Target: Automobile-Dacia S.A. / Dacia automotive brand Parent: Renault S.A. / Renault Group Research date: 22 October 2026 Request ID: f1f5c5d1-9fe3-45b3-8f5b-c97fbf3b167b Scope: Israeli defence and security supply chains, military logistics, weapons systems, occupied territories, controlling shareholders and integrated group operations.
Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement
Corporate structure and attribution
Automobile-Dacia S.A. is a Romanian automotive manufacturer headquartered in Mioveni; its official corporate disclosure identifies Renault S.A. as holding 99.4263360915% of its shares, with approximately 0.57% distributed among minority shareholders.1
Renault Group’s 2025 ownership disclosure identifies the French State as holding 15.01% of Renault S.A. share capital and Nissan Finance Co., Ltd. as holding 15.00%, with both percentages expressly dated 31 December 2025.2
Renault’s board disclosures identify Jean-Dominique Senard as chairman and François Provost as chief executive officer, alongside French State representatives Alexis Zajdenweber and Constance Maréchal-Dereu and two Nissan-nominated directors.3
Israeli distribution arrangements
Carasso Group is identified by Afifi Group as the Israeli importer and distributor of Dacia, Renault, Nissan and several other vehicle brands; the Afifi-Carasso joint venture provides additional Israeli distribution activity.4
Dacia Israel’s official information identifies Dacia as part of Renault Group and states that vehicles imported into Israel are manufactured in Romania and Morocco.5
Israeli government procurement
On 11 June 2025, Israeli business publication ICE reported that Dacia Duster Expression, Duster Hybrid Journey and Jogger Hybrid models were selected in a government hybrid-vehicle competition administered by Israel’s Accountant General.6
The report describes an overall government fleet of approximately 15,000 vehicles serving ministries, Israel Police, the Israel Prison Service, fire and rescue services and other public bodies; it does not allocate specific Dacia models to particular agencies or confirm delivered quantities.6
A separate Israeli defence procurement announcement reported by Calcalist on 23 February 2025 identifies Eldan and Perry as the winners of a roughly 10,000-vehicle IDF personnel leasing competition and lists Skoda Fabia, Skoda Scala, Skoda Kamiq, Kia Stonic and Opel Frontera as the selected models, without identifying Dacia.7
The June 2025 government-fleet model selection and February 2025 IDF leasing announcement concern separate procurement exercises and do not establish the same purchasing authority, award or vehicle allocation.7, 6
Historic military vehicle use
[pre-2020] Renault Israel’s corporate history describes the Renault 4 as a vehicle associated for many years with IDF officers; a 25 November 2007 Ynet article independently describes the model as a former IDF commander’s vehicle.8, 9
[pre-2020] The reviewed historical accounts do not identify a specific Renault 4 procurement contract, number of vehicles, military purchasing authority, or precise commencement and cessation dates.8, 9
Direct contracts and defence directories
No public evidence identified of a current Dacia-specific contract, tender award or framework agreement directly with the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service or Border Police in the reviewed procurement and manufacturer materials.1, 7, 6
No public evidence identified of Dacia appearing as an Israeli defence contractor in the reviewed corporate defence announcements; Renault Group’s disclosed 2026 programmes identify French defence-industry collaborations.10, 11, 12
No public evidence identified of a Dacia-specific Israeli SIBAT defence export-directory listing or documented military procurement memorandum.10, 11, 7
Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants
Civilian vehicle capabilities
Dacia Israel currently markets the Duster as a civilian SUV available with 4x4 capability, hybrid powertrains and configurable driving modes; the published Israeli product information does not describe an IDF-specific or armoured military variant.13
The June 2025 government-fleet competition selected civilian Duster and Jogger variants, with no disclosed military adaptation or tactical specification in the reviewed announcement.6
Parent-group tactical development
On 15 June 2026, Renault Group and Thales unveiled 4 TROOP at Eurosatory, describing it as a multi-role tactical vehicle prototype based on a civilian vehicle architecture and incorporating secure communications, sensors, UAV integration and AI-assisted decision-support capabilities.11
Renault’s 19 June 2026 defence overview states that 4 TROOP draws on its Vision4Rescue concept and combines Renault automotive engineering with Thales technologies for land forces; the reviewed material does not establish Dacia-branded production or Israeli military orders.10
Purpose-built military products
On 10 February 2026, Renault Group announced plans to assemble CHORUS drones at its Le Mans facility in partnership with Turgis Gaillard, with potential industrial capacity of up to 600 units per month within approximately one year.14
Renault Group’s June 2026 defence overview assigns Renault industrialisation and product-process responsibilities, while Turgis Gaillard handles aeronautical design, navigation software and testing.10
No public evidence identified that Dacia itself manufactures a dedicated Israeli tactical variant, military drone or weapons-integration product, or that CHORUS or 4 TROOP has been supplied to Israeli security forces.10, 14, 11
Civilian-to-military distinction
The available Duster product material establishes civilian four-wheel-drive capabilities, while Renault’s separate 2026 announcements explicitly describe military-purpose programmes; neither source establishes an Israeli military adaptation of a Dacia vehicle.13, 10, 11
Export authorisation
No public evidence identified of a Dacia-specific Israeli military end-user certificate, defence export-licence approval, denial or suspension in the reviewed French regulatory and corporate material.15, 16, 17
Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure
Occupied-territory commercial presence
Dacia Israel’s current authorised service directory lists the Tzarfati service centre at 5 Prigan Street, Mishor Adumim industrial zone, Ma’ale Adumim, offering mechanical, electrical and air-conditioning services for passenger and commercial vehicles.18
The directory identifies a Dacia-authorised service location in the Ma’ale Adumim settlement area but does not state that Automobile-Dacia S.A. owns the premises or identify Israeli military customers.18
Dacia Israel’s published customer information states that its authorised service network provides maintenance and repairs, including manufacturer-backed service and parts warranties.5
Construction and demolition machinery
The reviewed Dacia product information describes passenger and light commercial vehicles rather than dedicated heavy construction machinery or demolition equipment.13, 5
No public evidence identified of Dacia vehicles or machinery being specifically supplied for settlement construction, checkpoint development, separation-barrier works or demolition operations in occupied territories.18, 13
Contracts and distribution pathways
No public evidence identified of a Dacia-specific construction, demolition, engineering or military-infrastructure contract in the reviewed manufacturer, distributor and official procurement sources.1, 18, 7
No public evidence identified establishing whether any Dacia vehicle used for such activities, if present, reached its end-user through authorised distribution, direct manufacturer supply or secondary resale.4, 18, 13
Settlement-area service continuation
Dacia Israel continued to advertise the Mishor Adumim authorised service location when its service directory was consulted in October 2026, after both the 19 July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and November 2024 ICC arrest-warrant decisions; the listing does not establish when the individual centre became authorised or whether authorisation was uninterrupted throughout that period.18
No public evidence identified that the location provides military engineering, settlement-construction equipment or dedicated IDF vehicle maintenance.18, 5
Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes
Israeli defence manufacturers
[pre-2020] A report published on 5 May 2013 states that Israel Aerospace Industries entered a lease with Better Place for several dozen Renault Fluence Z.E. electric vehicles to replace conventional cars in its company pool.19
The documented transaction concerned civilian Renault-branded vehicles leased through Better Place; the report does not establish Dacia participation or Renault/Dacia supply of weapons components to IAI.19
No public evidence identified of Dacia supplying propulsion systems, electronics, structural components, communications equipment or other military subsystems to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael or Israeli Military Industries in the reviewed sources.10, 11, 19
Parent-group defence partnerships
In June 2026, Renault Group announced two defence collaborations with Thales involving a tactical multi-role vehicle and industrial production of loitering munitions; the announcements identify French defence-industrial objectives rather than Israeli co-production.11, 12
Renault Group’s TOUTATIS announcement describes a cooperation agreement with Thales for industrial development and production capacity that could reach 1,000 loitering munitions per month from the first production year, potentially beginning in 2027.12
No public evidence identified of an Israeli company being a licensed manufacturer, technology-transfer recipient, integration contractor or customer under the cited Renault-Thales programmes.11, 12
Former Renault-branded defence business
[pre-2020] Volvo’s corporate history records that Renault’s truck operations transferred to AB Volvo effective 2 January 2001; the historical transaction concerned Renault’s truck business rather than Automobile-Dacia S.A.20
Volvo Group announced completion of its sale of Arquus to John Cockerill Defense on 2 July 2024, identifying Arquus as a specialist producer of defence vehicles.20
No public evidence identified in the reviewed ownership disclosures establishing that Automobile-Dacia S.A. currently owns Arquus or Renault Trucks Defense.1, 20
Logistical Sustainment & Base Services
Carasso/Freesbe support to Israeli forces
In October 2023, Freesbe, formerly Carasso Motors, publicly stated that it had begun mobilising personnel and vehicle resources on 8 October 2023 and had adopted IDF Division 98 to provide equipment and food.21
Its statement describes transportation of equipment and food using commercial vehicles and employees’ assigned vehicles, including deliveries to military bases and outposts near Israel’s northern border, the Golan Heights, Paran and Eilat.21
Israeli publication ICE independently reported the Division 98 assistance and mobilisation of cars and trucks on 22 October 2023.22
Contemporary iCar reporting separately documented Freesbe’s mobilisation of company vehicles and refrigerated trucks for transport and supply missions, alongside civilian relief activity.23
A further iCar report described continuing assistance during October 2023, including food and equipment for Division 98, movement of soldiers, medical personnel and supplies, and transport support for displaced civilians.24
The Freesbe statement also reported NIS 500,000 donated to evacuees from communities near Gaza; the stated donation beneficiaries were evacuees rather than an identified military procurement body.21
Manufacturer and vehicle attribution
The relevant reports identify Freesbe/Carasso as the operator of the transport activity, but do not identify the individual vehicles as Dacia models or state that Dacia or Renault Group ordered, financed or reimbursed those missions.21, 22, 23
Freesbe’s distribution portfolio covers several automotive manufacturers, including Dacia and Renault, which prevents identification of the vehicles used in the 2023 operations solely from its role as Dacia distributor.4, 23
The October 2023 reports establish wartime logistical assistance, but do not document a paid IMOD transport contract, a military vehicle procurement award, or continuation of the described Division 98 programme beyond 2023.21, 22, 24
Geographic scope
Freesbe’s statement explicitly identifies military logistics destinations including the Golan Heights; it does not identify the individual recipient installations or establish deliveries to a specific settlement or military facility within occupied territory.21
Maintenance and sustainment
Renault Group’s 2026 defence overview describes potential military maintenance and operational-readiness support through its established after-sales capabilities for 4 TROOP-type vehicles; it does not identify Israel as the customer.10
No public evidence identified of a Dacia-specific contract to provide maintenance, catering, fuel, facilities management, telecommunications or waste services at an Israeli military installation.18, 10, 7
Military cargo and shipping
No public evidence identified of Dacia operating a dedicated shipping, port-handling or freight-forwarding contract for Israeli arms shipments in the reviewed corporate and official defence material.1, 10, 7
Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms
Parent-group loitering munition development
On 16 June 2026, Renault Group and Thales announced a strategic partnership to industrialise production of TOUTATIS, a loitering munition intended for military operations, with possible production beginning in 2027.12
The companies described Renault Group’s contribution as industrial engineering and large-scale manufacturing capability, while Thales supplies specialist defence-system expertise.12
The programme constitutes disclosed parent-group participation in a purpose-built munition platform; the cited announcement does not identify an Israeli customer, an Israeli manufacturing site or Automobile-Dacia S.A. as the producing entity.12
Military drone production
Renault’s February 2026 CHORUS announcement identifies the Le Mans assembly site and Turgis Gaillard partnership as part of a French Ministry of the Armed Forces/DGA-supported initiative.14
The June 2026 Renault defence overview additionally describes military drones and remotely operated munitions as areas where Renault Group is applying automotive industrial capabilities.10
No public evidence identified of CHORUS delivery to Israeli forces or the integration of Dacia-manufactured components into an Israeli kinetic targeting or weapons system.10, 14
French State ownership and Israeli missile-defence components
Renault Group reported the French State as a 15.01% shareholder at 31 December 2025 and identifies formal French State representation on its board.2, 3
A response by France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs published by the Senate on 13 March 2025 states that France authorised certain components for Israel’s Iron Dome system, naming ball bearings, glazing, cooling systems and shock absorbers as examples.15
A separate response by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, published on 11 September 2025, describes exports of components for defensive systems and components assembled in Israel before re-export to third countries.16
SIPRI’s 2025 review independently describes French component transfers associated with Iron Dome and reports that France had not supplied major conventional weapons to Israel during 2020–2024 according to its major-arms transfer database.17
A French government response published on 14 May 2026 reiterated its stated policy of permitting particular defensive or re-export components and separately described an investigation concerning Sermat.25
These records document French State export policy and component supply but do not identify Automobile-Dacia S.A. or Renault Group as the manufacturer or exporter of the Iron Dome components.15, 25, 16
Restricted 2024 component-delivery disclosure
A Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans response published on 27 November 2025 states that a detailed list of French component deliveries to Israel during 2024 was marked “Diffusion Restreinte” and “Spécial France” and had been provided to the chairs of the French National Assembly and Senate defence committees on 11 June 2025.26
The published response does not reproduce the restricted component list or identify Dacia or Renault as a supplier of any listed components.26
Other weapons-system categories
No public evidence identified of Dacia manufacturing or supplying small arms, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, missiles, ammunition, explosive precursors, fighter-aircraft components, naval weapons, tank fire-control systems or guidance electronics for Israeli military end-users.1, 10, 11, 12
Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History
French export-licensing policy
In its response published on 13 March 2025, France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs described restrictions under which components may be authorised for Israeli defensive systems, including Iron Dome, and identified the interministerial arrangements for reviewing military exports.15
The underlying Senate question 01227 was published on 10 October 2024, while the ministerial response was published on 13 March 2025.15
In a separate response published on 11 September 2025, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs described case-by-case authorisation of components for defensive systems and re-export following assembly in Israel, including examination by CIEEMG and CIBDU.16
Senate question 05039, to which that response relates, was published on 12 June 2025; the ministerial answer was published on 11 September 2025.16
In another parliamentary response published on 27 November 2025, the Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans stated that the precise inventory of component deliveries to Israel during 2024 had been disclosed under restricted handling arrangements to the chairs of the parliamentary defence committees on 11 June 2025.26
That November response relates to Senate question 04403, which Senator Raymonde Poncet Monge submitted and which was published on 1 May 2025.26
On 14 May 2026, the French government reported instructing customs authorities to block Sermat exports to Israel provisionally while investigating the relevant transactions.25
No public evidence identified connecting the Sermat investigation or the particular French licences described in these responses to Dacia vehicles or Dacia-manufactured components.15, 25, 16, 26
Dacia-specific licensing and enforcement
No public evidence identified of a granted, rejected, suspended or revoked Israeli military export licence naming Automobile-Dacia S.A. in the reviewed official records.15, 25, 16, 26
No public evidence identified of an arms-embargo investigation, military export-control enforcement action or judicial proceeding naming Dacia in relation to Israeli defence supply in the reviewed regulatory material.15, 25, 16, 26
Post-2024 activity
Renault Group’s CHORUS, 4 TROOP and TOUTATIS defence announcements occurred in February–June 2026, after the July 2024 ICJ advisory opinion and November 2024 ICC arrest-warrant decisions; the announcements describe French defence programmes without identifying an Israeli military customer.10, 14, 11, 12
Dacia Israel’s authorised service network remains publicly advertised in the 2026 research period, including the Ma’ale Adumim-area service centre; the directory does not establish the dates on which that individual centre first became authorised.18
The reviewed evidence of Freesbe’s IDF Division 98 logistical support concerns October 2023 and does not independently establish that the activity continued after July or November 2024.21, 22, 24
Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations
Military and defence-industry scrutiny
SIPRI’s 2025 report discusses French defence-component exports to Israel and the French government’s public position regarding defensive systems and re-export; it does not identify Dacia as a supplier in the passages reviewed.17
Renault Group’s 2026 defence announcements disclose its own military development programmes, including tactical vehicles and loitering munitions, without identifying Israeli end-users.10, 11, 12
Occupied-territory commercial activity
Dacia Israel’s own service directory provides primary evidence of a currently advertised authorised service centre in the Mishor Adumim industrial zone of Ma’ale Adumim; the listing does not document military sales or security-force servicing.18
Military support by an Israeli distributor
Freesbe’s October 2023 public communication and independent Israeli reporting document material and logistics support for IDF Division 98 by an Israeli automotive distributor that also markets Dacia vehicles.4, 21, 22, 23
Campaigns and corporate responses
No public evidence identified in the reviewed Renault/Dacia corporate announcements of a Dacia-specific contract termination, military end-use monitoring commitment or response to an Israel-related defence-supply boycott campaign.1, 10, 11, 12
No public evidence identified in the reviewed official disclosures of a named institutional divestment decision directed specifically at Dacia for supplying weapons to Israel.1, 2, 10, 17
Controlling principals
The reviewed Renault board material identifies French State governance representation, Nissan-nominated directors, chairman Jean-Dominique Senard and chief executive François Provost; no individual Israel-specific military contract or donation by those named directors was established through that material.3
No public evidence identified in the reviewed official governance and defence disclosures of a Dacia-specific executive or Renault board member personally operating a military supply business for the IDF.3, 10, 11, 12
Parliamentary scrutiny of French exports
The French Senate’s November 2025 ministerial response confirms parliamentary scrutiny of component transfers to Israel and the government’s statement that a restricted 2024 delivery inventory had been provided to parliamentary defence-committee chairs; the response does not identify Dacia or Renault.26
Footnotes
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Dacia Romania, corporate legal information, company registration, ownership structure and financial disclosures, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.dacia.ro/despre-dacia/juridic.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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Renault Group, Key Figures, ownership structure dated 31 December 2025, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.renaultgroup.com/en/finance/key-figures/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Renault Group, Board of Directors, governance composition and director biographies, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.renaultgroup.com/en/group/leadership/board-of-directors/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Afifi Group, Afifi-Carasso, corporate description of the Carasso automotive distribution business and joint venture, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.afifi-group.com/category/34/Afifi-Carasso ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Dacia Israel, Frequently Asked Questions, manufacturing locations, Renault ownership and after-sales services, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.dacia.co.il/about-dacia/faq.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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ICE, Winning models in Israeli government’s hybrid vehicle competition, 11 June 2025. https://www.ice.co.il/auto/news/article/1069067 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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Calcalist, IDF personnel vehicle leasing tender results, reporting the Ministry of Defense announcement of 23 February 2025; article by Tomer Hadar, published 23 February 2025. https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/car/article/hkfuxt00q1e ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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Renault Israel, History of Renault Cars in Israel, historical description of Renault 4 military association, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.renault.co.il/about/renault-in-israel.html ↩ ↩2
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Ynet, I remember it from the army, historical Renault 4 article, 25 November 2007. https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3475291,00.html ↩ ↩2
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Renault Group, Military drones and multi-role vehicles: Renault Group puts its expertise to work for defense, 19 June 2026. https://www.renaultgroup.com/en/magazine/technology/military-drones-and-multi-role-vehicles-renault-group-puts-its-expertise-to-work-for-defense/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18
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Renault Group, Eurosatory 2026: Renault Group and Thales unveil 4 TROOP, 15 June 2026. https://media.renaultgroup.com/eurosatory-2026-renault-group-and-thales-unveil-4-troop-an-innovative-tactical-vehicle-for-future-land-forces-engagements?lang=eng ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13
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Renault Group, Renault Group and Thales enter into a strategic partnership to develop a sovereign drone industry in France, June 2026. https://media.renaultgroup.com/renault-group-and-thales-enter-into-a-strategic-partnership-to-develop-a-sovereign-drone-industry-in-france/?lang=eng ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
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Dacia Israel, Duster product overview and civilian 4x4 specifications, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.dacia.co.il/cars/duster/overview.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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Renault Group, Information presse – Drones, CHORUS/Turgis Gaillard announcement, 10 February 2026. https://media.renaultgroup.com/info-presse-drones/?lang=fra ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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French Senate, Vente d’armes par la France à Israël en 2023 et 2024, question published 10 October 2024; Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs response published 13 March 2025. https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2024/qSEQ241001227.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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French Senate, Fourniture d’armes et aide militaire accordées par la France à Israël, question published 12 June 2025; Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs response published 11 September 2025. https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2025/qSEQ250605039.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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SIPRI, How top arms exporters have responded to the war in Gaza: 2025 update, 2025. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/how-top-arms-exporters-have-responded-war-gaza-2025-update ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Dacia Israel, official authorised service-centre directory, including Ma’ale Adumim/Mishor Adumim, accessed 22 October 2026. https://www.dacia.co.il/service/service-centers.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10
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Israel Active, Israel’s space travelers go electric, reporting the IAI–Better Place Renault Fluence Z.E. lease, 5 May 2013. https://israelactive.com/economy-business/israels-space-travelers-go-electric/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Volvo Group, Volvo Group completes divestment of Arquus, 2 July 2024. https://www.volvogroup.com/en/news-and-media/news/2024/jul/volvo-group-completes-divestment-of-arquus.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Freesbe, public company statement on wartime logistical activities, IDF Division 98, vehicle mobilisation and donations, October 2023. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/freesbeisrael_%D7%94%D7%97%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8-%D7%94%D7%98%D7%91%D7%97-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%90-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99-activity-7120804184072855554-0O2P ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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ICE, Freesbe provides vehicle fleet and donates half a million shekels, 22 October 2023. https://www.ice.co.il/auto/news/article/984951 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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iCar, Israeli automotive sector mobilises for the IDF and southern residents, October 2023. https://www.icar.co.il/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%91/%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%A3_%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A1_%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9F_%D7%A6%D7%94%22%D7%9C_%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%99_%D7%94%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9D/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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iCar, Israel mobilises: initiatives in the transport sector, October 2023. https://www.icar.co.il/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%91/%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C_%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%92%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%AA_%E2%80%93_%D7%99%D7%95%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%A3_%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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French Senate, Ventes d’armes vers Israël, question published 13 November 2025; Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans response published 14 May 2026. https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2025/qSEQ251106671.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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French Senate, Transfert et exportation d’armes vers Israël, written question 04403 by Raymonde Poncet Monge, published 1 May 2025; Ministry of the Armed Forces and Veterans response published 27 November 2025, confirming the reported restricted parliamentary disclosure of the 2024 component-delivery list on 11 June 2025. https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2025/qSEQ250504403.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8