Military Audit: Emirates

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of any contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Emirates (the airline or The Emirates Group) and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the IDF, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police. Emirates does not appear as a listed party in the Israeli SIBAT defence-export directory context surfaced during research. This scope excludes UAE state defence entities such as EDGE Group and Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC), which despite sharing the “Emirates” name are separately owned by the Abu Dhabi government, Mubadala, and Tawazun Holding, with no ownership link to Emirates airline or its parent, the Investment Corporation of Dubai ¹²³⁴.

Two additional recurring name-conflation traps were identified and excluded from findings in this update. First, “Elbit Systems Emirates” (ESE) is Elbit Systems’ own UAE-registered subsidiary, established in November 2021 following the Abraham Accords and named for the country “United Arab Emirates” rather than for Emirates airline. ESE was awarded an approximately $53 million contract to supply DIRCM and airborne electronic-warfare self-protection systems to the UAE Air Force’s A330 MRTT fleet; this is an Elbit-owned entity performing UAE-state defence procurement and has no connection to Emirates airline or The Emirates Group ⁵⁶. Second, “Emirates-Israel Investments Group” (EIIG) is a private Israeli/UAE investment-matching platform founded in 2019, representing third-party investors seeking UAE/Israel market opportunities; no ownership or operational link to Emirates airline, The Emirates Group, or the Investment Corporation of Dubai was identified ⁷. Both entities should continue to be excluded from any Emirates-airline-attributed findings alongside EDGE Group, EDIC, flydubai, and Emirates Telecommunications/e&.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Emirates is a passenger and cargo air-services provider rather than a manufacturer, and no public evidence identified of ruggedised or mil-spec product lines marketed by Emirates to Israeli security forces. Emirates’ published passenger dangerous-goods policy explicitly prohibits firearms, ammunition, explosives, and munitions as passenger baggage beyond narrowly defined personal-use limits, with declared ammunition capped at 5kg and requiring advance approval; no evidence indicates this policy differs for Israeli end-users specifically. No new evidence on this sub-category was identified in the updated research pass.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified of Emirates equipment, vehicles, or machinery being used in settlement, separation-barrier, or military-installation construction or demolition. Amnesty International’s Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians (2022) references Emirates only in the context of the 2020 Abraham Accords political announcement, not construction or infrastructure activity ⁸. Human Rights Watch’s A Threshold Crossed (2021) similarly references Emirates only in the same diplomatic context ⁹. No public evidence identified of construction or engineering contracts involving Emirates for checkpoints, detention facilities, or settlement infrastructure.

A targeted settlement-nexus check in this update - covering Emirates-branded activity connected to West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Golan Heights settlement construction, demolition, tourism routing, or infrastructure - likewise found no public evidence identified. The Who Profits Touring Israeli Settlements report and the UN OCHA list of companies operating in West Bank settlements do not name Emirates. No settlement nexus for this target has been identified.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Emirates holds a verified, ongoing commercial relationship with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), a wholly Israeli state-owned defence prime and manufacturer of the Arrow ballistic-missile-defence family ¹⁰¹¹. In November 2021, announced at the Dubai Airshow, IAI signed an agreement with Emirates to convert Boeing 777-300ER passenger aircraft into freighters under IAI’s “Big Twin” passenger-to-freighter (P2F) programme ¹²¹³¹⁴. Order-size reporting has since been partially reconciled: AP wire copy and AirportSpotting/StatTimes reporting indicate the order covers ten Boeing 777-300ERs from Emirates’ own fleet ¹⁵¹⁶¹⁷, while a FlightGlobal headline from June 2026 refers to “the first of five” converted freighters - plausibly a phased-delivery figure within the larger ten-aircraft total, though this interpretation is not confirmed by any source stating both figures together, and FlightGlobal itself could not be independently fetched (represented only by a search snippet) ¹⁸. This discrepancy remains unreconciled.

Updated evidence materially refines the facility-location finding from the prior audit. The prior audit described conversion work occurring at “IAI’s facility co-located within Etihad Engineering’s MRO centre in Abu Dhabi.” Current evidence establishes that the first Emirates-fleet aircraft actually converted and delivered - registration A6-EBK, originally delivered new to Emirates in 2006 - underwent its conversion at IAI’s own facility in Lod, Israel (co-located with the Ben Gurion/Tel Aviv airport area), described as “the first of ten Boeing 777-300ERs from Emirates’ own fleet” to be converted; the aircraft re-entered commercial service on the Dubai–Hong Kong route as flight EK9860 on 30 June 2026 ¹⁵. The Abu Dhabi Etihad Engineering/IAI conversion line, originally announced in 2021 as intended to become “the largest and most advanced [P2F facility] in the Middle East,” appears to have become operational as a third induction site only around July 2026, after a 2007-vintage 777-300ER landed there for conversion - i.e., after the first Emirates aircraft had already completed its conversion cycle in Israel ¹⁹. This indicates that at least one Emirates-owned, Emirates-liveried commercial aircraft has physically entered Israel and operated at an Israeli defence prime’s home facility for conversion work, representing a more direct geographic and operational nexus with Israeli soil and Israeli defence-prime infrastructure than the Abu Dhabi-based characterisation in the prior audit suggested ¹⁵¹⁹.

Separately, the IAI “Big Twin” programme’s prototype/demonstrator aircraft (originally an Emirates-fleet aircraft sold via a leasing company before the Emirates–IAI commercial deal was signed) was ferried to IAI’s Tel Aviv/Lod facility in 2020 for the prototype conversion, conducted its maiden flight from Tel Aviv, and was delivered to launch customer Kalitta Air rather than to Emirates; this prototype is the STC-certification aircraft for the wider programme and is not part of Emirates’ own fleet order, and should not be conflated with the Emirates-owned A6-EBK conversion described above ¹⁶. IAI achieved STC certification for the conversion from the FAA and Israel CAA in 2025, becoming the first company approved for a 777-300ER P2F conversion ²⁰.

The relationship began in 2021 and has continued, without any reported pause or review, across the 19 July 2024 ICJ Advisory Opinion, the November 2024 ICC arrest warrants, and the June 2026 Israel-Iran war period (during which Emirates suspended unrelated regional passenger routes but the IAI conversion programme itself continued uninterrupted), through the delivery of the first converted Emirates aircraft in mid-2026 and confirmed continuing fleet expansion plans reported as of late 2025/2026 ^1220211517. This is a civil aviation MRO/manufacturing-services contract for passenger-to-freighter cargo conversion, not a weapons or military-platform transaction, and no public evidence identified tying the conversion work itself to any military end-use. No public evidence identified of NGO or BDS campaigns specifically targeting the Emirates–IAI conversion relationship; searches for company- or contract-specific criticism surfaced only general anti-normalization commentary directed at the broader 2020 Abraham Accords, not at this transaction ²².

No public evidence identified of Emirates supplying components, sub-systems, or manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land. Separately, EDGE Group’s January 2025 acquisition of a 30% stake in Israeli drone-detection firm ThirdEye Systems Ltd was confirmed as a transaction of the UAE state defence conglomerate EDGE Group, not of Emirates airline, reaffirming the existing scope-boundary exclusion rather than changing it ²³²⁴.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of Emirates or dnata service contracts - catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities, or telecoms - supplied to IDF bases, training facilities, or detention centres in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev. dnata, the Emirates Group’s ground-services and catering arm, does not operate ground handling directly at Ben Gurion Airport, where the three ground handlers are QAS, Laufer, and Aero Handling. dnata’s “marhaba” meet-and-assist brand maintains a partnership with Laufer Aviation-GHI to offer Tel Aviv meet-and-assist services, which is a civilian VIP passenger-concierge service rather than a base-services or military logistics contract ²⁵.

No public evidence identified of Emirates SkyCargo shipping, freight, or port-handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli military cargo or arms shipments. The August 2025 Il-76TD shipment from Al Dhafra/Al-Reef Air Base, Abu Dhabi, to Ramon Airport in southern Israel - reported as carrying approximately 40 tonnes of equipment and described as the first known direct UAE-to-Israel arms transfer - involved a UAE state or military aircraft and is not attributable to Emirates airline or Emirates SkyCargo ²⁶.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of Emirates acting as a manufacturer, licensee, or supplier of small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, munitions, or strategic-system components - including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft, tanks, or warships - to Israeli forces. Emirates’ single verified Israel-linked defence-prime relationship, the IAI aircraft-conversion agreement detailed above, is a civil aircraft-conversion contract rather than a weapons-platform transaction ^121320211519.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of export-licence grants, denials, or suspensions specific to Emirates’ dealings with Israeli military or security end-users in any jurisdiction. No public evidence identified of arms-embargo or sanctions-compliance enforcement actions taken against Emirates related to Israel. No public evidence identified of court proceedings or judicial review specifically concerning Emirates’ defence supply relationship with Israel; unrelated litigation exists, such as EU Regulation 261 passenger-compensation cases, but these concern consumer flight-delay law rather than defence supply and are out of scope. No new evidence on this sub-category was identified in the updated research pass.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Emirates does not appear in a range of checked authoritative and NGO sources, including UN A/HRC/59/23 (Albanese, 2025), the UN OHCHR settlement database, PAX’s Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers (2024), Al-Haq’s Business and Human Rights (2024), BankTrack’s Don’t Buy Into Occupation reports, BDS Movement’s Corporate Priority Targets (Nov 2024), and Who Profits’ Financing Land Grab and Touring Israeli Settlements reports. The Norwegian pension fund KLP’s excluded-companies list references “Emirates Telecommunications Group Co PJSC” (e&/Etisalat), a separate Abu Dhabi telecom operator unconnected to Emirates airline, and is therefore not attributable to the target ²⁷. BDS Movement/PACBI has called for a boycott of the Emirates Airline Festival of Literature, a Dubai cultural event sponsored by Emirates, in both 2022 and 2026, on the stated grounds that the festival “whitewashes” the UAE government’s human-rights record and its perceived complicity in “war crimes in Palestine and Sudan” ²⁸²⁹. This campaign targets Emirates’ sponsorship of a cultural event tied to broader UAE state conduct rather than being a defence-sector-specific campaign, and no institutional divestment decision by a pension fund or sovereign wealth fund tied to this campaign was identified ²⁸²⁹. Reporting by JNS states that as Israel-UAE ties deepened following the Abraham Accords, BDS advocates largely abandoned a broader boycott of Israel-linked commerce inside the UAE, though this is general political context rather than Emirates-specific evidence ³⁰. An unverified January 2021 report claiming Emirates suspended a named pilot for refusing to fly the newly launched Tel Aviv route was retracted after Emirates stated it had never employed anyone by that name and called the reports false; this is included explicitly as a debunked claim, not as evidence ³¹. A source describing itself as “Emirates Leaks,” an anti-UAE outlet whose backers are contested in some reporting, surfaced claims about “Emirates officials” supporting Israel; these claims were not independently verified against a primary source and are therefore excluded from findings under the aggregator-sourcing rule.

A separate aggregator lead, “Islam21c,” was directly checked in this update. Its single reference to Emirates airline is limited to a description of commercial flight-volume growth (“The UAE’s Etihad, Emirates, flydubai, and its airports boosted operations, keeping Israel connected…”) rather than any weapons or military-logistics claim; its weapons-supply allegations name EDGE Group specifically, consistent with the existing scope-boundary exclusion, and no claim in this source is attributable to Emirates airline ²².

Controlling principals. Targeted searches for Emirates Group Chairman & CEO Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, President Tim Clark, and the Investment Corporation of Dubai’s reconstituted board found no public evidence identified of defence-board roles, Israeli-defence-industry directorships, FIDF/reservist-fund donations, or personal equity in Israeli defence primes held by any of these individuals. The Investment Corporation of Dubai’s board was reconstituted on 3 October 2023, chaired by Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed with Sheikh Maktoum bin Mohammed as vice-chair and Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum (also Emirates chairman) among its members alongside Mohamed Al Hussaini, Reem Al Hashimy, Sultan Al Mansouri, Mohammed Al Shaibani, Abdulrahman Al Saleh, and Helal Al Marri ³². No public evidence identified linking any named ICD board member individually to Israeli defence-sector directorships, FIDF donations, or personal equity in Israeli defence primes.

Flight-suspension chronology, refreshed. Emirates suspended Tel Aviv service on 12 October 2023 following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war ³³. By mid-November 2025, Tel Aviv flights had been removed entirely from Emirates’ published schedule, reported by Yahoo/wire copy as Emirates “permanently” ending Tel Aviv service ³⁴, with Simple Flying’s direct review of Emirates’ schedule independently corroborating a definitive removal of the route with no stated resumption date ³⁵. On 3 February 2026, Haaretz (citing Bloomberg) and Aviation A2Z reported that Emirates was working to restart Dubai–Tel Aviv flights after a roughly two-year pause, though neither outlet cited a confirmed resumption date or an official Emirates announcement ³⁶³⁷. In June 2026, amid the Israel-US-Iran war, Emirates suspended flights to Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq, with Tel Aviv service - already not operating - remaining suspended ³⁸; UAE airspace restrictions stemming from the Iran war were reported lifted by 3 May 2026, a date that precedes the June disruption reported separately by Gulf News, a discrepancy not reconciled between the two outlets ³⁹³⁸. As of the current audit date, Emirates continues not to operate to Tel Aviv, with flydubai continuing to serve the route separately ³⁶³⁷. Throughout this period, Emirates has attributed the suspension to “safety concerns” rather than human-rights considerations, and no evidence identified in this update changes that characterisation ³⁴³³.

In a related development, Israel’s Transportation Ministry in May 2026 proposed granting Emirates “seventh freedom” traffic rights to operate Tel Aviv–New York and Tel Aviv–Bangkok routes without landing in the UAE, with senior Israeli and Emirati officials - including Emirates representatives - reported to have met to advance the proposal. The proposal is reported to face expected legal challenges from El Al, Israir, and Arkia and would require changes to Israeli aviation law; no Emirates public statement or response was identified ⁴⁰. This indicates active, ongoing high-level engagement between the Israeli government and Emirates on route rights even while direct Emirates passenger service to Tel Aviv remains suspended, relevant context for assessing whether the commercial relationship should be characterised as suspended or as an ongoing relationship under active bilateral discussion.