INDEX / DIRECTORY / HOMEBASE / MILITARY

Homebase MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-09-22
Military Score 0.00 /10 E Homebase - Complicity Index 139
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Homebase’s current website identifies CDS Superstores International Ltd, trading as The Range, as owner of homebase.co.uk and controller of personal data processed through the site 1.

In November 2024, the administrators of HHGL Limited and Hampden Group Limited sold up to 70 UK Homebase stores, the Homebase brand, and associated intellectual property to CDS (Superstores International) 2.

Companies House records CDS as the sole active person with significant control of Homebase Limited, holding more than 75% of its shares and voting rights and rights to appoint or remove directors, with notification dated 10 October 2025 3.

No public evidence identified.

The reviewed public materials did not identify a Homebase, CDS, Homebase Group, or related-principal contract, framework agreement, tender award, joint venture, or official procurement announcement involving the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or another Israeli security body 3, 4, 5, 6.

Homebase and its evidenced group entities were not identified in the reviewed publicly accessible Israeli Ministry of Defense defence, homeland-security, and cyber-defence directory 6.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Homebase’s 2022 outdoor-living catalogue listed Keter-branded consumer garden and storage structures using Keter’s “Evotech” composite technology 7.

The catalogue presents these as ordinary consumer outdoor products and does not describe ruggedised, tactical, military-specification, or security-force variants 7.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials that Homebase developed, marketed, contract-modified, or sold a tactical or military-specification product to an Israeli state-security end user 7, 5, 6.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of export-licence applications, end-user certificates, or export-control decisions naming Homebase, CDS Superstores, or Homebase Group in connection with Israeli military or security end users 3, 4, 6.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified of Homebase-branded machinery, vehicles, construction equipment, or direct construction or maintenance services being used for settlements, the separation barrier, checkpoints, detention facilities, or military installations 7, 5, 8, 6.

A 2012 Prosper Palestine report stated that Keter plastic garden and storage products were sold through Homebase in the United Kingdom, relying on Keter’s then-current “Where to buy” information from May 2011 9.

That report stated that Keter operated two plants in Barkan but could not determine which plant supplied UK products, characterising possible West Bank-factory sourcing as unresolved rather than verified 9.

The 2022 catalogue confirms a later civilian Keter product listing but does not state manufacturing location, establish that any goods originated in a settlement, or demonstrate direct procurement from Keter by Homebase 7.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Homebase, CDS Superstores, Homebase Group, or named corporate principals supplying components, materials, manufacturing services, or technology to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, IMI/Elbit Land, or another Israeli defence prime 3, 4, 5, 6.

No public evidence identified of joint development, co-production, technology transfer, or licensed-manufacturing agreements between those entities and Israeli defence manufacturers 5, 6.

The documented Keter retail lead concerns consumer garden and storage products and does not establish defence-prime supply-chain integration 7, 9.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of Homebase or its group entities providing catering, transport, fuel, waste, facilities, telecommunications, shipping, freight-forwarding, or port-handling services specifically for IDF bases, detention centres, military facilities, or Israeli arms shipments 3, 4, 5, 6.

No public evidence identified of such services at installations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, or the Negev 5, 8.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of Homebase or its group entities acting as a weapons prime, licensed weapons manufacturer, munitions supplier, strategic-platform supplier, or provider of critical subsystems for Israeli lethal systems 3, 4, 5, 6.

The available Keter-related evidence concerns civilian garden and storage products and does not evidence a weapons, munitions, or military-platform supply relationship 7, 9.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of an export-control enforcement action, sanctions or arms-embargo investigation, licence suspension, court proceeding, OECD National Contact Point complaint, or judicial review naming Homebase in relation to defence supply to Israel 3, 4, 5, 6.

The reviewed materials establish no verified Homebase military-channel activity continuing after 19 July 2024 or after the November 2024 administration and asset sale 2, 5, 8.

The absence findings are limited to the publicly searchable materials reviewed and do not substitute for Israeli procurement files, export-licensing datasets, or other non-reviewed primary records 5, 6.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The supplied document-scoped checks found no Homebase mention in the reviewed UN Special Rapporteur report, OHCHR settlement-database update, and BDS guide, which does not establish absence from other editions, databases, or civil-society evidence sources 5, 8, 10.

The 2012 Prosper Palestine report is the only documented lead in the supplied materials connecting Homebase to an Israeli-linked supplier, through historic UK retail availability of Keter consumer products 9.

That report leaves product factory of origin unresolved and does not allege that Homebase maintained a military or security supply relationship 9.

No public evidence identified of a boycott, divestment, exclusion decision, corporate response, end-use-monitoring commitment, or policy change directed at Homebase specifically for Israeli defence-sector activity 1, 5, 10.

Companies House records Christopher Frederick Dawson as Homebase Limited’s sole active director, appointed on 10 October 2025 11.

CDS is controlled by Norton Group Holdings Limited, while Christopher Frederick Dawson and Sarah Jane Dawson are recorded as active PSCs of CDS with significant influence or control 12.

Norton Group Holdings records Sarah Jane Dawson as holding more than 75% of shares and voting rights, with Christopher Frederick Dawson recorded as exercising significant influence or control 13.

No public evidence identified within the reviewed focused searches and supplied report scan of defence-board roles, Israeli defence-prime holdings, Israel- or IDF-related charitable giving, political contributions, lobbying, public co-belligerency statements, or settlement-organisation affiliations by the identified Homebase and CDS principals 5, 8.

Footnotes

  1. https://www.homebase.co.uk/en-uk/legal/privacy-policy ↩ ↩2

  2. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hhgl-limited-and-hampden-group-limited-trading-as-homebase-in-administration-information-for-employees-and-creditors ↩ ↩2

  3. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16777483/persons-with-significant-control ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  4. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/04071533/officers ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  5. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/23 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14

  6. https://mod.gov.il/media/otaeo2yv/%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%90_250811_080922-1-_compressed.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  7. https://s1.thcdn.com/design-assets/documents/homebase/Homebase%20Outdoor%20Living%202022.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  8. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  9. https://www.france-palestine.org/IMG/pdf/prosper_palestine___0828_pp_research.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  10. https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩ ↩2

  11. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16777483/officers ↩

  12. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/02699203/persons-with-significant-control ↩

  13. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/09562778/persons-with-significant-control ↩