TROY

Key Findings

• Economic: TROY is Türkiye’s domestic payment-card scheme, owned and operated by Bankalararası Kart Merkezi A.Ş. (BKM), whose controlling shareholder is the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye. International acceptance depends on additional payment-network arrangements; the reviewed records do not identify Israel-specific transaction volumes or settlement merchants.^{1, 2, 3}
• Political: Consumer organisations and consumers promoted TROY as an alternative to Visa and Mastercard during Gaza-related boycott campaigns in November 2023. The reviewed campaign sources do not establish that TROY/BKM directed or financed those campaigns.^{4, 5}
• Digital: Discover network participation, Worldline merchant-processing support and Google Play acceptance establish commercial payment relationships. They do not establish Israeli processing locations, Israeli military customers or participation in Project Nimbus.^{6, 7, 8}
• Not found: No public evidence identified in the four audits of attributable Israeli military supply, Israeli-origin surveillance procurement, direct Israeli investment or settlement-specific operations by TROY/BKM. These are findings bounded by the reviewed public record, rather than a certification covering every transaction or undisclosed relationship.^{1, 2, 7, 9, 10}

Target Profile

Executive Summary

TROY is a Turkish domestic payment-card scheme established within BKM in 2016. Participating banks and electronic-money institutions issue TROY-branded cards, while BKM provides the scheme and associated payment infrastructure. BKM also operates Türkiye’s Domestic Clearing and Settlement System, a regulated interbank card-payment system. The CBRT became BKM’s controlling shareholder in April 2020. These records establish the target as a Turkish-controlled financial-infrastructure operation; they do not establish Israeli ownership, headquarters or an acquired Israeli operating identity.^{1, 2, 9, 12}

The clearest documented Israel/Palestine connection is TROY’s adoption by consumers and public bodies responding to the Gaza conflict. In November 2023, consumer campaigners encouraged switching from Visa and Mastercard to TROY, and reporting described municipal adoption. The consumer federation’s primary statement identifies TROY as a preferred domestic alternative. This documents campaign activity involving the brand, but does not establish that BKM organised or sponsored the campaign, substantiate campaigners’ wider financial-flow allegations, or demonstrate a formal TROY/BKM position on Israel’s military operations.^{4, 5, 16}

TROY’s international relationships require similarly precise treatment. Its FAQ describes overseas use through additional international networks carried on eligible cards, including Discover and Diners Club. Discover identifies TROY as an alliance participant, Worldline documents merchant-processing support, and an April 2025 announcement establishes Google Play payment acceptance. These relationships do not identify a particular Israeli merchant, settlement counterparty, Israeli technology supplier or Israeli government customer. Google Play acceptance does not establish Google Cloud procurement or Project Nimbus participation.^{2, 6, 7, 8}

Across the military, digital, economic and political audits, No public evidence identified of an attributable Israeli defence contract, settlement-specific acquiring operation, Israeli investment, Israeli-origin surveillance deployment or donation supporting Israeli military or settlement organisations. Important information remains unavailable: international transaction geography, merchant-level flows and every underlying technology component are not comprehensively disclosed. Those limits prevent a universal assurance of absence, but do not supply affirmative evidence of involvement. The final human-vetted V6.6 outcome is BRS 0, Tier E (Minimal/No Complicity), with all four domain scores fixed at zero.^{1, 2, 7, 10, 17}

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

TROY is the scheme and brand; BKM is the operating legal entity. The official FAQ, contact information and privacy disclosures resolve the political audit’s initial uncertainty over target identification. They support attribution of TROY’s operations to Bankalararası Kart Merkezi Anonim Şirketi without establishing a separate TROY corporation. BKM’s regulatory designation for domestic clearing and settlement should also be distinguished from the broader collection of services discussed in the audits.^{1, 2, 9, 11, 17}

BKM is controlled by Türkiye’s central bank and has Turkish public and private financial institutions among its shareholders. January 2025 reporting identified a CBRT holding of 51.01% and named institutions including Halkbank, Ziraat Bankası, Garanti Bankası, Akbank and İş Bankası among remaining shareholders. The official issuer directory separately identifies institutions offering TROY cards. Issuance participation alone does not establish a bank’s ownership percentage in BKM or make that bank’s unrelated investments attributable to TROY.^{2, 3, 23}

The documented operating model combines card issuance through participating institutions, merchant acceptance, authentication and international network interoperability. No public evidence identified of an Israeli subsidiary, franchise, branch, research centre or settlement-based operating entity belonging to TROY/BKM. Nor do the reviewed records identify an Israeli merchant acquirer holding a direct TROY operating contract. International network participation establishes a route to overseas acceptance, without supplying a complete account of transactions, counterparties or geographic fee allocation.^{1, 2, 7, 11}

Domain Summaries

Military: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of a qualifying Israeli military mechanism. The military audit found no direct contract, procurement programme or defence-specific payment arrangement involving TROY/BKM and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF or another Israeli state-security body. Its reviewed corporate and product records likewise identified no supply of weapons, munitions, military components or defence-specific software.^{1, 10, 24}

The documented products are civilian payment instruments and services: consumer and commercial cards, contactless and mobile payments, wearable payments, QR transactions, online authentication and public-transport payment acceptance. GO Secure Pay is described as payment authentication and fraud prevention. The BKM Transportation Platform concerns civilian public transit. No public evidence identified of military-specific variants, Israeli base-support services or a defence-prime supply relationship attributable to TROY/BKM.^{10, 24, 25, 26}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the absence of a documented Israeli military customer combined with the ordinary financial purpose of the products. The possibility that a general-purpose card might pay for a military-related purchase does not establish a contracted military programme, customised defence service or identifiable supply relationship. Worldline’s integration documentation establishes merchant-payment functionality without identifying such an end-user.^{2, 7, 24}

The records do not disclose the ultimate purpose of every possible merchant transaction. Accordingly, the military finding is No public evidence identified, rather than a claim that no military-connected transaction could ever occur. Turkish public-sector adoption in 2025 documents domestic payment administration and supplies no evidence of service to Israeli military institutions.^{7, 20, 24}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Digital: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of an Israeli digital-infrastructure or surveillance nexus meeting the audit’s attribution requirements. TROY’s documented external relationships comprise Discover network participation, Worldline merchant-processing support and Google Play acceptance. Worldline describes local acquiring integration and functions including authentication, tokenization, refunds and recurring payments. Its documentation does not establish that it supplies BKM’s core domestic switch or hosts TROY’s central transaction database.^{6, 7, 8}

BKM’s wider infrastructure includes GO Secure Pay, SİPER fraud-information sharing and GEÇİT open-banking services. The CBRT describes GEÇİT as developed using domestic personnel and technical resources, while the digital audit cautions that this does not establish the provenance of every underlying component. The reviewed descriptions identify no Israeli surveillance supplier, Israeli government recipient or occupied-territory deployment.^{18, 22, 25, 27}

No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin enterprise-security procurement, an Israeli processing or disaster-recovery facility, Israeli-jurisdiction storage of BKM-controlled payment data, or technology provision to Israeli military or intelligence bodies. The privacy notice identifies categories of personal data and potential recipient classes, but names no specific Israeli recipient or processing location.^{7, 10, 17}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is the documented scope of each relationship. Google Play integration concerns purchases on a digital-content platform; it establishes neither Google Cloud hosting nor Project Nimbus participation. Discover connectivity does not identify transaction routing through Israel. Worldline acceptance support does not establish deployment of an Israeli-origin product within BKM infrastructure.^{6, 7, 8}

Payment-security information exchange and risk-based authentication should not be reclassified as population surveillance without evidence of the relevant supplier, recipient or deployment. SİPER’s documented purpose is financial-fraud information sharing. Nevertheless, the public record does not enumerate every technology supplier, processing location or subcontractor. This unresolved visibility is carried as a limitation, without turning it into an affirmative allegation.^{17, 18, 25}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Economic: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

No public evidence identified of direct Israeli investment, Israeli beneficial control, settlement-specific commercial operations or financing of Israeli state or defence activity by TROY/BKM. The economic audit establishes Turkish ownership and an Istanbul operator address. It identifies no acquired Israeli operating company, Israeli property or processing facility, direct Israeli portfolio holding, sovereign-debt underwriting, or settlement-development lending.^{2, 9, 11, 12}

International acceptance is the principal potential cross-border channel documented in the records. Eligible TROY cards can function through additional international schemes, but the FAQ supplies no transaction-level identification of Israeli merchants, settlement merchants or Israel-attributable fees. No public evidence identified of a directly documented TROY acceptance arrangement with a named settlement merchant or a separately disclosed Israel-derived revenue line.^{2, 24}

The agricultural and physical-goods checks also produced negative findings. No public evidence identified of direct procurement from the named Israeli agricultural exporters, an Israeli importer-of-record subsidiary, or TROY importing, stocking, relabelling or selling settlement-origin goods. These findings are consistent with its documented payment-network business, rather than a retail or agricultural-import operation.^{1, 24, 28}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence combines the absence of a documented Israeli operation or investment with strict entity attribution. Participating issuers and international partners remain separate institutions. Their unrelated portfolios or commercial activities cannot be treated as TROY operations merely because they issue, accept or process its cards.^{2, 7, 23}

TROY states that its domestic infrastructure retains fees and commissions within Türkiye. The economic audit expressly treats this as the operator’s objective, rather than an audited reconciliation of every cross-border fee or payment. Conversely, incomplete geographic financial disclosure cannot establish Israeli profit flows. No public evidence identified of direct profit repatriation into Israel, but the reviewed materials do not resolve every international-network payment.^{2, 12}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Political: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The documented political connection is third-party mobilisation involving TROY during the Gaza conflict. Tüketici Birliği Federasyonu’s 29 November 2023 statement urged switching from Visa and Mastercard to TROY. TRT World reported consumer adoption, while Duvar English reported that 19 Istanbul district municipalities had changed internal financial arrangements as part of a boycott initiative.^{4, 5, 16}

These sources establish campaigners’ actions and motivations. They do not establish TROY/BKM direction, financial sponsorship or independent verification of allegations concerning international networks’ military-related financial flows. No public evidence identified of a formal TROY/BKM declaration supporting Israeli military operations or settlements; no independently verified formal corporate condemnation of Israeli military operations in Gaza was identified either.^{1, 4, 5}

Documented state partnerships are Turkish. They include CBRT control, SGK pensioner-benefits protocols and public-sector payment adoption. The June 2024 SGK agreement concerns pensioners, discounts and card provision; its programme title should not be interpreted as evidence of Israeli military-welfare activity. No public evidence identified of Israeli political lobbying, military-support donations, settlement sponsorship or punitive workplace action against Palestinian solidarity.^{12, 14, 19, 20, 1, 2}

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest defence is that brand use by campaigners does not establish corporate authorship or funding. TROY’s published mission emphasises Turkish financial autonomy, secure payments and domestic infrastructure. Municipal switching and consumer advocacy cannot, by themselves, establish the operator’s formal political position or a verified financial contribution.^{1, 2, 4, 16}

The CBRT’s October 2025 disclosure concerning an audit, criminal complaint and continuing judicial proceedings is a separate governance matter. The announcement established no Israel/Palestine connection, and the dossier draws no such inference. Similarly, the audits’ unsuccessful searches for target-specific settlement findings are bounded by accessible material; they are not a comprehensive certification of absence from every historical investigation.^{21, 29, 30}

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Complicity Index Score

Method: V6.6. Final human-vetted scores.

• V_MAX: 0.00 Avg_OTHERS: 0.00
• BRS Score: 0 Tier: E (Minimal/No Complicity)

All four domains remain zero because the audited record identifies civilian Turkish payment operations and third-party boycott adoption without establishing an attributable Israeli military, digital, economic or political-support mechanism.^{1, 2, 4, 7, 10} Consequently, V_MAX and Avg_OTHERS are both 0.00, yielding the fixed BRS 0 and Tier E outcome. This is a scale-free, evidence-only, human-vetted assessment: company size, generic interoperability and unresolved disclosure gaps do not substitute for documented activity and attribution.

Methodology Note

• This dossier synthesises only the four supplied domain audits, with their evidence cutoff of 26 October 2026. Source citations identify the underlying records used in those audits; no additional investigation is represented here.
• Under V6.6, scale-free Impact (I) concerns activity type, Magnitude (M) concerns scale, and Proximity (P) concerns directness. The supplied final scores are preserved without recalculation.
• The temporal rule mitigates divested or exited operations rather than presenting them as continuing. No qualifying Israeli operation requiring such mitigation was established in these audits.^{1, 2}
• Entity attribution excludes transitive guilt: issuer participation, shareholder relationships, merchant-processing support and international network connectivity do not automatically transfer another institution’s unrelated conduct to TROY/BKM.^{2, 7, 23}
• Verified settlement operations would dual-count under Economic and Political. No public evidence identified of a qualifying TROY/BKM settlement operation in the reviewed record.^{2, 24}
• “No public evidence identified” records a negative finding within the reviewed material. Unresolved processing geography, transaction flows and component provenance remain limitations; neither those gaps nor third-party campaign claims are hardened into verified involvement.^{2, 7, 17, 27}