Zoom - Digital Infrastructure Audit

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Check Point markets a SaaS integration for Zoom that it says can discover and protect third-party Zoom integrations, block risky connections, generate UEBA alerts, and conduct SaaS security-posture and compliance checks ¹.
The Check Point page identifies Check Point as the integration provider; it does not establish that Zoom procures or deploys Check Point products within Zoom’s own infrastructure, nor that Zoom customer data is transferred to Check Point ¹.
A 2021 Israeli Ministry of Justice committee protocol described Naotech Communications Group as Zoom’s official and sole representative in Israel for the relevant procurement, with responsibility for licence purchasing, support, and training ².
The 2021 intermediary relationship is documented only for that procurement, and its current status is not established by the reviewed record ².
Zoom’s FY2024 filing stated that customers in Israel and the surrounding area, combined with customers in the Ukraine-related conflict region, represented approximately 1% of net assets and consolidated revenue for the year ended 31 January 2024 ³.
The filing does not disaggregate Israeli revenue, identify individual Israeli customers, or describe Israeli hosting or research-and-development operations ³.

No public evidence identified of Zoom using Israeli-origin facial recognition, biometric identification, gait analysis, predictive policing, social-media monitoring, or workforce-surveillance products ^{1, 4}.
The documented Check Point relationship concerns SaaS security tooling and product integration rather than a Zoom deployment of biometric or surveillance technology ¹.
No public evidence identified of Zoom supplying surveillance, biometric, or retail-technology systems to Israeli state, military, intelligence, or security bodies ^{4, 5, 6}.

A Ministry of Justice procurement notice recorded an intended single-source purchase of Zoom licences through Neotech Communication Group Ltd., valued at NIS 128,992 for 1 July 2021 through 30 June 2022 ⁷.
The notice identifies Neotech, rather than Zoom, as supplier and evidences procurement of Zoom licences by the Ministry of Justice rather than a direct contract between the ministry and Zoom ⁷.
The 2021 committee protocol described a procurement including 120 licences, a 1,000-participant webinar licence, support, training, account settings, recording support, and advanced-security settings, with a published maximum of NIS 110,250 excluding VAT ².
The procurement materials describe licences and support, not cloud hosting, regional data storage, data retention, routing, processing, or a sovereign-cloud service ^{2, 7}.
The Israeli Courts Administration published a notice of intention to contract with Neotech Communication Group Ltd. for Zoom licences valued at NIS 410,000 for a stated 1 January–31 December 2026 term, but the notice itself does not establish that a contract was executed ⁸.
No public evidence identified of Zoom-operated or leased data-centre infrastructure in Israel, participation in Project Nimbus, or Zoom sovereign-cloud or resilience services for Israeli state or military bodies ^{2, 3, 7, 8}.

The Ministry of Justice record states that the 2021 licences supported routine remote-work video meetings for ministry staff, with the limited licence pool serving senior ministry management ².
The reviewed 2021 Justice Ministry procurement does not identify the Ministry of Defence, IDF, intelligence agencies, occupied-territory operations, or military or intelligence use ².
The reviewed official procurement notices concern the Ministry of Justice and Courts Administration and name Neotech as local supplier ^{7, 8}.
No public evidence identified of a contract between Zoom and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, IDF, intelligence agencies, Israel Police, Israel Prison Service, or another named Israeli state-security body ^{2, 7, 8}.
No public evidence identified of Zoom developing, selling, licensing, or maintaining offensive cyber tools, digital weapons, or purpose-built kinetic-targeting systems for Israeli state actors ^{4, 5, 6}.
The 2021 Ministry of Justice procurement was stated to end on 30 June 2022, and the reviewed materials do not establish a renewal of that specific procurement ^{2, 7}.

No public evidence identified that Zoom provided AI or machine-learning, computer-vision, autonomous decision-support, or surveillance-derived training-data services to Israeli military, intelligence, or security bodies ^{4, 5, 6}.
No public evidence identified that Zoom models were trained on Israeli or occupied-territory surveillance data ^{2, 3, 7}.
The UN Special Rapporteur report was checked for Zoom mentions, including in its discussions of Project Nimbus, surveillance, and AI, and no Zoom mention was reported in that document-scoped review ⁶.

No public evidence identified in the reviewed materials of Zoom-operated Israeli research-and-development centres, acquisitions or investments in Israeli technology companies, or patent or co-development arrangements with Israeli research institutions ³.
No public evidence identified of Zoom services supplied in Israeli settlements, the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights through Naotech or another reseller ^{2, 7, 8}.
The reviewed procurement records do not identify the precise hosting environment, data location, technical configuration, end users, or whether the procured service was accessible to Israeli security bodies ^{2, 7, 8}.

Zoom was not listed in the document-scoped full-text checks of the 2023 and 2025 OHCHR settlement-database updates, which does not establish absence from every historical version or related database ^{5, 9}.
Zoom was not named in the supplied full-text check of the UN Special Rapporteur’s 2025 report, a document-scoped finding rather than a broader database-wide conclusion ⁶.
Human Rights Watch’s 2022 global education-technology report cites Zoom sources concerning pandemic-era education use, but the reviewed material does not connect Zoom to Israel, occupied-territory operations, or Israeli state technology provision ¹⁰.
No public evidence identified in the reviewed sources of an Israel/Palestine-specific boycott, divestment, sanctions, export-control, regulatory, court, or parliamentary action directed at Zoom for technology provision ^{2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
A 2025 Georgia Technology Authority contract amendment records Zoom’s certification that it was not engaged in a boycott of Israel as defined by Georgia law; this is a contractual affirmation for a Georgia state contract, not an Israel/Palestine-specific regulatory or accountability action ¹¹.