN recruitment and Kape disclosures of Israeli operations. Kape’s 2021 accounts identify Webselenese as an Israeli subsidiary and Tel Aviv among group R&D locations; reporting described ExpressVPN as Webselenese’s largest customer. These facts do not allocate headcount, identify customer-data access, or establish that ExpressVPN’s technical infrastructure is operated from Israel.2, 3, 19

No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN or Kape use of Israeli-origin surveillance, biometrics, predictive-policing, Project Nimbus, offensive cyber, AI-targeting, or Israeli state digital-sovereignty products or services. AWS is identified as the cloud partner for ExpressKeys, but the documentation does not identify AWS regions; Israel’s Project Nimbus selection of AWS and Google does not name ExpressVPN, Kape, or related entities.10, 30

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

ExpressVPN’s privacy policy says that user personal data remain controlled and stored by ExpressVPN, not Kape or other related entities. It permits limited processing by related entities for specified purposes but expressly does not transfer data control to Kape. Israeli hiring and corporate ownership alone therefore do not demonstrate customer-data transfer to Israel, surveillance, or Israeli state access.12, 19

The existence of an Israeli server location establishes consumer-facing infrastructure without proving military or government use. Under the rubric’s Data-Exposure / Sovereignty Principle, the communications and metadata routed through that physical endpoint nevertheless support I=6.1; this is a structural-exposure assessment, not evidence of interception or intelligence integration. M=7 reflects a continuing advertised service and P=9 its direct provision by ExpressVPN. The RAM-only and no-activity-log controls limit retention claims but do not remove the geography of live traffic transit.4, 5, 31 The audit found no disclosed government customer, facility, provider, deployment architecture, or contract. The KPMG assurance report describes RAM-only TrustedServer operations and limited non-personally-identifiable monitoring metrics, but does not name cloud providers, hosting locations, or access-control jurisdictions for those systems.31

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

Kape acquired ExpressVPN in 2021 for final consideration of US$925.8 million. The acquisition’s enlarged revolving credit facility included Bank Leumi among a multi-bank lender group. This establishes a Kape-group financing relationship associated with the ExpressVPN acquisition, not an ExpressVPN investment in Israeli sovereign debt, settlements, Israel Bonds, or defence companies.18, 2

Kape group disclosures establish Israeli subsidiaries and Tel Aviv R&D activity. ExpressVPN’s jobs page listed Tel Aviv-Yafo or Tel Aviv District positions, including UX, data-engineering, and social-media roles. The listings demonstrate recruitment activity but do not disclose a precise office address, employing entity, workforce size, revenue, tax registration, or the scope of Israeli operations.3, 19

Unikmind’s current website states that it owns 98.63% of Kape’s issued capital and is wholly owned by Teddy Sagi. This supports a controlling-principal link. It does not establish Israeli state ownership, government board appointments, state policy control, or a current role for Sagi as Kape CEO or director.6, 15

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN direct investment in Israeli facilities, data centres, real estate, sovereign bonds, Israel-focused funds, or Israeli R&D programmes. No public evidence identified of ExpressVPN revenue attributable to Israel, profit repatriation to Israel, Israeli tax registration, or a public description of Israel as a strategic market or regional hub.21, 2

No public evidence identified of commercial activity in settlements or occupied territory. The evidence supports Israeli recruitment and group operational links, but does not establish settlement commerce, settlement sourcing, an Israeli ExpressVPN legal domicile, or Israeli customer-data operations.26, 27

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of an ExpressVPN or Kape conflict-specific statement concerning Israel/Palestine, October 2023 attacks, Gaza, civilian protection, humanitarian relief, or a company conflict-period donation or free-access programme. ExpressVPN’s integration communication instead framed the brand around privacy, security, digital rights, and an open internet.14, 33

Political-proximity evidence principally concerns controlling principal Teddy Sagi’s reported personal philanthropy. Globes reported a NIS 1 million Sagi gift to assist families evacuated from the Gaza border. A 2019 report described cumulative US$3 million personal donations for scholarship programmes for discharged Israeli soldiers and referred to military-welfare organisations. Neither report establishes a donation, payment, advocacy act, or logistical support by ExpressVPN or Kape.8, 7

No verified ExpressVPN or Kape lobbying registration, PAC contribution, anti-BDS advocacy role, corporate conflict-period donation, or asset mobilisation was located in the completed searches; the relevant registry checks were not exhaustive. A reported 2023 soldier-transport allegation was not treated as established beyond the source’s limited description of the broader project and the civilian-relief character of Sagi’s reported gift.34, 8

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

Reporting about Sagi’s personal philanthropy is not evidence that ExpressVPN or Kape made the payment or adopted a corporate programme. The rubric nevertheless includes documented acts by a controlling principal: Sagi’s cumulative scholarship support for discharged soldiers supplies the military-welfare financing frame (I=8), the personal rather than institutional company commitment limits M to 5.1, and the controlling-principal rule sets P=9. The 2016 gift reported from Sagi’s parents is separate and is not attributed to Sagi or the company.6, 7, 35 The audits distinguish Sagi personally from the company and distinguish civilian relief, transport home for soldiers on leave, and combat logistics.8, 7

Calls to boycott or cancel ExpressVPN recorded by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre are not treated as verified allegations because the entry disclaims responsibility for linked third-party material’s accuracy. No corporate Israeli-state partnership, state-held share, golden share, military heritage, charter mandate, or Israeli government procurement relationship was identified.20, 33, 9

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

Method: V6.5.

DomainIMPV-Domain Score
Military0.000.000.000.00
Digital6.107.009.006.10
Economic8.307.009.008.30
Political8.005.109.005.83

V_MAX is governed by controlling beneficial ownership through Unikmind/Teddy Sagi under the rubric’s Indigenous Capital / Beneficial Ownership band: I=8.3, M=7 for the continuing substantial controlled business, and P=9 for direct attribution of that operating asset. The Israeli group operations and Webselenese relationship corroborate the group nexus, without establishing current Israel-specific headcount, tax receipts or profit repatriation.6, 2, 3 Digital scoring applies the structural data-routing rule to the physical Tel Aviv endpoint; political scoring applies controlling-principal attribution to the documented military-welfare scholarships. Military remains zero because the reviewed record establishes no qualifying physical military supply or logistics outcome.4, 5, 7, 29

This is a scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted assessment. It does not convert allegations, familial donations, ownership alone, or generic consumer availability into proof of military contracting, state partnership, surveillance access, or settlement operations.

Methodology Note

Footnotes

  1. https://www.kape.com/press-room/ ↩ ↩2

  2. https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/LSE_KAPE_2021.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  3. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3918443,00.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. https://www.expressvpn.com/vpn-server/israel-vpn ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  5. https://www.expressvpn.com/support/knowledge-hub/virtual-server-locations/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  6. https://unikmind-holdings.com/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10

  7. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sagi-salutes-israeli-students-with-scholarships-jobs-1001283846 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  8. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sagi-donates-nis-1m-to-omer-adams-fund-for-evacuees-1001462858 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  9. https://www.expressvpn.com/privacy-policy ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  10. https://mr.gov.il/ilgstorefront/en/news/details/111222 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  11. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. https://www.expressvpn.com/privacy-policy ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  13. https://www.expressvpn.com/about-us ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  14. https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/expressvpn-officially-joins-kape/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  15. https://www.kape.com/our-leadership-team/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/FC038564/officers ↩

  17. https://www.kape.com/about-us/ ↩ ↩2

  18. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/kape-technologies - kape/completion-of-acquisition-business-update/6833468 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  19. https://www.linkedin.com/company/expressvpn/jobs/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  20. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/isrealopt-calls-to-delete-expressvpn-intensify-due-to-owners-alleged-support-for-israeli-military-incl-company-non-response/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  21. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/kape-technologies - kape/-936m-acquisition-of-expressvpn-354m-placing/6825145 ↩ ↩2

  22. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/kape-technologies - kape/final-results/7479849 ↩ ↩2

  23. https://data.fca.org.uk/artefacts/NSM/RNS/4753204.html ↩

  24. https://www.expressvpn.com/tos ↩

  25. https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/k/LSE_KAPE.L_2018.pdf ↩

  26. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/53/24 ↩ ↩2

  27. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/60/19 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  28. https://data.fca.org.uk/artefacts/NSM/RNS/4753204.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  29. https://www.expressvpn.com/vpn-service/military-vpn/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  30. https://www.expressvpn.com/support/knowledge-hub/how-is-expresskeys-data-managed/ ↩ ↩2

  31. https://www.expressvpn.com/wp-ws/uploads-expressvpn/privacy-policy/ExpressVPN_ISAE3000_2025-02-28.pdf ↩ ↩2

  32. https://www.lse.co.uk/rns/KAPE/cash-offer-increased-and-declared-final-xmuyentymh6k8hv.html ↩

  33. https://www.expressvpn.com/llm-info ↩ ↩2

  34. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/isrealopt-calls-to-delete-expressvpn-intensify-due-to-owners-alleged-support-for-israeli-military-incl-company-non-response/ ↩

  35. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-4874525%2C00.html ↩