INDEX / DIRECTORY / PROTON / MILITARY

Proton MILITARY

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-08-27
Military Score 0.00 /10 C Proton - BDS-1000 579
Military 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream - see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

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Proton Military Audit

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Proton’s public corporate materials describe Proton AG as a Swiss company focused on privacy, email, VPN, cloud storage, password management, and related internet services, and the reviewed official pages do not describe defence, military, or Israeli state-security contracting activity.1234

The reviewed Proton ownership and foundation materials state that Proton is structured around Swiss corporate and foundation governance, but they do not disclose contracts, memoranda of understanding, or procurement awards involving the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Israel Defense Forces, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or other Israeli security bodies.34

Proton’s June 17, 2024 announcement states that Proton is transitioning toward a non-profit structure and identifies the Proton Foundation as Proton AG’s primary shareholder, while the reviewed official materials continue not to describe defence, military, or Israeli state-security contracting activity.5134

The reviewed current team and governance materials identify named controlling principals and board or trustee figures including Andy Yen, Dingchao Lu, Antonio Gambardella, Carissa Veliz, and Tim Berners-Lee, but they do not disclose Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or other Israeli security contracts.235

Text-search review of the public SIBAT catalogues for DSEI London 2023 and DEFEA 2025 did not surface Proton as a listed exhibitor or participant.67

SIBAT’s Defence and HLS directory page describes the directory as covering Israel’s defence industries, and the reviewed SIBAT materials still did not identify Proton as a defence-industry participant.867

No public evidence identified of verified IMOD, IDF, Israel Prison Service, Border Police, or other Israeli state-security contracts, tender awards, framework agreements, or MoUs involving Proton in the reviewed corporate, SIBAT, and public-source materials.12346758

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Proton publicly markets civilian and business privacy services rather than ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade product variants in the reviewed materials.129

The reviewed Israel server page for Proton VPN markets privacy, streaming, and peer-to-peer functionality and states that Proton VPN operates 14 servers in Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva.9

The reviewed Proton pages do not describe military hardening, tactical deployment features, classified-environment suitability, or dedicated security-force product adaptations for those services.129

Proton’s Wallet terms, last modified on September 9, 2025, describe Proton Financial AG as a wholly owned Swiss subsidiary of Proton AG that develops software for end users, which is consistent in the reviewed materials with civilian software positioning rather than military-specified product lines.10

The current Proton VPN Israel page states that those 14 Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva servers support 10 Gbps connections, ad blocking, and streaming, but the reviewed page does not identify military or security-force end users.9

No public evidence identified of export-licensed, end-user-certified, or military-specified Proton sales to Israeli defence or security end users in the reviewed materials.1467

No public evidence identified of military-specified Proton variants, Israeli security-force sales of tactical variants, or export-licensed or end-user-certified Proton products for Israeli defence or security end users in the reviewed materials.1496710

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

The reviewed sources present Proton as a software and services company rather than a manufacturer or operator of heavy equipment, vehicles, demolition machinery, or construction systems.1211

The only Israel-specific infrastructure identified in the reviewed Proton materials is VPN server presence in Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva.9

The reviewed source does not place that infrastructure in West Bank settlements, East Jerusalem settlements, or the Golan Heights.9

The reviewed Proton team page lists offices in Geneva, Zurich, Paris, London, Barcelona, Skopje, Vilnius, Prague, and Taipei, and no Israel office is disclosed on that page.2

Proton’s reviewed materials, including the Wallet terms, continue to present the group as a software and services business rather than a manufacturer or operator of heavy machinery, vehicles, or construction systems.121110

No public evidence identified of Proton involvement in settlement construction, the separation barrier, military installations in the occupied Palestinian territory, detention facilities, or demolitions.912131411

No public evidence identified of Proton involvement in construction or engineering contracts for settlement construction, military installations in the occupied Palestinian territory, detention facilities, or demolition-linked infrastructure in the reviewed materials.912131411

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of Proton supplying components, subsystems, software modules, licensed services, or manufacturing support to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land in the reviewed materials.121567

A historical Israeli security-sector vendor relationship was identified in Proton’s own incident reporting, which states that Proton partnered with Radware for DDoS mitigation during incidents discussed in 2015 and 2018.1617

Radware’s SEC filing states that Radware is incorporated in Israel and headquartered in Tel Aviv.18

The reviewed materials do not connect that Radware relationship to Israeli defence primes, Israeli military procurement, or post-2018 continuity of the vendor arrangement.161718

A second reviewed SEC filing from March 28, 2025 also states that Radware is incorporated in Israel and headquartered in Tel Aviv, and it notes business risk exposure arising from the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023.19

That Radware evidence is historical as to Proton’s own disclosed relationship, and no reviewed 2019-2026 Proton source located in this expansion pass confirms whether the Proton-Radware arrangement remained ongoing, was discontinued, or was replaced after 2018.16171819

No public evidence identified of Proton supplying components, subsystems, software modules, licensed services, or manufacturing support to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, or IMI/Elbit Land in the reviewed materials covering Proton AG and the currently identified group entities.121567102021

Proton’s reviewed current group materials show operational integration across Proton AG, Proton Financial AG, SimpleLogin, and Standard Notes, but no reviewed source identifies any of those group entities as suppliers to Israeli defence primes.102021

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

The reviewed corporate and product materials do not describe Proton providing catering, transport, fuel, waste, facilities management, telecom support, or other base-service functions to Israeli military or security facilities.129

The reviewed SIBAT catalogues also do not identify Proton in exhibition contexts associated with defence sustainment or base-support services.67

No public evidence identified of Proton providing services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations.12967

No public evidence identified of Proton-specific shipping, freight-forwarding, or port-handling contracts servicing Israeli military cargo or arms shipments.167

No reviewed Proton corporate, support, or product materials describe Proton providing catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications support, or other base services to Israeli military or security facilities.124910

No public evidence identified of Proton service contracts for IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations, including in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights, or the Negev.12967

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified.1214152223

The reviewed sources do not identify Proton as a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, or critical subsystem supplier for small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, drones, naval vessels, missile defence, fighter aircraft, or other lethal or strategic platforms supplied to Israeli forces.1214152223

The reviewed sources also do not publicly describe Proton software as purpose-built targeting, fire-control, kill-chain, or weapons-integration software for Israeli forces.12142223

No public evidence identified of Proton software being publicly described in the reviewed materials as purpose-built autonomous targeting, guidance, or other weapons-integration software for Israeli forces.1214222310

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

The reviewed materials do not identify granted, denied, suspended, or revoked export licences for Proton products to Israeli military or security end users.1467

The reviewed materials also do not identify arms-embargo, sanctions, or export-control enforcement actions against Proton in relation to defence trade with Israel.1414

Proton’s ownership and corporate-structure materials provide limited public visibility into private customer lists, reseller relationships, and any non-public government contracting, which constrains external verification of unpublicised end users.134

No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, OECD National Contact Point complaints, or government litigation naming Proton in connection with defence supply to Israel in the reviewed materials.1414510

The reviewed materials do not identify granted, denied, suspended, or revoked export licences for Proton products to Israeli military or security end users, including for Proton Financial AG’s reviewed software offering.146710

No public evidence identified of arms-embargo, sanctions, or export-control enforcement actions against Proton in relation to defence trade with Israel in the reviewed materials spanning Proton’s current corporate and product pages.141410

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Page-text checks of the public PAX June 2024 report, Al-Haq July 2024 booklet, AFSC “Companies Profiting from the Gaza Genocide” page, and the AFSC Investigate Gaza tag page did not surface Proton.15222311

The OHCHR 2023 settlement-database update, the 2025 UN database publication, and the 2025 UN Special Rapporteur record were reviewed as priority authoritative materials, and no Proton-specific military or settlement finding was developed from those materials during this research pass.121314

No public evidence identified of Proton being a named target of an institutional divestment, exclusion, or boycott action specifically grounded in defence-sector activities linked to Israel in the reviewed materials.15222311

The reviewed Proton materials also do not contain a company statement addressing Israeli defence contracts, settlement operations, or military end-use monitoring.12349

The user-supplied deterministic full-text pre-scan described in the research memo states that Proton was not mentioned in full-text checks of the OHCHR 2023 settlement-database update, the 2025 OHCHR or UN settlement-database update, the 2025 Albanese report record A/HRC/59/23, the June 2024 PAX report, the July 2024 Al-Haq booklet, the checked 2024 KLP excluded-companies material, and the checked BDS guide material.12131415112425

Existing page-text checks of AFSC’s Companies Profiting from the Gaza Genocide page and AFSC Investigate’s Gaza tag page also did not surface Proton.2223

Proton’s current governance materials identify controlling principals and trustees, but no public evidence identified in the reviewed materials indicates defence-board roles, Israeli defence-industry directorships, FIDF-linked donations, or equity stakes in Israeli defence primes by Proton’s named controlling principals.235

Proton’s current Israel-facing commercial activity identified in reviewed official materials is the continued operation and marketing of VPN servers in Tel Aviv and Petah Tikva.9

No public evidence identified of organised boycott, divestment, or exclusion actions specifically targeting Proton for defence-sector activities linked to Israel in the reviewed materials, including the checked KLP and BDS materials referenced in the research memo.2425

No public evidence identified in reviewed Proton materials of a company statement addressing Israeli defence contracts, settlement operations, or military end-use monitoring.12349510

Footnotes

  1. https://proton.me/about ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21 ↩22 ↩23 ↩24 ↩25 ↩26 ↩27 ↩28

  2. https://proton.me/about/team ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21

  3. https://proton.me/foundation ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  4. https://proton.me/support/who-owns-protonmail ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15

  5. https://proton.me/blog/proton-non-profit-foundation ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  6. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Exhibitions/DSEI/Documents/ISRAEL%20at%20DSEI%20LONDON%202023.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13

  7. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/Exhibitions/DEFEA/Documents/ISRAEL%20at%20DEFEA%202025%20updated.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13

  8. https://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/OurServices/Pages/%E2%80%8BDefense%20and%20HLS%20directory.aspx ↩ ↩2

  9. https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers/israel ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16

  10. https://proton.me/wallet/terms ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  11. https://www.alhaq.org/cached_uploads/download/2024/07/04/business-and-human-rights-booklet-1720077751.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  12. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session31/database-hrc3136/23-06-30-Update-israeli-settlement-opt-database-hrc3136.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  13. https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/a-hrc-60-19-aev.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4088356 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11

  15. https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/06/The-Companies-Arming-Israel-and-Their-Financiers-June-2024.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  16. https://proton.me/blog/protonmail-ddos-attacks ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  17. https://proton.me/blog/a-brief-update-regarding-ongoing-ddos-incidents ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  18. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094366/000117891326001923/zk2634899.htm ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094366/000117891325001101/zk2532903.htm ↩ ↩2

  20. https://proton.me/blog/proton-standard-notes-join-forces ↩ ↩2

  21. https://proton.me/support/link-simplelogin-account-proton-account ↩ ↩2

  22. https://afsc.org/gaza-genocide-companies ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  23. https://investigate.afsc.org/tags/gaza-genocide ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  24. https://www.klp.no/en/corporate-responsibility-and-responsible-investments/exclusion-and-dialogue ↩ ↩2

  25. https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩ ↩2